A REVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000100050010-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 81
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: December 8, 1967
• Content Type: IM

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Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
No Foreign Dissent
Intelligence Memorandum
A Review of the Situation in Vietnam
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
.5D
r 1CtPI/CDF pages 1-8D] except
or separator pages
SC No.08753/67
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
A REVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
8 December 1967
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared
jointly by the Office of Current Intelligence, the Office of Economic
Research, the Office of National Estimates, and the Vietnamese Af-
fairs Staff. Readers are referred to "The Vietnam Situation: An An-
alysis and Estimate," 23 May 1967, and to other recent CIA Intelli-
gence Memoranda for treatment of these topics in greater detail.
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A Summary View
South Vietnam
I. The Current Military Situation
11. Communist Strategy and Tactics
III. Communist Forces in South Vietnam
IV. Status of Troop Infiltration Into South Vietnam
V. Infiltration of Supplies Into South Vietnam
VI. Pacification and Population Control
VII. The View From Hanoi: Policy and Prospects
VIII. The Rolling Thunder Program
IX. The North Vietnamese Economy
X. North Vietnamese Manpower Resources
XI. North Vietnamese Ground Forces
International Aspects
XII. Soviet Attitudes Toward the War
XIII. Chinese Attitudes Toward the War
XIV. Soviet Bloc and Chinese Aid to Hanoi
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1. During 1967 the situation in South Vietnam
has developed unevenly. Both the allies and the
Communists have achieved successes and experienced
failures. The costs and problems confronting the
Communist military effort have continued to grow.
Although the long-term military and political trends
have been running against the Communist effort, Hanoi
has effectively adapted its tactics to cope with US
military pressures. The Communists have also main-
tained pressures of their own on the vital Revolutionary
Development program.
2. The most important aspect of the over-all
situation is that no early turning point appears
likely. Given the Communists' belief that they
enjoy political and psychological advantages in a
protracted war, both Hanoi and the Viet Cong have
some reason to view the past year with encouragement
and to persevere with their policies, at least
through 1968.
3. The struggle between allied forces and
Communist regular units is beginning to go bet-
ter from Hanoi's viewpoint, than it has for some
time, despite heavy casualties and a steady erosion
of Communist capabilities. While US forces have
maintained some of the momentum of their gains in 1965
and 1966, the tempo of allied progress against main
force units has begun to slow and the Communists have
regained the strategic initiative in certain key areas.
A number of traditional indexes used to chart the
course of the war are now less favorable to the allies.
The Communists have managed to offset the advantage
gained when US combat forces were introduced by a
combination of continued heavy infiltration and timely
shifts in strategy and tactics.
4. In the war of attrition planned by Hanoi,
the price of victories to the US counts more than the
cost of defeats to the Communists. Although enemy units
are hurting under continued allied pressure, they re-
main effective enough to achieve Hanoi's immediate ob-
jective: to tie down US forces on widely scattered
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fronts and to deny the degree of provincial security
essential to the pacification program.
5. To compensate for the heavy casualties
sustained during 1967, the Communists have sent
large numbers of replacements into South Vietnam.
Infiltration figures indicate that Hanoi has been
able to maintain the total Communist main force
strength at roughly its previous level while in-
creasing somewhat the number of combat units there.
Its objective apparently is not to match the US
build-up unit for unit, but to maintain a support-
able level suitable to its protracted war strategy.
There are indications that sizable new units are
in the process of deploying to the South, but we
do not expect a drastic shift in the pattern or
pace of infiltration. The availability of manpower
in the North and Hanoi's determination to keep up
the fight suggest, however, that the scope and
pace of infiltration are not likely to decline sub-
stantially in the foreseeable future.
6. The war is not going so well for the Com-
munist local forces and the guerrilla components
of enemy combat units. The losses inflicted by
allied action since 1966 have produced a drastic
drop in combat efficiency and morale among many Com-
munist units. The degree of difficulty varies
radically, however, and in some areas the guerrilla
elements remain a formidable threat. Moreover, the
Communists are making strenuous efforts to remedy
these problems through improved organization, co-
ordination, and new tactics.
7. The reality of the guerrilla threat and
its impact on security conditions are reflected
in the slow pace of progress in the pacification
program. While there has been a net forward move-
ment this year, the programs have generally been
running behind schedule in most provinces. The
performance of South Vietnamese supporting elements
remains spotty; setbacks were not, however, limited
to their areas of responsibility. Given the slow-
ness of the South Vietnamese to adapt to their sup-
port mission, the intensity of the Viet Cong counter-
attack, and the disruptive effects of allied stra-
tegic redeployments to meet enemy initiatives, the
prospects for adequate security in pacification areas
are not bright. Without this security, progress
will continue to be slow.
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8. Although the Communists have prevented the
establishment of the'degree of security necessary
for pacification progress in many areas, they are
faced with growing problems within their own local
organization. Morale in the lower reaches of the
Communist infrastructure has declined and there
are signs that some rank-and-file cadre have lost
faith in the Communist cause. These developments,
combined with population movements away from Com-
munist areas, have helped cause a shrinkage of the
Communist taxation, support, and recruiting base.
Popular disenchantment with the Communists, more-
over, has contributed to an improvement in allied
intelligence on the enemy infrastructure. The
allies meanwhile have developed an organizational
framework for a systematic nationwide attack on
the infrastructure, which, if effectively utilized,
could seriously disrupt the enemy apparatus.
9. In the political realm, the South Viet-
namese have made considerable strides in establish-
ing the framework for developing national politi-
cal institutions. Although what has been created
is presently more shell than substance, it is the
first step in the evolution of a viable South
Vietnamese state, and gives the government a bet-
ter claim to legitimacy and popular mandate than
anything its Communist opponents can presently
offer. Political evolution, moreover, has not
been confined to the national (or Saigon) arena.
Some of the elected hamlet and village councils
recently established represent a structure that,
if effectively supported and protected, could
outweigh the better known national institutions in
political impact.
10. On balance, the political trends in
.South Vietnam have been running in a direction
potentially more adverse to Communist interests
than trends in the military field. There are no
grounds for easy optimism, however, since the
trends are fragile and hold more promise than
demonstrated achievement.
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11. In North Vietnam, Rolling Thunder operations
have imposed an increasingly heavy burden. The costs
of bomb damage, the neutralization of industry, the
increased disruption of transport, and the rigors
of daily living have combined to make support of
the war more difficult and complex. Despite the
achievements of the bombing program, however, no
significant deterioration in North Vietnam's military
capabilities or its determination to persist in the
war can be detected. The flow of men and supplies
to the South has been maintained; and the cost of
damage has been more than compensated by deliveries
of foreign aid.
12. Hanoi harbors no illusions of ultimate
military victory, in a Western sense. But the North
Vietnamese remain confident that they can hold out,
in a protracted war of attrition, longer than the
US. They apparently remain willing and able to.
accept the high cost of US attacks in the South
and in the North, at least at present levels, in
the hope that the American and South Vietnamese will
to fight to the end eventually will weaken under
the strain of military frustrations and domestic
political pressures.
13. The view of the war from Moscow and from
Peking has remained fairly constant over the past
year. Although the Soviets probably believe that
a military victory by either side is virtually im-
possible at the present level of effort, they con-
tinue to hold the view that the USSR has no accept-
able alternative to helping Hanoi carry on the
war. Moscow would welcome a political solution of
the conflict, but is not willing to try to force
Hanoi to the negotiating table by threatening to
curtail military aid.
14. Chinese hostility to negotiations of any
kind remains as rigid as ever. We believe that
Peking is prepared to exert considerable politi-
cal pressure, to increase its military aid to Hanoi,
and--if requested--to station combat troops in
North Vietnam in order to sustain Hanoi's will
and ability to prolong the war in the South. We
do not believe, however, that the Chinese are com-
mitted to a Communist success in South Vietnam at
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any price. In the event that only their own inter-
vention could save the situation, we feel that
Chinese fear of a US attack on mainland China would
be the commanding factor.
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The Current Military Situation
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I. THE CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Measuring Progress of the War
1. Measured in terms of progress since the com-
mitment of American combat troops in 1965, the cur-
rent military picture in South Vietnam reflects
great gains. Many strategic lines of communica-
tion have been recovered from enemy control, for ex-
ample, and allied forces are able to conduct military
operations in sectors of the country which were for-
merly inviolate Communist sanctuaries. The enemy's
direct control over substantial sections of the rural
populace has been broken. The total number of Com-
munist battle losses is much higher than in 1965,
and the rate of enemy in-country recruitment appears
to be down sharply. Morale problems have intensified
and local shortages of supplies have hampered opera-
tions.
2. From a conventional military viewpoint, the
enemy's continuing reverses seemingly should raise
the pressure on the Communist military apparatus to
an intolerable level within the foreseeable future.
It is clear, however, that this war cannot be judged
solely in conventional terms, and that such tradi-
tional indexes of progress as enemy killed-in-action,
weapon losses, desertions, etc., do not necessarily
reflect the present strategic balance in the con-
flict. From the Vietnamese Communist point of view,
there are no prospects of a purely military victory
in South Vietnam so long as US forces remain in the
country. There is the prospect, however, that pro-
longation of the war as an indecisive conflict beyond
a point at which the US is willing to endure its
cost will open the way to a political settlement
satisfactory to the Communists.
3. If allied progress in the war is judged
from this point of view, the current military situa-
tion appears considerably less favorable.
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The Present Balance
4. By a combination of continuing heavy manpower
inputs from North Vietnam and shifts in strategy
and tactics, the enemy regular units appear to
be overcoming the advantage gained by the allies
through the introduction of US combat troops. There
are indications, in fact, that the tempo of progress
against the enemy main force units--as compared with
1965-66--has slowed down, particularly in areas where
the Communists have concentrated increased forces and
pressures.
5. While many of the Communist main force
units continue to absorb heavy casualties and are
operating at a combat efficiency far below their
optimum, they are still in the field. By tying
down and spreading out most of the allied maneuver
elements in widespread operations against Communist
regular units, the enemy has precluded the concentra-
tion of friendly forces in a strength sufficient
in any one area to eliminate a significant Communist
component. A decisive victory in these terms would
appear to involve the destruction of an enemy unit
to the point when friendly force strength in the
area could be permanently reduced and employed
in similar operations elsewhere.
The Communist Estimate
6. The failure of the allies to "wipe out"
the Communist units is a point consistently and
heavily stressed by North Vietnamese strategist
General Vo Nguyen Giap in his periodic articles
assessing the balance of forces in the war. Giap's
articles and other Communist statements suggest
that Hanoi believes it can prolong the conflict in
much. its present balance--despite casualties
and other difficulties--for at least two more years.
