(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000100310004-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 20, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301'
20 May 1967
OSD DECLASSIFICATION/RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS ON FILE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF-
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
THE SECRETARY 'OF THE AIR FORCE
Considerable controversy surrounds our current program of bombing
North, Vietnam. Several alternatives have been suggested. The two most
promising appear to be:
I. Concentrate the bombing of North Vietnam on the lines of cor+u,nii-
cation in the Panhandle Area (Route Sectors I, II, and III) and terminate.
bombing in the remainder of North Vietnam unless there occurs reconstruc-
tion of important fixed targets which have been destroyed by prior raids
or unless'new military activities appear.
II. Terminate the bombing of fixed targets not directly associated
with LOCs in Route Sectors VIa and VIb and simultaneously expand the armed
reconnaissance operations in those Sectors by authorizing strikes on all
LOCs, excepting only those in an eight-mile circle around the center of
Hanoi and an eight-mile circle around the center of Haiphong. This pror;ram
would undoubtedly require continuous strikes against MIG aircraft on all
airfields. Further, the program should be examined under two alternative
assumptions in one of which strikes against ports and. port.facil.itics are
precluded and in the other of which every effort is made t6 deny importation
from the sea. (This latter.program is essentially that recommended in
JCSM-286-67 dated May 20.)
As a basis for determining the future course of the bombing in the
North, I should like to ask each of you to analyze the two alternatives
outlined above and any others you consider worth discussing. Such analyses
should examine the extent to which the proposed bombing pattern will reduce
and aircraft, and affect.._tho-._risk of increased- militaxrr or political pressur
rom lie Soviet Union and/or Red China.
I believe it would be wise for each of the four addressees to carry
out their'studies independently of each other. I hope it will be possible
for you to complete your reports by-June 1.
Robert S. McNamara
Approved' or'Release 2001/08/31 CIA-RDP78'S ' `7g - 81`"80310004-2