THAILAND, LAOS, AND CAMBODIA BRANCH (I/TLC)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000200140001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000200140001-2
25X1
25X1
No Date
21 Dec 67
No Date
Blind Memo re Air Attacks on VC Base Areas in Cambodia
Attachment: Proposed Outline: VC/NVA Base Areas
No Date Map of Cambodia
25X1 28 Feb 68
as a Air Traget System
showing enemy Base Areas
(and various,) re timeaschedule for
producing a study on The. Status of Vietnamese Communist
Use of Cambodian Territory (1 October 1967 - 31 March 1968
(outline attached).
25X1
25X1
22 Mar 68
7 May 68
17 Jul 68
28 Agu 68
(study not attached)
to Ch/D/I memo_ie CICV report, VC/NVA Use of
dia as a source for arms and ammunition
(evaluation of subject report)
Current intelligence item re Cambodia-China-VC and
Cambodia-China (report of Chinese shipment of arms to
the VC via Cambodia)
Transmittal Manifest from forwarding piece 25X1
on Use of Cambodia for Arms an nunition Resupply
(attached)
Transmittal sheet forwarding CICV study "VC/NVA Use of
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000200140001-2
Cambodia as a Source for Arms and Ammunition" from
 SECt&i/
Approved For Release I
28 August 1968
I.EMORANDUM FOR: Chief, D/I
FROM : I/TLC
SUBJECT CICV report, VC/NVA Use of Cambodia as a source for
arms and ammunition
1. The attached CICV report on arms infiltration through Cambo-
dia is a very good summary of reports on the location of probable routes
used (see map). In fact, it is probably the best report we have received
from the field on this subject. In general, much of the analysis used
by CICV is similar to that of the CIA report (July 1968, ER IM 68-84),
but, in our opinion, the conclusions reached in the CICV report often are
too strong.
2. We would take issue primarily with the CICV conclusions on the
volume of arms infiltration through Cambodia. It is impossible to con-
clude -- as does the CICV report (p.10) -- from the intelligence now
available that large quantities of arms and ammunition unloaded in Siha-
noukville are being diverted to VC/NV.Aforces in III and IV CTZ. The
CICV report claims that an estimated 9,500 tons of war material (itemized
in attached table) were delivered to Sihanoukville from December 1966 to
March 1968,and concludes that, since this seems an excessive mount even
considering ARK's shortage of military equipment, much of it is being trans-
ferred or smuggled to the VC/NVA. CIA, on the other hand, accepts only
911 tons as probable munitions. Flour and sugar are included in the 7,333
tons which remain,for the most part, unidentified. Moreover, one hundred
and twenty tons of the material accepted as military goods by CICV have
been identified by CIA as definitely non-military.
3. CIA also takes issue with the CICV conclusion that ARK involve-
ment is extensive enough to provide a solid framework for supply activities
(p.)+l). The precise role of ARK remains undetermined.
ii. OER concurs with CICV's conclusions concerning the effectiveness
of the enemy's logistical system and the gaps in allied intelligence which
make interdiction more difficult (pp. 4+5-48).
25X1
25X1
 SMT
4
Approved Fo
004/11/30: CIA-RDP78TO2095R
5. Two other reports, MACV of May 1968 and DIA-Navy of 18 May 1968
(both attached), also address the problems of arms infiltration through
Cambodia. Both reports are good in their analysis of the routes used for
arms infiltration, but their reasoning and conclusions as to the volume
of arms infiltration are even more illogical than those of the CICV re-
port. Low-level intelligence is too often accepted at face value.
