VIET CONG MILITARY PROSELYTING AND PENETRATION ACTIVITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000100110024-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: June 25, 1970
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
\ C; ,..t
-_ WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505 (?~
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
25 June 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT : Viet Cong Military Proselyting and
Penetration Activities
1. This memorandum and its attachment were prepared in
response to your 19 May request for an analysis of Viet Cong military
proselyting and penetration. activities. This memorandum's attach-
ment also constitutes a fuller and broader look at some of the issues
on which our preliminary findings-were reported in a memorandum
entitled Viet Cong Covert Agencies in South Vietnamese Territ '.ry
(ER IM 70-b3, May 1970).
2. The Communists in Vietnam believe (and often state) that
they are fighting the war on three fronts: military, political, and
proselyting. The degree of, emphasis devoted to each sphere of
activity depends on the Communists' analysis of the situation at any
given time. After the Paris peace talks opened and especially after
the U. S. indicated its plans for reducing U. S. troop strength, the
Communists began to place more stress on the political and proselyting
aspects of their struggle. Part of this effort was directed at improving
their civilian and military proselyting activities and infiltrating large
numbers of additional agents into GVN areas and institutions for both
immediate and long range political tasks.
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3. This shift in activity emphasis'was probably designed to
accomplish three objectives:
a. To put the Communists in the strongest
possible position to wage the political-subversive
struggle which would follow any cease-fire or
negotiated settlement (developments the Communists
viewed as distinct possibilities in 1969).
b. To weaken South Vietnam's military, security,
and administrative capabilities for a long-term struggle
if there should be no settlement.
c. To put the Communists in a position to take
maximum advantage of any dramatic or sudden change
in the GVN's political position and, especially, to
exploit any. political stresses or crises. that might arise
in Saigon.
4. There is little doubt that the Communists' proselyting/
intelligence apparatus is playing an important role in their total
effort. Their penetrations of the GVN's military and administrative
establishment have given the Communists a capability for providing
tactical warning and strategic intelligence, setting up accommo-
dations, promoting desertions, exacerbating political dissension,
spreading propaganda, conducting sabotage and hindering Viet-
namization. We doubt, however, that under present circumstances
enemy penetrations, by themselves, could seriously cripple the
GVN political or military structure, or instigate a mass uprising
against the government.
5. Nevertheless, a serious and potentially very dangerous
situation could develop if the government fails to contend successfully
with the numerous exploitable elements of dissent which plague
Vietnamese society, such as unrest among the students, minorities,
Buddhists and veterans, the rising cost of living and other economic
strains, corruption, and divisions within the national political leader-
ship. Should'these elements of dissent coalesce, or should there be
a serious deterioration in the military situation, the presence of a
significant subversive element within the GVN structure could help
bring on the kind of political strife and discord which would work to
the advantage of the Communists.. Continuing and intensified efforts
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to eliminate or reduce these basic causes of dissent will be an essential
counterpart to the measures for improved security discussed in the
attachment to this memorandum.
6: The GVN security and intelligence agencies have achieved.
some notable successes in counterintelligence operations. With
American advice and guidance, there has been a marked improvement
over the years in their professionalism .and in coordination of their
operations. We recognize, however, that further improvements in
this sphere will be required if the GVN is to cope with the growing
VC subversive effort, especially if the conflict should move primarily
into the political arena. The intelligence community is presently
focusing on this problem through the Interagency Coordinating Group
for Vietnamization of Intelligence.
7. I have attached hereto a more detailed discussion of the
questions raised in your memorandum of 19 May. The Agency also
has under preparation a new study of the Viet Cong military proselyting
effort and a new examination of the VCI, both of which will be for-
warded to you as soon as they are completed. . .
Richard Helms
Director
SECRET/ S E INSITIVR
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COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE EFFORTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
A. Assessment of Communist Subversive Efforts
1. A major premise underlying any assessment of the
extent and significance of increased proselyting and penetration
efforts; or the subversive threat as a whole, is that the Com-
munists believe the war will not be brought to conclusion by
military action alone. On the basis of the Vietnamese
Communists' own statements of policy as contained in captured
documents (exhaustively discussed in COSVN Resolution 9 of
July 1969 and in subsequent directives), some of the main
battles in the future will be fought within the political /diplomatic
arena. In Communist terms, proselyting and penetration work,
as well as the entire field of covert subversive endeavor, is
regarded as an integral part of the political struggle. ("Political
struggle" may be viewed as including all forms of the covert
struggle engaged in by Communist security and intelligence
components, * civilian and military proselyting elements, and
other clandestine-oriented elements.)
