ECONOMIC AND MILITARY IMPACT OF DESTRUCTION OF DREDGES IN THE PORT OF HAIPHONG

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000200180005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2000
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 5, 1965
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release 2001fg3M,
"
8
8SO2149RO00200180005-~,ftj
OCI No. 1687/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
5 July 1965
Economic and Military Impact of Destruction of Dredges
in the Port of Haiphong
Importance of Dredges
There are 3 dredges employed in the port of Haiphong and a total of
8 in North Vietnam. One dredge at Haiphong is of the modern suction-type
of Soviet manufacture with a capacity of 950 cubic yards per hour and the
remaining 2 are low-capacity clam-bucket types. In order to handle ocean-
going ships the harbor needs constant and systewR;tic dredging. In addi-
tion the Canal Maritime and the channel in the Cua Cam River which extends
some 20 miles before emptying into the Gulf of Tonkin, must be dredged.
If no dredges were available, it is estimated that the harbor would be
completely blocked to oceangoing ships within 6 months.
II. Actions Available to North Vietnam if Dredges are Destroyed
If the three dredges in the port of Haiphong were destroyed there are
several courses available to North Vietnam in attempting to keep the port
open-for oceangoing ships or in attempting to compensate for the loss of
a portion or all of the port's capacity to handle seaborne trade.
A. Redeploy Other Dredges in North Vietnam to Haiphong
The five remaining dredges in North Vietnam are believed to be used
principally for improvement of the inland waterways, and for maintenance
of the required channel depth for Nam Dinh, a minor port for coastal traf-
fic. During the rainy season (currently underway) the requirement for
dredging on the inland waterways practically disappears so that the dredges
normally allocated to this purpose could be moved to Haiphong. Although
these dredges are rif low capacity they, nevertheless, could compensate to
an .i.mportant extent for the loss of the Haiphong dredges.
B. Borrow or Buy Dredges from Communist China and the USSR
Communist China has dredges employed in the harbors at Fort Bayard
and Canton and in the smaller harbors of Hainan Island. If Communist China
were willing to forego the port improvements in which some of these dredges
are employed it would be possible to move them to Haiphong in 2 to 3 weeks.
Approved For Release 2001,3 jpE.~JARP&78S02149R000200180005-5
SECRET
 Approved For Release 200'I831
78S02149R000200180005-5
The movement of dredges employed in the Soviet Far East would take 4 to 5
weeks. The movement of dredges from Soviet ports in the Black Sea would
take 8 to 10 weeks. Finally, the construction of the hulls for low-
capacity dredges could probably be undertaken in the several boat yards at
Haiphong. Clam-buckets, cables and machinery would have to be imported
from China or the USSR. Completion of such low-capacity dredges would
probably take 8 to 10 weeks.
C. Use of Small Craft as Lighters
As the harbor and channels begin to silt up for lack of dredging
the North Vietnamese could employ the numerous harbor cft such as
lighters, barges, junks and sampans to offload parts of the cargo of ocean-
going ships prior to their entering the channel leading to Haiphong.
Wigh the draft reduced, oceangoing ships could then proceed to normal un-
loading areas within the harbor. The chief problem in an operation of this
type would arise in the handling of oilers. North Vietnam is known to have
only 2 small transport tankers based at Haiphong. The deadweight tonnage
of these craft is about 300 tons each. It could take as long as 10 days
to offload sufficient petroleum from a 10,000 ton oiler to make it possible
for such an oiler to proceed to the petroleum pier.
D. Use of Railroad or Truck Transport to Compensate for Reduction in
Capacity of Haiphong
A railroad and three roads connect the Kwangsi Region and Kwangtung
Province of China with Hanoi and Haiphong. If Haiphong were to become
completely or partially unusable all import traffic and the bulk of the
exports which normally move through Haiphong could be handled through South
China ports, primarily Fort Bayard. A conservative estimate of the capac-
ity of the meter-gauge rail line between Ping-hsiang, the transloading
station in Communist China, and Hanoi is about 3,000 metric tons (Mt) each
way per day or about 1.1 million mt per year. The connecting railroad in
China has a higher capacity. It is estimated that toward the end of 1964
the volume of goods being moved through P'ing-hsiang from. China into
North Vietnam was between 1,200 and 1,500 mt per day,* which amounted to
about one-half the estimated capacity of the line. At this level of traf-
fic the rail line, therefore, could carry an additional 1,500 to 1,800 mt
per day into North Vietnam. The estimated seaborne imports during 1964
amounted to at least 700,000 and possibly as high as 800,000 mt, or
* Including North Vietnamese imports and Chinese transit traffic moving
between the Chinese provinces of Kwangsi and Yunnan by way of the North
Vietnamese railroads.
