C.I.A. SAYS ENEMY SPIES HOLD VITAL POSTS IN SAIGON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000100110019-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: October 1, 1970
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2006/10/05: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000100110019-6
C.I.A.- Says Enemy Spies
Hold Vital Posts in Sai on
'By NEIL SHEEHAN
special to The New Yank Times
WASHINGTON, Oct. 18-Thel They said that the President
Central Intelligence Agency has
told President Nixon that the
Vietnamese Communists have
infiltrated more than 30,000
agents into the South Vietna-
mese Government in an appa-
ratus that has been virtually
impossible to-destroy..
Because of this, the C.I.A.
reported, as United States troop
withdrawals proceed, a resur-
gence of Communist strength
in South Vietnam can be ex-
pected.
The report to Mr. Nixon said
that the secret Communist
agents had included an aide to
President Nguyen Van Thieu
of South 'Vietnam, a former
province chief and high offi-
cials of the police and of mili-
tary intelligence. .
Confirmation by Officials
While the study is not ad-
dressed specifically to the ques-
tion of the President's war
policy, officials of the United
States Government. who have
read it say that it does raise
questions about a key aspect
of this policy-Vietnamization,
or gradually giving the South
Vietnamese the main burden of
defending themselves against
the Vietcong and North Vietna-
mese and thus allowing Ameri-
can troop withdrawals.
. High White House officials
confirmed the existence of the
report. They contended, how-
ever, that it exaggerated the
extent of infiltration and they
rejected the, analysis as inac-
curate and "overly pessimistic."
had read a summary of its con-
tents and that he is understood
to believe that the analysis is
unwarranted because of ' the
generally, optimistic reports he
has been receiving from other
sources about the progress of
pacification, the improved mili-
tary performance of the South
Vietnamese and the effects of
the Cambodian incursion.
The Central. Intelligence
Agency's analysis does not as-
sert or imply that the South
Vietnamese Government is like-
ly to fall. in the next few
months, the officials who have
read it said. Nor does the study
discount the likelihood that the
South' Vietnamese Army will
perform well in battle for some
time to come, as occurred in
Cambodia.
What the study does imply,
the officials said, is that the
South Vietnamese Government
has little. chance of enduring
over the long. run because of
the great extent of Communist
penetration.
In terms of troop withdrawals,
the President. has so far com-
mitted himself only to reducing
American men in South Viet-
nam. to 284,000 by next May.
 - 8T02095R000100110019-6
(High White House officials
said that the study gave a total
of about 20,000 agents, but the
officials who had read it said
they were certain the figure
was 30,000.)
The number of such agents
Is said to be growing, with a
goal of 50,000. If this goal is
reached, the spy organization
would be 5 per cent of the
South Vietnamese military and
police forces. The C.I.A. study
doubts, however, that the Com-
munists achieved their goal by
the Vietcong guerrillas and continuing failure of Phoenix,
their North Vietnamese allies.
a pro
ram considered vital to
have been arrested. The C.I.A.
refers to the relatively few ar-
rests to tell how Communist
agents have reached into. army
headquarters, into President
Thieu's office and even into
the negotiating team at ,the
Paris peace talks.
Apathy a Possible 'Reason
In' addition,, the- Central In-
telligence Agency reports the
failure of hundreds of thou-
sands of South Vietnamese
policemen and soldiers to re-
port contacts by Vietcong
agents. The. report adds that
the enemy network could not
exist without the tacit complic-
ity-whether from fear, sym-
pathy' or apathy-=of the ma-
jority of South ' Vietnamese
soldiers and policemen..
The C.I.A. cited such feelings
as evidence that the' Saigon
Government could. not' com-
mand the deep loyalty of the
men on whom it depends to
defend itself.
Although the South Vietnam-
ese Government. is infiltrated
from bottom to top, the study
said, the United States and Sai-
gon have had little success not
only in penetrating the Com-
munist organization but also
in keeping agents alive 'in
areas the Communists' control.
The study offers the follow-
ing assessment of the advan-
tages of the enemy's virtual
monopoly on subversion:
cThere is a permanent im-
balance in tactical' military in-
telligence. The enemy is us-
f
ually forewarned o
alliedlagents-is run by the Vietcong
moves and the United States S
t
lli
and South Vietnam are usually
ignorant of Communist. ones.
cBecause most Government-
held areas are nominally, rather
than firmly, controlled, the en-
emy is able to recruit selec-
tively and to decide freely who
should be assassinated for max-
imum political effecti
cThe enemy has excellent
security and can thwart Gov-
ernment efforts to infiltrate
its organization and territory.
Government agents are ex-
posed in advance and programs
such as Phoenix-an effort be-
gun in 1967 to uncover and
destroy the Vietcong apparatus
in the countryside-are under-
mined. Officials noted that the
namese intelligence organize.-I study provided the most plau-
tions charged with eradicatinglsible explanation yet for the
He has indicated, however, that
he hopes to make further with-
drawals at his Vietnamization
program continues. The Presi-
dent has also repeatedly stated,
as did high White House offi-
cials in commenting on the
C.I.A. analysis, that the Viet-
namization program is going
well.