The North Vietnamese probably hope that such a
time span will suffice to break the American will
to continue the war.
7. The Communist estimate probably is based
in part on their own view of some of the conven-
tional indexes of war progress. For example, while
their casualties have been heavy, they have--even
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by allied computations--declined somewhat since mid-
1967, simultaneously with shifts in enemy strategy
and tactics discussed below and at length in Sec-
tion II. Military returnees under the Chieu Hoi
program, which is considered an indication of enemy
morale and the effectiveness of organizational dis-
cipline, have also dropped substantially during the
latter months of 1967 after peaking early in the
year. By contrast, the rate of offensive activity
by enemy units--defined statistically as "attacks"--
has moved up sharply since mid-year.
8. Currently, the Communists have embarked
on a vigorous "winter-spring" offensive. While the
pace of this activity may taper off before long as
Communist units pull back to recoup and realign in
the wake of their battle losses, the offensive will
have served several significant purposes from the
enemy point of view. It will, for example, have
demonstrated in newspaper headlines throughout the
world the continuing military punch maintained by
the Communists and will probably have served to
shake the faith of a large part of the rural populace
in the ability of the allies to maintain and guarantee
security in the countryside. It is possible, more-
over, that in certain sections of the country, the
enemy may be able to keep up a fairly sustained
rate of offensive activity--in the northwestern III
corps area, for example, and in parts of Ist Corps.
The Regional Situation
9. The ability of the Communists to sustain
their position to some extent and even to reverse
some of the allied gains--thus protracting the war--
can perhaps best be seen in the current enemy situa-
tion in the central coastal provinces from Quang
Ngai south to Khanh Hoa. During late 1965 and
most of 1966, strong allied offensive operations in
this area broke the tight grip over the populace held
by the NVA 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Divisions, and the
local Viet Cong units, inflicting very heavy casual-
ties upon them. However, by replacements from North
Vietnam and a continuing trickle of local recruits,
it appears that the NVA divisions in this area have
managed to maintain their numerical strength at about
70%. Although their combat efficiency has been drasti-
cally cut, they are still formidable threats.
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10. Through defensive maneuver operations, unit
dispersal, and other tactics, the NVA units have
managed to remain in the field, to keep a growing
number of allied units tied up against them, and to
stage continuing small-scale offensive operations in
and on the fringes of the populated coastal prov-
inces. Allied efforts to consolidate the gains in
population control in the area, meanwhile, have been
slow and subject to quick reversal. Security in
parts of the central coastal provinces has deteri-
orated during the past few months in the face of re-
newed aggressiveness by Communist main force units.
11. Allied progress against the Communist regu-
lars has also slowed appreciably, when compared with
1965-66, in many parts of northern I Corps. In the
mountainous area of southern Quang Tri Province, for
example, a substantial build-up of Communist strength--
possibly involving several regiments--has occurred
during the latter half of 1967, despite the deploy-
ment of additional allied units to the northern
provinces. The location of these units theoretically
permits them to harass allied elements operating in
the DMZ area from behind and also to put additional
pressure on the critical coastal lines of communica-
tion with the DMZ. Communist development of the A
Shau Valley base area has also continued and current
deployments of divisional-level units from North
Vietnam may involve a build-up in this area which
would greatly increase the threat to the strategically
important lowlands from Hue to Da Nang.
12. In the III Corps area, allied units--at
their most heavily concentrated strength in South
Vietnam--are continuing to keep the enemy main forces
under heavy pressure in the area of Binh Tuy, Gia Dinh
and Hau Nghia Provinces. Pacification in this re-
gion, however, also remains slow and tenuous under
the threat of small-scale enemy operations.
13. In northwestern III Corps, meanwhile,
security conditions have deteriorated over the past
few months as the Communists have moved in new regi-
mental-sized forces from the highlands and coastal
III Corps. Heavy infiltration of replacements
from North Vietnam into this area has also taken
place in an apparent effort to rebuild the Communist
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units damaged by major allied offensives in Tay Ninh
and Binh Duong Provinces in late 1966 and early
1967. The enemy may now be in a better position
to defend against major allied sweep operations in
this sector than in 1966.
14. In the delta, the combat effectiveness
of many of the Viet Cong main force battalions has
been severely curtailed as a result of continuing
combat attrition and difficulties in recruiting local
manpower. None of the major enemy elements have
been knocked out, however, and there is no real
prospect that this will occur in the foreseeable
future. Meanwhile, an evolution of enemy tactics
designed to cope with the strengthening of allied
forces can be very clearly detected in the delta.
Rather than expending troops generously in mass
infantry attacks on allied strongpoints, the Commu-
nists have begun in many instances to rely on attacks
by fire (mortars and recoilless rifles) and to follow
this up with limited ground probes. The objective
is to =-ep the allies tied down as much as possi-
ble on static defense while conserving the posi-
tion of the Communist units and scoring the maximum
psychological impact on the populace.
15. As in the areas around US strongpoints in
northern South Vietnam, Communist units in the delta
have attempted to increase the density of their
strength in the vicinity of the US bases in Dinh Tuong
and Long An Provinces, hoping to tie up the Americans
in skirmish type combat near the installations and
thus stall US offensives against more vulnerable Com-
munist positions elsewhere in the northern delta.
Better coordination of enemy attacks is also evident
in the delta, as the Communists seek to spread out
and cut the effectiveness of allied reaction forces.
The "Strategic Area" Strategy
16. The development of the "strategic areas" con-
cept discussed in the articles of General Giap has
been a highly important element in the Communist effort
to hold on against the allies and eventually to offset
the presently programmed level of US military forces
in South Vietnam. During 1966 and early 1967, the front
opened by the Communists in the DMZ sector appeared to
be one such "strategic" battlefield. During the last
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few months, it appears that the enemy has been attempt-
ing to develop similar fronts in the central highlands
and possibly in the northwestern sector of III Corps.
Each of these areas is advantageous to the Commu-
nists from the standpoint of terrain, sanctuary and
access to resupply and replacement.
17. At the present time, the military situa-
tion in these areas appears to be largely a stand-
off. While the Communists have probably taken sub-
stantial losses in the stiff battles which have oc-
curred in each front area, their forces are still
intact and the losses can be replaced and combat ef-
fectiveness rebuilt until such time as the enemy
chooses to renew offensive operations in the
particular sector.
18. The Communists hope through the use of
these fronts to soak up many of the extra maneuver
battalions of the allies and prevent their concen-
tration for decisive operations against Communist
main force units in other parts of South Vietnam.
Status of the Irregular Forces
19. The current state of the war against the
local forces and the irregular components of the Com-
munist combat units in South Vietnam is more difficult
to assess than the situation with respect to the enemy
main forces. In terms of overall numerical strength,
the evidence appears overwhelming that the enemy,
beginning in 1966, has sustained substantial attri-
tion among his local and irregular units. The re-
sultant problems have produced a drastic drop in
combat efficiency and morale among many of these
units. The situation varies radically, how-
ever, from area to area of the country. In north-
ern I Corps, where they are backed by substantial
and effective main force units, the guerrilla ele-
ments are a formidable and, in some sectors, a grow-
ing threat. They have probably also maintained
their relatively strong position throughout most
of the delta, where allied pressure has been the
lightest. Elsewhere in the country, the local
forces and guerrillas are definitely less effective
than in 1966.
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20. It is clear from captured Communist docu-
ments, however, that the enemy fully recognizes
his shortcomings in this sector and is making
strenuous efforts to alleviate the situation. It
appears that the Communists do not envisage the
rebuilding of the numerical strength of the ir-
regulars to former levels. They aim rather at
stiffening the effectiveness of the remaining ir-
regular units by organizing closer cooperation be-
tween main, local and irregular forces, by better
armament for some of the guerrillas, and by such
new tactics as the use of sapper squads to maximize
damage in connection with guerrilla-type raids.
There is extensive evidence, moreover, that the
Communists are reorganizing and consolidating many
irregular units with a view to developing more viable,
better led elements which will still have a substan-
tial ability to intimidate and influence a large
portion of the rural populace of South Vietnam.
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Communist Strategy. and Tactics
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1. Present Communist strategy in South Vietnam
is to hang on militarily and politically, in the
hope that the US and South Vietnamese will to prosecute
the war to its end will weaken and that the allies
will agree to a solution which will leave the Com-
munists in a commanding position in the South. The
Communists harbor little illusion that they can
win final military victory or that a few dramatic
battlefield successes will bring about a repetition
of the Dien Bien Phu sequence. Rather, they envisage
a war of attrition in which prolonged, inconclusive
combat and failure to consolidate South Vietnamese
Government control will eventually persuade the
allies to alter their policy.
2. The tactics by which the Communists hope
to achieve their objective involve the maintenance
and strengthening of essential base areas; the co-
ordination of military operations among various
battlefronts--mountain and jungle areas, coastal
lowlands, and the delta; coordination among various
types of forces--main force, local force, and guerrilla;
and coordination of military operations with political
activity. Through these means, the Communists hope
to force allied troops to overextend themselves
in carrying out both offensive and defensive missions.
They also hope to prevent extensive and lasting
pacification of populated regions, and to frustrate
the establishment of a viable, popularly supported
government under anti-Communist leadership in Saigon.
Military Tactics
3. In an effort to husband their military
forces and to cut down heavy losses, the Communists
are trying to avoid large-scale engagements initiated
by the allies in which superior allied firepower
and mobility can be brought to bear. They have
acquired improved weapons themselves, particularly
in the form of heavy mortars and rockets, which
enable them to inflict significant casualties on
the allies at minimal cost to their own forces.
While avoiding large-scale engagements where possible,
the Communists remain willing to undertake limited
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offensive operations under favorable conditions
and to take high casualties in the defense of vital
bases or supply routes, or in the hope of ambushing
or otherwise trapping and destroying an isolated
allied unit.
4. Although some of their regular combat units
are under strength, and certain ones perhaps chron-
ically so, there is no evidence that the Communists
currently are prepared to dissolve their main force
structure and resort entirely to guerrilla warfare.
There is evidence of increasing flexibility within
and among the main and local force structure--re-
subordination, dispersal, or dissolution of some
units--but so far this has been carried out on a
limited scale.
5. The Communists appear to have reaffirmed
the traditional concept which envisages the use
of both regular and guerrilla units, even while
giving increased emphasis to mutually supporting
actions between regulars and guerrillas. Thus they
seek to combine main force offensives with extensive
harassment, such as mortar and rocket attacks on
allied bases and population centers, sabotage of
lines of communication, and small-scale raids.