attachment:
table: Shipments into Sihanoukville
attachments with original copy:
map
MACV report, Use of Cambodia for arms and ammunition supply
DIA-Navy report, Viet Cong Use of Cambodia for Arms Infiltration
CICV report, VC/NVA Use of Cambodia as a source for arms and ammunition
25X1
25X1
2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T0209 R000200140001-2 25X1
Approved
ZIP
 25X1
Approved For Release 2004
Amount (short tons)
bate
chip
CICV
MACV CIA
30 Dec 66
Heping
450 arms
450 arms
450 probably arms
30 Jan 67
Hang Shou
2300 arms
2300 arms
unidentified
Mar 67
Heping
450 arms
450 arms
x+50 arms
27 Aug 67
Jining
1000 arms
1000 prob. arms
1000 prob. arms for FARK
for FARK
400 Unid., not for FARK
22 Oct 67
You Yi
805-1+00 arms
805 arms
685 unidentified
(120 ident. as non-military)
10 Dec 67
Fo Shan
11 arms
10 Jan 68
You Yi
33+8 arms
33+8 prob. arms
unidentified, some :flour &
sugar
20 Mar 68
Xu xi
1000 suspect
Unidentified
arms
9500 85 00
836 including some flour &
sugar (90% unidentified)
Approved For Release 2 R000200140001-2 25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
Next 7 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
 TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE
16 May 68
TO: chief, D/T
ROOM NO. BUILDING
REMARKS:
We have asked IS/IT
and I/L
for oral appraisal o
f MAC-V
case by 1000 Friday
ay 68.
rr
FROM: Chief, 0ER /I /TLC
ROOM NO.
3G19
BUILDING
Hdq.
1
1
.
1
FORIR ND .~41 REPLACES FORM 38-8
wur(N MAY BE USED.
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
28 February 1968
We should complete the project in the attachment outlined as soon
as possible, but without overtime work. I would like to submit a draft
to Chief, D/I by the end of March. With a bit of updating early in
April we could put out a timely piece on developments during the just-
completed six-month period. The outline is for research purposes. I
realize that we do not have the desired information on all areas, but we
can modify the organization of the finished report to fit the information
in hand. I expect to get a big hand from NPIC/IAS, and additional contri-
butions from I/L and IS/CST.
Chief, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000200140001-2
The Status of Vietnamese Communist Use
of Cambodian Territory
(1 October 1967 - 31 March 1968)
I. Base Areas
A. Location of each
B. Description of each identified camp
1. types and numbers of structures
2. estimated number of troops that can be
accommodated (or estimated maximum number
detected there)
3. principal functions
a. hospitalization
b. training (cite evidence)
c. R&R
d. storage and supply
C. Extent of use
a. forces detected at @
b. length of stay
c. estimated concentration in terms of man weeks
d. apparent nature of use, i.e., used by units
to prepare for action, or used by units to
recover from action?
II. Infiltration Routes
A. Locations
1. routes connecting base areas
2. principal routes into South Vietnam
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000200140001-2
 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
B. Nature of use
1. general information
2. specific information (actual unit movements detailed)
3. change in use over 6 months?
III. Cambodian Activities in Eastern Border Areas
(in proximity to Vietnamese bases)
A. Military
1. location and size of military units and sub-units
2. construction activities
B. Civilian
1. development projects
a. completed
b. in progress
c. planned
2. commercial
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND B TTOM
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME A
N
D
ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
I
c
~
~
C i F ) ) ,
.1-~
2
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks :
RETURN TO SENDER
AND PHONE NO. DATE
CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
Approved For Release
9 2004/11/30 :CIA- 8TO2095ftb
002001400
 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
- Parrot s Beak Axis
Bassac-Mekong Corridor
(Base Area 704)
Seven Mountains Area
(Base Area 705)
Ha Tien Route
Mimot/Snuol/Fishhook Axis
Tonle San/Route 19/Bo Kheo/
Lomphat Area
Tonle Kong River/Route 110/
Base Area 609 - Tri Border
Area
waterway, -- town
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
 'z I beer=
BATTAM AWG
POINTS .SM
PhnomOnnPenh, Bokoy Sep,send Shonoukvi0e are
murti
00tMOMS npo hie
00 DAR EA NC HEY
e
AEg Y' ~ KON ANTAY
Hon Chong AeBIOW
HON......
O MINK HOA
IIf% d.