Approved For Release 200 tt03 mCI 78S02149R000200180005-5
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2001/03/b:P78S02149R000200180005-5
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
between 1,900 and 2,200 mt per day. The railroad could carry the majority
of this tonnage and the remainder could be moved by highway transportation.
A shortage of narrow-gauge tank cars for carrying petroleum probably would
be the major difficulty encountered by the North Vietnamese if the sea-
borne imports were to be shifted to rail transport. Some petroleum products
could be moved in drums by rail or truck and by tank truck but would re-
quire more time and expense than the movement by tank car.
Export through Haiphong were estimated to have been about 800,000
mt or about 2,200 mt per day in 1964. Because the volume of exports shipped
to China by rail is not large currently, the railroad to I'ing-haiang has
sufficient capacity to move all exports that are normally exported through
Haiphong. Some of these exports, are apatite, and other low-value, high-
volume commodities, however, and the additional cost of rail transport
en route to the ports of China would be so great as to make the price that
would have to be charged not competitive in world markets. Thus, North
Vietnam would be denied the ability to acquire foreign exchange, a considera-
tion which is not of great importance in the present situation.
E. Use of the Ports of Cam Pha and Hon Gay
North Vietnam has only two ports, in addition to Haiphong, which
can accommodate large oceangoing ships. These are the ports of Can Pha
and Hon Gay, located northeast of Haiphong. They are especially equipped
to export coal and have very limited facilities for handling other types
of cargo. Moreover, neither of these ports has rail connections with the
main railroad system of North Vietnam, and cargo moved through them has to
be transported by road, barge and other coastal craft. Shortages of trucks
and other high priority requirements for trucks would limit the use of
road transport to clear these ports although some import cargo could be
unloaded by using ships' gear. Ships could also unload cargo into barges
and other coastal craft, but the distances involved to and from Haiphong
and the lack of facilities at Cam Pha and Hon Gay lead to the conclusion
that these ports cannot be regarded as complete alternates to Haiphong.
They could be used, to a minor extent as alternates to Haiphong, however
in the event that silting prevented oceangoing ships from serving Haiphong.
III. Importance of the Port of Haiphong
A. Shipping Service
Of North Vietnam's total foreign trade, at least 80 percent of its
imports and about 40 percent of its exports move through the port of Hai-
phong. Rail transport accounts for most of the remaining 20 percent of
-3-
Approved For Release 2001r@3 LIMA 8SO2149R000200180005-5
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2001/03AU91P78S02149R000200180005-5
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
North Vietnam's imports, but only a small amount of its exports. The
other 60 percent of the exports consist for the most part of coal, which
is exported mainly through the coal ports of Cam Pha and Hon Gay. The
port of Haiphong has an estimated capacity of about 4,500 mt per day of
dry cargo (or about 1.6 million mt per year) and 800 mt per day of petro-
leum in bulk (or nearly 300,000 mt per year). During 1964, imports of dry
cargo moving through Haiphong are estimated to have been at least 560,000
mt and possibly as high as 660,000 mt. Exports of dry cargo through Hai-
phong in 1964 are estimated at about 800,000 mt, giving a total of 1.4 million
to 1.5 million mt of dry cargo--a level which approached the capacity of
the port for dry cargo. In addition, about 142,000 mt of petroleum products
were imported through Haiphong in 1964, a level of about half the port
capacity for petroleum.
Because North Vietnam has only 1 fair sized cargo ship used mainly
between Hong Kong and Haiphong and a few small ships used mainly for coastal
trade, virtually all of its seaborne trade is carried in foreign merchant
craft. Although a precise division of ship arrivals by port of arrival
cannot be made, it is estimated that at least 425 of about 580 foreign ship
arrivals in 1964 were made at the port of Haiphong. The remaining arrivals
were made almost entirely at Cam Pha and Hon Gay to load coal. A breakdown
by flag of the estimated arrivals at Haiphong is shown in the accompanying
table.
Ships flying Free World flags accounted for nearly 60 percent of
the arrivals and about 47 percent of the gross register tonnage of ships
observed. in Haiphong in 1964, while Communist Chinese ships accounted for
16 percent of the arrivals and about 12 percent of the tonnage. The re-
maining arrivals at Haiphong consisted of about an equal number of ships
from the USSR and from the European Satellite countries.