Intelligence and security components include the North Viet-
namese Ministry of Public Security (MPS), which supervises
Communist Party security sections and other elements/agents
in South Vietnam; the North Vietnamese Research Agency (Cuc
Nghien (tut:) of the Ministry of Defense, which directs the tactical
and strategic military intelligence operations in the South of both
the Strategic Intelligence Office (SIO) of the Central Office for
South Vietnam (COSVN), which acts as the executive agent of the
Research Agency in supervising certain strategic intelligence
operations in the South; and the Military Intelligence Office (MIO),
of COSVN, which conducts and supervises military intelligence
operations in the South.
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2. For years, Vietnamese Communist efforts in the
proselyting area (aimed at both GVN civilian and military
targets), and in the security, intelligence, and political action
fields in South Vietnam have been comprehensive and massive.
They have been targeted against all facets of private and public
life. Communist documents suggest that the Communists have
had contact of one kind or another with hundreds of thousands
of GVN soldiers and civilian officials each year. From the
mid-60s until early 1969, the Communist organization in South
Vietnam gave primary emphasis to the military aspects of the
revolutionary struggle. While efforts had been made to improve
their political posture in the South, the Communists prior to
1969 devoted somewhat less attention, personnel, and effort to
the political aspects of their struggle.
3. Beginning with the Paris Peace Talks in mid-1968
and especially after the first hints of unilateral reductions in
United States troop strengths in South-Vietnam in 1969, the
Communists began to put greater stress on both the long and
short-range preparations for political struggle. Communist
directives contain unmistakable pronouncements of policy and
directions concerning this increased emphasis on the political
struggle. Great importance was placed on the need for more
effective results in the fields of civilian and military proselyting
and on the importance of the security apparatus, not only with
respect to its South Vietnamese targets, but with respect to the
security of party organizations themselves. A special effort was
made to infiltrate large numbers of additional agents into GVN
controlled areas for both immediate and long-range political
tasks. Measures were taken to transfer guerrillas into the
Viet Cong party/government organizations for employment in
activities more directly related to and in support of the political
struggle. The best documented method for infiltrating agents
into GVN territory has been by false defection through the Chieu
Hoi program. The number of false- defectors last year appears
to have increased substantially and may have reached several
thousands.
4. In June 1969, the Viet Cong launched an "Accelerated
Military Proselyting Campaign. " The campaign was part of the
Communist strategy, formulated earlier in the year, designed
to lower the Communists' military profile while U. S. troop
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withdrawals proceeded. The military proselyting campaign has
the short-term objective of weakening the GVN forces and thus
undermining the Vietnamization program and the long-term goal
of building a reserve of subversive agents. This reserve could
be used in a number of contingencies: a cease fire, a political
upheaval such as a coup, or simply as an adjunct to the Communists'
military and political effort over the longer term.
5. Recently captured documents reveal that the intelligence/
security elements in the South are extensively manned and the Com-
munists are planning to increase their numbers. A December 1969
document contained strength figures for both the strategic (SlO) and
tactical military (MIO) headquarters elements in COSVN; SIO was
listed as having 1, 040 personnel and MIO, 1, 401. In another
document covering fund estimates for COSVN agencies (prepared
in late 1969), the COSVN Public Security Section (i. e. , headquarters
administrative element) was designated as having 284 members but
with an estimated increase by 1970 to 500 personnel; the Armed
Security Section, listed as having 1, 294 members at the end of
September 1969, was. projected for 3, 000 members by the end of
1970. Also in the same document was an indicated increase of
personnel assigned to the COSVN Military Proselyting Section from
185 members in 1969 to 300 members in 1970. Other documents
indicate the.full-time military proselyting apparatus is also under-
going considerable expansion at the lower echelons.
