ROUTE 110

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000200250004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2003
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 15, 1967
• Content Type: BRIEF

03/10/21: CIA-RDP :$ 2 49W O200250004-8
l I !J
.This portion of the briefing is designed to -iase-F
.S,rar? enemy logistical activity along Route 110. . The information
plotted on the map and discussed throughout this analysis was obtained.
25X1
Before proceeding any further Sir, it is necessary for
the purpose of clarity.and understanding to explain some map symbols
which are mentioned throughout this analysis (explain map symbols).
ROUTE 110 (Point to on map) is the main artery utilized in.trans
porting rice from Cambodia into Laos. It is a dirt road, approximately
80 KM in length and 2/ to 3 meters in width, which connects the Se icons
River with Route 96 (Point on map). Route 110 is impassable by vehicular
traffic during the rainy season from May to October. There are ten truck
parks and six by-passes located along this route, and its importance
cannot be overemphasized because it provides the link.. between Cambodia,`
and the rice-poor areas further north in Laos, and the VC/NVA B-3 Front
Area in western highlands of South Vietnam. (Point on map) Cambodian
rice is essential to the Communist forces in the B-3 Front Area because
this region is one of the most rice deficient regions in SVN, and most of
their rice must be imported from out-of-country sources..
Located adjacent to Route 110 is Base Area 609, an important storage
facility and transshipment point (Point on map). It is the southern
`'terminus of the enemy road network in the Laotian panhandle which receives
Class I supplies from Cambodia via Route 110, and Class II, III, IV and V
Army review(s) completed.
from aerial sighting. reports, road watch reports,
25X1
Approved For Release 200, RDP78S0214.9R000200250004-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/21 : CIA-RDP78SO2149R000200250004-8
25X1
25X1
AdOu
OL3~i
supplies from North Vietnam via Route 96 (Point on map).
determinin
In ~g the tonnage of supplies being shipped on these two
of 25 trucks is required.
routes, the following criteria was utilized: The Route 96 figure was
developed by computing the Class II, IV and V requirements of the units
served by Base Area 609, plus the requirements of the 2000 Support Personnel
positioned along Route 110 and the lower portion of Route 96. First, we
estimated the number of trucks travelling these routes based on the amount
of supplies required; secondly, we estimated the POL requirements on the
number of truck trips needed to transport the supplies required; and
finally, we adjusted the estimated number of truck trips to reflect the
additional trips required to move the POL. As a result of the foregoing
manipulations, the monthly tonnage of Class II, IV and V supplies arriving
at Base Area 609 via Route 96 amounts to 51 tons, Class II and IV
combined - 45 tons; Class V - 6 tons. To transport this 51 tons, a total
Of the previously mentioned 1200 tons per month of suppli
consumed by the Support Personnel located on this route, while the
mostly rice,.which enters Laos over Route 110, approximately 70 tons are
remaining tonnage of 1130 is trucked over this same route to Base Area 609. i
1,01
Once at.the Base Area, approximately 165 tons are expended by the enemy
I%
Approved For Release, 20601'1f='(AA-RDP78S02149R000200`I
 Ap __p _roved F Relase=% 03/10/2.1 :CIA-RDP,8S02149X
ed 00200250004-8
transport supplies on Route 110.
units and enemy controlled civilians in South Vietnam believed to be
served by Base Area 609,, thereby leaving 965 tons of the original 1200
available for further disposition. Even if the enemy stockpiled 300 tons
per month, there would still be an imposing 665 tons per month left over.
It is felt that this remainder, which constitutes over half of the original
import, is forwarded to Base Areas 608, 610, and 611, and possibly even
to North Vietnam (Point on map).
We believe that the enemy is presently storing large amounts of rice
at Base Area 609 to compensate for the effects of the five months monsoon
season which involves a substantial reduction in their capability to
ment of 165 tons of rice, a:stockpile of 825 tons of rice is needed.
the commander of the Route 110 support elements hopes to maintain the
present rate of traffic during the monsoon by utilizing 2000 bicycles as
a means of conveyance for the much-needed supplies. Considering that the
road is impassable, even to bicycles, and that there is a monthly require-
can, therefore, assume that the enemy stockpiled about 300 tons per month
over the last three months, or spread their contemplated needs over a longer
period of time, for example, up to six months.
.the enemy utilizes-140 trucks
for transport on Route 110. The average load capacity for these trucks
is three tons, and to carry the magic figure of 110 tons of supplies
1
would require F377truck loads. Based on.the estimate of 377 round trips
per month on Route 110, we determined the monthly expenditure of POL along
this route to be approximately 10,000 gallons. In addition, Base Area 609
would probably require an additional 2,000 gallons per month for use by
t rA&ro eIL 'f WO YM21 ~60 IA F)P f 1 9f0626615bbb24s8II1
 Approved For Release 2003/10/21 : CIA-RDP78SO2149R000200250004-8
expenditure per month in this area is, therefore, 12,000 gallons. This
amount can be transported by a minimum of six to eight trucks, and as
a result, the additional traffic along Route 96 for moving Class III
supplies would be almost negligible.
From the above analysis of enemy supply requirements in the Route 110
area and Base Area 609, the likely enemy mVement plan begins to'eme rge.
