THE EFFECTS OF THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM ON THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES OF NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000100140002-3
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• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2004
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• Content Type: REPORT

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THE EFFECTS OF THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM ON THE
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES OF
NORTH VIETNAM
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 Approved For Releas
The Effects of the Rolling Thunder Program on the Manufacturing Inds ri
of North Vietnam
SUMMARY
The manufacturing industries of North Vietnam have suffered relatively
little damage from air strikes in 1966. Although attacks against the coal
treatment plant at Cam Pha and the Viet Tri Paper Mill have had an important
impact on coal exports and the production of paper, the remainder of the
manufacturing sector has emerged unscathed. Moreover, there is no evidence that
the Rolling Thunder Program has forced large-scale industry to either disperse
facilities or curtail production. In fact, the manufacturing capability of
North Vietnam has been augmented by a stepped up rate of imports of machinery
and equipment from the Communist countries. There is no evidence, however,
that the manufacturing section of North Vietnam has converted to the
production of military hardware.
Imports of machinery and equipment have played an especially important
role in the support of the transportation system of North Vietnam,and in the
improvement of the military communications capability. Along with transportation
equipment itself, the Communist countries have increased deliveries of spare
parts, machinery for the repair and maintenance of transportation equipment,
and construction equipment for the reconstruction and repair of line of
communication. Such imports have supplemented an already existing capability
in the North Vietnamese machine building industry for the production of spare
parts and simple machinery. The sharp increase in the import of telecommuni-
cations equipment almost certainly reflects an effort to upgrade military
communications.
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The increased program of aid associated with the military effort, however,
has not been at the expense of economic aid in general.' The number of Communist
aid projects has actually increased significantly, and although some of these
projects such as machine building shops clearly have a potential military role,
others -- chemical, mining, glass, and food products -- are just as
clearly non-military in nature.
Attacks against selected machine building plants in North Vietnam -- the Hanoi
Engineering Plant for example -- would delay recovery from the damage inflicted
by the Rolling Thunder program. Destruction of North Vietnam's few major
manufacturing facilities outside of the machine building sector would be of little
value, other than from the standpoint of reducing enemy morale, in the reduction
of the North Vietnamese military capability. Even the destruction of the large
machine building plants would not be cruciallinasmuch as much of the repair
capacity is already dispersed. Furthermore, the apparent scope of recent aid
agreements suggests that the Communist countries will continue to provide
North Vietnam with both replacements for essential damaged equipment and
equipment enabling North Vietnam to continue its own repair and maintenance.
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I. Current Activity in North Vietnamese Manufacturing Facilities
A. Photo rg aphic Evidence
A detailed study of representative major modern industrial installations
in North Vietnam shows no appreciable change in the level of production activity
at these installations during the period of Rolling Thunder. In only one plant,
the Hanoi Vehicle Repair and Assembly Plant was it possible to discern a
significant decrease in productive activity in recent months and this apparent
reduction could reflect the dispersal of part of the plant'S facilities to other
areas. Photography gave no firm evidence of the dismantling and moving away of
significant amounts of production equipment from large plants. Not even the
Nam Dinh Textile Mill,which has repeatedly been reported to have been dismantled,
showed signs of such dismantlement. On the other hand no new construction was
evident in the photography of the plants studied. A summary of the photographic
analysis is given below in Table 1.
B. Dispersal of Industry
Despite the heavy emphasis given in the North Vietnamese press to the
claim that industry has been dispersed, it is extremely doubtful that any
serious attempt has been made to dismantle major industrial plants and set up
the equipment again in scattered areas. Technical constraints would probably
prohibit any effective dispersal of such facilities as the fertilizer or rubber
plants. Such plants cannot be economically subdivided and even a plant with
homogeneous equipment such as in a spinning mill cannot be subdivided without the
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installation of necessary ancillary equipment at each of the new locations.