They hope in this way to increase the number of
allied troops on static or perimeter defense duties,
and to limit the number of allied maneuver battalions
available for search-and-destroy operations.
6. The Communists now deploy the bulk of their
larger main force units in sparsely populated areas,
around the DMZ, in the western highlands, and in
northern III Corps. Each of these areas affords
sanctuary in North Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia, and
access to lines of supply. By staging from these
border strongholds and by shifting emphasis from
one to another, the main force units pose a constant
threat to the control of strategic areas. Their
actions serve to draw in and tie down allied forces
over widely scattered areas, thus relieving pres-
sure on Communist forces in the coastal provinces
and in the delta. These tactics also enable the
main force units to accept combat under conditions
from which they can rapidly disengage to safe havens.
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7. The Communists are also using their local
and guerrilla units not only in their traditional
role of probing and softening up potential targets
for main force operations but as integral elements
of such operations in ambush or blocking missions.
Likewise, main force units, particularly in contested
areas and on the periphery of government areas, are
being used increasingly in small-unit actions to
back up local force and guerrilla operations and to
disrupt the government's pacification program. The
Communists are forming increased numbers of sapper
units, often by retraining local force or guerrilla
units. These modifications, together with increased
emphasis on guerrilla forces and guerrilla tactics,
are aimed at maintaining the Communist presence in
populated areas and preventing significant exten-
sion of government control.
8. Some captured documents and agent reports
suggest that the Communists plan to step up both
selective and indiscriminate terrorism to intimidate
the public and undermine its confidence in the Saigon
government. So far, however, there appears to be no
clear trend in this direction. The Communists appear
to be increasingly aware of the counterproductive
effect of harsh measures against the populace under
their control. Much of their political energy is
currently directed at improving the quality, morale,
and local acceptability of their cadres so that their
internal organization can survive a protracted war.
9. Communist expectations of attracting greater
mass support and of fomenting a "general uprising"
have almost certainly diminished as a result of
continued political stability in Saigon, the establish-
ment of representative government institutions, and
the limited nature of Communist assets in urban areas.
The Communists thus appear to be introducing greater
flexibility into their political tactics as well as
their military tactics. The National Liberation
Front's recently revised platform, while essentially
reaffirming earlier policies, appears to be designed
to offer a possible alternative to the new Saigon
regime and to convince disaffected non-Communists
that they can live with the Front. The Communists
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may be hoping that dissatisfaction with the Saigon
regime and general war weariness will increase as
the conflict drags on, and that some form of compromise
or coalition with the Front may prove acceptable
to non-Communist Vietnamese.
10. The Communists are constantly re-examining
their strategy and tactics in South Vietnam in the
light of their over-all capabilities. Just as they
have had to abandon their hopes of early political
or military victory, their strategy and tactics
have undergone and may further undergo readjustment
to the reality of growing allied strength, their
own heavy losses, and their problems of morale and
logistics. The evidence suggests, however, that
for the present they feel under no compulsion to
abandon their basic objectives in the South or the
means by which they are seeking to attain them.
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III
Communist Forces in South Vietnam
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III. COMMUNIST FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. The strength of Communist forces in regular
combat units in South Vietnam is estimated at approxi-
mately 118,000, of whom some 54,000 are in North Viet-
namese Army units and 64,000 in Viet Cong main or
local force units. In addition, there are estimated
to be at least 35,000-40,000 administrative support
troops who back up the combat regulars. The strength
of Viet Cong village and hamlet guerrillas is believed
to be in the 70,000-90,000 range. The combined total
of these forces is estimated at between 223,000 and
248,000.
2. There is fairly good intelligence on the
regular combat units, and the total strength figure
for this category is considered fairly accurate.
Intelligence on the other two categories of combat
forces is considerably less complete and there is
more room for error in estimates of their strength.
3. It is also possible that our estimate of
the number of North Vietnamese Army troops within the
total strength figure for the regular combat units
is low. Captured documents and prisoner interroga-
tions indicate that an increasing number of North
Vietnamese soldiers are serving as replacements in
regular Viet Cong units. A study in late 1966 of
Viet Cong forces in the III Corps area north of Saigon
revealed that in some units at least 23 percent of
the personnel were North Vietnamese Army infiltra-
tors. This percentage is probably higher now, and
Viet Cong units in I and II Corps probably contain
a correspondingly greater percentage of northerners--
perhaps 50 percent in some instances.
4. There is no evidence that North Vietnamese
Army troops are present in significant numbers in
the delta, or among the guerrilla force, although
a few may be serving as cadres or advisers.
5. Apart from,the military forces described
above, the Communists make a strong effort to organize
much of the total manpower under their control into
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various work forces and semimilitary organizations.
Among the most significant of these organizations
are the local "self-defense" forces. These units
are mainly charged with the protection--in a defen-
sive sense--of Viet Cong - controlled villages and
hamlets. They apparently do not participate very
often in offensive operations against allied forces.
Moreover, the self-defense forces include a large
number of people of both sexes who normally would not
be fit for regular combat duty. Some have firearms,
but many others do not. They are only partially
trained, and usually do not serve full time. Their
existence, however, poses an impediment to allied
sweeps and pacification, and they do inflict casual-
ties on allied forces.
6. There is no officially accepted estimate
of the strength of these self-defense forces. How-
ever, Communist documents indicate that the enemy
estimated their strength in early 1966'at around
150,000. They probably have suffered some attrition
since that time, both from casualties and by the
induction of some self-defense personnel into the
regular armed forces or the guerrilla forces.
Effects of Losses and Recruiting Problems
7. During the past year Communist manpower
problems within South Vietnam have become more serious
as their loss rates have increased and their ability
to recruit in the South has diminished. Analysis
of loss and recruitment data suggests that the Com-
munist force level, which increased substantially
during 1965 and 1966, probably has stabilized or pos-
sibly has been reduced somewhat during 1967.
8. It is difficult to assess the exact extent
to which Communist force strengths in South Vietnam
have declined over the past year and any estimate
of these losses is subject to wide margins of error.
It is clear that most of the decline is at the lower
levels of the Communist structure. This is due not
only to increased casualties, but to the Communist
practice of drawing on the lower levels to help main-
tain the strength of Regular Force units. There is
some evidence that guerrilla forces have declined
considerably in some provinces where allied activity
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has been most intense. In other areas, particularly
in IV Corps, the guerrilla structure may be almost
as solid as before.
9. The number of VC troops in Administrative
Service Units has probably also declined from a
year ago. This assumption is based on the increased
share of combat being assumed by North Vietnamese
Army units; the need to use administrative service
troops to provide combat replacements; and the in-
creasing tendency of main and local force troops to
perform more of their own logistical support.
10. Increasing casualties, illness, and other
hardships are known to be causing considerable morale
problems for both Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops.
The number of Viet Cong returnees under the Chieu Hoi
program this year is well above last year's total,
although the rate for the past seven or eight weeks
has dipped below the comparable period last year.
Prisoners and documents also indicate that desertions
are a growing problem.
11. As of 1 December, the US military command
in Saigon estimated that only 85 to 115 of the 194
enemy maneuver battalions accepted in the official
order of battle are combat effective; the remainder
are listed as ineffective or marginally effective.
Judgments on combat effectiveness are admittedly
arbitrary, however, and are subject to rapid individual
change as enemy units receive replacements and new
supplies.
12. Although the manpower problem apparently
has been more acute in 1967 than previously, it has
not been grave enough to erode the over-all ability
of the Communists to continue the war. While their
losses have been heavy and they face increasing
recruiting difficulties in the South, they retain
sufficient initiative to control their casualty
rate and have the ability to maintain, and increase
if necessary, the level of infiltration from North
Vietnam. Finally, the infrastructure--the political
cadre and Viet Cong government--which the fighting
forces must protect, remains relatively intact.
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IV
Status of Troop Infiltration Into South Vietnam
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1. Evidence on infiltration for the first ten
months of 1967 indicates that Hanoi has been able
roughly to maintain the total Communist main force
strength in South Vietnam, while moderately increas-
ing the number of main force combat units there.
2. The pattern of infiltration in 1967 has
differed somewhat from that of previous years. In
1965 and 1966 the bulk of North Vietnamese personnel
were sent south to encadre existing VC units, to
form the nucleus for new units, or as intact bat-
talion and regimental formations of the North Viet-
namese Army. This year, however, at least 24,000
of the 41,000 infiltrators--almost 60 percent--have
come south as replacement personnel for both Viet
Cong and North Vietnamese units. This figure is
probably somewhat higher since the disposition or
assignment of a number of infiltration groups is not
known.
3. The need for Hanoi to pump in such a large
percentage of replacements is the result of increas-
ingly heavy casualties sustained by Communist main
force units and greater difficulties in recruiting
and training personnel in South Vietnam. Although
some units have been depleted, the Communists have
been able to maintain the nine division force struc-
ture that they achieved in 1966. In some instances,
particularly in the northern provinces of South Viet-
nam and in the central highlands, they have also been
able to add to their force structure and to beef up
their infantry units with artillery, rockets, and
other heavy weapons.
4. Another difference in 1967 has been the
continuing use of the DMZ for infiltration. Some
10,650 of the known infiltrators--about 26 percent--
have used this route. Use of the DMZ complicates
the problem of estimating infiltration because units
suffering casualties in the area return to North Viet-
namese territory for replacements, and often it is
impossible to determine the number of new infiltra-
tors when the units return to South Vietnam for com-
bat. In addition, some North Vietnamese units which
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have taken part in DMZ actions have not yet been
included in field infiltration statistics. These
include elements of the 270th Infantry and the 164th
Artillery Regiments.
5. Between 9,000 and 10,000 infiltrators--
some 22 to 24 percent of the total--arrived in South
Vietnam during 1967 as members of at least five new
North Vietnamese regiments. These were the three
regiments of the 325th Division, the 174th infantry
regiment which infiltrated into the central highlands,
and the 368 "B" Artillery Regiment which infiltrated
into Quang Nam Province. A sixth regiment was formed
in Quang Tri Province primarily from smaller in-
filtrated units.
6. In recent weeks, prisoners and ralliers par-
ticularly from the central highlands, have identified
a large number of newly infiltrated units or groups.
It is likely that many of these will be picked up in
MACV's statistics in the coming months. Most of these
groups appear from their descriptions to be either
replacements or support units for existing NVA regi-
ments or divisions.
