A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF TRUCK TRAFFIC PATTERNS IN NORTH VIETNAM AND COMMUNIST-HELD PORTIONS OF LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000200160010-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2002
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: May 11, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

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A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF TRUCK TRAFFIC PATTERNS
IN NORTH VIETNAM AND COMMUNIST-HELD PORTIONS OF LAOS
Prepared by the
Central Intelligence Agency
and the
Defense Intelligence Agency
8 May 1964
DIA review(s)
completed.
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GROUP I
Excluded from automatic down-
grading and declassification
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SUBJECT: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF TRUCK TRAFFIC PATTERNS IN NORTH VIETNAM
AND COMMUNIST-HELD PORTIONS OF LAOS
THE PROBLEM
To assess the truck traffic patterns in North Vietnam and Communist-held
portions of Laos as these patterns may relate to the logistic support intended
for Communist units in Laos and for the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, and to
evaluate the adequacy of photographic and other coverage of this traffic.
SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE
Truck traffic patterns revealed in aerial photography obtained during the
period 6 March through 10 April 1964 and reports of road watch teams during the
'period 8 March through 9 April 1964 form the 'principal basis of this analysis.
Field reports of photography as late as 3 May 1964 have been scanned, but have
not been incorporated in this analysis.
INTELLIGENCE BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
I. Roads leading from North Vietnam to Laos are used to supply the esti-
mated 11,200 Communist troops deployed in the southern provinces of Khammouane,
Savannakhet, Saravane, and Attopeu and the 11,800 troops located in the
northern provinces of Luang Prabang, Xieng Khouang, and Vientiane. The forces
in the southern provinces of Laos require, at present levels of activity,
supplies amounting to 18 to 30 short tons or 6 to 10 truckloads daily. The
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troops in the northern -provinces require 1i5 to 60 short tons, or 15 to 20
truckloads daily because of the greater activity in that area.
2. The capacities of the roads leading from North Vietnam to Laos greatly
exceed these requirements. During the dry season (November through April) the
roads within Laos also have capacities far in excess of present supply re-
quirements of Communist forces in Laos, but during the rainy season great
difficulties are encountered in moving supplies to the southern provinces.
The main supply route for the northern provinces is capable of meeting current
supply requirements throughout the year. (See map at annex).
CONCLUSIONS
A. Aerial 'photography and reports from road watchers show truck activity
of sufficient magnitude to confirm the identification of the principal roads
used to supply Communist forces in Laos. These roads are: route 7 from its
junction with route 1 in North Vietnam to the Plaine des Jarres, and route 12,
route 12A, and route 12B leading from route 1 to the southern provinces of Laos.
(See Annex A and the map at annex). The apparent heavy activity on route 1
from Vinh south to the Demarcation Zone in North Vietnam probably is associated
principally with economic activity in the northern 'portion of that route.
(See Annex B).
B. There have not been a. sufficient number of samples of truck activity
on the various routes to estimate with a high degree of confidence the
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magnitude of the supply activity over the routes. In the 36 days sampled, in-
dividual routes were observed from 10 to 23 times, but 50 percent coverage of
the routes was achieved on only 1 to 19 days. The two most important routes,
7 and 12, received 50 percent or better coverage on only 4 and 5 days respec-
tively. (See Annex C). If the days on which we have reasonably complete
photographic coverage could be regarded as representative, the truck traffic
entering Laos from North Vietnam is more than adequate to meet the supply
requirements of Communist forces in Laos. The photography does not permit a
similar conclusion for the supply routes in southern Laos---routes 12A, 12A/B,
12B, 9, and 23.
C. We believe, therefore, that more complete aerial photography could
provide the basis for reasonably accurate estimates of the supply activity in
this area. More frequent coverage should be concentrated on routes 7, 12, 12A,
12A/B, 128, 9, and 23. Road watchers are an essential supplement to aerial
photography because convoys have been known to move at night. Low-level photo-
graphy during the rainy season also would be desirable.
D. With respect to the logistic support intended for communist units in
Laos and for the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, we are able to conclude from the
preliminary analysis only the following:
1. There appears to be considerable truck activity on route 7, which
provides support exclusively for the Communists in northern Laos.
2. There also is considerable truck activity on route 12, which is
the northern portion of the road that supplies the Communist forces in
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southern Laos and which represents one land route for the supply of the Viet
Cong in South Vietnam. Information on routes south of route 12, however, is
so incomplete that we are unable to estimate with confidence whether the
activity is in excess of the daily supply requirements of Communist forces in
Laos, whether it represents stockpiling of supplies in advance of the rainy
season when road movements become most difficult, or whether it is of suf-
ficient size to provide daily and stockpiling requirements with asurplus
for the Viet Cong.