Furthermore, it is even likely that many of the large number of small machine
shops and repair installations already scattered throughout North Vietnam are
being consolidated and strengthened by additional equipment. The Hanoi Machine
Tool Plant, the prime candidate for dispersal in the machine building industry,
reportedly has expanded its facilities in 1966 and has opened a shop in another
location as well.
That production is in fact to continue at the larger plants is further
suggested by the provisions made for the protection of workers and equipment.
Most large industrial facilities have many foxholes nearby and trenches
radiating from the plant area for the protection of personnel. Extensive
shelter systems of this type are evident in photography of the Hanoi Chemical
Fertilizer Plant, Hanoi Vehicle Repair and Assembly Plant, the Nam Dinh Textile
Plant, the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Combine, and the Phosphate Fertilizer
and Cement Plants in Haiphong. A number of factories have reportedly resettled
their employees and families in housing away from the plant. Sandbags or
brick walls have been installed in the main interior of some plants to minimize
damage of equipment in case of a direct hit.
Most of the dispersal that has occurred in industry is believed to
consist of the resettlement of light and handicraft-type industry. The
relocation of this type of industry would serve both-to meet the demands of
evacuees for goods, services and employment opportunities sand to provide for
protection of such production.
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In addition to the resettlement of small, light 'and handicraft shops
away from urban areas and the aforementioned consolidation of many of the smallest
machine and repair shops the Vietnamese are probably also building small new
industrial shops away from urban areas as a means of developing a degree of
regional self-sufficiency. A network of small machine building shops, for
example, is being established based in part on the indigenous manufacture of
simple production machinery, and in part on the import of simple production
machinery. Such small shops are probably being installed in existing buildings
in many instances.
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II. Capability of North Vietnamese Manufacturing Industries to Support the War
A. Introduction
The only manufacturing industry in North Vietnam which is capable of
providing significant assistance to the military effort is machine building.
The chemical industry manufactures only small quantities of tires, pharmaceuticals,
and some chemicals used in the production of munitions. The explosives industry
itself provides only a fraction of the country's current military needs. The
Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Plant currently is producing only pig iron, most of
which is going for export. The rest of the small manufacturing sector is
devoted to production for the consumer and, except for the manufacture of
military clothing and rations, has little military potential.
B. Machine Building
Before 196C North Vietnam had a very limited capability to produce
modern or even semi-modern machinery. Most of its machine building output
consisted of crude agricultural implements, simple water pumps, and spare parts
for repair. Production then was typical of the machinery output of any under-
developed country -- simple in design, of low capacity, and of poor quality.
The product-mix of North Vietnam began to show an increase in complexity in
the early 196C's. By 1963 North Vietnam was claiming production of replacement
parts for "intricate" machinery, belt conveyors, and air compressors. By 196/+
the Hanoi engineering plant, a Soviet aid project, was producing modern lathes,
and other plants were producing DC motors and more complex pumps for the mining
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industry. References were also made in the press to precision-mold castings,
120-ton "pieces of machinery", and high pressure hose, all examples of an
improving technology. In 1965 the DRV claimed to have completed its second
locomotive, a rail motor car and "hundreds of tons of spare parts for tractors,
diesel motors and mechanical pumps." Table 2 shows the progress of the
North Vietnamese machine building industry as reflected in press reports.
Perhaps the most important facet of North Vietnam's machine building
industry, with respect to support of the war, has been its experience in the
of
maintainancr/the transportation system. This experience, together with
extensive support from its Communist allies (see below) has enabled North
Vietnam to provide extensive maintenance for a hard pressed fleet of vehicles.
The experience of the small motor vehicles installation in Nam Ha Province
probably is at least partly representative of that at other such facilities.
This shop was dispersed out of the city and 40 percent of the repair workers
were reassigned to serve truck convoys. The workers have resorted to various
means of improvisation, including cannibalization, to service the convoys.
