ONE MEMORANDUM , ' COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN U.S. COURSE OF ACTION , ' 6 FEBRUARY 1967

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000100290002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 19, 1999
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 7, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized - Approved Fqt Release ::QIAr=RDP78SO2149R000100290002-7
(SENSITIVE
7 FEB 1967
mmumUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
CT ONE Memorandum, "Commmisat Reactions to Certain
U.B. Couvees of Action," 6 February 196fi
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R B'ES'CE TB (SensitivvNo. 185997
The Board of National Estimates yesterday completed its
bbing programs would lead to war with the USSR or China.
3. We believe that the memorandum does not fully spell out the
severity of the supply problems which would face Hanoi -- particularly
after the mining program and the attack on the dikes. Similarly, the
ars du z tends to understate the extent to which Hanoi's persistence
in the war would necessitate hard and painful decisions about its in-
volvement. The Board felt that these points did not require extensive
restatement, since the memorandum is., in effect, a companion piece to
Namara IV, which presented them in considerable detail.
l+. bake, we feel that although the memorandum has the
shortc s mentioned above, they are insufficient to warrant i3DWI
non-concurrence.
negotiate. Finally, the memorandums estimates that none of the
It to persuade Hanoi to negotiate, but would not try to force it
consideration of the memorandum cited above. The CIfl representative
Wei The iorandum was prepared to estimate Communist
reactions to the alternative bombing programs discussed in McNamara IV
(The Rolling Thunder Program -- Present and Potential Target Systems).
2. The ONE memo andum essentially finds that none of the be nbing
programs would force Hanoi to negotiate. It points out, however, that
externl factors such as the Situ-Soviet dispute, the chaos in China,
and problems In maintaining the flow of external assistance could
ss 'f`eot Hanoi's attitudes. It also estimates that the USSR might
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