USCSB Comments on Pertinent Portions of Part 1, Appendix I, of the Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities
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RIFPUB
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T
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 19, 2002
Sequence Number:
35
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REPORT
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HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
REC=NDATION #A
"THAT THE MILITARY SERVICES AND NSA CONTINUE TO STRIVE FOR A HIGHER
DEGREE OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY; THAT THE PROBLEM OF COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY,
INCLUDING PLAIN TEXT MESSAGES AND TRAFFIC ANALYSIS OF ENCRYPTED MESSAGES, PIP,
RESTUDIED BY USCSB (OR THE COMBINED BOARD AS RECOMMENDED IN THIS REPORT)
WITH A VIEW TOWARD REDUCING TO THE LOWEST PRACTICABLE LEVEL THE QUANTITY OF
INFORMATION RELEASED THROUGH TELECOMMUNICATIONS; AND THAT NSC 165 BE
REEXAMINED TO ASCERTAIN IF THE DIRECTOR, NSA., HAS SUFFICIENT AUTI30RITY TO
CARRY OUT HIS COMSEC RESPONSIBILITIES."
C EN S:
With regard to the first part of this recommendation, USCSB notes that
the Military Services and NSA continually strive for a higher degree of
cryptographic security and, as a matter of routine, keep this problem under
thorough review at all times.
With reference to the second part of this recommendation, viz, "That NSC
168 be reexamined to ascertain if the Director, NSA, has sufficient authority
to carry out his COMSEC responsibilities", USCSB concurs, noting that, in
essence, the recommendation calls for a restudy of matters which are a3,,?eady
under review in accordance with the provisions of NSC 168.
MC=1 ?NDATION #5
"THAT A SINGLE BOARD WITH APPROPRIATE TECHNICAL SUBCOMMITTEES HAVE
POLICY COGNIZANCE OVER COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE AND CC tJNICATIONS SECURITY.
IF THE RECOIN2ENDATION TO PLACE THE EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS OF ELINT UNDER NSA
IS ADOPTED, THEN POLICY GUIDANCE FOR ELINT AS WELL AS COMINT AND COMSEC SHOULD
BE-EXERCISED BY THE PROPOSED SINGLE BOARD u 11
C OMtNTS :
USCSB is at present unwilling to recommend establishment of the single
Board referred to in this recommendation, both because of the difficulties
involved in its implementation, and the fact that USCSB is operating under a
provisional charter. In connection with its review of NSC 168, USCSB will
give further consideration to this problem.
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With regard to the second part of this recommendations USCSB considers
that the proposal regarding policy guidance for ELINT has been overtaken by
the issuance of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 17 and
the related Department of Defense Implementing Directive of 13 July 1955.
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BCOMENDATION #8
"THAT THE PRESENT BASIC COMMUNICATIONS (CRYPTOGRAPHIC) SFCtIRITY PLAN,
PROVIDING FOR CENTRALIZED CONTROL WITH EFFECTIVE DECENTRALIZATION OF OPERA-
TIONS, BE CONTINUED; THAT EACH AGENCY AND SERVICE MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE IN-
SPECTION AND VIGOROUS TRAINING PROGRAMS TO REDUCE TO THE MINIMUM CRYPTO-
GRAPHIC OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIOLATIONS."
C OMC+ ENTS:
USCSB concurs in this recommendation, noting that the Communications
Security Plan referred to represents, in reality, a number of Communications
Security arrangements each of which is considered satisfactory.
RO C TIO#9
"THAT NSC DETERMINE WAYS AND MEANS TO CONTROL MORE EFFECTIVELY RELEASE
OF VALUABLE INTELLIGENCE TO POTENTIAL ENEMIES VIA CLEAR TEXT MESSAGES BEING
TRANSMITTED OVER GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL COMMUNICATION NETWORKS."
COMENTS:
USCSB considers that the policy responsibility for effective control of
governmental clear text messages transmitted over civil or governmental net-
works falls within the charter of USCSB. USCSB has long recognized this
problem and is working toward its solution. Progress is considered satis-
factory and the problem does not appear to be one for NSC consideration.
With respect to the transmission of civil clear text messages over civil
communications networks.. USCSB considers this problem to be outside its
purview.
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RE0O14ATION #lO
"THAT THE GENERAL TENDENCY WITHIN THE COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE AND THE
COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY AGENCIES TO OVEREMPHASIZE THE SPECIAL SECURITY FACETS
OF THEIR OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO BASIC COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS
FEATURES BE EXAMINED OBJECTIVELY AND COMPREHENSIVELY BY COMPETENT, TECHNICALLY
QUALIFIED AUTHORITY TO INSURE THAT SUCH OVEREMPHASIS IS NOT FRODUCING UN-
NECESSARY DUPLICATION OF FACILITIES AND OPERATIONS IN PEACETIME WHICH WILL
GROW TO COMPLETELY UNREALISTIC FIGURES IN WARTIME, AND PRODUCING A SYSTEM
WHICH MAY FAIL IN AN EMERGENCY BECAUSE IT WILL REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE READJUST-
MENT OF BASIC OPERATIONAL PRACTICES AT A CRITICAL TIME. (THIS SERVICE COULD
BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE PROPOSED IN RECCR NDATION #1 ABOVE.)"
COMMENTS:
USCSB considers that this recommendation falls within the scope of the
study referred to in the Special Recommendation.
SPECIAL RECO?Th NDATION
"THAT THE PRESIDENT SET UP A SPECIAL COMMISSION COMPOSED OF TECHNICALLY
QUALIFIED CIVIL AND MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS REPRESENTATIVES,
TO SURVEY AND PRODUCE RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO WAYS AND MEANS TO INSURE THE MORE
EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION OF ALL COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS RESOURCES OF THE
UNITED STATES IN THE NATIONAL INTERESTS IN CASE OF WAR OR NATIONAL EMERGENCY,"
CONIvEN'TSS
Although comments on this recommendation were not requested, USCSB
considers that active participation of COMSEC and COMINT representatives
would be advantageous, should such a study be approved.
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