THE COMMUNIST LOGISTICS SYSTEM IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000100270013-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 12, 1999
• Sequence Number: 13
• Content Type: REPORT

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Appendix A
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The Communist Logistics System in South Vietnam
Organization
The Central Office South Vietnam (COSTJN) continues to
function as the principal organization responsible for internal VC
logistics operations in South Vietnam. Within the CO9ITN structure
the three organizations responsible for logistics are; the Finance
and Economic Section, the Forward Supply Council, and the Rear
Services Section. In theory the Finance and Economic Section procures
necessary money and supplies through its taxation and other fund raising
functions whereas the Forward Supply Council is responsible for keeping
military units supplied with foodstuffs and manpower, with the Rear
Services Section providing a logistical and medical planning and
support function. In practice the three organizations have interrelated
functions in the VC logistical system;.. These organizations exist at all
levels from COSVIN to district and in some cases to village level.
Supply Councils are particularly important, exercising control and
supervision over communications and liaison sections* as well as the work
of the two basic transportation organizations---Finance and Economic
Section transport elements and military Rear Service Section
transport elements.
(including guides, security personnel, and station attendants)
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A. Personnel
Enemy forces in South Vietnam in December 1966 amounted
to 265,000-285,000, including between 18,000-19,000 combat support
personnel. The composition of the VC combat support force is shown
in the following tabulation.
Headquarters, Staff and Technical Personnel (Combat Support)
COS'VN Headquarters
4, 000
Region Headquarters
3,000
Province Headquarters
800
Sappers (Combat Engineers)
700
Intelligence/Reconnaissance
700
Guard
x+00
Production
3,000
Transportation Corridor -
0
Operations & Communications/
Liaison
6,000
Total 18,600
II. Capabilities of the Communist Logistical Supply System
A. Personnel
As of 1 October, 1966 the VC had general control over 19%
of the population, about 2,900,000 people. In the aggregate the VC
do not lack logistical support personnel. A VC force of 300,000 would
not be expected to encounter widespread labor shortages when they have
a population of 2.9 million at their disposal from which to recruit
laborers.
Represents MACV's OB. ACSI adds over 26,000 other support
soldiers, including boat crews, transport units, and communications
personnel. These personnel are not included in MACV's OB.
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In addition to the population under their control, the VC are also
capable of drawing manpower from areas undergoing clearing operations,
areas which in October of this year contained 2.9 million people or
roughly 19% of the population as well as drawing from areas undergoing
security, areas which in early October of this year contained 800,000
people or 5% of the population. Labordrs remain the primary work
force for VC logistical operations. Because most of the motorized
means of transport are unavailable to or cannot be used by.the VC,
civilian laborers are a major asset to the VC transportation system,
particularly in the Central Highlands.
B. Transportation
The VC in South Vietnam maintain a large number and
variety of lines of communication in South Vietnam. The VC continue to
use trucks in some of their logistic support activities in VC controlled
areas and where feasible sampans and shallow draft boats are employed.
Other forms of transport which are being utilized in significant
amounts are trains of oxcarts, elephants, and three-wheeled lambrettas.
In the delta the VC depend on water as their basic means of transportation.
Watercraft presently employed by the Communists in the delta vary
from small three-man sampans with a draft of a few inches to large
types with a draft of several feet. The exact number of boats available
to the enemy is not known, but COMUSMAC-V estimates that the enemy
has enough watercraft not only to maintain the present level of combat
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in the delta, but sufficient numbers to increase the level of operations.
The VC continue to have reasonable success in countering
interdiction in the Del by moving at night or covertly by day, making
maximum use of camouflage, maintaining advance and rear units to warn
of approaching aircraft, as well as sinking boats for later
recovery when detection seems imminent.
C.Storage and Distribution
The VC continue to operate an area supply system which
incorporates a large number of small depots, each generally having a
capacity of five-ten tons--- dispersed throughout areas in which VC
units operate. This system has the advantage of limiting the damage
that can be caused by the destruction of one large depot or supply cache.
Even in the larger war zones supplies are frequently disperse.doover
a wide area. In addition, war zones provide the advantage of
generally being situated in areas which are sparsely populated and/or
populated by ethnic or religious minorities hostile to the South
Vietnamese governments.
III. Vulnerabilities of the Communist Logistics Supply System
A. 1. Material Losses
~/ Quantities of enemy war material that have been
destroyed, damaged, or captured have probably effected some serious
supply shortages when the VC logistical structure, however, the full
impact of these losses cannot be accurately measured since we are
lacking hard information on available VC stockpiles. Enemy material
losses inflected by US and allied forces during recent months as
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compiled from available data for selected categories of supplies
are shown below. Complete data on communist material losses are
unavailable at the present time. The data appearing in the following
tables represent losses from significant Allied operations and does
not represent total losses.