At the same time, the cadres and skilled workers reportedly trained over 100
students as lathe operators, fitters, etc.
Claims that machine building plants have converted to production for
agriculture are difficult to believe. There has always been a relatively
heavy emphasis on the production of farm implements -- in 1964 such equipment
accounted for 40 percent of machine building output. Today during a period
when its stock of railroad rolling equipment, trucks, power grid, and POL
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storage facilities is under strong air attack it is almost inconceivable that
the machine building facilities of North Vietnam would be converting to farm
machinery production or even that business as usual is being carried on.
It would seem equally unlikely, however, that machine building has
converted any significant capacity to the production of military hardware.
small quantities of carbines, grenades,
bangalore torpedoes and other simple hardware have been produced in North
Vietnam. However, the ease of importing weapons-should discourage any
serious desire on the part of the regime to produce modern weapons in
sizeable quantities.
The production of spares and the general maintenance of lot,-(,motives,
trucks, construction equipment, and industry in general is the present priority
task of North Vietnam's machine building industry. Its total machine building
capability is still rudimentary but many of today's priority tasks resulting
from Rolling Thunder are similar to many of the tasks performed by machine
building, under less pressing circumstances, during the past six or more years.
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Table 2
Reported Machinery Production in North Vietnam, 1957-1966
1964
1966
Brick
resses
Cement mixers Belt conveyors
T-620, T-630,
1K62
Hun
dreds of tons of
Electric generators,
p
Farm implements
Farm implements Farm implements
(Soviet-type
lathe
s sp
are parts for
15 KW
Mechanical pumps
uipment for: Began production
E
of
Milling machin
es
tr
actors, diesel
Electric motors
Ventilators
q
jacks
Brick factories springs
DC motors for
troll
ey mo
tors, mechanical
Switchboards
Motor launches
,
,
Rice mills measuring device
s
cars
pu
mos
Diesel engines
Locomotive repair
and river boats replacement par
Tu
,
ts cr
Pumps for agri
cultu
re Tra
nsformers for pump-
Auto accessories
Truck and engine
g
Railroad cars intricate machi
nery
and mining
in
g stations
T613 lathes,
repairs
Internal combustion Development of e
engines hammer
Air compressors Transformers
Transformers
Diesel engines
Welding machines
lectric
"120-ton piece
machinery"
Filter presses
Valves
Fans
Crushing machi
High pressure
Precision-mold
of
nes
hose
cast
Wat
me
Rai
DRV
lo
ings
er pipe, 62,000
ters
l motor car
's second
comotive
M12C universal milling
machines
Circuit breakers
Water pumps
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 Approved F
The Ha Bac Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant , situated 2 NM north of Bac
Giang (Phu Lang Thuong) , is a major Chicom aid project adOga
a potentiatel producer of components for military explosives.
t4irst stage of construction may be completed and the plant may
be capable of-producing 100,000 tons per year of ammonium nitrate--
an intermediate for TNT and other military explosives.
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III. Communist Aid to North Vietnam in Machinery and Equipment
A. Introduction
Communist aid to North Vietnam in machinery and equipment has been
vital to the support of the war effort. Along with transport equipment, the
Communist countries have provided substantial quantities of equipment for
construction, communication, and maintenance -- all of which are valuable
to the military effort and to the maintenance of the civilian economy.
Furthermore, increased quantities of machinery and equipment have apparently
been made available for both new and continuing aid projects which are not
military-associated. Table 3 describes the trend in 1959-65 in North
Vietnamese imports of machinery and equipment from the USSR.
B. Deliveries from the USSR
DRV imports of machinery from the USSR increased from $25.1 million
in 1964 to $47.6 million in 1965. Imports in 1965 were 32 percent higher than
the previous peak of Soviet imports which occurred in 1963. Although total
machinery imports from the USSR by the DRV are still small when compared to
machinery imports of an industrial nation, DRV imports are impressive in view
of the small industrial base of North Vietnam. The value of Soviet machinery imported
by North Vietnam in 1965 was 64 percent greater than that of North Korea although the
latter country has many times the industrial capacity of North Vietnam.
