ANALYSIS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE PROPAGANDA REGARDING NAM DINH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000200060003-0
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• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2002
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

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Analysis of North Vietnamese Propaganda Regarding Nam Dinh
I. Introduction
,3q r 3
In their "Report on US War Crimes in Nam Dinh City," the North Vietnamese
have released a number of statistics and allegations concerning the US
bombing of Nam Dinh in 1965-66. 'Many of these statements have also been
reported in Harrison Salisbury's series of articles in The New York Times.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the veracity of the statistics and
allegations presented and to investigate the possibility of developing an
alternative methodology for estima#ng casualties.
Nam Dinh is a textile-producing city approximately 47 miles south of
Hanoi normally inhabited by about 90,000 people. Partial evacuation has
reduced the population to a reported 20,000. Other than one large and one
moderate-size textile mills, Nam Dinh has no major industries. The city is
situated, however, along the infiltration-important Hanoi-Vinh Railroad Line.
A transshipment facility on a tributary of the Red River makes it possible
to transfer goods from coastal craft to the railroad. Nam Dinh is heavily
defended by AAA sites. Major targets included in
for Nam Dinh are the POL storage area
power plant
transshipment facility, textile mill complex, railroad yards, and several
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storage areas.
Table 1 lists missions against major Nam Dinh targets as reported by
US authorities. This is not a comprehensive list of all attacks on Nam Dinh;
some armed reconnaissance missions against the city are not reported in
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sufficient detail to be included.* Six of the dates of raids reported by
.the North Vietnamese agree with the US list, while raids reported by the
North Vietnamese on five other dates do not appear on the US list. Apparently
substantial civilian casualties did not occur on dates of US raids not
reported by the North Vietnamese -- 2-4 July 1965, 25 April 1966, 13 May 1966,
12 June 1966, and 16 August 1966.
II. Analysis of North Vietnamese Charges
Propaganda Statement
"The April 14, 1966 air raid over Hang Thao Street (Silk Street)
was one of the biggest deliberate US attacks on human lives. ...killing 49
people, ...wounding 135 people."
Comment
25X1A Qn 14 April 1966, 5 US A4 jets attacked the Nam Dinh Transshipment
Facility (with 5 2000 pound bombs. This facility.consists of
a narrow strip of wharf area and support buildings along the river bank and
is served by a rail spur. Directly behind it is a provincial wharehouse
and a densely populated residential area, presumably occupied by workers
from the nearby textile plants, rice mill, and food processing plant.
Post strike photography reveals that most of the 2000 pound bombs fell
within an area 500-1000 feet northwest of the target in the densely populated
civilian residential-residential commercial area. While other raids have
caused civilian casualties in this and other areas of Nam Dinh, both US and
*Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Ptiblic Affairs,
announced that Nam Dinh has been struck 64 times since midu1965.
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and North Vietnamese sources indicate that this raid was the most damaging
from the civilian casualty standpoint. Although it would be nearly impossible
to bomb the transshipment facility without causing some civilian casualties
and damage, the reasons for such serious bombing errors are unclear. Efforts
to,,evade heavy defensive fire from AAA sites may have been a contributing
factor. In addition, it is possible that pilots may have been attempting
to supress small arms fire from rooftops in the civilian area. Poor weather
over the target could also have been a factor.
Propaganda Statement
...881 dwelling houses (accounting for 13 percent of the city
housing) with an area of 86,847 square meters0were destroyed, leaving 12,464
homeless.
t'
Comment
Analysis of 12 October 1966 post strike photography of Nam Dinh-
reveals that approximately 65',1-40 square meters of roof cover within one
nautical mile of the center of town were destroyed or severely damaged.
This amounts to 12.7 percent of the total civilian-residential and residential-
commercial roof cover within one nautical mile of the center of Nam Dinh.
By selecting a typical housing block as a sample of the number of distinct
structures. per unit of roof cover, it was estimated that the average amount.
of roof cover per building was 59.7 square meters. Using this estimate,
approximately 1090 buildings were destroyed or severely damaged. In addition,
it is likely that many other dwellings received substantial damage not
discernable from photography.