DE POOL
MMA
0h hfn / 1--e
,. %. 9lem Pen
CAMBODIA
RMllroed Province b.MMery
ROed T!-e Province cedltel
-- Tiell t Plrfleld
t Principal Pod
PopWeted p1.0.0
? owr BOA00
0 10,000 to 00,000
. Under10,000
MM-
30 MG TS
Approved }For Zele.
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
Sudden, intensive
aircraft against VC be
result in inf1:
upon the
Using of
,r optimum conditions
military losses
`epende;it upon the
on of targets. Thorough
tsrgetingfB : studies would be a pre-requisite to effective air attacks
for the following reasons:
a. The specific areas to be attacked would have to be
and precisely defined if significant damage is to be
widescale attacks by B- 's and tactical
cant, alt
hate selection of targets would result in
civilians being killed,
attacks were made against enemy base areas
inflicted on the enemy;
there would little likelihood of air attacks causin ai ifi 'ant
military losses;
presently active -- contain large numbers of enemy
border;
c. Unless attacks were made a
in the heavily populated areas along the Cambodian-South Vietn
25X1
Ap
CRET
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
Without a thorough study of specific targets it would not
damaged. It is possible that poliey eke rs m
supply depots in the base areas to be more
effective than can be realistically expected.
eks gleaned from
CIA/O 51
on enemy activity in these areas
Imo, aerial photography, and g
iblem would be useful, however, in that it
would, 1) establish the criterion for targe
on, m- e.g. be
plated aa.~eas, 2) and give a non-exaggerated appraisal
of the probable effectiveness of such attacks.
ch on the
infeasible at this
e attendant political and pr
ible that
t system would, in
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 -ttA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
 ET
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
:Pr'Q sed Outline :
VC W11A BaseA
I. __'get _sc`i_i_n
A.
The tern base a
to
Allied concept used to refer to a
l+ooseir defined area, frequently
by Communist forces for refuge, reg
car short periods
resupply
most cases we can define and locate such areas and indicate
,cult to pin-point the
real of most intensive act
B. Fixed Facilities
Fixed facilities in Cambodian base areas are largely limited
to mall, dispersed caches of supplies. T
bivouac und
upon departure from
t often are dismantled
Reconnaissance teams have
pin-pointed few such facilities.
C. Troop Concentrations
Combat units using the Cambodian base areas
provided by l f
hzen,sive information..
Appro ed For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R0002001 25X1
40001-
ftE T
Tentative information on their locations is
but recon ajs?aance
 Approved For Release 20045 Ti- ZDP78T02095R000200140001-2
cadre consists only of enough men to handle security, guidance
itary Posts
In some instances Cambodian military outposts are located
assist in the logistical support
We can demonstrate this in several
cases.
E. Proximi to Civilian Emulation Centers
Several base areas are located so close to Villages that it
is difficult to distinguish between Communist and C,,MbOdj
facilities. In other cases, Communist activities are clearly
distinguishable.
II. Probab
Based on experience in Laos it would be very difficult to
estimate the enema 1(IA resulting from air strikes a cinst
a. If there were follow-up ground reconnaissance
estimated.
-4-
25X1
the effectiveness of the air attacks in causing casualties
Approved For Release 2004P 'F MLA- DP78T02095R000200140001-2
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
B. Logistic Su lies
Without ground reconnaissance it would be very difficult to
estimate the volt of enemyy supplies destroyed. Rough
es would be dependent upon unreliable indicators suebc
as secondary explosions and fires. The relatively =all
volume of munitions that are required by the enemy forces
uth Vietnam and the large areas in Cambodia over which
supplies could be readily dispersed suggests that air
attacks alone could not be expected to seriously affect the
enemy supply position in South Vietnam.
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
25X1
SECL
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
 UNCLASSIFIED
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2 . ~ DEC 1967
7 Cc taetit.
Conditions for Success
As a weapon of et(
pre-emptive buying is to
good t' cmntiwied efforts to
supply of the good in question.* P
any all of the suppler of a good to the on=W
buying is very expensive to the nation or nations,
it can, in addition to limiting the supply, risk
enear does receive a great deal more sivee as
motive buying
21
or all of the outstanding
only under certain rather limited conditions.