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DISCUSSION
1. NPIC analysis of sporadic aerial photography flown during the period
6 March through 10 April has revealed truck traffic patterns on roads leading
from North Vietnam to Kharimiouane, Savannakhet, Saravane, and Attopeu*, the
four southern provinces of Laos, within which it is estimated that 11,200
Communist troops are deployed. The three southernmost provinces are the ones
from which it is believed that-supplies are infiltrated over trails to the
Viet Cong in South Vietnam. Road-watch teams have also sporadically reported
truck convoys moving over some of the same roads. These same sources also
have revealed truck traffic patterns on the major route used to supply an
additional 11,800 troops located in theAeeuthern provinces of Laos, Luang
Prabang, Xieng Khouang, and Vientiane.
2. The purpose of the track traffic analysis is to attempt to determine
whether our sources of information are adequate to indicate the significance
of these patterns, namely: (a) Do they confirm other sources of intelligence
on the routes actually being used for the supply of forces in Laos? (b) What
is the volume of traffic? (c) Is the volume of traffic in excess of the
daily supply requirements? (d) Is the volume and pattern of traffic such as
to indicate stockpiling of supplies for forces in Laos, or of such character
as to indicate that there is an increase in the overland supply of the Viet
Cong in South Vietnam?
* Not shown on map. An estimated 1,950 Communist troops are located in
Attopeu.
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3. The reports on truck traffic have been sufficient to confirm the use
of the various routes for the supply of the southern 'provinces. These are
routes 8 and 12 from their junctions with route 1 in North Vietnam thence 12A,
12B, and 9. Route 7 from its junction with route 1 in North Vietnam is con-
firmed as a main supply route for the northern provinces of Laos. (See map
at annex).
4. The portion of route 12 to the junction with route 12A in Laos is the
beginning-of the supply line for most of the h,800 troops in the three
southernmost provinces. It is estimated that a daily average of four to six
trucks must cross into Laos on the route to meet the requirements of the
troops in these provinces. The road capacity in its limiting sector is esti-
mated to be about 130 trucks each way per day in the dry season (August to
April) and 33 trucks each way per day in the rainy season. Thus the ca:pa.city
of the road is far in excess of the average daily traffic requirement and
it is not necessary for trucks to move on this route each day. In the dry
season the road is capable of sustaining large convoys of vehicles moving
over the route at one time that could supply the military units dependent on
this route for as long as 2 weeks.
5. Photographic coverage of route 12 in March and April included only
five missions during which at least 50 percent of the route was covered. This
limited photography revealed three possible convoys moving to Laos---one of
16 trucks on 6 March, one of 49 trucks on 3 April and one of 15 unidentified
vehicles on 6 April. In addition, 27 trucks were found moving in the
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opposite direction on 15 March. (See the tables at annex). Preliminary field
reports of 'photography taken on 3 May reveal two groups of trucks headed south,
one containing 38 trucks and another, 25 trucks. Trucks were also 'photographed
at the Bai Due Thon staging area located on this route 24 miles from the Laos
border: 50 on 6 March, 35 on 5 April and 65 on 3 May. The number of trucks
observed on this route is greater than the traffic on any route in Laos for
which we have aerial 'photography, except on route 7 (see below). There are
no road-watch reports for this route. If the days on which we have reason-
ably complete -photographic coverage can be regarded as representative, the
truck traffic is far in excess of the supply traffic needed in the southern
'provinces of Laos.
6. The convoys probably start their trip into Laos from the Bad Due Thon
staging area, in the early morning and move at least to the junction of route
12 and 12A where a rest and refueling area, is located. From there, most of
the onward movement of trucks is almost certainly down route 12A. Photography
of the portion of route 12 beyond the junction with route 12A has not re-
vealed much truck traffic (See the tables at annex).
7. Route 12A provides a. continuation of the supply line into southern
Laos. During the dry season the capacity of this route is the same as the
limiting section on route 12, but during the rainy season the route is esti-
mated to sustain very little traffic. Consequently, considerable supplies must
be stockpiled during the dry season so that they will be available for the
troops served by this route during the rainy season. Photography during the
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entire period 6 March to 10 April included only five missions with more than 50
'percent coverage of the route. This photography revealed only one convoy of 13
trucks moving south and one of 18 trucks moving north, both on 15 March. (See
Annex B). Three large convoys reported by road-watch teams were not discovered
by photography. According to these reports, one convoy of 63 trucks moved
south on 8 March and another of 47 trucks moved south on the 25th. All but five
of these trucks were said to be loaded with troops rather than supplies. The
other convoy of 62 trucks moved north on the 18th of March. Although the con-
voys observed in photography were large in terms of the daily supply require-
ments for the troops deployed in this part of Laos, the samples of photography
are too small to conclude 'that more supplies are moving down 12A than are needed
for stockpiling or for the troops in Laos.