6. In addition to the full-time bureaucracy, the proselyting
effort employs part-time workers. These do the grass-roots
proselyting work in the cities, villages, and hamlets. They include
couriers, agent spotters, women who write letters or plead with
_ARVN soldiers to desert, and persons who distribute pamphlets
or write slogans on walls. Countrywide, they number in the tens
of thous ands .
7. The number of penetrations in the South Vietnamese
Armed Forces and security agencies as a result of military
proselyting cannot be estimated with confidence because of the
limited data available. Actual achievement may be quite high
given t1 le concentrated VC effort in this field, their experience
in conducting such operations, and their demonstrated past
successes. These penetrations range from trained and dedicated
agents to unproductive fence-sitters. The hard core of the agent
network -- Party or Party Youth Group members -- may have
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totaled about 2, 500 as of early 1969. The entire network may
have been on the order of 20, 000. We believe that both the
quality and number have increased somewhat since then.
.8. In listing agents on their rosters, Communist
military proselytors usually try to make quality distinctions.
The most trustworthy agents are listed as "Fifth Columnists";
those of less certain reliability are designated as "Sympathizers. "
Captured rosters from a limited number of areas suggest that
the number of Fifth Columnists and Sympathizers for all areas
of South Vietnam are roughly equal. Considerably less than
one quarter of the total of suspected military proselyting agents
in early 1969 were believed to be functioning as GVN civilian
and security officials. All but a few of the balance belonged
to ARVN or to the Regional and Popular Forces. Perhaps a
tenth of these were officers.
B. The Impact of Proselyting/Penetration Activities on Vietnamization
9. It is difficult to measure the total impact of the
Communist proselyting and penetration effort because by
definition these operations are covert and they are only really
successful when we are not aware of them. Moreover, the
Communists often exaggerate their successes and the GVN
tries to hide them.
10. It is self-evident that the stepped up Communist
proselyting efforts during- the past year or .so have not prevented
-the Vietnamization program from making progress. Indeed,
the growth of South Vietnam's armed forces, the shrinkage of
the Viet Cong population base, and a more effective GVN security
apparatus have created new problems for enemy proselytors.
The atmosphere in which they have been working, at least until
recent months, clearly has not been conducive to success.
11. There is, however, solid evidence that penetrations
of the GVN and of GVN forces have often aided Communist attacks,
and such penetrations probably contribute regularly to successful
acts of sabotage and assassination, to encouraging South Viet-
namese desertions, and to enabling individual Communists and
Communist units to evade South Vietnamese operations. To the
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extent that such activities inhibit South Vietnam from assuming
more responsibility for the conduct of the war, the enemy
proselyting/subversive effort is setting back progress of the
Vietnamization program.
12. But the main purposes of this effort probably are
not short-range and not primarily designed to frustrate or
disrupt the Vietnamization program as such. For more than
a year, the Communists have been tailoring their activities
to the long haul struggle in South Vietnam, partly on the
assumption that their prospects are bound to improve as
more and more U. S. forces are withdrawn. The Communists
probably calculate that as the Vietnamization program proceeds,
the GVN will be increasingly hard pressed, if not overwhelmed,
by a combination of political, economic, and military/subversive
pressures, and that such an environment will facilitate their
proselyting tasks and enable them to bring more of their in-place
subversive assets into play. None of our evidence suggests that
the Communists expect to gain the upper hand soon or easily,
but the presence of a significant subversive apparatus within
the GVN structure could help them greatly both in fomenting
future chaos, and in exploiting an unstable situation to their
advantage.
C. Nature and Effectiveness of Current GVN Countermeasures
13. The GVN elements which attempt to cope with Corn-
munist subversive activity within the army and security apparatus
are the ARVN Military Security Service (MSS), and the National
Police, particularly its Special Branch. The organizations
which try to counter subversion aimed at the population at large
are the National Police, the GVN military forces (including
ARVN, and the Regional and Popular Forces), and the Peoples'
Self Defense Force (PSDF).
14. Starting in early 1968, the MSS began to implement
an intensified program to combat subversion in the armed forces.
The program included increasing numbers of investigations,
greater file security, lectures to GVN soldiers by captured
Viet Cong cadres, requirements that the soldiers sign pledges
that they were not in contact with the enemy, and appeals to
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military personnel to report VC approaches to their superiors.