POD, b
of the good roust be critical and unavailable domestically or from
territories. Second, the supply of the good should be limited and
luared
incapable of Increasing substantially despite rapidly rising prises, i.e.,,
supply should, in the short run, be price inelastic.
ment (as) of the country or countries who supply the critical
actively interfere with tl
pre-eMtive buying is used o other sic:
ie; econc lc, political
or military warfare sures are not feasible. In such circ cstancsa
g is one of the more gentle means used during war.
* The, Use of Pre-emptive buying as a weapon of economic
first used the A.l.lies in World War II and was under the direction cf
t3CC (United Kingdom CT, rcia1. Corporation) and the tJ',',CC (TJnltec' 3tatea
C rciaal. Coies).
Approved For Release 2004/11/
UN
i P78T02095R000200140001-2
: AS .
UNC
 UNCLASSIFIED
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
II
stages of the tar, having ash and Pr,,
xnavy as both the Franc* and Sss r re
Allied
x al because while
he A.lUied need
Spain
trots and attempted to "equitably" parce2 out
d the Anion. Tn 'min the only limit nn
becau a of the sk7rocketin :. We* per ton of
rs poured into the if ie bus neae. A
pick,
ort of
a policy of doling out wolfram between
Go
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
UVCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
6,
It was a terrib iv. Allied campaign. the and of the war,.
a of vol fran b&d been pa hased frM 311 in and 9.0M, ton
a total coat (to the and ) of
ld have cost o about 15
The Germ n war effort was in jAwed
tungsten in carbide tool tips from
a
1'43
ala
eoutrolled t v interests friendly to the en. or was allocated
the enog W the neutral government -- pre-emption was c!oo sd
Wlure, in adft=e. Fortmately, such cases ware not so
numerous as to dsa our prog . . . .. In its uoA inrorunt
and per spe met successful aspects, pre-. tpti was a Kara ssinr
action rather than a. decisive battle on the econnnic f nt."
Gordon,
t
3.
ag UM
. and ngerfield, ydon,
York, 1st Edition, 11947.
10 to 1t? Ott t; 2 or 3
e-:ill., Inc., Nov T
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
UNCLASSTFIED
 U1 CLhSSIFIED
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
For other exampUs as veil ecditional in math di
i ive b. , also :, ! li tt, W. N.,
Vol. I end It, L e? 'Green and Co., raan
in additioe a stern ecs :. c jade from i925-154
so list (t iubjeot) in the Index of Eoauo is 3auma3s. Based o
titles, 10 articles ve lseted but none have, been read.
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
UACLASSIFIED
 TG
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-I [ T.02095R000 01140001--f s J 1 ~
et rl,-t
rqrs to t
i s. year *if-
tntift
bI
chows I*vv av4o t for a
r e
t a e than I. t e -- sr
Oulbod
2.1 2.6 Sillian tot* a yes
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
ms's t tti Pr",Iy V,1111
L-ttweeu 311,041 * k
Is r r VA.n that of
.a's rx r of r e
tAbI* Offt
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
Principal Purchasers of Cambodian Rice and its Derivatives,
1966 and January - June 1967
Jan - Dec 1966 Jan - June 1967
thousand $ US ) thousand US )
metric tons millions) (metric tons (:millions)
Total 190 24.2 121 199.
French Colonial
Area 67 9.5 23 4.2
Singapore 44 3.7 19 2.3
Communist China 22 2.8 10 1.7
Hong Kong 14 1.7 24 4.0
Poland 12 1.7 0 0
East Germany 8 1.0 0 0
Czechoslovakia 7 1.1 9 1.7
France 4 0.5 1 0.1
Other European .
Countries 8 1.4 4 0.7
India Neg. 0.1 11 1.8
Phillipines 0 0 15 2.4
Indonesia 3 0.4 2 0.3
Other Countries 1 0.3 3 0.7
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200140001-2
U H V ~? .f F s:? i E
D