An analysis of Soviet exports of machinery to the DRV in 1965 shows that
a large share of the imports can be related to a war-supporting role. As
shown in Table 3, spare parts for motor vehicles, trucks, power equipment,
and excavators and road building equipment comprised an important share of
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Table 3
North Vietnam Imports of Machinery from the USSR, 1959-65
Mill
ions of
USA
352
1960
2
362
1963
166
1965
imports
19.9
24.4
41.3
54.7
56.7
47.
7
74.9
Imports of machinery
5.9
11.9
19.6
31.4
34.C
48.0
Imports as percent of total
29.4
48.5
47.2
57.5
60.1
64.1
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imports of machinery into the DRV other than "complete enterprises". Truck
cranes, winches, and hoisting equipment, were also imported in significant
quantities. Exclusive of complete enterprises, more than one-third of North
Vietnam's imports from the USSR in 1965 can be related to the maintenance,
repair and expansion of the transportation and power sectors of the economy, the
two sectors of the economy under heavy attack by Rolling Thunder. Moreover,
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some small "complete enterprises" -- by far the most important
category of North Vietnamese imports -- consist of repair shops, and manufacturing
facilities that probably also have war-supporting capabilities, such as vehicle
repair.
At the same time, however, there were substantial increases in the
import of other commodities not directly related to the support of transportation
and power. The import of mining equipment in 1965 increased by 428 percent
compared to 1964, pumps and compressors by 923 percent, and oil well drilling
equipment by 337 percent. Furthermore, much of the machinery being imported
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under the category "complete enterprises", is
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going to major Soviet aid projects in mining, electric power, and
civilian manufacturing.
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markedly in 1965 and
imports of machinery by North Vietnam increased
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imports have increased even more in 1966. 25X1
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As shown in Table 4_, a large share of the increase in North Vietnam
imports of machinery can be related to maintaining and improving the transportation
sector of the DRV. The great increase in the import of trucks from numerous
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imports of equipment well suited for repairing all kinds of transport equipment 25X1
railroads and port facilities. Import trends
construction equipment and other industrial equipment,
in Table 5 The significance of imports, by commodity, is discussed below.
1. Machine Tools
In 1965 and 1966 substantial quantities of machine tools were
imported by North Vietnam. The largest share of these imports can be identified
as machine tools appropriate for the repair of all kinds of motor vehicles, 25X1
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Some large, heavy duty machine tools are also being imported.
been identified. This equipment would be appropriate only for a relatively large
installation, possibly the Hanoi Railroad Equipment Plant or the Haiphong
Railroad Equipment Plant.
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appropriate for only an established industrial plant and would be most useful
in the production of some spares. Other machine tools, centerless grinders and
a few automatics, are appropriate only for a well established plant such as the
suggesting
Hanoi Engineering Plant, hence/ sizeable production runs of at least spare
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for military hardware production. However, the overall volume and mix of the
machines being imported is much more suggestive of spare parts production and
repair in small dispersed shops, including quartermaster repair shops.
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2. Telecommunications
In the pre-Rolling Thunder period the level of telecommunications
imports into North Vietnam was relatively modest. Imports were intended for
the maintenance and improvement of existing facilities. In 1965 an increasing
emphasis on military equipment became apparent. However, the import of 15,000
convential radio broadcasting receivers indicated some consumer needs were
still being met. In 1966, however, both the level and mix of telecommunications
imports by North Vietnam changed radically. The quantity of telecommunications
for which North Vietnam either has attempted to contract, or in fact received,
is without precedent. To a predominant degree telecommunications sought in 1966
are well suited for military purposes. Additionally, large quantities of copper
with a telecommunications capability have been imported. Most of this
equipment very likely is or will be used to assist the restoration and extension
of logistical and transportation facilities and for outright military use.