Grenades (Captured)
8,500
Large Cal Ammo (Rounds Captured)
15,000
Small Arms Ammo (Rounds Captured)
390,000
Mines Captured)
2,300
Food (tons destroyed)
6,000
(tons captured)
2,900
Medical supplies (tons destroyed)
2
POL
gallons destroyed)
3,300
gallons damaged)
80,000
allons captured)
4,200
Cloth
yards destroyed)
62,500
yards captured)
36, 000
Table I
Enemy Material Losses 12 May - 31 July 1966
enades (captured)
G
00
35
r
Large Cal Ammo (rounds captured)
00
6,5
Small Arms Ammo (rounds captured)
715, 000
Mines (captured)
5,100
Food
Incomplete
data
Medical Supplies
Incomplete
data
POL
Incomplete
data
Cloth
Incomplete
data
Table II
Enemy Material Losses 31 July - 19 November 1966
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Table III
Weapons Loss Summary
3rd qtr-1966 oct.-1966 Nov.-1966 Total
VC Crew Served 4o4 172 100 676
Individual 3,982 1805 858 6,645
Table IV
Market Time Operations
Cargo Seized Mar-Nov 1966
Ammunition 4,600 rounds
War material 9D tons
Table V
Naval Naval Gunfire Support Operations and Results
(April - October 1966)
I Corps II Corps III Corps IV Corps Total
Structures
destroyed 8,990 2,865 147 547 12,549
damaged 12,243 3,351 105 1P478 17,177
Table VI
Game Warden - Naval Surveillance Activities
(July - October 1966)
Structures
damaged
56
destroyed
147
Suspect Vessels
damaged
38
destroyed
124
captured
15
* includes those seized in Market Time Operations
includes ammunition, 1100 rifles and machine guns, and 27 artillery
pieces.
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2. B-52 Strikes
B-52 bombings cottinue to adversely affect the VC
economy. The destruction of structures and other vital supplies are re-
sulting in some disruption of the VC logistics and communications
system. These strikes have also facilitated ground operations into
VC redoubts. In addition, it appears that the bombings have forced
the enemy to make recent changes in tactics and plans. A captured
VC directive stressed the need for increased personnel security, more
effective camouflage, dispersion of bivoac areas, and an increase in
guard and patrol activities. Troops are now being stationed along the
periphery of base areas rather than entirely within them, thus
forcing the enemy to delay or abandon planned attacks. Exact estimates
of damage inflicted are presently impossible because of limitations
of imagery interpretation and the limited number of ground f1lilow-up
operations.
B. Potential labor Shortages
In the future the VC may experience an increase in the squeeze
on manpower in view of the flow of refugees out of VC territory, heavy
casualties, the VC, draft, and the gradual increase in the number of
hamlets pacified by the government.
C. Problems of Food Distribution
VC/NW forces in South Vietnam have daily logistical
requirement'v for Class I (Food), Class II (Weapons), Class III (POL),
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Class IV (quartermaster, engineer, and medical), and Class V
(ammunition). Of these five classes the most pressing problem
for the VC at this time appears to be related to the distribution
of food rations.
Communist forces in South Vietnam obtain most of their food
supplies within the country. Although these forces control
sufficient rice production to satisfy all VC/NVA food requirements,
substantial quantities of rice are apparently being transported
from Cambodia to every controlled rice deficit areas in South
Vietnam, mainly because of the problems associated with internal
transport and distribution of large amounts of bulk supplies.
The principal rice-deficit areas with large troop concentrations
include the provinces of Fi;ontum, Pleiku, Darlac, Phg Bon, and
Quang Duc, all in the II Corps area, and Phu(Pve Long, Binh Long,
and the ;.orthern part of Tay Ninh in the III Corps. If VC and NVA
troops in these areas were made completely dependent on Cambodian
sources for food, Cambodia would be providing about 20% of the total
daily food requirement for all Communist main force units in South
Vietnam--between 25 and 30 tons of rice per day, or about 10,000
tons annually.
There have been a number of recent reports citing food
shortages among enemy forces, particularly those located in the
Central Highlands. Once of these reports described an October 1966
meeting of the Economic Affairs Committee in Quang Ngai province
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between I and IV Corps. The IV Corps area with only 15% of the total
VC/NVA regular forces is the area in which the VC have the greatest
self-sufficiency in logistic supplies, particularly foodstuffs. A
large share (20%) of the confirmed enemy combat force in South
Vietnam is concentrated in food deficit areas. The II and III Corps
areas which are the predominant rice deficit areas, account for almost
2/3 of the total daily logistic requirement (all classes) for VC/NVA
regular forces in South Vietnam. At the present time the total
daily logistic requirement for VC/NVA regular forces in South Vietnam
is estimated to be on the order of 160 tons per day.
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