SPECIAL ASSESSMENT ON VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000100120007-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2003
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: May 24, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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Approvedo
of
es,e,2(~3Jp$/013' ll&Q7$'S02149R000100120007-
At'
10104, 26, May 113
ME TORANDUM FQR:
4 May 19;,67
SVBJZCT Special Assessment'ean Vietnam
~ t. I Ik 4. r~; :~ ;~ ~p ~ k?i .~7
A ; draft Spec Assessment on V1etaam, w~ c1 sas pax?3
41. made the _ of ,owsn9 p infs
~'"
kk.F' es ecially against
. The allies Are. making progress p
larger unite, but formidable obstaclep"are ,in the way o
further progres6,
1 41 29 North Vjet a ki the apacity Ito continue fight a
z w t7 , k + ,. ,a , t
..pp r a long~p time
4 "~ ~ r i r ?t > v gS't- rkr ~yl k r(~~ ~ 6 ,
~'xn xY W' Y $i .ttij ~l S, g, t Fk r N ~:''yak,, & ,38 k k
3 ,War.:.in theSauth.
k,... sti' all imps essa e
USha achietodSta
csult in mer killed and, stores destrQ(ed' and
has seriously Iam .ge'd .the Headquarters and 1ogiti
r? s'
cal structure c4 f, the VC,;especially Corps Areas 2 ,
and 3 Desertions were up to 20,242 in:1966, but
b! These 'r!esults may be misleading. North
Vietnam claims the "US'$as, touched only. a racoh { 1'
of their suppli 9 in Tay Ninh; a large pa `t of th#
.military defectors ? in? 1966 were local force1guer--'
ri llas d "; the VC I deem able to ~ maintain .then streng h ' 1
of the x main force uni is^. x ,a d p,
1The m~r"Nh eat to tk~e ali.es is that
osed by the x ia;ss bly Pave, North Vietnamese .
p.11' "I
r t ca ?utli ~nrl fihP. DItTZ
4 P.abi-ficatiQtt
al~ Pro r o,s .,"appallingly slow"' , eS o
xcsto 'e 0 ,vc~n ~ nt ~ ;Gniaif$ttatxve Control-, ire .,nc
tc,- kinf?i gat alafi' Cu1ti ' ; and
w,U,u X13 'A e a1'ct t'i" ~' "oops are "t 3 1 ti
u :C:.`.x a
Y~ a"S"~ t~~~ITiG'1 ~ T
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 6502149 2Y0;01001.200 '0 71
Tk e :North;
The chief allied objective is; to
war seem unprofitable to ~,orcn vac na1L.
,. Though the effectiveness bf the bombing
cannot bequantiXied, it has.slowed the movement
_ _ i n vin-sca.l.e
OX men and !tt-oops ;,- ha_. --- --- _ .
diversion,cf men (possibly 300,000) and materials
to.repair,gnd construction.
Q .,
"'L'~ econo 'R` has heen "seribusl of ectE'C ," .
but morale See'uia o
the hnmhinLY has st?engthened morale and unified the.
country as; not hixl e1Se
6: outlook; 11 f .'I a_ The allies'probably'-can.keep main force
enemy units on the defensive;
b, Increasing enemy emphasis
n T lnrth Vietnam can expect only "ephemeral"
military s'uccesses,; ,n
,
There i s "no sign 'w ,h4atever" of any North
Vietnamese, i nteres F ;~ n Ga ram ,, ead gut,
Nort ii +.nnm nrnbal lv: calculates the war
V
November 19668 US elections.
;orcx isions
4- f he Sout `, allied action has
major North Vietnamese/VC units. and kept
on the defensive,
b. `c logistics
suffered dome damage;
low allied pro
L -"l- V etnom '.v I '~'}7?;*'}-.L0C aid f has the
and the resources to CJ.'`.] J-auc d a fah c } n ~`
)(FRO
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 Approved F
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The above differs at several points with the previous
January 27) Special Assessment on Vietnam;
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the "very I- xes inflicted on i or-cu vjqvu14" . 4. ,
VC -main ford units, while the current assessment distinguishes
---1,x c4.a r~cttl s (see 3 above).
Thca ec.rlier assessment emphasized
The Nor:h; The-January assessment noted evidence of
hurt also
hardened into an', estimate. Csee 5c abo e.
e sect by, it . In -he current assessmPn
v
a decline .n morfJ.e vv1w~, ..~ .. ..a .---__. would be strentri
;,cod; ;;coned thQ poSsibilit that will and unity wo
Y the latter result has s
pressuice a ainst; hence, it was a u~zna 91 1 ,
r.3 .a..,....,, I,+ rlnr?i de to negotiate.
It :further implied Sovlet pressuvuji-tv
ted that if China seemed
The earlie assessment said it was "reason-
3. Qutlooki; _ v. ~ml~M F 'hoc-Ut?a!n Hanoi's hawks and doves.
mate . ( See taq acove . 1
about tQ coijapsle 9 1VQ.C 4[l v tc v;ac us ,. y~.
t-t,pr of these! Propositions is contained n the. current esti
In other important respects, the two assessments seem to.
reasonably close. 25X.1A9A
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 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP78SO2149R000100120007-0
Approved For Release 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP78SO2149R000100120007-0