COMMENTS ON ONE STAFF MEMORANDUM 11-66, PROBABLE REACTIONS TO A POSTULATED PROGRAM FOR BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000100280007-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 1999
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: MEMO

Apprbved F,Dr Release 1999/09/10: CIA=R-n "cIO-149R000100280007-3
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
~ YY- .:J a C G v~- vs : yr
SUBJECT . Comments on ONE Staff Memorandum 11-66, Probable
Reactions to a Postulated Program for'`Bombing North
Vietnam
General Comment
A. The ONE draft of subject memorandum (copy attached) is to be
reviewed by the Board at 121-00 today. The draft generally focuses on
the major questions raised by the Secretary of Defense when he requested
the report. We believe, however, that he would prefer a more detailed
exposition of the sequence of events and alternative courses of action
being considered by the drafters. Moreover, the draft would be stronger
if the estimaters presented a more specific accounting of the precise
reasons they hold certain estimates, rather than presenting them without
elaboration.
Specific Comments
Para. 1. The language is unclear as to why the postulated program
would be a "dangerous step" and by whom specifically it would be regarded
as such. World reaction to the program will depend on many factors
among which are (a) statements by US policy-makers defining the purposes
and the limitations of the program; and (b) the manner in which the
air attacks are carried out.
The combination of these two factors should make it clear
that the program is militarily justifiable and is patently not a program
designed or leading to a campaign to devastate North Vietnam or its
people.
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Para. 2. The casualties resulting from the program will patently
be in excess of the pre-.strike JCS estimates. The likelihood of their
reaching "opinion-shocking" levels is remote principally because of the
DRV programs of evacuation and shelter; and the methods of executing
the attack. Moreover, those injured by the attacks will for the most
part be principally workers engaged zEairly directly in war supporting
activities -- e.g., transport and government services.
The ideas of Paragraph 2 are expressed much better in
Paragraph 18. We would propose incorporating some of the last sentence
in Paragraph 18 into Paragraph 2.
Para . line 7 -- delete "especiallyo" There is, in view of
known patterns of Soviet and Chinese aid, no reason to ascribe any
particular importance to the Chinese participation.
Para. 4 and 5. Paragraph 4 sets up a couple of strawmen. The
sending of large numbers of PAVN forces for a "quick defeat" ? of Allied
forces is really impractical. The DRV knows and says it is in for
a long war. Para. 5 states the practical consideration much better.
We suggest a deletion of Para. L.
Para. This paragraph needs to be redrafted to express the
thought that Peking must face up to several hard decisions. It must
not only make a hard judgment in whether to provide air defense of North
Vietnam. It must assess its practical capabilities to do this effectively
in view of its inferior aircraft and the limits of conventional AAA.
Peking must also decide how willing and at what rate it is to bear sus-
tained aircraft losses.
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Para. 10. This paragraph needs to elaborate the scenario to show the
method of escalation.
US destroys high-priority targets
DRV commits its aircraft
US attacks DRV aircraft
China provides more aircraft
US attacks DRV airfields
The paragraph must then estimate if the Chinese will commit more
aircraft. They would be reluctant to do this if the loss-rate were
high in view of the odds in taking on advanced US aircraft.
Paragraph 11. This paragraph should examine the question of how.
many Chinese the DRV are willing to allow. Moreover, in view of the
interdiction campaign the paragraph should not state Peking would
increase J" shipment of military material. Last sentence should read:
Peking probably will increase its efforts to maintain the flow of essen-
tial military and logistic materials to North Vietnam although movement
of these goods would become increasingly difficult and costly.
Para. 1 . This paragraph glosses over the probability of Chinese
allowing use of their airfields, and the sequence should be spelled out.
On the basis of US reactions in the Korean War and our
stated limited objectives in this war the Chinese could feel safe in
using their airfields. This would depend also on the losses they could
expect and be willing to sustain. If the US then attacked the Chinese
airfields then the Chinese would have to make a decision to back off or
to continue. If they continued at this point, then the last sentence
would be correct.
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Para. 14. Penultimate sentence: delete "by almost imperceptible
Paragraph should spell out Peking's and Hanoi reasons.
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Para, 16 - spell out reasons for Soviet reluctance to continue
support.
Para. 17 - Delete Soviet attempt to break the port closure for
contradicts statement in paragraph 16 that mines
can't be neutralized.
Spell out the nature of the "offensive weapons."
Para. 18 - Change language to indicate that protests of
maritime powers would not be sufficient to impair
their relations with the U.S.
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