Although similar data for Haiphong during the first part of 1965
is not yet available, the number of ship arrivals at all North Vietnamese
ports observed during the first five months of 1965, if projected on an
annual basis, indicates that the level of foreign trade passing through
Haiphong probably has increased in 1965. The number of Free World flag
ship arrivals at all ports in North Vietnam increased about 10 percent in
the first qua?ter over the 1964 level and arrivals by Bloc ships increased
about 50 percent. In 1965 most of the ships have called at Haiphong and
some then proceeded to other ports to load coal.
Haiphong is also the focal point for much of North Vietnam's in-
land and coastal water traffic. The most important coastal water traffic
in North Vietnam is the shipment of coal by barge from Cam Pha and Hon Gay
-4-
Approved For Release 2001]0370SE?f 1ADP78S02149R000200180005-5
SECRET
 Approved For Release 200160 ~,
,M-RI 78S02149R000200180005-5
to Haiphong. The most important inland water traffic probably is the move-
ment of foreign trade and domestic traffic on the inland water network
between Haiphong and Hanoi. Because most of this coastal and inland water
traffic is moved by small steamers, barges, and other shallow-draft craft,
this traffic would be little affected by silting in Haiphong harbor.
B. Importance of Seaborne Foreign Trade and Coastal Traffic
The North Vietnamese economy, which is basically one of subsistence
agriculture, has only a small modern industrial sector concentrated in a
few urban centers, one of which is Haiphong. This small industrial sector
is heavily dependent on imports of machinery and raw materials, principally
from Communist China and the USSR. The country imports little food, even
in poor agricultural years, and depends largely on domestic production to
feed its population of about 18 million persons. North Vietnam produces
only minor items of military equipment--grenades, mines, mortars, and
ammunition for small arms--and must import all of its heavy military equip-
ment and most of its small arms, ammunition, and medical supplies from
Communist countries.
The foreign trade of North Vietnam has been an important factor
in the economic development of the country. Machinery and equipment re-
presented about half of the value of the total imports of North Vietnam
during 1961-63. Soviet deliveries of equipment for complete plants grew
particularly rapidly during this period. Most of these shipments move
through Haiphong. Imports from Communist China consist largely of industrial
raw materials and semi manufactured products with machinery being less
important than it is in imports from the USSR. Imports from Communist
China move mainly by rail through Dong Dang and by ship through Haiphong.
The most critical industrial supply item imported by North Vietnam is petro-
leum which arrives principally at Haiphong by tanker. Most industrial chem-
icals are also imported, although the small indigenous chemical industry
has recently been expanded particularly to produce chemical fertilizer.
The country also imports all of its steel products, particularly all of its
railroad rolling stock and vehicles, and most of its complex machinery,
metal manufactures, spare parts, chemical fertilizer, and raw cotton.
North Vietnam exports handicraft products made from agricultural
raw materials, light industrial products, and some unprocessed agricultural
products, although exports of the latter have declined since 1959. Products
of the extractive industries, particularly coal and apatite, represent
about one-third of the value of total exports. Cement and apatite are the
major bulk commodities exported through Haiphong.
Approved For Release 2001403 c -` 78S02149R000200180005-5
 Approved For Release 2001{3078S02149R000200180005-5
IV. Impact of the Destruction of Dredges
A. Impact on the Economy
In view of the alternative courses of action available to North
Vietnam, as outlined in Part II above, it is estimated that there would
be no serious short or long term effect on the econcamy, as a consequence
of the destruction of the riredges in the port of Haiphong. Such an opera-
tion, if successful, nevertheless, would create a great deal of confusion,
disorganization, and add to the problems already confronting the country.
In both the short and long term, however, it would be regarded as an irri-
tating challenge rather than a catastrophe. Implementation of any of the
counter measures would require hard decisions which would involve the
reallocation of relatively scarce resources, including manpower, and would
again test the willingness of Communist China and possibly also the USSR
to provide additional aid to North Vietnam.
B. Impact on the Military
There is no evidence that cargo moved through the port of Haiphong
has contained material that could be said to be strictly military end
items. Military shipments to North Vietnam are estimated to move princi-
pally frcen Communist countries by way of the secure railroads of China to
Ping-hsiang, the railroad transloading station for North Vietnam. From
this point shipments either continue by rail into North Vietnam or are
moved by truck to storage areas in North Vietnam. The destruction of the
dredges at Haiphong, therefore, would have no impact on the ability of
North Vietnam to obtain arms for the military establishment, and to con-
tinue aggression.
