COMPROMISE OF IM 70-134 'COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY AND SECURITY APPARATUS'
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP78T02095R000100110026-8
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 19, 2005
Sequence Number:
26
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 22, 1970
Content Type:
MF
File:
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Body:
Approved For Release 2006/10/05: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000100110026-8
22 October 1J70
MO , DU FOR. Assistant Deputy Director for
Intelligence
Compromise of IM 70--134, NCozmiunist
Subversion in the South Vietnamese
Army and Security Apparatus"
1. 'hzi a morning dent
to a VSSJ Working Group meeting. in a separate die-
cussio.a with raised the
question of whether or not the Neil Sheehan article
also involv`d a compromise of IM 70--134.
observation was based on this paragraph in tae Sheehan
article.
he number of such agents is said to : e
growing, with a goal of 50,000. If this
goal is reached, the spy organization would
e 5 per cent of the South Vietnamese military
and police forces. The C.I.A. study doubts,
Ao.iever, that the Con*unists achieved their
goal by the end of 1969, the target date.
May report spoke to the 50,000 goaal.
The September report spoke to the 50,000 goal and also
had a footnote pointing out that 50,000 was 5 percent
of the GVN military and security apparatus (sect Page 24).-
3. It seems to us that this is really not evidence
of a compromise of IM 70-134. his seems to be the
case principally because the paragraph in question is
imm diately on the heels of sentences apparently re-
Suiting from Sheehan's discussions with a'aig : ?'/riite
house officials." ily guess is that in parrying with
a x3ri, e~;i.Wal Haig had in mind the Se teml,er
report rather than the May report. This would explain
for exa t 1e the White House saying the study contained
a figure of 20,000 rather than 30,000. Thu; the
compromise ; if any, would appear to have been a verbal
Approved For Release 2006/10/05: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000100110026-8
recounting of some of the figures in the September report.
It would not seem to be a compromise in a seise of Sheehan
having physical access to the September report, if, for
example, he did have the September report, I would have
expected Sheehan to give a large play to paragraph 85 b
w iic11 says flatly that the GVN security organization has
been Inadequate and t'1hat there is little assurance that
it will be able to prevent further growth of military
=roselyting. I would have also expected Sheehan to
focus on other tidbits in the September report such as
it fairly vigorous condemnation of the ID system (see
Para s 53 and 54).
Iconomic Research
Distribution;
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
2 -e OD/OER /-.U4 M
DD/OER
25X1 DD/OER. 1(22 Oct 70)