8. Some trucks moving down route 12A continue on 12A/B thence 12B or 12A
and to route 9, the most important part of which extends from Muong Phine to
the South Vietnam border. On route 9 they serve the Ban Thay storage area a. few
miles east of Muong Phine, the barracks and supply area at Muong Phine, and the
Tchepone Complex which is also a. barracks, supply, and storage area. Route 9
has an estimated capacity of 300 trucks each way during the dry season and 100
during the rainy season. Photographic coverage of route 9 has been far more
extensive than for any other route discussed in this memorandum except route 23.
Very few trucks have been revealed by photography on the route east of Muong
Phine, and only one truck was observed on route 9 between Muong Phine and the
junction with route 12B.
9. The final route on which aerial photography is available in southern
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Laos is route 23 from its junction with route 9 to Saravane. The Communists
control only the northern portion of the route, thus it cannot be used for
through movements to the Attopeu area. The capacity of the route is estimated
at 130 trucks each way per day during the dry season but it would have very
limited ca:pa.city for truck movements during the rainy season. Although the
route has been covered well on a large number of missions during March and
April only one truck was sighted. It was headed south in Communist-held terri-
tory on 15 March.
10. Route 1 south of Vinh to the Demarcation Line serves North Vietnamese
troops estimated to be in excess of 10,000 men, serves the reconstruction
taking place on the rail line south of Vinh, and serves the construction at
Dong Hoi and the port of Quang Khe, which is located at the mouth of the Nguon
Nay River. The limiting sector of the route has an estimated capacity of 250
trucks each way in the dry season and 33 each way in the rainy season. Photo-
graphic coverage of the area revealed considerable numbers of trucks along this
route in March, but one mission in April with coverage of most of the area re-
vealed very few trucks. Most of the trucks were located near the ports of Dong
Hoi and Quang Khe. It is impossible to account for this difference between
the various missions.
11. The routes not directly associated with movement of supplies to southern
Laos are 8, 8A, and 7. Route 8 extends from Vinh in North Vietnam to Lak Sao
in Laos serving 4,400 troops located in Khammouane Province. Route 8A merely
serves as a connection between route 8 and route 12, but is believed to be in
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very poor condition at present. Route 7 is the main supply route for the northern
'provinces of Laos.
12. From two to four trucks per day are required to supply the troops in
the Lak Sao area served by route 8. These supplies are in addition to those
moved to the southern provinces on route 12. The limiting sector of this route
has an estimated capacity of 100 trucks each way per day in the dry season and
very few per day during the rainy season. Although a fairly large number of
missions were flown over portions of the route, none were flown over its entire
length. No truck convoys were sighted, and only a small number of individual
trucks were seen during the entire period. More trucks were sighted during the
10 days in April than in the 23 days in March, with a maximum for 1 day of five
trucks on 6 April. A road-watch team reported that a, convoy of 100 trucks
entered Laos loaded with food and ammunition on 3 February 1964 and returned
to North Vietnam the same day. Photography revealed only two trucks on route
8A in March and none in April. Although the coverage was scanty, it was gen-
erally as good as or better than that available for most of the other routes,
indicating that there is probably very little traffic moving between routes 8
and 12.
13. Route 7 is the major route used to supply about 11,800 troops located
in Luang Prabang, Xieng Khouang, and Vientiane Provinces of Laos. It is esti-
mated that their resupply requirements could be carried by 15 to 20 trucks
per day. The limiting sectors of route 7 have an estimated capacity of 100
trucks each way per day in the dry season and 33 'per day in the rainy season.
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This capacity is greater than the requirement for supplies, even in the rainy
season. It is not necessary, therefore, for the trucks to move every day; they
can be grouped into convoys. On 14 March a road-watch team reported a convoy
of 200 trucks moving west in Laos toward Ban Ban. If these trucks carried sup-
plies, the amount delivered by the convoy would have been sufficient for more
than 10 days. Photographic coverage of the route is not sufficient to deter-
mine with confidence the total number of trucks moving on the route. The only
mission flown in March that covered the entire route (with partial or scattered
clouds) revealed 100'parked trucks and 15 trucks heading west. No other photo-
graphy was obtained during March with sufficient coverage of the route to con-
firm the 200-truck convoy on 14 March or to reveal any other large convoys.
Photography taken during 1-10 April revealed a higher level of traffic than
that during March. This statement must be qualified with the fact that only
one mission with good coverage of the route is available for each month. The
mission flown on 4 April spotted 47 trucks moving west toward Ban Ban and
spotted 72 possible parked trucks. The same mission located 7 possible tanks
and at least 28 trucks on the route beyond Ban Ban. This photography coincides
to some extent with a road-watch team?s report of 236 trucks heading west on
route 7 during 6-9 April. On the basis of the above information, it is possible
to conclude that truck traffic on route 7 is more active than that on any
other routediscussed in this memorandum. If more photography of the route were
available with better and more frequent reports from road-watch teams, it is
possible than an estimate of the total volume of supplies moved during a certain
period of time could be made.
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