In a fifteen-month period from January 1968 to March 1969, the
MSS and related security organs within ARVN arrested 1, 186
military personnel on charges of being Communist agents
(although many were not convicted). In the last year or so,
the Police Special Branch has rolled up several Viet Cong net-
works in Saigon. Communist elements arrested have included
sappers, security cadres, and intelligence operatives. A
summary of some of these activities was forwarded to Dr.
Kissinger by the Deputy Director for Plans on 15 May 1970.
15. Other programs tied in with the counter-subversive
efforts -- either directly or indirectly -- include the Chieu Hoi
program and the Phoenix program. In addition, the GVN last
year created the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee
(NICC). The NICC attempts to coordinate the individual efforts
of the heretofore independent-minded police and security services
in the fields of counterintelligence.
16. The agencies are employing most standard counter-
intelligence techniques. For example, ex-Communist cadres
are used to spot Viet Cong operatives trying to infiltrate the
cities. Successful examples of this technique have occurred
in Saigon, Danang and. Kien Hoa.
17. In brief, the GVN machinery for counter-subversion
exists, and GVN agencies are aware of the mechanics of how to
make it run. These efforts are being supported by extensive
U. S. advisory and material assistance.
18. The effectiveness of GVN countermeasures is
another story. Several basic unsolved problems still exist.
First, the Viet Cong find it relatively simple to acquire the
legal papers necessary to enter GVN territory and join govern-
ment organizations. They can do so by theft, bribery, forgery
or false defection through the Chieu Hoi program. Second, the
population has been apathetic in reporting approaches by Com-
munist proselytors and intelligence agents. The only set of
statistics available on the subject was obtained from the MSS.
It indicates that during a sixteen-month period ending June 1969,
only 348 GVN soldiers had reported Viet Cong contacts to the
authorities. This was apparently only a small fraction of the
number of approaches to soldiers and police during the same
period. Finally, though progress has been made, a large number
of captives are still either not convicted or, in a variety of ways,
are able to avoid prison sentences. .
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19. The problems of counterintelligence and counter-
subversion are similar to those affecting all governmental
programs in South Vietnam. These include venality which
allows GVN policemen to be bribed by Viet Cong agents, a
lack of effective leadership, and the widespread lack of
determination to root out the Communists on the part of many
administrative and civilian personnel, territorial security
forces, and the population in general.
20. Of course, the picture is not entirely one sided.
The -effectiveness of GVN countermeasures must be assessed
as spotty in some respects and effective in others. In their
totality, they have probably inflicted significant damage to the
enemy's subversive structure. Communist documents, ralliers,
and prisoners frequently complain-that the GVN security
apparatus has made it difficult for agents to operate in many
areas. Moreover, the penetrated GVN agencies have remained
intact and operating, and it is doubtful that under present circum-.
stances such penetration could seriously cripple them. Additionally,
Viet Cong security section documents often express concern about
the success of GVN operations in the fields of intelligence,
psychological warfare, and Chieu Hoi in penetrating VC security.
21. Overall, however, the difficulties facing GVN counter-
intelligence are basic and fundamental. In large part, they hinge
on the fact that the human resources assigned to counterintelligence
are limited and their effectiveness is impaired by problems of
motivation and morale, not only of the police, but of the population
at large. Thus, it is more of a matter of people than of measures.
D. Alternative Courses of Action to Improve GVN Capabilities
22. Influence the highest levels of the South Vietnamese
government to raise standards of performance for the police
system, recognizing demonstrated performance over seniority,
military rank or'personal connections. Convert the police
service into an adequately paid and enviable career service
with pertinent career benefits.
23. Seek agreement by the highest levels of the GVN
for a government review of the provincial administrative system,
with a view to replacing chiefs and senior administrative
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jSECRE'T.j. i NSITIV.E
personnel. who have proven records of slackness and who lack
determination to make provincial administrations more
susceptible to centralized control and supervision in place of
the largely independent, personal satrap system now in effect.
24. Improve the security screening system applied to
refugees and ralliers and their subsequent control by police
authorities.