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Propaganda Statement
"The US imperialists also attacked the dike surrounding the city in
an attempt to sabotage the peaceful work of the population."
i
Comment
The river banks are diked all the way through the city of Nam Dinh.
Consequently, it would be impossible to strike the Transshipment Facility or
POL Storage Facility on one bank or the ferry landing on the other without
risking some damage to dikes. The North Vietnamese do not claim any
casualties or severe damage from dike breaches.
Propaganda Statement
"During the 33-above said air attacks against Nam Dinh, ...89
persons were killed, ...and 405 wounded....
Comment
These casualty estimates do not appear exaggerated. Based on
casualty e:cperience from the World War II bombing of Japan, post strike
estimates of civilian casualties (includes both killed and wounded) range
from 2721 if.there was prior warning up to 2720 if no warning was given. In
a breakdown (see Table 1) of 6 separate major raids on Nam Dinh and an
adjacent hamlet, the North Vietnamese list a total of 91 killed and 207
wounded.
III. Estimation of Civilian Casualties
North Vietnamese propaganda statements on Nam Dinh can be used for
developing a methodology for estimating civilian casualties. Much of the
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propaganda released by North Vietnam appears to contain gross exaggerations
with respect to civilian damage and casualties as well as downings of US
planes. However, some North Vietnamese statements appear to be accurate
with respect to damage and casualties. This is particularly true of damaged
areas that are frequently shown to foreigners as "proof of US atrocities."
In the case of Nam Dinh, a multi-variable casualty relationship can be
developed which includes the following information:*
Nam Dinh
Roof Cover of Total Area
Population of Target Area Damaged or Destroyed
Target Area Total Casualties ' (million lag. ft.) (million sg, ft.)
20,000 494 5.5 .7
This relationship states that the number of casualties is equal to the
percent of roof cover destroyed or damaged times the population times a
"casualty experience factor." Because casualties in Nam Dinh are known, the
relationship can be solved for the casualty experience factor -- a factor
that can be applied to areas of other cities which have sustained civilian
damage in order to estimate civilian casualties.
Phu Ly, about 32 nautical miles south of Hanoi and also located on the
Hanoi-Vinh Rail Line and Route 1A, has been struck repeatedly since 1965.
The city contains a number of important transportation and military targets.
Strikes against the railroad yard and port facilities resulted in almost
( i kxv
*This relationship may be expressed mathematically: C=f z or C= z
where G--casualties, k--constant, x=ro6f cover damaged, Y--population of.entire
target area, and z =total roof cover of target area. The relationship may be
solved for any civilian casualties in any given urban target area with a
constant, k=.19, which reflects bombing casualty experience in Nam Dinh. It
is necessary, however, to continue to re-examine k=.19 as further reliable
information on civilian casualties in North Vietnamese cities becomes available.
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complete destruction of the most heavily populated area of the city as well
as extensive damage to other.cfvilian areas. The following table illustrates
the estimation of civilian casualties using the Nam Dinh experience.
Phu Lv
Roof Cover of Total Area Predicted
Target Area Damaged or Destroyed Civilian
Population (million sq. ft.) (million sq. ft.) Casualties
51000 .588 .355 575
Using the current methodology employing Japanese casualty experiences,
casualties would range from 173 to 1730.
The suggested casualty relationship based on the Nam Dinh bombing has
two important advantages over the currently used method. First, it utilizes
actual bombing experience in North Vietnam rather than World War II experience
against'Japanese cities. Secondly, it provides a single number estimate
ratherr. than a very broad and sometimes useless range. The casualty
relationship does have, however, several drawbacks. It is necessary to have
estimates for population and total civilian roof cover for each city which
has sustained civilian bomb damage. Population data for North Vietnam is
quite unreliable due to conflicting evacuation claims. The methodology may
be applied only to cities that have been struck a number of different times
in order that large differences in amounts of casualties per raid'due to the
presence or absence of warning, preparation, air raid defense, and so forth
may be assumed to?"wash out."*
*It would be possible, however, to develop a series of different "k'*s"
to reflect various levels of warning and preparation if sufficient casualty
information were available.
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IV. Conclusions
The statistical information concerning damage to civilian areas in the
North Vietnamese "Report on US War Crimes in Nam Dinh City" is accurate.