Details of the top-secret
study were made available to
The New York` Times by the
Government officials who read
it. The study was made last
May, the officials said, and has
been circulated in the, White
House, the Pentagon and the
State Department. Information
received since May-especially
after the two-month attack on
Communist sanctuaries in Cam-
bodia that,ended June 30-has
continued to confirm the
C.I.A.'s findings, the officials
said.
Fresh Analysis of Documents
The study was apparently
based on new information about
the nature and size of the Com-
munist spy organization in
South Vietnam as well as on a
fresh analysis of captured doc-
uments and interrogations of
prisoners and defectors during
the last two to three years.
In its analysis, the Central
Intelligence Agency says that
early last year, after a number
of setbacks on the battlefield,
the Communists decided to shift
their long-range strategy from
intense military activity to po-
litical erosion, against the day
when American troop strength
would no longer be a serious
threat because of withdrawals.
The enemy is confident that
this strategy will succeed, the
analysis pointed out. It offered
no contradiction.
To carry out the new strat-
egy, the report asserts, the
Communists stepped up their
infiltration of secret agents into
various branches of the South
Vietnamese Government.
Most Natives of South
The study estimates that the
enemy has infiltrated more
than 30,000 agents-most of
them natives of the, southern
,.part of divided .Vietnam-into
the armed forces,. the. police
force and the South Viet-
and the South Vietnamese Gov-
ernment have nothing remotely
comparable.
The study describes the
workings of three Communist
g
Vietnamization.
(]Penetration of non-Commu-
nist political parties and reli-
gious groups allows-'the Com-
munists to take advantage of;
and worsen, the chronic politi-
cal weakness of the South Viet-
namese Government.
cThe Communists can . sur-
vive despite great allied mili-
tary pressure. Thus, as Ameri-
can troop withdrawals proceed,
a 'resurgence of :Communist
strength can be expected. The
United States expects to have
the end of 1969, the target
date. 344,000 soldiers in Vietnam by
While the. enemy operatives the 'end of 1970-a reduction
range from very effective to of 205,000 in two years.
very poor, the study says, ' the Hanoi Sends the Orders.
network derives its power from Discussing` the. make-up of
the fact that the United Statesithe enemy apparatus,., the
Communist organizations that
control the estimated total of
30,000 agents receive their or-
ders from Hanoi, through the
Central Office for South Viet-
organizations, one of which haslnam, the Communist command
proven so impervious to Gov-,for the South. The destruction
? ernment countermeasures that,of its headquarters was a goal
none of its important agents of the American drive into
Cambodia, but it is still oper-
ating in the. jungles.
According to the C.I.A. the
full-time operatives are to be
distinguished from the many
more tens of thousands of part-
time agents and Vietcong sym-
pathizers in South?Vietnamese
society.
The largest segment of about
20,000 full-time operatives is
run by the Military Proselyting
Section, whose primary aim
is to undermine.the morale, and
effectiveness of the South Viet-
namese armed froces and po-
lice, according to the study.
Many of these operatives
are South Vietnamese officers
and non commissioned officers.
They try to recruit other sol-
diers to the Communist cause,
foment dissent within units,
perform covert assassinations,
encourage desertions and de-
fections and arrange accommo-
dations in which Government
military units, to avoid cas-
ualties, tacitly agree not to
attack Communist forces. Such
accommodations are a wide-
spread practice that 'American
military advisers have not been
able to end. -
Relatives of Soldiers
This group of 20,000 agents
is supported by a large network
of couriers and keepers of safe-
houses, where agents can take
refuge. Most keepers of these
refuges are the wives or rela-
tives of South Vietnamese sol-
diers and policemen, the study
ion,
gence ec
Military Inte
the study says. These agents
are said to be spotted through-
out ' all levels of the police,
armed forces and civilian ad-
ministration, principally for
espionage. The study notes
that the mission of some of the
high-level agents is to try to
manipulate Government policy.
The Communist Military Intel-
ligence Section also intercepts
top-secret South Vietnamese
Army and police radio com-
munications.
South Vietnamese counterin-
telligence has had its greatest
success against these military
intelligence agents; but the
study cautions that the success
has been a limited one. A wide-
ly publicized roundup last year
probably apprehended less than
half of the high-level agents
working solely in the Saigon
area, the study says. .
Most Dangerous Network
The third and possibly most
dangerous network of agents
reported by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency is an estimated
total of 3,000 members of the
Vietcong security service who
permeate the South Vietnamese
police intelligence service, the
army intelligence and military
security service, and the Cen-
tral Intelligence Office, the
South Vietnamese counterpart
of the C.I.A. Other agents from
this same organization are re-
ported to be active throughout
the non-Communist political
parties and religious groups.
The Vietcong security service
is reportedly a type of political
and. secret police with the main
mission of combating infiltra-
tion or disloyalty in the Com-
munist party, the armed forces
and the population in Commu-
nist-dominated regions in the
South.
The service also reportedly
operates large networks of
- DP78T02095R000100110019-6
 Approved For Release 2006/10/05: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000100110019-6
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