Their basic problem is to move Class II, III, IV and V supplies south on
Route 96 to Base Area 609, and to move principally Class I supplies from
Cambodia to the same base area, and from there to the north. As originally
stated, Base Area 609, therefore, assumes the important role of trans-
shipment point as well as a storage facility. The trucks from the north
transporting Class II, III, IV and V supplies, and the trucks from the
southwest carrying Class I supplies, all converge on Base Area 609. Vie-
trucks from the north discharge their loads, reload with Class Isupplies,
and return to the north. The trucks from the southwest for the most part
have to return to the Cambodian Border area empty, since most of the
Class II, III, IV and V supplies delivered to Base Area 609 are destined
for use.in South Vietnam.
The probable manner of movement of a typical Class I shipment from
Siem Panes Cambodia to Base Area 609, Laos (Point on map) as inferred from
various types of reports encompasses the following: Rice is accumulated
in Siem Pang in warehouses belonging to Chinese merchants, some of.which
are under official Royal Khmer Government (RKG) auspices, but most of
which are motivated by a profit incentive. The rice is loaded on boats
Approved For Release 2003/10/21 CIA-RDP78SO2149R000200250004-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/21 : CIA-RDP78S02149R000200250004-8
Li --A
which are similar to dugout canoes with outboard motors, for movement
up the Se Kong River to Don Fai Island where the rice is unloaded and put
in warehouses. Since this part of the operation takes place almost
entirely in "neutral" Cambodia, the trip. may. be accomplished either in
the daytime or ate. The actual movement up the river is probably
planned so that it takes place during the daylight hours for ease of
navigation,-but the unloading process is completed at night to avoid
detection. Later,.as trucks become available, the rice is loaded at night
and transported along Route 110 to the area which the Vietnamese refer
to as "Hill 200," a distance of approximately 45 kilometers. The drivers
have negotiated this stretch of road many times and in this typical night,
the rate of march for the three truck convoy is about 5-8 KM's per hour,
with only. parking lights utilized for illumination. The trucks are forced
to stop once for about 30 minutes due to flare aircraft orbiting in. the
area. Upon arriving in the "Hill 200" area, the drivers bed down for the
day. That night, the drivers of the first section of the road transfer
their loaded rice trucks to drivers of the second section of the road; in
return they receive unloaded trucks for the trip back to Don Fai Island.
The drivers of the second segment, utilizing a, similar "blackout" type
driving SOP, transport the rice to Base Area 609 where it is once again
placed in storage. The next night the trucks and drivers return to "Hill
200" area. Occasionally, circumstances compel the trucks to travel on
the road during the day, but the NVA attempts to avoid this undesirable
situation whenever possible because of the trucks' vulnerability to air
Approved For Release 2003/10/1 `~dg 78S02149R000200250004-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/21 : CIA-RDP78SO2149R000200250004-8
25X1
25X1
r~
U.k q
Is. ?a K"1
2 2 ~,
strikes. Unlike the units served by the B-3 Area, the enemy forces opposite
Base Area 609 are supported directly from 609. Due to a lack of rear
service elements, these units assume the internal responsibility for
resupply. Normally it is accomplished by replacement I and through cache
areas near the border.
Up to the present time, this briefing has been centered on the enemy's
traffic on Route 110 during what can be considered a "normal" or "typical"
period. At this time Sir, I would like to elucidate on the validity of
the information received since much of our
analysis is based on this and other similar type data acquired from the
__?,_.._.. ...., Cr ..~ ~..~ ....~ ....~. .. i~j.?.. .,.... .. LS..7 wag -w-.U~% Ci504.138L LIIC wcaLCA.u ke
As a result
\rQ~~~
a four day air operation V'I,
Y1y ~ ,,rr
during an average weak rarely exceeded 40.trucks. Convoys normally averaged
about 2-3 trucks, and road watch teams apparently encruntered only moderate
difficulty in maintaining fixed positions. However, following the,
successful air operation, total truck sightings for a week's period amounted
to more than 70, with the data still incomplete. The convoys are now composed
of up to 20 trucks, as opposed to the previously mentioned 2-3 truck convoys
prior to the air operation. The upward trend in truck traffic since the
air strikes is probably a result of the enemy's desire to complete his
resupply prior, to the closing of Route 110 by the monsoon. The. recent
and 30 secondary fires, and.a complete renovation in the enemy's convoy
tactics. Prior to above-mentioned air operation, total truck sightings
Approved For Release 2003/10/21: CIA'-RDP78S02149R000
 Approved For Release 2003/10/21 : CIA-RDP78S02149R000200250004-8
~oa3K+ ~~,r .,
19E,C"LAlj G~
air strikes has undoubtedly added to this sense of urgency. In addition,
the unexpected magnitude of the results of the air strikes, notably the
inexplicable number of secondary explosions, tends to indicate the possi-
bility,that Class III and V supplies may also be entering Laos from
Cambodia.at the west end of Route 110. Road watch teams are apparently
encountering increased difficulty in. maintaining their fixed positions,
and enemy harassment of the friendly base at Kong My has increased. (Point
on map).
As you know Sir, our purpose in preparing this study was to'determine
if operational research could be utilized in constructing a movement
model for Route 110 which could be applied to other routes. Due to a
paucity of available data, operational research on this route has yielded
results that are less than conclusive; however, we were able to arrive
at a tentative movement pattern. An important bonus effect, which is being
further investigated, did result from our research. Heretofore, we
believed that all Class V supply was being transported into Base Area 609
from the north; however, the secondary explosions caused by the air strikes
indicate that large quantities of explosive materiel, munitions, and
MOE
POLare being dispatched from Cambodia to enemy units in Laos along
~oabGbly iS
Route 110.
Approved For Release 2003/10/21 : CIA-RDP78S02149R000200250004-8