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December 20, 2016
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September 12, 2005
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April 21, 1972
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PDF icon CIA-RDP78T02095R000100080004-6.pdf263.13 KB
-d For Release 2006/11/06: CIA-RDP78T02095R000100080004-6 ? 21 April 1972 MLZJORANDUN FOR Assistant Deputy Oirector for Intelligence SUBJECT Coatments or Adams Memorandum, The Communists Combat Strength in Cama)odia," 11 April 1972 1. The princia,a1 new issue probably is the 20,000 VC/VA troops Sam judges to be missing from the combat OB. Part of. this quantity (5,000) is attributed to units carried understrengtn. Sam provides no evidence on this, but we believe we have made adequate provision for unit strengths. (See comments on infiltration below.) 2. The larger portion of the difference (15,000) is based on his estimate that large numbers of battalion-size and smaller units are omitted from the OB. I would doubt that any omissions involve considerably fewer personnel than Sam auggests and, in any event, will have :ake a look at the evidence, as he did at the time of am's attack on his RC estimate. 3. I think Sam errs by not properly analyzing the structure and missions of various portions of tae OB. For example, he shows quite an array of combat units (7 battalions and others) subordinate to MR C-20 where we don't carry any. Our analyst was inclined to the view that the evidence ano logic aointed to a support role for C-20. Just today, a document snowing one of Sam's missing combat battalions to Lie a transport unit arrived. Both C-10 and C-20 are likely s,n.,port organizations given their areas of responsibility. 4. Aggregate numbers aside, Sam nas also icnorod the ocuaaizatIonal structure of tae Vietnamese Communist forces 4hen he defines the NVA threat to South Vietnam from Cambodia o, Paraa 2. Thi2, he quantifies as more than 75,000 composed of the 30,000-35,000 in our OB, his 20,000 add on, plus 25,000 of the infiltrators as though men deployed an fought in hoards rather than units. Whatever we mignt add to the OE from Sam's eviecnce on battalions and small units would not ;;e a part of the mobile strike forces now attacking _ 25"1 - or Release 2096/11/06: CIA-RDP78T02095R000100080004-6 T South Vietnam but local security forces protecting the rear. Sam provides no evidence at all that our estimates of these strike forces are not sound. 5. As far as the local and regional security functions, including the need to worry about FANK, are concerned, Sam exnibits a woefully inadequate treatment of the evidence and uncierstanaing of capabilities when he said that tac KC "probably aave more than enough men to mina the store in Cambodia, even if most VC/NVA soldiers cross the border." Out of their much needed resources, the VC/NVA have built a series of regional regimental structures to back up the local forces wno arer:g_w_a?lisome VC/NVA cadre. This we explain carefully in paper. Our treatment of the OB has been shown to e correct during the current offensive. The mobile strike forces we describe are the ones attacking; the regional and local forces are performing their security functions as expected. 6. The question of the impact on OB of infiltration groups sent to COSVN needs illumination. Adams suggests that 25,000 of the 33,000 troops estimated to be destined for COSVN are combat troops which should be added to the combat OB. Even if we accept the notion that 25,000 are combat troops, his assumption that all would be destined for Cambodia-based units ignores the fact that COSVN infiltrators are allocated not only to Cambodia but GVN 1.10s 3 and 4 as well. He also assumes that combat infiltrees should be immediately added to the OB -- in tais case, even prior to the arrival of some of them. This ignores the dynamics of the OB and infiltration metnodologies, the former developing CN post estimates and the latter ex ante prediction. Even after an infiltration group has arrived at its eestination, it will not be counted in the combat 03 unless it is part of a new organic unit. Same of the combat filler troops move fairly quickly ineo combat units to replace losses incurred during the erevious dry season and some are held in recovery/replacement regiments to cover anticipated losses. 7. During the current dry season, nevertheless, we have already accounted for an increase of 10,000 in the Cambodia- based VC/NVA combat OB owing to infiltration. The deployment of the 271st Inuependent Regiment through the infiltration pii,eline caused a 5,000 increase in the OB weich was inclueeei in the OLH paper. This rather "fat" increase for the regiment Was partly intended to reflect additional regular group -elease 2006/1 S.: IA-RUm :S la -185 I 1111:11004-? ? infiltration. Since the paper was prepareCi, we hove, in effect, increased the VC/NVA Cambodia OB by adding 5,000 to the GVN FR 3 OB to account for Cambodia-based forces decicying into South Vietnam -- without reuucin the Cambodia OB. This was done to refloct the continuing high level if infiltration to COZVW. With 10,000 uf these 25,000 already accounted for in the 03, tne diposition of the remaining 15,000 is as yet unclear. Because of tne high level of casualties in the current fighting, the 15,000 may well vanish as far as OB is concerned. Chief South Vietnam Branch Indochina Division . ;27*. pproved For Rele e ,00 1/06: CIA-RDP78T02095R000100080004 \OC"..41.4L4/ \o A \ ( or_ ditA44, MO at,f