I
Total damage claims fall remarkably close to estimates based on post strike
photography. Furthermore, reported casualties fall within casualty estimates
made by use of the World War II Japanese bombing experiences. However, no
basis exists to evaluate North Vietnamese statements regarding total sorties
flown or ordnance expended against Nam Dinh as US data on armed reconnaissance
strikes against fixed targets are not always complete.
The North Vietnamese have carefully distorted US target intentions,;'
attacks on the Nam Dinh Transshipment Facility and the Nam Dinh POL Storage
Area were reported as attacks on workers' housing and dikes. No mention was
made of attacks on the Thermal Power Plant, the POL Storage Area, the
Railroad Yard, or the Transshipment Facility. In addition, no mention was
made of heq,vy anti-aircraft defenses.
Nam Dinh citizens are unlikely to perceive a small river port area, an
electric power plant, or a textile mill as being military targets; the damage
caused by the 14 April 1966 raid would not likely be interpreted as bombing
error due the distance from clearly identifiable military targets.
It is significant to note that a substantial share of the civilian
casualties and damage to civilian areas inflicted on Nam Dinh occurred in'only
two raids'-- 13 April and 18 May 1966. These raids, both on the Transshipment
Facility, caused 208 civilian casualties. Indeed, it is-unlikely that
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civilian casualties could have been avoided in attacking this target because
of its proximity to heavily populated areas. All of the other 62 raids
combined caused 286 casualties, an average of only 4.6 casualties per mission.
Furthermore, at least five of the US-reported raids were apparently carried
off without any significant civilian casualties. Although these raids were
against such major targets as the POL storage and railroad yard and involved
large amounts of ordnance, the North Vietnamese did not even refer to them
in their propaganda statement even though the statement mentions raids in
which as few as one person was killed.
The case of Nam Dinh supports the conclusion that air-strikes can be
carried off against targets on the outskirts of'major North Vietnamese cities,,
without prohibitive civilian casualties or damage. However, raids against
targets which directly border on heavily populated areas cannot be struck
without accepting the risk of substantial casualties and damage, despite
enemy efforts to evacuate a. sizeable portion of the civilian population.
Experiences gleaned from the Nam Dinh bombings can be,-used to develop a
"Vietnamese experience factor" useful in estimating civilian casualties in
other cities. For purposes of estimating casualties in North Vietnamese
cities this methodology has advantages over the one now in use. However, it
requires more base data than the currently used method and should be "updated"
as more reliable casualty intelligence becomes available.
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Selected it strikes Against Nam Dinh, 1965-66
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Ta
rg
et
As reported
by US
As reported
b NVN
As reported
US
As reported
~b NVN
Ordnance
C
lti
asua
es
28-29 Jun 1965
28 Jun 1965
Power Plant
Textile workers' housin
g
15x250#
10 killed, 12 wounded
2- 4 Jul 1965
NR
POL Storage Area
NR#
9x1000#
2- 4 Aug 1965
4 Aug 1965
Power Plant
NR
44 Bullpups
38x2.75" Rockets
12-15 Sep 1965
12 Sep.1965
POL Storage Area
Textile Complex
86x250#
6 killed
28
d
,
woun
ed
13 Apr 1966
14 Apr 1966
Transshipment Facility
Hang Thao St. (Silk St.)
8x2000#
49 killed, 135 wounded
28 Apr 1966
NR
Railroad Yards
13x1000#
13 May 1966
Railroad Yards
18 May 1966
18 May 1966
Railroad Yards
Hoang Van Thu St.
116x500#
13 killed, 11 wounded
31 May 1966
31 May 1966
Railroad Yards,
Transshipment Facility
Dikes
121x250#
12.Jun 1966
NR
Railroad Yards
NR
76x250#
NR
4 Jul 1966
NR
NR
NR
1 killed, 11- wounded
NR
14 Jul 1966
NR
Dikes
NR
20 Jul 1966
Dikes
NR
30 Jul 1966
Phu Long Hamlet
(NE of Nam Dinh)
12 killed, 10 wounded
31 Jul 1966
16 Aug 1966
*Not Reported
POL Storage Area NR 6Bull )
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91 killed, 207 wounded
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