Furthermore there are indications
that still more North Viet-
namese units may a in the process of deploying or
preparing to deploy to South Vietnam. The 31st Regi-
ment, which formerly operated in the DMZ area, was
last identified moving southward in the Laos panhandle.
Another is the 304th NVA Infantr Division, last
based at Thanh Hoa in the DRV,
One regiment of the 304th Division has already
been spotted in the Laos panhandle.
8. Infiltration for the first six months of
1967 has been running at the rate of about 5,800 men
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per month. This compares with a figure of about
9,700 men per month for the first six months of
1966. The 1967 figures undoubtedly will continue
to rise as more information becomes available. Past
experience with the accumulation of infiltration data
indicates that a time lag of approximately six
months is inherent in the figures. This problem
has been further complicated in 1967 because of the
large number of known replacements--almost 60 percent
of the total infiltrees to date. They are harder to
detect than the incoming organic units.
9. Nevertheless, the pace of infiltration in
1967 gives evidence of being much steadier than that
of any previous year. Again, this is probably a
result of the large number of replacements being fed
into the VC/NVA force structure each month. In
previous years, Hanoi had infiltrated personnel in
an effort to achieve a programed force structure of
eight to ten divisions. This force was to be Hanoi's
answer to the heavy US build-up in 1965 and 1966.
Thus in the first nine months of 1966, some 75,000
men were sent to South Vietnam, including twelve
regimental-size formations. During the last third
of 1966, infiltration dropped off drastically to an
average of 3,300 men per month--mostly replacements.
With the acceleration of combat in 1967 and the con-
comitant rise in Communist casualties, Hanoi has
been forced to maintain a fairly steady flow of
manpower to the South.
10. Hanoi apparently is not trying to match
the US build-up unit for unit. It has chosen instead
to try to maintain a force level it considers attain-
able and supportable, a level suitable to its pro-
tracted war strategy. If a decision is made to shift
the pattern or pace of infiltration significantly,
it will be based on a number of factors. Among
these are the level of combat in the South, the
casualty rates of Communist forces, and the extent
of any further build-up of allied forces.
11. We doubt that a drastic shift in the pat-
tern or pace of infiltration will be made in the
foreseeable future, partly because the build-up of
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allied forces in the South has leveled off during
the current year and is publicly forecast to continue
at a slower pace into late 1968. Although enemy
casualties also increased drastically this year, the
big surge in Communist losses occurred during the
first half of 1967 and has leveled off since then.
12. Moreover, Hanoi would probably want to re-
tain sufficient reserves to continue the struggle
over a long period and to be in a position to
capitalize swiftly on any possible weakening of US
resolve by a major move South. Hanoi must also take
into account the possibility of a limited invasion
of North Vietnam. It also has problems of supply
and protection of present and future forces fighting
in the South. This is especially important in the
central coastal provinces and in eastern III Corps
where the NVA/VC units already in place are relatively
vulnerable to allied offensives. The North Vietnam-
ese thus are unlikely to try to augment their forces
in these areas on any major scale. Another inhibit-
ing factor is that infiltration must be geared to
the availability of adequate trained cadre and of-
ficer personnel. It is likely that the North Viet-
namese are encountering some serious shortages in
training cadre and officers for their forces.
13. Nonetheless, the availability of manpower
in the North (see Section X) and the experience of
steady infiltration in the past leave little room
for any conclusion that infiltration is likely to
decline substantially in scope or pace during the
foreseeable future. Hanoi still appears committed
to sending everything it believes is needed to keep
its forces in the South in the fight. Despite the
inhibiting factors discussed above, Hanoi retains
the capability of moving several division-size ele-
ments into South Vietnam, in an attempt to alter
quickly the balance of forces there.
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V
Infiltration of Supplies Into South Vietnam
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Logistical Requirements
1. North Vietnamese and Viet Cong regular
forces in South Vietnam* currently require about 215
tons of logistical support per day, of which all but
35 tons is food. The Communists obtain about 75
percent of the total requirement from within South
Vietnam and the remaining 25 percent, or about 55
tons a day, from outside the country. The dependence
of Communist forces in South Vietnam on external
sources for food, ammunition, weapons, and equipment
has grown in 1967 for several reasons. Allied forces
are denying the Communists domestic sources of supply
and are disrupting internal distribution; the Commu-
nist forces are being re-equipped with new and
heavier weapons, the proportion of North Vietnamese
troops in South Vietnam is increasing, and they are
deployed mainly in rice deficit areas. Currently
about 85 percent of the ammunition, 30 percent of
the weapons and equipment, and a little more than
20 percent of the food required by Communist forces
must be infiltrated from out of country.
Infiltration Routes
2. Four general routes are used to infiltrate
supplies to South Vietnam: through Laos; by sea;
through and around the Demilitarized Zone; and from
or through Cambodia. Historically, the Laotian and
sea routes were the main infiltration routes. The
Laotian route is still the most important route,
while sea infiltration has been reduced since the
start of Market Time operations.
3. The Laotian route (the Ho Chi Minh Trail)
consists of an extensive trail and road network.
The road network in the Communist-controlled areas
of Laos near the South Vietnamese border has been
extended from 200 miles at the beginning of 1965
'See Section III for a breakdown of these forces.
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to about 700 miles at present. In previous years
supplies could be trucked only part way through Laos
and only during the dry season. New and improved
roads now enable trucks to move the full distance
from North Vietnam through Laos into South Vietnam
during the entire year. Despite US airstrikes
against this road system and the trucks using it,
the volume of traffic has increased each year. Dur-
ing the 1966-67 dry season, for example, the Commu-
nists delivered more than 20,000 tons of supplies
from North Vietnam along this system, compared with
about 14,000 tons during the previous dry season.
This route is used primarily to move weapons, equip-
ment, and ammunition from North to South Vietnam
but other supplies are also moved through Laos in-
cluding food from Cambodia.
4. Infiltration of supplies into South Vietnam
by the use of small ocean-going ships and junks has
been reduced as a result of US sea and air patrols.
However, three attempts at sea infiltration using
steel-hulled craft of about 100-tons capacity have
been detected this year, the most recent occurring
in July. Weapons and ammunition have made up the
bulk of the supplies infiltrated by sea.
5. Use of land and water routes through and
around the DMZ has increased as North Vietnamese
forces have moved into the provinces just south of
the DMZ. All types of supplies needed by these
forces have been infiltrated by primitive transport
over these routes. Daily needs for the personnel
infiltrating into South Vietnam are also supplied
along these trails.
6. The Cambodian infiltration routes make use
of existing Cambodian roads and waterways to border
areas from where supplies are moved mainly by primi-
tive transport on trails and waterways to the Commu-
nist forces in Laos and South Vietnam. Rice is the
principal item obtained by the Communists from Cam-
bodia. Most other supplies infiltrated to Communist
forces in South Vietnam are either produced in Cam-
bodia or are legally imported to Cambodia through Si-
hanoukville or Phnom Penh and can be readily purchased
in Cambodian markets. The Communists obtain a small
portion of their total requirement for such items
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as batteries, radios, cloth, and paper in this way.
We still lack firm evidence that any substantial
amounts of weapons or ammunition are obtained by
the Communists from Cambodian stocks or through
Cambodian ports, particularly Sihanoukville. On
the other hand, there is evidence that Communist
units in border areas receive arms and ammunition
from stockpiles maintained on Cambodian territory.
These munitions probably were moved from North Vietnam
south through Laos to Cambodia.
Prospects
7. The Communist logistical network has been
and will continue to be a flexible and resilient
system. It has the capability to meet the increased
logistic demands that would result from an expansion
of Communist force levels, from an increase in the
intensity of combat, or from deployment of forces
in new and remote locations. This was illustrated
recently at Dak To. Communist expenditure of
ammunition--particularly ammunition for heavier
weapons--in the Dak To battle was much greater than
the expenditure of ammunition in other recent enemy
engagements, excepting those in the DMZ area.
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VI
Pacification and Population Control
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1. Progress in pacification continues at a
very slow pace. There has been a net forward movement
this year, with setbacks in some areas being more than
offset by gains in others. Nonetheless, programs
were generally running behind schedule in most prov-
inces, and it seems likely that achievements will
fall about 25 to 30 percent short of 1967 goals.
Pacification Progress
2. The best measure of the current status of
the pacification effort is the security of the popu-
lation. The new Hamlet Evaluation System, which
seems to be a reasonably valid indicator of trends,
places about 67 percent of the populace in areas pro-
tected by Allied military forces and administered on
a continuing basis by the South Vietnamese Government
(GVN). Although this figure represents a substantially
improved situation over that prevailing three years
ago, when perhaps 40 percent of the populace lived in
secure areas, it marks only a slight gain (from 64
percent) this year. The population living in Viet
Cong - dominated hamlets has declined from 19 to 17
percent in 1967.
3. The slow pace in pacification is attributable
to a number of factors. The village and hamlet
elections last spring and the national elections in
September and October preoccupied GVN authorities
and diverted security resources from purely pacifica-
cation objectives. Although these activities can be
viewed as contributing to long-term nation-building
aims, they detracted from current pacification
momentum.
4. The Viet Cong counterattack on the pacifica-
tion program, which according to captured documents
is a high priority task, has intensified this year.
In addition to attacking pacification teams and
secured hamlets directly, the Viet Cong have stepped
up their actions against district towns and provin-
cial capitals. The effect of these attacks is
intended to be more psychological than material, and
hence is difficult to measure.
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5. The over-all impact of the Viet Cong counter-
pacification effort is reflected in the Hamlet Evalua-
tion System data, which show that while there was
significant improvement in 33 districts there was
equally significant deterioration in 28 districts
(eight in I Corps, seven each in II and IV Corps, and
five in III Corps) from March through September. The
most significant gains occurred in areas near the
major cities--Hue, Da Nang, and Saigon--where allied
forces are active. Significant deterioration occurred
generally in more remote areas, but included reversals
in districts of Quang Ngai, Phu Yen and Vinh Binh
provinces where pacification successes had been
scored in previous years.
6. These setbacks underscore a continuing lack
of security in the pacification program. The per-
formance of South Vietnamese armed force elements
supporting pacification remains spotty, enabling the
Viet Cong to concentrate their efforts on selected
exposed targets and also occasionally to strike deeply
in the rear of pacified areas. Setbacks were not
limited, however, to zones where these units were de-
ployed. Erosion occurred also in some districts within
USMC, ROK, and US Army areas of responsibility. This
suggests that overextension of pacification operations
(or thin deployments of allied forces) may be as
much a factor as the low combat effectiveness of the
South Vietnamese.