3. Power Equipment
Over 400 mobile generators are estimated to have been imported in 1965,
with a total capacity of about 12,000 kw. Imports came from the USSR, Hungary,
Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Imports in 1966 of mobile generators have
continued at the same high rate as in 1965. Relatively few transformers have
been imported and there has been no increase in transformer imports in 1966. Many
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Imports of aluminum alloy cable increased dramatically between 1964
and 1966. In 1966 about 450 tons has been imported from the USSR and Eastern
Europe. About 3,250 tons has ben imported from Free World countries. Most of
this cable is not appropriate for cross country power transmission. It is
suitable for low voltage lines, 1 kv to 10 lkv.
4. Tractors
No Soviet tractors were imported in 1964 compared to
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upwards of 100 tractors were imported
in 1965. Although many of them were agricultural tractors there is some evidence
that they were used for non-agricultural uses.
Imports in 1966 have continued at about same level as 1965. Several
dozen large tracklaying tractors suitable for construction or logging work were
imported. At least 150 agricultural tractors equipped with 4-wheel drive
0
transport work particularly where roads are bad.
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Table 5
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1965 -- In 1965 the level of telecommunications imports increased over
1964 but was not unusually high. However, an increasing
emphasis on military equipment became apparent -- manifest
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1966 -- In 1966 both the level and mix of telecommunications imports
by North Vietnam has changed radically. The quantity of
telecommunications for which North Vietnam either has
attempted to contract, or in fact has received, is without
precedent. To a predominant degree, such telecommunications
as has been sought thus far this year is well-suited for
military purposes. Of most importance, are 30,000 kilometers
of military field wire (valued at approximately $1 million),
and ten, 10-kilowatt transmitters, and one hundred, 15-watt
transceivers (valued collectively at $275,000). Additionally,
large quantities of copper oable with a presumed
telecommunications capability have been imported. Most of
this equipment very likely is or will be used to assist the
restoration/extension of logistical and transportation
facilities and for outright military use.
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D. Aid Pro.lects to North Vietnam
Analysis of
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Communist aid projects indicates that
rather than tapering off since the inception of US air attacks the number of
such projects has increased substantially during 1964-66.;` This is shown in
the following tabulation which summarizes the number of Soviet and European
Satellite projects identified as having been in progress during the period:
1964
1965
1965-663
1966
USSR
23
26
38
49
Eastern European Countries
9
10
--
11
* Observed at some time during Jan 1965 - Feb 1966.
The nature of many projects is unknown. Many of these are the
responsibility of Tekhnoeksport and can consist of geological surveys,
airfields, sports and educational facilities as well as projects in the light
industrial, building and pharmaceutical industries. Some of the unidentified
projects observed in 1965 and 1966, however, could be war-supporting installations
nastily ordered and shipped to North Vietnam to engage in repair or war-support
production. Rumania has agreed to supply five regional machine shops which will
be capable of repairing trucks and other machinery -- East Germany has apparently
consented to supplying an automotive repair shop. Numerous projects from 1964
onwards have been concerned with generating and transmitting electric power.
On the other hand there are numerous aid projects continuing into 1966 which
are expanding mining and industry in general. For example, the Vang Danh coal mine,
the Cam Pha coil washing plant and a sulfuric acid shop have been receiving
equipment from the Communist countries, with relative consistency through the period.
Among the light industries, food processing and cold storage installations have
been progressing fairly steadily. Moreover, during October, Hanoi sent
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representatives to Poland and Communist China to examine methods and techniques
for installing rolled steel capacity and making other improvements in iron and
the regime still intends to complete;
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the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Plant --- North Vietnam's only iron and steel complex.
There has been evidence of a slowdown in only one major industrial project.
This curtailment may have been the result
of a reallocation of scarce manpower resources needed elsewhere.
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