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MACV 29 APRIL 1968 GUERRILLA OB

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP78T02095R000100010009-8
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 6, 2006
Sequence Number: 
9
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 15, 1968
Content Type: 
MFR
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP78T02095R000100010009-8.pdf177.07 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2006/10~'ZDP78T02095R000100010009-8 15 May 1968 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: MACV 29 April 1968 Guerrilla OB 1. The 29 April Guerrilla OB was received at DIA on 13 May and forwarded to CIA on 14 May. This new estimate shows an natio7 wide increase of 14,323 guerrillas over the previously held MACV estimate. This new estimate is probably based on incomplete lI repart,3 for the 2W1 first quarter of 1,068. This is assumed to be the case since there is no change In the current estimate for IV Corps and the previous one. 2. Although this estimate is a vast improvement over previous MACV estimative attempts, the current exercise still contains numerous inconsistencies; the least of which is not the methods used in evaluating documentary evidence. 3. In I Corps the estimate was increased from 12,562 to 25,045. This is the most acceptable of the four Corps, with only one major and one minor exceptions. Of minor impact is the apparent exclusion of about 1,000 Secret Guerrilla from the RVN Quang Nam Province estimate. On the other hand the estimate of 6u for Thus "Chien appears to be devoid of all reason. In the first place, dt>eunxentary, evidence supports a figure well over twice this number. A document, with the data of info of Septemher 1967, lists 1,747. In the second place, possible MACV attrition does not seem to warrent such e drop. The estimate for Thua Thien 6 decreased from 2,600 since the first of the year while those for all other provinces in I Corps have in- creased. Finally the current estimate does not take into account the VC gains as a result of Tet -- the number of GVN controlled hamlets has been substantially reduced. 4. In keeping with m Rc rta~p tradition the estimate for II Corps shows a decline from the previous estimate to 15,806. Inconsistancies within this Corps are numerous. The methods used to evaluate docu- mentary evidence vary greatly. The estimates for Binh Dint and Phu Yen Provinces reflect available documentary evidence. A dccnment dated February 1968 lists 5,404 guerrillas in Binh Dinh. The :MACV estimate is 5,654. The estimate for Phu Yen is within 164 of the latest documentary indication. The estimate for Pleiku, on the other hand, totally disregards available documentation. Although the estimate is 70 above the pre-Tet estimate it is a far piece short of the 8,803 ~S_ECRE Approved For Release 2006/10/20: -RDP78T02095R000100010009-8 X-PRE1 claimed by the VC during 1967. The reason for this was onetexplained to be a result of the low number of weapons available (719) and the large number of women (912) and teenagers (627). This might be accepted as valid if it were consistent with past MACV interpretative procedures. Following the capture of a document dated late. 1966 which claimed the strength of the guerrilla in Ninh Thuan to be around 1,700 (i.e., 1,698 - 1,745) MACV has accepted and held this figure as a valid estimate for the guerrilla strength of this Province. The following table demonstrates this fact. MACV September 1967 estimate 1,700 MACV October 1967 estimate 1,700 M.A:CV December 1967 estimate 1,700 MACV January 1968 estimate 1,700 MACV April 1968 estimate 1,688 It is also interesting to note that the document claimed that the number of weapons available to the guerrillas in idinh Thuan was only 130 and that there were 436 women in the guerrilla force, which is a higher percentage than in Pleikat. 5. The III Corps estimate was increased from 4,618 to 6,634, a move in the right direction but totally unacceptable. Ha% Ngbia is estimated to have 730 guerrillas -- in February of 1968 two of the four districts of the provinces had 1,084 alone. The strength of the other two districts was 1,058 in 1967 and there is little evidence which would indicate a substantial decrease in this figure. The estimate for Hatt. Nghia is weak by about 1,000 men. The present MACV estimate for Gia Dinh is 294. This is a estimated decrease of 906 since 1 4anuary 1968. According to documentary evidence there were 259 gue:rillas in one of Gia Dinh's eight districts in February of 1968 alone. We could go on but let it suffice to say that the estimate for III Corps is totally unacceptable. 6. There is no change in IV Corps. The previous estimate of 13,024 was believed to have been about 10,000 shy end from all indications the trend during 1968 has not been in the direction of lowering this estimate but now 23, 000 Is probably low. 7. The following table shows MACV's previous and 29 April. 1968 guerrilla OB estimates. Previous Currently I CTZ 12,562 25,045 II CTZ 15,979 15,806 III CTZ 4,618 6,634 IV CTZ 13,024 13,024 Skid 46,185 6o, 509 I SERET Approved For Release 2006/10/20: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000100010009-8 TRAN4W-rAL SLIP DATE TO: c/1" ROOM NO. BUILDING REMARKS: FROM: ROOM NO. BUILDING EXTENSION FORM RM O 2.4I REPLACES FORM 36-8 FEB WHICH MAY BE USED. Approved For Release 2006/10/20: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000100010009-8