7. A further reflection of lagging pacification
momentum is the declining Chieu Hoi rate. Although
the total number of defections from the Viet Cong for
1967 is almost double that for 1966, the rate of
flow has dwindled markedly since early this year,
and has been running below last year's level for
the past several weeks. This decline is attributable
in part to the reduced pace of clearing operations in
II and III Corps since mid-1967. The new GVN cabinet
is planning greater emphasis on the Chieu Hoi pro-
gram. Increased use is being made of Chieu Hoi re-
turnees in a number of pacification operations,
such as in Revolutionary Development (RD) cadre and
armed propaganda teams.
8. Significant progress has been made in or-
ganizing resources for a coordinated attack on the
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Viet Cong infrastructure. District Operations and
Intelligence Coordinating Centers (DOICCs) had been
established in 48 districts by the end of September,
and cooperation between US intelligence and security
elements has been effective. Despite some initial
problems with the Vietnamese National Police direc-
torate, operations against Viet Cong political control
elements are being mounted at local levels with
encouraging results, and the tempo of this activity
can be expected to increase significantly.
9. The RD cadre program is moving forward
despite difficulties. Almost all teams have now com-
pleted work in their initial 1967 target hamlets, and
have moved on to their second targets. Cadre strength
had increased by 20 percent to 24,509 by the end of
October, with another 6,266 in montagnard teams.
Combat losses this year, however, have been high--
almost 600 killed and missing and 840 wounded through
the third quarter. Losses from various forms of at-
trition have also mounted this year, but have been
offset by the output of the training center, which
is now meeting its monthly quotas. Efforts being
taken to improve discipline, morale, leadership,
and the quality of recruits are expected to reduce
the attrition rate.
10. National Police recruitment continues to
lag, and it is likely that this force will fall about
4,000 short of its projected 74,000-man goal this year.
Police deployments continue to focus on urban areas,
and half of the 58 Police Field Force companies con-
tinue to be improperly utilized.
11. The outlook for pacification is mixed. Given
the slowness of the South Vietnamese to adapt to
their pacification-support mission, the intensity of
the Viet Cong counterattack, and the disruptive ef-
fects of allied strategic redeployments to meet Viet
Cong main force initiatives, the prospects for
optimum security in pacification areas are not too
bright. Without optimum security, progress will
continue to be spotty. On balance, allied troop re-
inforcements programed for the next few months should
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result in additional security in some areas, and
thus permit some net gains. The reassignment of
General Thang to direction of Regional and Popular
Forces should enhance their capabilities to support
pacification. But progress will continue to be slow,
and may fall short of the goals now projected for
1968. The shortfall would be greater in the event
of a deterioration in political stability.
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VII
The View from Hanoi: Policy and Prospects
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VII. THE VIEW FROM HANOI: POLICY AND PROSPECTS
1. Hanoi's policy during 1967 has rested on the same
general propositions that have guided the Communist effort
in South Vietnam since late 1965. Briefly stated, these
propositions are: (1) the Communist military effort will
be sufficient to tie down US troops on widely diverse
fronts and deny the security essential to the pacifi-
cation program; (2) the Saigon government will fail to
stimulate popular support for the war; (3) the South
Vietnamese Army will not develop into an effective fight-
ing force; and (4) these frustrations combined with po-
litical pressures in the US will eventually erode US
determination to continue the war.
2. There is no body of intelligence indicating that
the North Vietnamese have lost faith in these assumptions,
or that they intend at this time to revise the policy
based on them. Nonetheless, the North Vietnamese could
face some hard decisions next spring or summer when they
review their position after the current "winter-spring"
military offensive. North Vietnam's leaders then will
be able to judge the effectiveness of their latest mili-
tary-political campaign. By that time they should also
be in a better position to appraise the new Saigon
government. Finally, they should have a better idea of
the effect of American political pressures on the war.
The Situation in the South
3. General Giap has recently confirmed that the
military-political situation in the South is still the
determining factor in Hanoi's policy. Even though the
North Vietnamese leaders can no longer hope to achieve
a purely military victory, they are still fully capable
of influencing the over-all situation through military
means.
4. Since military results are likely to prove in-
conclusive, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong leader-
ship are relying heavily on the weaknesses of the South
Vietnamese political and military establishment. They
estimate that even if allied forces succeed in inflict-
ing heavy losses on Communist main forces, the US will
find in the end that it has no solid political base in
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South Vietnam and that the destruction of the guerrilla
and political infrastructure cannot be accomplished by
a weakened and ineffective South Vietnamese Army. Then,
the theory runs, the US will have no choice but to set-
tle on Communist terms.
5. From Hanoi's standpoint, the situation in the
South is almost certainly not going to improve signifi-
cantly. Continued slow deterioration of Communist mili-
tary capabilities and political effectiveness is more
likely. However, Hanoi is willing to accept the ap-
pearance of a "stalemate" on the assumption that the
Communists are in a better position than the US and South
Vietnam to endure the frustrations of a prolonged war.
Hanoi apparently now believes that the US will choose
to compromise long before the deterioration in the Com-
munist position becomes significant enough to force a
change in policy.
US Policy and Political Pressures
6. The American political situation thus is taking
on increased importance in Hanoi's calculation. There
is no hard evidence, however, indicating how the North
Vietnamese leaders interpret the American scene or how
they might choose to exploit it. They have tried recently,
both in public and private, to dismiss the American presi-
dential elections as of little consequence. Hanoi asserts
that the basic content of American policies is determined
by the nature of "imperialism" rather than by its leading
personalities, and it contends that North Vietnamese
policies cannot be affected by the American elections.
But it is doubtful that Hanoi actually dismisses the
elections so summarily.
7. There are two ways the North Vietnamese might
try to approach the US election period. They might con-
tinue their present course on the chance that a new adminis-
tration will come to power, perhaps providing better op-
portunities for a favorable political settlement. The
risk in this approach is that there is a constant danger
of new escalation and, in addition, that the chances of
obtaining US concessions after the elections might be
greatly reduced should there be no change in US leader-
ship.
8. The alternative would be to move toward negotia-
tions before the elections. The North Vietnamese leaders
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in this case might hope to exploit the campaign, cal-
culating that the Administration could not afford the
political cost of breaking off talks during an election
campaign.
9. The first of these scenarios is the more con-
sistent with the trend of Hanoi's policy. But the North
Vietnamese themselves probably have not decided and may
feel no need to make such a decision until next spring.
Internal Political Factors
10. In addition to the situation in South Vietnam
and the American elections, the political situation in
North Vietnam will influence Hanoi's policies over the
next year or so.
11. A new factor, of considerable potential im-
portance, is the possibility of change in the North Viet-
namese leadership resulting from Ho Chi Minh's incapacita-
tion or death. The North Vietnamese party has been un-
usually free of the internal strife that has characterized
almost every Communist party around the world. In the
past two years, however, signs of disagreement over the
conduct of the war in South Vietnam have appeared, al-
though the leadership seems to have continued to function
as an effective "collective" under Ho.
12. It is reasonable to conclude that the demise of
Ho Chi Minh could bring to the surface splits of a serious
nature within the ruling circles of the party. We have
no evidence thus far, however, that a faction or group
exists within the party that wishes to end the war on
compromise terms. But it must be borne in mind that our
knowledge of the internal workings of the Vietnamese
leadership is scanty.
13. The options available to the North Vietnamese
appear to be: (1) more of the same; (2) reduction of
the fighting to the level of a purely guerrilla struggle;
(3) gradual phasing out of the fighting without an at-
tempt at a political settlement; and (4) negotiations.
A reversion to guerrilla war or a phasing out of the
military struggle seems less and less feasible in practi-
cal terms. The guerrilla option has been exhaustively
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debated in Hanoi; it apparently has been rejected as
tantamount to handing the US a "strategic victory,"
mainly because in the absence of large Communist units
allied forces would be capable of destroying the VC
political infrastructure and the guerrilla movement.
As to phasing out the war unilaterally, the question
would be whether the Viet Cong could expect to survive
as an underground organization. It would be a risky
course, inviting piecemeal annihilation.
14. The more realistic options would thus appear
to be to fight on with both large and small units or
to open negotiations at a favorable time. There is no
persuasive evidence that the latter course is under
serious consideration in Hanoi. A prudent estimate
would be that the North Vietnamese leadership intends
to fight on at least through 1968, that is until after
the US elections.
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VIII
The Rolling Thunder Program
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No Foreign Dissent
1. Rolling Thunder operations have imposed
an increasingly heavy burden on North Vietnam.
25X1
25X1
Despite the achieve-
ments of the bombing program, however, no signifi-
cant deterioration in North Vietnam's military capa-
bilities or its determination to persist in the
war can be detected. The flow of men and supplies
to the South has been maintained; and the cost of
damage has been more than compensated by deliveries
of foreign aid.
Cost of Damage Inflicted
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25X1
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Military Target Systems
11. Damage inflicted on military targets in-
creased during 1967 and the cumulative effects of
the bombing have disrupted normal military activi-
ties, led to the abandonment of barracks and supply
and ammunition depots, and have caused the dispersal
of supplies and equipment.
12. North Vietnam's air defense system con-
tinues to function effectively despite increased
attacks on airfields, SAM sites and AAA positions.
The recent raids against primary airfields--includ-
ing Phuc Yen--inflicted heavy losses to North Viet-
nam's jet fighter inventory and caused the evacuation
of additional MIGs to China. Nevertheless, these
bases have been restored for at least limited
fighter operations and in recent weeks North Vietnam
has shot down more US planes in air engagements
than it has lost, thus reversing the long-term ad-
vantage US aircraft have held in these encounters.
Attacks on SAM sites apparently have not reduced
either the total number of active SAM battalions
or the available firing sites. Missile supplies
appear to be virtually unlimited and in late Novem-
ber mass SAM firings resulted in North Vietnam's
most successful week in downing ten US planes.
Further, North Vietnam's air defense capability ap-
parently has been improved by the introduction of
more sophisticated radar and the training of more
capable ground control intercept personnel.
13. The loss of capacity at barracks complexes
and supply and ammunition depots is causing incon-
venience, especially in the outlying areas of the
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country. Damage to barracks in these areas has not
been repaired, and troops apparently are being
quartered in makeshift shelters or in nearby vil-
lages. Loss of supply and ammunition depot capac-
ity has required a dispersed logistics base, com-
plicating management problems and reducing opera-
tional efficiency. However, the North Vietnamese
have had time to adjust to these losses and they
probably are less inconvenienced now than at the
end of 1965.
