THE PROS AND CONS OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000100130006-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: OUTLINE

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The Pros and Cons of the bi
of North Vietnam
I. bettive Effects of Bc nbing
A. Maher Drain
from -700,000
1. The air strikes bave_tied p ~ ,t 600,000 forth
workers dive
programs.
b.
civil defense
C.
.e. The am jor categories are:
.. 200, 000
About full-time and 100,000 jrt-tine
2-2c'1 J)
ed to repair, reconstruction, dispereel and transport
About 150,000 persons involved in part-time
ivities.
About 83,000 military personnel, or 20 percent
of North Vietnam's military strength, are directly engaged in air
defense activities; an additional 2T;,500 personnel are indirectly
involved.
d. An estimated 20,000-25,.000 personnel are directly
involved in full-time coastal defense duties.
2. These diversions of empower have Limited North Viet-
ma's capability for sustained large-scale conventional military
operations against North Vietnam.
3. The diversions of manpower have also contributed sub-
stantially to a shortfall of from 5 to 10 percent in agricultural
production and caused sharp increases in North Vietnam's food import
requirements.
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Yietx ese population has sustained frcm
casualties, of whom about. 12,000 were military
of the civilian ca lties are of a r-related
person iel directly engaged in bomb
activities, truck drivers, and persons participating in military
logistic oents.
B. MXdCal gem 12 Milik9z Mae-to
1. Air attacks have destroyed or inactivated significant
percentages of total national capacity in direct military or mar
supporting target categories. These include
amet Ctte
of Capacity
o
B&-mucks
Ammunition Depots
69
prole Storage
;5
Electric Parer
30-45
Explosives Manufacturing
71,
Phdar Sites
Additional stg%nificant destruction
. bases, A mates, bridges, and c uni t
taken place.
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c Effects
ng the *=aee
of which over/O $W million represents
by air attacks
euppllies.. Eco oLe losses
outpu
not only repair coats of direct physical danW to
equipment; bridges, and electric power plats but also
in 19663 tb
taming from the reduction of agricultural
earnings due to the
expense of pa iv*
rd losses in agricultural production and the
r $30 million. Although t
cal,, rice production was 300 000 tons below
cit will create additional probl as
id 'will .wire more food imports from other C mnunist
forced to cut back
asses attributable to the banbings total over
$15 million, an amount equivalent to about onethird of North Viet-
annual export earnings of bard currencies.
4. the coat of over 20,000 units of transport equipment
destroyed or damaged by air attacks is bet n #35-40 million. North
vietmm has had to increase the number of transport warmers by 50,000
and to cam it one-fourth of its truck inventory in the effort to
_3-
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The major losses of transport equipment are as follows
gat
Tie
Vessels
x+, 451
8o233
Vehicles
2,540
2,377
&ilroad Stock
1,508
1,859
5. The air attacks have inflicted high costs in the min-
taimning of supplies for the Ccamurdat forces in lace and South
Vietnam. North Vietnam has had to increase the number of transport
workers by 50,00 and to commit o e-fourth of its truck inventory
in the effort to maintain distribution and logistic activities at
required levels. It is estimated that at least 3POOO truck drivers
alone have been lost as a result of air attacks. The inability to
move goods in daytime has reduced the operating efficiency of its
truck park by at least 50 percent and has at least doubled if not
tripled; the time required to transport goods. We estimate that
es in transit due to spoilage pilferage and air attack
amounted from 20.40 percent of total traffic volume.
6 The air attacks have forced North Vietz m to undertake
a program to disperse industry which has disrupted normal economic
production and aggravated the me: zi.genent and administration of
economic activity.
7. The
,ption caused by air interdiction of the trans-
and electric power facilities,, plus the dislocation of
required the indefinite postponement of Ho Chi Minh's
plan to build North Vietnam into a modern industrial state. As the
war continuum, the Industrial damage mounts, the time when North
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Vietnam can hope to have a modern industrial sector is pushed
progressively farther into the future. If Hanoi fails to react,
a continuation of the air attacks will deal a most serious blow to
their hopes for econc.tc progress and status, null,
g a decade
intense effort and sacrifice on the part of the people.
t of _DcmbA
Hanoi would regard the abandonment of bombing its territory
as clear-cut major victory. It would believe that, by pro ga,nc
and political pressure, it has forced the United States to take
this action. not `e belief in ultimate victory would be strengthened;
it would be greatly encouraged that the United States would ultimately
tire of the war. Almost certainly, the North Vietnamese would not
interpret a halt to the bombing as an act of U.S. de-eseaiation,
its policy was forcing the United States to retreat.
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t .e war. Rost cert lply, the Nooth Vietname vouid not ~nterpret
Y I t the\ bombiz an act of U\.\6. de-esc t` oa, but a #\,a sign
11 - The Negative Effects of the
~~y
1. Costa of gtaration
The air campaign against North Vietnam is an expensive under
ct operating costs, which do not allot for
e and the aircx ft carriers, or for logistic
support, amounted to about $1.25 ~ billion, broken drawn as follows:
Million U=. S
Aircraft lost
Sortie overhead
truce
Total
1965
Q
305~y.8
98.0
L6. 2
L.6o.o
I3 ffs 'tt . Effects of ` in .st Ald
M.a
605.6
330.4
1,.x+7.5
North Vietnam's apparent willingness to withstand the effects
of continued air attack is explained in. large measure by the
assistance rendered by other Counist countries. Total economic
and military aid deliveries In 1.906 amounted to at least $505 million
or almost four times the coat of measurable doge resulting from
the air attack. The Cc nunist countries have provided increasing
amounts of technical assistance in the repair of bomb damaged f'acili-
ties and there is a tacit implication t h a t they h a v e committed them-
selves to underwrite the eventual reconstruction of North Vietnam I s
industrial base.
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lz cezzt Clviijzn Casualties
Vine the air attacks on North Viet have been directed
ei at military and war supporting targets, it is true that there
unfortunate civilian casualties. Careful
planning by U.S. force ccxu artders has held this total & wn to
ffre. Nevertheless, iii, its Ccmunist sympathizers around the
old, and many veU ning people in other countries have bad a
propaganda field day with the handful of authentic care of innocent
civilian casualties. This baa hurt the image of the United States..
h. yer Ord tr, * A
While there is considerable support for the U-8. be i ng
of North Vietnam, there is strong opposition to thew air attacks in
certain neutral countries. This opposition se is to stem frcu fir
tit the var may bee a vorld-Vide conflict, or that the T.S. is
guilty of "fission" against a ricer Asiatic state. Specific
nations in opposition include India, France,. and :S ortant segmente
of public opinion in the United Ringd, Canada, and Jan.
5. AAir a "Failure"
Flnal4, the air cmqxitm is frequently critized because
it basnt stopped the infiltration of men and supplies into South
'yietne. But as Secretary Mara has made clear, never believed
that it would. Air attack against militaary targets in
tcl to make Hanoi ;r a high price for continuing its infiltration
and we believe it has done this.
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