. . 25. Improve the capabilities of the Peoples' Self Defense
Forces, and convert them into a reasonably well-paid corps in
order to compensate for the personal motivation which is so
often lacking. Assumption of this service by an expanded
National Police Field Force might be considered.
26. Expand the Military Security Service and intensify
efforts to improve its professionalism. One outstanding need
is to increase the size and efficiency of its informant nets within
the armed forces, particularly in the Regional and Popular Forces.
27. Maintain or. increase the current level of U. S.
advisory and material support to the GVN police and other security
and intelligence agencies. Maintain or increase the degree of
.continuity on the U. S. side in this form of support for at least
three or four years. Concurrently, obtain the highest level GVN
support for maintenance in concerned GVN agencies of the
continuity of key personnel of demonstrated competence.
29. Develop programs to encourage the reporting of the
presence'and approaches of Viet Cong agitators and agents.
30. Revamp and revitalize the GVN information apparatus.
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G Af
2 4 AUG 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Economic Research
Chief, Indochina Division
SUBJECT: OER Project 52. 5732, Communist Subversion
in the South Vietnamese Army and Security
Apparatus
FE Division has reviewed reference study and perceives no
objection to its substantive contents. Coordination is hereby
effected.
A.cting Chief, Far East Division
S EC ET
Lxclc s~ r~e~r aai~mat}e
da.~ngr~di ~p and
 I A
^ UiiCL.ASSIFrED ^ USE ONLY ^ CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
OER Project 52. 5732, Communist Subversion in the South Vietnamese
A a Security Apparatus
FROM:
A
ti
Chi
f
EXTENSION
NO.
c
ng
e
,
Far East Division
DATE
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1 CIE R
ATTN:
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
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13.
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15.
FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS fX] INTERNAL
3-62 EDITIONS SECRET ^ CONFIDENTIAL F-1 USE ONLY ^ UNCLASSIFIED
 Approved For Release
2 1 A UG 1g7O
Chief, Far East Division, DDP
SUBJECT OER Project 52.5732, Communist Subversion
in the South Vietnamese Army and Security
Apparatus
1. Attached is a revised draft of OER Project 52.5732
Communist Subversion in the South Vietnamese Army and
Security Apparatus. This draft has been fully coordinated
wit OCI, ONE and SAVA and once your coordination is
received it will go to press. It now incorporates many
of the suggestions and comments you sent to us on 29 June
1970. In addition, I understand that there has been a
number of meetings between analysts in OER and
25X1 to iron out other differences in
opinion.
2. You will recall the history of this report. On
19 May Dr. Kissinger requested of Mr. Helms an analysis
of Viet Cong military proselyting and penetrating activities.
On 25 June Mr. Helms responded by sending to Dr. Kissinger
an eight page memorandum with an attachment on Communist
Subversive Efforts in South Vietnam. The attachment was
coordinated throughout the Agency. In his memorandum to
Dr. Kissinger, the DCI indicated that a more thorough
study was underway and would be sent to Dr. Kissinger as
soon as it was completed. It is this report which is
attached. It is essentially an amplification of the
short report already sent to Dr. Kissinger.
3. Some specific changes or corrections can still
be made in the report. However, we have moved slowly
through the coordination process so as to satisfy as many
divergent views as possible. Further delays could become
embarrassing because the NSC staff knows that this report
Copy L
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is in coordination and delay could lead them to believe
that there are greater divergencies of views within the
Agency than have, in fact, ever existed.
4. I have enclosed copies of your earlier comments
and have indicated with marginal notes those which were
specifically taken into account in the detailed redrafting
of the report. I have also enclosed a copy of Mr. Helms'
memorandum of 25 June 1970 to Dr. Kissinger and a copy of
the coordinated memorandum and attachment on Communist
Subversive Efforts in South Vietnam.
Chief
Indochina Division, OER
Attachments:
1. IM on "Communist Subversion in
the South Vietnamese Army and
Security Apparatus"
2. Your memo to DD/OER dated
29 Jun 70 re Communist Military
Proselyting Agents in the South
Vietnamese Army and Security Services
3. Memorandum from DCI to Dr. Kissinger
dated 25 Jun 70 re Viet Cong Military
Proselyting and Penetration Activities
?- ~~ 25X
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