17. The ratio of US air losses to the number
of sorties has declined each year since the begin-
ning of the Rolling Thunder program, primarily as
the result of improved electronic countermeasures
and increased experience in evasion tactics.
18. During the period 1965 through September
1967, US combat and operational losses over North
Vietnam totaled 772 fixed wing aircraft. Almost
90 percent of these were combat losses caused by
antiaircraft fire, surface-to-air missiles, and
MIG aircraft. During the first nine months of
1967, US aircraft sustained 1.8 combat and opera-
tional losses per 1,000 attack and support sorties,
compared with 2.1 in 1966 and 3.4 in 1965. Simi-
larly, during the first nine months of 1967, US
combat losses were 2.2 attack aircraft for each
1,000 attack sorties compared with 2.8 in 1966
and 5.1 in 1965.
19. Although over-all loss rates are declin-
ing, the rates against specific targets such as
industrial installations and particularly targets
in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas are many times
higher than the over-all average. Combat losses of
attack aircraft resulting from strikes against pe-
troleum and electric power facilities and against
the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Complex in 1967
soared to over 20 aircraft per 1,000 attack sorties.
By contrast, a combat loss rate of less than one
attack aircraft per 1,000 attack sorties was sustained
against primary infiltration routes, and related
truck parks and supply areas. The combat loss rate
over targets close to Hanoi and Haiphong during
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April-September 1967 came to 19.5 attack aircraft
for each 1,000 attack sorties.
20. 1,058 US Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps
personnel have been downed in aircraft disabled by
hostile action over North Vietnam from August 1964
to 17 November 1967. About one third of these were
rescued, at least one fifth were captured, and one
tenth are known with fair certainty to have been
killed. A large share of the remainder are believed
to have been captured. The success and scale of
rescue efforts vary according to target location.
Thus, in Route Package VI, which includes Hanoi and
Haiphong, only about 16 percent of the personnel
downed during January-September 1967 were rescued.
21. The systematic attack against fixed eco-
nomic and military target systems leaves few stra-
tegically important targets for future air campaigns.
Other than manpower, North Vietnam provides few
direct resources to the war effort, which is sus-
tained by large infusions of economic and military
aid. The agrarian nature of the economy precludes
any economic collapse as a result of the bombing.
There is no reason to believe that additional pres-
sures which might result from a more extensive or
intensive bombing--baring attacks against cities and
the dikes--would be sufficient to induce Hanoi to
alter its goals for the war. Moreover, it is dif-
ficult to conceive of any interdiction campaign
that would pinch off the flow of essential military
supplies to forces in the South as long as combat
requirements remain at anything like current levels.
Under these conditions, Hanoi's outlook toward the
war is likely to be determined by the situation in
South Vietnam.
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The North Vietnamese Economy
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IX. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ECONOMY
Character of the Economy
Neither ot these conditions, however, has seriously
affected North Vietnam's ability to continue the
war. The remarkable resiliency of North Vietnam's
economy is explained in part by its comparatively
primitive state; agriculture and small factories
and shops predominate; the people have simple
needs, most of which are satisfied locally.
Furthermore, the large and increasing amounts of
economic and military aid from Communist countries
have enabled North Vietnam to make up shortfalls
in production, to replace war-destroyed equipment,
and to take care of other essential requirements.*
2. North Vietnam's Gross National Product is
estimated at $1.6 billion for 1964, or about $90
per capita--slightly less than that of South Viet-
nam. Since 1965 there has been no economic growth.
The development of centralized, large-scale modern
industry has been postponed in favor of local
industry. Goals in agriculture emphasize in-
creased yields, diversification, and more efficient
use of farm labor.
The Civilian Front
3. The civilian population of North Vietnam,
long accustomed to a bare subsistance living, has
accepted with resignation the disruptions to
normal living patterns. The evacuation of non-
essential people--the young and very old--from
Hanoi and Haiphong has probably been a major factor
*Communist economic and military aid programs
are discussed in Section XIV.
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affecting morale because of the disruption of
strong family ties. Hanoi probably has evacuated
half of its population, and Haiphong up to three
quarters, giving a total of about 400,000 persons
relocated from these two cities, and leaving an
estimated 240,000 in Hanoi and 55,000 in Haiphong.
Conditions for the evacuees have become more
difficult in recent months--housing, education,
and transportation to and from the cities are
particularly troublesome.
4. Working hours have been changed to reduce
vulnerability to the bombing. Farmers and workers
in the dispersed workshops labor in the early
morning hours and again in the evenings. Dispersal
of factory production has increased the difficul-
ties of getting to and from work and frequent air
raids disrupt work routines.
5. Although the food situation is worsening
it has not become critical because of large in-
creases in food imports. Identified seaborne
imports of food totaled nearly 380,000 tons
through October of this year, compared with
77,000 tons during all of 1966 and 119,000 tons
in 1965. There has been no indication of a cut
in food rations. Although the minimum rice ration
has been maintained, an increasing proportion of
it is made up of less palatable substitutes,
such as wheat flour. While the official meat
ration has not been cut, the supply of meat has
declined in urban areas, and prices have risen.
The supply of fish has also declined and has
resulted in higher prices. There is a shortage
of textiles, and the annual cloth ration is not
always met.
Agriculture
6. Rice production during the seven years
before 1965 averaged about 4.5 million metric
tons per year. Output in 1966 was about 4.2 mil-
lion metric tons, and the rice crop in 1967 is
estimated to be even below the 1966 crop.
Decreased production in 1967 has been attributed
to adverse weather, a reduction in planted acreage,
and disruptions caused by the bombing. Yields
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in rice production in North Vietnam are slightly
below those in South Vietnam but greater than
those in Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos.
Industry
8. Local industry is currently playing a
more important role in the economy because of the
damage to modern industry. Small machine shops
perform important repair functions. Other local
industries continue to produce a wide variety of
consumer goods. Numerous manufacturing facilities
have been dispersed to outlying locations.
Problems in coordinating supplies and transporta-
tion however, have limited output of the dispersed
factories.
Transportation
9. Despite more than 30 months of bombing,
the transportation system has greater over-all
capacity than it had in 1964. The flexibility and
capacity of the railroad network has been improved
with the help of Chinese construction troops
since 1965. New construction and the installation
of a third rail on some lines, making possible
the use of Chinese standard-gauge equipment on
the main route from China, has made important
additions to rail capacity. The highway network
also has been extended since 1965, from about
9-10,000 kilometers to between 11-13,000 kilo-
meters at present. Instead of five motorable
*See Section VIII for a listing of specific
industrial facilities affected by the bombing
program.
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border connections to China there are now at least
eight. Instead of one all-weather route into
Laos there are now three. The inland water net-
work remains much the same as it was in 1964.
Dredging and other improvements have increased
the navigability of much of the system and water
transport is now being used with increasing
effectiveness. Imports of transport equipment have
been sufficient to increase the inventory and
capacity of railroad rolling stock and to main-
tain the inventory of trucks and watercraft since
the beginning of the bombing, despite heavy losses.
Foreign Trade
10. As a result of declines in food and
industrial production, and the greatly increased
demands of the war, North Vietnam has become in-
creasingly dependent on assistance from Communist
countries. Trade deficits have increased sharply
as-imports have grown and exports have fallen (see
the following tabulation).
(Million US $)
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
Imports
(excluding
grant aid)
143.7
135.3
146.9
131.2
194.6
240.7
Exports
84.1
101.3
100.9
107.9
102.9
82.3
Deficit
-59.6
-34.0
-46.0
-23.3
-91.7
-158.4
Exports in 1967 may be below $70 million (be-
low their 1961 level) and imports have been above
1966 levels, so the deficit in 1967 may go to
$200 million.
11. In 1966, trade with Communist countries
accounted for about 95 percent of imports and 75
percent of exports. The remainder of North
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Vietnam's imports in 1966 came primarily from Japan,
France, and Singapore. Exports to the free world
went primarily to Japan, Hong Kong, and France.
12. Almost half of North Vietnam's exports
by value are products of agriculture, forestry,
fishing, and handicrafts. In addition, metals,
coal, apatite, cement, and wood products are
normally exported. However, by mid-1967 important
exports of apatite, coal, cement, and pig iron had
been drastically curtailed as a result of bomb
damage to the modern industrial sector.
13. The country imports all of its petroleum,
finished steel, railroad rolling stock, vehicles,
and most of the machinery and metal manufactures,
spare parts, industrial chemicals, and raw cotton.
There have been sharp increases in imports of
machinery and equipment; such imports include
vehicles for road, rail, and water transport, road-
building equipment, machine tools, small diesel
generators, and spare parts. About one third of
all imports by volume came by land transport during
1965 and 1966, but during the first half of 1967
this proportion declined as seaborne imports
increased considerably.
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North Vietnamese Manpower Resources
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X. NORTH VIETNAMESE MANPOWER RESOURCES
1. North Vietnam's manpower resources have
proved more than adequate to provide sustained sup-
port of the war effort at its present levels and
probably are adequate to support an expanded effort.
Although Hanoi shows continuing concern about man-
power allocations and productivity, the major strains
appear to result from a lack of experienced leader-
ship and skilled workers. Unless manpower losses in
the South increase sharply, these problems are not
expected to become critical.
2. North Vietnam's population at the beginning
of 1967 was about 18.3 million people. The population
includes approximately 4.2 million males between the
ages of 15 and 49 of whom about half are believed
to be physically fit for military service. An es-
timated 115,000 physically fit males will reach the
draft age of 17 during 1967.
3. The major war-induced manpower requirements
in North Vietnam are twofold: (a) those required to
support the build-up of Communist military forces in
both North and South Vietnam and to replace combat
losses, including an increasing need for NVA troops
to replace VC casualties; and (b) the substantial
diversions of manpower required to counteract the
effects of air strikes against North Vietnam.
4. The rapid build-up of North Vietnam's armed
forces* has been accomplished without recourse to
full mobilization, and the rate of build-up is ex-
pected to be much lower in the next few years. The
military build-up alone has required about 120,000
persons a year during 1965 and 1966. In addition,
during 1966 North Vietnamese combat and infiltration
losses probably totaled from 35,000-45,000 persons
and have undoubtedly been running much higher in
1967. These manpower requirements have been met,
for the most part, by the drafting of almost all
'*See Section XI for North Vietnamese force levels.
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the 115,000 physically fit youths estimated to reach
draft age annually, the regime has also had to
mobilize some reservists but has not found it neces-
sary to alter the current draft age of 17-35 or to
resort to coercive measures to obtain military man-
power.