V. Impact of Blocking Canpletely the Approach for Oceangoing Ships to
Haiphong*
Initially, the blocking of an approach for oceangoing ships to Haiphong
would cause great confusion. Organization of a fleet of small craft as
outlined in Part II, above, for effective operations may require several
weeks. The North Vietnamese press has often discussed inefficient loading
and unloading operations in all modes of transport and the difficulties
* It is not known what method is being considered. for blocking the ap-
proach. Possibly the method would include the sinking of a ship in the
Maritime Canal.
-6-
0 FOREI N DISSEM
Approved For Release 20013/Q EI. P 78SO2149R000200180005-5
 Approved For Release 200A6o4m m&R78SO2149R000200180005-5
of coordination between the various modes of transport. The use of a large
number of small craft would also probably divert them from their normal
movement of domestic traffic on the coastal and inland waterways. Further-
more, a sudden blockage of a channel would probably confine in the harbor
at least 6 oceangoing ships that normally are loading or unloading cargo.
Some of these would be owned by Free World countries.
After a reasonable period of time, however, it would be possible, as
described in Part II, for North Vietnam to shift at least a small portion
of its international seaborne trade to other ports in North Vietnam and a
major share of the remainder to the rail and road transport connections with
Communist China. Both the short and long term impact, therefore, would be
essentially the same as described in Part IV, above. This action,however,
would create greater initial problems because its physical effect on the
movement of oceangoing shipping would be immediate rather than gradual as
in the case of destroying dredges. Counter-measures and decisions regarding
them would have to be taken with greater urgency. For additional detail
regarding the vulnerability of Haiphong to blockage see the Appendix, at-
tached hereto.
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Approved For Release 2001/03/Q FP78S02149R000200180005-5
 Approved For Release 209j1/ Gj P78S02149R000200180005-5
Appendix
Vulnerability of the Port of Haiphong to Blockage
The entrance to Haiphong harbor is from the Gulf of Tonkin through the
lower reach of the Cua Nam Trieu and the Canal Maritime. The Canal Mari-
time is about 3,900 feet long and between 450 and 700 feet wide. The
harbor fairway is dredged to a minimum of 26 feet (at low water). The depth
of the Canal Maritime at its northwestern end is shown on a hydrographic
chart to be 23 feet, but this also probably has been deepened to 26 feet
by dredging. If the Canal Maritime could be effectively blocked, the har-
bor at Haiphong would be closed to oceangoing ships, because there would
be no alternate routes to the port for vessels with drafts of more than
11 feet.*
The Cua Cam River empties into the Gulf of Tonkin south of the Canal
Maritime, but is so shallow that oceangoing ships could not move ui to
Haiphong. There is another branch of the Cua Cam north of the Canal Mari-
time which then empties into the Cua Nam Trieu and the Gulf of Tonkin,
but this branch, although deeper than the southern arm, is also too shallow
to permit oceangoing ships to travel through it. To deepen either of these
branches of the Cua Cam would require dredging a distance of at least 4
miles. To dredge a 100-foot-wide channel for this distance to a depth of
28 feet, using a dredge with a capacity of 950 cubic yards an hour, would
take an estimated 1,371 hours. If one dredge were in operation for 10
hours daily, it would take about 411F months to open a new channel. If more
than one dredge could be used it might reduce the time required to open
a new channel. It also might be possible to remove the obstruction fran
the Canal Maritime or to dredge around it, in less than 12 months.
Blocking the Canal Maritime would cause silt to accumulate in the
harbor area at a faster rate than it usually does, and would, therefore,
require more dredging to keep the harbor open.
25X1 B
Approved For Release 20P1R j1bP78S021 49 R000200180005-5
 Approved For Release 209$
Table
T
P78S02149R000200180005-5
North Vietnam: Foreign-Flag Ship Arrivals at Haiphong
by Flag
1964
Flag
Number of Arrivals
Gross Register Tons
(Units)
(As a Percent
of the total)
(In Thousand
Tons)
(As a Percent
of the total)
425
100
1,844.5
100
Free World
251
59
872.5
47
Denmark
2
6.8
Finland
1
5.7
France
1
2.9
Greece
27
197.4
Italy
2
14.4
Japan
75.6
Lebanon
12
68.6
Netherlands
10
21.9
Norway
38
94.9
Panama
6
34.2
Sweden
2
13.8
United Kingdcn
116
318.9
West Germany
4
17.4
USSR
48
11
359.5
20
European Satellites
56
18
385.4
21
Czechoslovakia
7
45.5
East Germany
1
9.6
Poland
48
330.2
Communist China
10
16
227.2
12
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Approved For Release 2001 /0?po f DP78SO2149R000200180005-5