5. The principal diversions of manpower have
been those associated with war-related programs such
as repair, reconstruction, dispersal, and transport
programs. Air strikes against North Vietnam have
required the services of 575,000 to 700,000 indivi-
duals, about equally divided between full-time and
part-time workers, as shown in the following tabula-
tion:
Full-Time Part-Time
Lines of communication
(LOC) repair and
reconstruction 72 100 to 200
Transport and dispersal 100 to 120 25
Civil Defense -- 150
Air Defense 83 25 to 30
Coast Defense 20 to 25 --
Total 275 to 300 300 to 405
The air and coast defense activities are handled
principally by military personnel, so that the major
civilian requirement is for LOC repair, transport-
dispersal operations, and part-time civil defense
activities. In addition to these workers, up to
34,000 Chinese engineering troops and up to 16,000
Chinese AAA troops are employed north of Hanoi to
repair and reconstruct and to defend the two rail
lines to China. Additional North Vietnamese personnel
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are located in the Laotian panhandle expanding and
repairing the infiltration corridors to South Viet-
nam.
6. Hanoi continues to voice concern about man-
power allocations and productivity and to stress the
importance of female workers, but this is nothing
new. Several factors indicate that North Vietnam
is not yet feeling the manpower pinch to any mean-
ingful degree. Foremost is the existence of the
large and underemployed agricultural sector, which
accounts for slightly more than two thirds of the
labor force. Although large numbers of agricultural
workers have already been taken for military service
and part-time work in lines of communication, the
number and low unit productivity of agricultural
workers means that additional large numbers could be
diverted with only a slight impairment of agricul-
tural output. We estimate, for example, that the
diversion of 100,000 males from rice production would
cause the annual loss of only 50,000 tons of polished
rice, or less than two percent of the average annual
rice crops. If the diversion of manpower from agri-
culture were a grave problem, we would expect to see
substantially increased imports of labor-saving de-
vices. This has not been observed.
7. In addition to the manpower reservoir in
agriculture, there are about 380,000 males in the
civilian service sector including education. Most
of these could be diverted to military-related pro-
ductive work if necessary, but we have little evi-
dence of diversion.
8. North Vietnam's major manpower problem
appears to be a lack of experienced leadership
and skilled workers. These talents are scarce
and are subject to the competing demands of both
military and war-related programs. The lack of
skilled cadre is a limiting factor in North Viet-
nam's ability to train and infiltrate troops for
service in South Vietnam. It is probably less of
a restraint on North Vietnam's capability to coun-
teract the effects of air attack. The recent in-
tensification of the bombings apparently has not
compounded North Vietnam's manpower problems and,
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at least in the case of skilled labor, may have
eased them. The enforced shutdown of most modern
industry has idled an elite labor force of about
30,000 persons. This group can provide North
Vietnam with much of the technical competence and
skills that are currently in such short supply.
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North Vietnamese Ground Forces
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XI. NORTH VIETNAMESE GROUND FORCES
1. North Vietnam's leaders emphasize that their
armed forces consist of three different categories
of troops: the regular army, regional or local
forces, and the self-defense militia. This "three
layer" concept of forces is a basic tenet of the
people's war doctrine developed by General Vo Nguyen
Giap and other Vietnamese revolutionaries. It is
based on the premise that the entire people will
be mobilized in the face of an enemy who is numerically
and materially stronger. Thus each category of
forces has tasks for which it is best suited.
The Regular Army
2. The regular North Vietnamese Army is es-
timated to number some 447,000 men as of 1 November
1967, almost double its estimated strength three
years ago.
3. The army is broken down into 10 infantry
divisions, two infantry brigades, an artillery divi-
sion, an antiaircraft artillery division, over 100
independent antiaircraft artillery regiments, and
various other service and support units, including
Hanoi's 30 to 35 surface-to-air missile battalions.
4. The above forces--numbering some 374,000
men--are located within North Vietnam. Approximately
54,000 additional North Vietnamese troops are in
South Vietnam and at least 18,000 are estimated to
be in Laos.
5. Within North Vietnam, the army is broken
down into two major functional groupings--infantry
and air defense. Some 171,000 men are believed to
be in infantry units while some 93,000 men are en-
gaged in air defense tasks. Another 110,000 men
are believed to be in artillery, armor, high com-
mand, logistics, engineer, and transportation units.
6. At least seven of North Vietnam's ten
divisions are believed to be primarily engaged in
training new recruits and forming new units, both
for infiltration into South Vietnam and to replace
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those regular army units sent South. Elements of
all infantry units are also believed to be engaged
in bomb repair tasks and in efforts to keep lines
of communication open. The use of army personnel
in agricultural tasks does not seem to be as extensive
as it was before.
7. There is still some uncertainty about the
size of the regular army, although we have been ob-
taining much better evidence in the last two years
from prisoners, returnees, and captured documents
in South Vietnam. Areas of uncertainty include the
real strength of units in North Vietnam, the number
of North Vietnamese troops in Laos, and the size of
various security organizations. The figures given
above should probably be considered conservative
estimates.
8. It appears that Hanoi believes that the size
of its regular army is adequate for the present situa-
tion, and the limited evidence suggests it is unlikely
to grow much larger as long as the current situation
prevails. This is supported by a statement in June
1967 by the chief of staff of the army, who said,
"The numerical strength of the air defense forces,
the air force, the engineering corps, the forces in
charge of ensuring communication and transportation
in general, and military communication and transpor-
tation in particular, the infantry units of the regu-
lar forces and the self-defense militia forces...is
suitable to the present war conditions." The view
that the size of the regular army is adequate was
also made plain by Defense Minister Giap in January
1967, as will be seen below.-
The Regional Forces
9. There is very little information on the size
and organization of the regional forces (also called
local forces). They are believed to be a full-time,
lightly armed force organized on the basis of one
battalion per province. They are subordinate to each
of the five military region headquarters.
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10. Historically, the main task of regional
forces has been to engage in combat within their local-
ities or region. They were to join with the self-
defense militia to wage guerrilla warfare or to fight
in coordination with main force or regular army units.
Regional forces are believed to be performing bomb
repair and air defense missions, maintaining civil
order, and preparing defenses within North Vietnam at
present.
11. The strength of the regional forces is
currently estimated at between 15,000 and 25,000 men.
We believe, however, that they are considerably larger
than the official estimate and could number on the
order of several hundred thousand men. Defense Min-
ister Giap said in a January 1967 speech that the main
forces, or regular army and regional units together,
totaled "fewer than a million men." If the estimate
of the regular army is generally accurate, then it
would follow that regional forces are considerably
larger than officially estimated.
The Self-Defense Militia Forces
12. The third category of North Vietnam's
armed forces are the self-defense militia, who num-
ber in several millions, according to General Giap.
US estimates suggest there are some 375,000 armed
militia with the over-all total approaching some
three-million of whom one third are probably women.
These forces are, in essence, North Vietnam's Na-
tional Guard. For the most part, they are part-time
soldiers who perform their military duties after they
have performed their civilian tasks and who can be
called upon in times of emergency. In present day
North Vietnam, their tasks are probably largely con-
cerned with air defense and bomb damage repair work.
13. Self-defense militia forces are only
partially armed; many with just rudimentary weapons.
There has been a concerted effort under way for over
a year to provide better and more modern weapons to
these forces, and to increase the level of their
training.
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XII
Soviet Attitudes Toward the War
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XII. SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD THE VIETNAM WAR
1. Soviet attitudes and intentions toward the
Vietnam war have remained fairly constant over the
past year.* The Soviet leaders probably continue to
view a military victory by the Viet Cong and the
North Vietnamese as impossible. They also probably
believe that a decisive military victory by US-Viet-
namese forces in the near term is unobtainable un-
less the US intensifies its war effort against North
Vietnam to a very substantial degree.
2. The Soviets continue to hold the view that
they have no acceptable alternative but to support
Hanoi in carrying on the war. They probably are
increasingly concerned, however, over the complica-
cations and dangers that might ensue as a consequence
of the war and of their support of Hanoi--notably,
the risk of a US-Soviet confrontation and the
possibility of Chinese military intervention. We
believe that, as a consequence, they would probably
welcome changes of attitude in Hanoi or Washington
that would make a political solution possible.
3. But Moscow is not willing to attempt to
force Hanoi to the negotiating table by threatening
to curtail Soviet military assistance. For one thing,
the Soviet leaders probably judge that Hanoi, even
without Soviet aid, could continue to fight, although
the nature and level of the conflict would necessarily
change. In addition, such a threat might end what-
ever influence the USSR has in Hanoi and might drive
North Vietnam into a tight embrace with China. Finally,
a withdrawal of support or even the mere threat of
it would seriously undermine the USSR's prestige and
influence in the Communist world.
*A general examination of Soviet attitudes toward
the war is contained in SNIE 11-11-67, "Soviet Attitudes
and Intentions Toward the Vietnam War," 4 May 1967.
The main judgments in this paper remain valid.
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4. Concerned about US impatience to get the
war over and finished, the Soviets have repeatedly
emphasized the danger of greater involvement on their
part should the US intensify in any major way its war
effort against North Vietnam.* From time to time,
the Soviets have also referred to the possibility
of Chinese military intervention in the event that
North Vietnam's survival was threatened.
5. We do not believe that the Soviets are
prepared to commit their own combat forces to active
participation in the war. The Soviets clearly rec-
ognize their logistic and other inadequacies, and
they wish to avoid courses of action which might
lead to a choice between confronting the US or backing
down. If the US greatly intensified its military
pressures on North Vietnam, the Soviets would almost
certainly move to create an atmosphere of heightened
tension with the US. They might break off various
negotiations and contacts with the US or suspend
certain agreements. They might announce that they
were going to provide North Vietnam with "volunteers."
They might also dispatch crews for defense equipment
as well as increased quantities of aircraft and
other arms intended to strengthen North Vietnam's
defenses.
6. Depending on the specific nature of future
US military actions, the Soviets might move at some
point to exert pressures on the US outside of South-
east Asia. Soviet-inspired provocation against South
Korea is a possibility, but Berlin remains the most
plausible pressure point. US interests there are
directly engaged and more vulnerable than elsewhere.
The Soviets have a greater capability to control their
actions in Berlin than in most other areas, and minor
pressures on access routes would suffice to create
an impression of crisis. The-Soviets recognize,
*In two recent instances, Soviet Leaders have
threatened. greater Soviet participation in the war.
Marshal SokoZovsky, in an interview with a US jour-
nalist Last week, warned of deeper Soviet involvement.
More recently, Soviet Premier Kosygin told the visit-
ing Swedish foreign minister that the war might "spread"
if the US bombing of the North did not end.
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however, that such measures carry a serious risk of
a generalized crisis, and they would probably be
careful, we think, to avoid situations likely to
lead to a major confrontation.
7. As far as Soviet views on the war in the
South are concerned, if the Communist position in
South Vietnam further deteriorates and Communist
forces there face certain defeat, we believe that the
Soviets would almost certainly stress the need for
Hanoi to negotiate. From the beginning, the Soviets
have interpreted their commitment in terms of support
to North Vietnam rather than to the war in the
South. Moreover, there is reason to believe that
Hanoi's conduct of the war in South Vietnam has raised
serious doubts in Moscow from time to time. The So-
viets would make it clear to Hanoi that they would
not involve themselves in an effort to retrieve a
lost cause in South Vietnam, and that they would not
cooperate with any Chinese intervention in the South.
In the event that Hanoi accepted the need for a
negotiated solution of the war, the Soviets would
of course make every effort to gain terms favorable
to Hanoi's objectives.
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XIII
Chinese Attitude Toward the War
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XIII. CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARD THE WAR
1. China has a substantial stake in the conduct
and outcome of the war in South Vietnam, and a vital
interest in the preservation of a friendly Communist
regime in Hanoi. Vietnam has been the testing ground
for one of China's principal ideological theses: that
wars of national liberation can be successfully and
safely pursued throughout the underdeveloped world.
2. Three years ago Communist successes in
South Vietnam promised early vindication of this
thesis, which had become a major issue in the Sino-
Soviet dispute, and the Chinese urged Hanoi to move
on to the final stage of mobile warfare. US inter-
vention with ground forces in 1965, together with
the USSR's reinvolvement in support of Hanoi, threat-
ened a major blow to Chinese aspirations in Asia and
in the Communist world. In the view of the Chinese,
US intervention was a desperate effort to retrieve a
local defeat but they also recognized an inherent
danger that the war in Vietnam would grow and possibly
include an attack on China. Peking therefore placed
qualifications on its military commitment to Hanoi,
and it continued to urge the Vietnamese to persist in
a "self-reliant" people's war. At the same time,
China's hostility to negotiations of any kind be-
came more rigid, even to the point that Peking at
times seemed at odds with Hanoi on the question of
whether a cessation of the bombing could be followed
by US - North Vietnamese talks.
3. China's intransigence reflects several
factors. The Chinese leaders, particularly Mao,
may still believe that the US can be defeated pro-
vided Hanoi pursues a strategy of protracted con-
flict relying on the proper guerrilla warfare tac-
tics. But even if Peking sees diminishing chances
of success for Communist aims, there are compelling
political reasons for Chinese insistence that the
war continue. Peking probably realizes that the
USSR would play a large role in any political solu-
tion in Vietnam, and that in peaceful conditions
the USSR's economic and military assistance to
Hanoi would pose a major threat to Chinese influence
there. Peking's efforts to limit the influence of
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the USSR in Vietnam have contributed to the deteriora-
tion in China's relations with North Korea, the
Japanese Communists, and other sympathizers. To
yield at this point would, in the Chinese view, be
a defeat for Peking's general line of revolutionary
strategy and would represent a major gain for the
USSR.
4. We believe the Chinese are prepared to
exert considerable political pressure, to increase
military aid, and, if requested, to station combat
troops in North Vietnam, in order to sustain Hanoi's
will and ability to prolong the war in the South.
Even so, we do not believe that Peking is committed
to a Communist success in South Vietnam at any price.
The Chinese have allowed themselves room in their
public position to accept the failure of the mili-
tary effort in the South. If faced with a situation
where only their own intervention could save the
situation in South Vietnam, we feel that their fear
of a US attack on mainland China would be the de-
cisive factor. Rather than accept this risk in
these circumstances, we believe Peking would be in-
clined to accept a termination of the fighting with-
out negotiations in the hope that this might-permit
some level of resistance to continue.
5. US military actions against North Vietnam
or China, however, are an entirely different matter.
We continue to estimate that Peking wishes to avoid
a confrontation with the US, which could result in
a nuclear attack. We are certain, however, that
China would fight if the US launched a deliberate
and sustained air attack on Chinese bases and supply
lines in South China. There are two other situa-
tions which would probably bring some form of Chi-
nese intervention: a major invasion of North Vietnam
and the disintegration of effective Communist
authority in Hanoi.
6. If Peking did intervene in the ground
fighting, we estimate that the Chinese could move
300,000 to 380,000 men against initial objectives
in Thailand, Laos, and South Vietnam, using light
infantry forces in the relatively dry months of
November to January. This represents basic logisti-
cal capabilities, and does not take account of
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Peking's military strategy or the US response to such
moves. An effort on this scale could not be sus-
tained through seasons of unfavorable weather.
7. The size of the Chinese force that could
be deployed and supported in South Vietnam, directly
across the DMZ, would vary with the weather: in
the period November-January the Chinese could move
two to three light divisions into South Vietnam;
with improving weather during February and March,
this force could be increased to a total of seven
to eight light divisions (133,000 to 157,000 men).
8. With respect to greater involvement in the
air war, we note that China has recently permitted
Hanoi limited operational use of one Chinese air-
field following the US attacks on air bases in North
Vietnam. We doubt that Peking has yet determined
how far it will go in allowing the North Vietnamese
to use these Chinese bases in the event North Viet-
namese bases become inoperable. If there is no
strong US reaction to limited use, and if the North
Vietnamese think continued fighter defense is neces-
sary, we believe the odds are about even that Peking
will permit Hanoi to mount combat operations from
bases in China.
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XIV
Soviet Bloc and Chinese Aid to Hanoi
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XIV. SOVIET BLOC AND CHINESE AID TO HANOI
1. North Vietnam is heavily dependent on
economic aid for maintaining present levels of pro-
duction and consumption, and on military aid for main-
taining air defenses, the transport system, and sup-
port of the war in the South. North Vietnam has re-
ceived over $1.6 billion in military and economic
aid since 1965. The Soviet Union has provided nearly
three fourths of this aid, as shown in the following
tabulation:
Million US $
1965
1966
Jan-Jun 1967
Military Economic Military Economic Military Economic
USSR
210
85
360
150
260
100
Communist China
60
50
95
75
70
40
Eastern Europe
Negl.
15
Negl.
50
Negl.
30.
Total
270
150
455
275
330
170
Military Aid
2. Soviet and Chinese military aid to North
Vietnam since 1965 is valued at $1,055 million, about
as much as their combined total military aid deliveries
to all free world countries in the same period. The
USSR provided about 80 percent of all military aid.
East European countries thus far have supplied only
negligible amounts of military equipment although
they have supplied war-supporting equipment such as
trucks and construction equipment. Military aid to
North Vietnam is believed to be on a grant basis and
the great bulk arrives in North Vietnam by land
transport through China rather than by sea.
3. Soviet military aid since 1965 has concen-
trated on air defense equipment such as surface-to-
air missiles, antiaircraft guns, radar, and fighter
aircraft. This equipment has been the mainstay of
the North Vietnamese air defense system. Major items
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1967 were:
Surface-to-air missile
firing battalions
Surface-to-air replace-
ment missiles
200
1,100
1,750
Aircraft
57
85
Artillery, antiaircraft,
and other
1,430
2,830
2,180
Radar
23
160
73
Ammunition (tons)
17,000
40,000
30,000
of equipment delivered by the USSR from 1965 to mid-
4. Chinese military aid since 1965 has concen-
trated on building up North Vietnamese ground forces
and sustaining the military effort in South Vietnam.
Deliveries of small arms, ammunition, and other
supplies have contributed substantially to the fight-
ing capabilities of the North Vietnamese and to the
Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam. Chinese military
equipment delivered from 1965 to mid-1967 included:
1965
1966
Jan-Jun 1967
Aircraft
8
0
12
Naval Craft
2
2
6
Artillery, antiaircraft
and field
320
140
285
Radar
33
112
60
Trucks and other
vehicles
600
400
300
Small arms and other
infantry weapons
(Million US $)
Ammunition (tons)
8,000
10,000
10,000
XIV-2
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5. Economic aid delivered to North Vietnam since
1965 is valued at $595 million. Since 1965, economic
aid has concentrated on local, small-scale industrial
development and on the fulfillment of consumption,
maintenance, and reconstruction needs. The USSR has
supplied vehicles, railroad equipment, barges, machinery
and equipment, petroleum, fertilizer and food. Chinese
aid has contributed to the construction of light
industry, maintenance of the transport system, and
improvements in communications and in the irrigation
systems. East European economic aid has emphasized
light industry, transportation, and medical supplies.
About 56 percent of all economic aid delivered from
1965 through June 1967 came from the USSR; about 28
percent from Communist China; and the remainder from
the East European countries.
6. Both the USSR and Communist China have
provided military personnel to assist the North
Vietnamese. Between 30,000 and 50,000 Chinese sup-
port troops are working on the construction, repair,
and defense of transportation facilities in North
Vietnam. The use of Chinese support troops in North
Vietnam frees additional quantities of North Vietnamese
manpower to maintain the supply and infiltration
routes to South Vietnam and Laos. Some Chinese mili-
tary personnel probably are training North Vietnamese
troops.
7. The number of Soviet military technicians
currently in North Vietnam is estimated at 2,000.
Soviet technicians probably have been working with
the SAM system, jet fighter units, communications,
maintenance, and logistic support.
8. Large numbers of North Vietnamese students
and technicians have been trained in Communist coun-
tries. In 1967 about 10,000 Vietnamese were study-
ing at academic, vocational, and industrial installa-
tions in the USSR, Czechoslovakia, East Germany,
Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria. Over the next few
years the number may rise to about 20,000. Academic
subjects studied by overseas Vietnamese include
medicine, engineering, agronomy, metallurgy, mining,
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and teaching. North Vietnamese technicians are re-
ceiving training in a wide range of industries in-
cluding chemicals, textiles, glass, rubber, paper
and motors.
Recent Trade and Aid Agreements
9. During August through October 1967, new
aid agreements for 1968 were signed with all Commu-
nist countries. Although the value of aid was not
announced, it is probable that North Vietnam's basic
economic and military requirements have been guaranteed.
In the statements announcing the agreements with
Rumania, Bulgaria, Poland, and North Korea, military
aid was mentioned, but it is not known whether mili-
tary hardware was included. Because of the increasing
adverse balance of trade, the majority of present
aid extensions probably will not be dependent on
immediate capability to meet repayment terms.
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