CAMBODIAN PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000200150001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 6, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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Cambodian Problem
No Date
Blind Memo re Logistic Requirements and Flows: A Look
at Roadwatch Reporting, and Losses
No Date
Blind Memo re MACV on Arms Shipments to Cambodia
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29 Aug 69
II to Ch/D/I memo re Explanation of the 0 25X1
Tables (tables prepared to illustrate the effects
of using a stockpiling factor and of using the more
complete IDHS Mission Summary File instead of the
COACT file on estimates of throuqhput re Laotian
Panhandle)
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17 Sep 69
to Ch/D/I memo re New Sources of Information
on Delivery of 107mm Rockets and Other Ordnance to
Rear Service Gro
100 i
up
n Southern III Corps
No Date
Blind Memo re Evaluation of Report on 25X1
Supply Shipments to the VC I 25X1
14 August 1969
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-10 Sep 69
0 to Ch/D/I memo re A Reappraisal of the Cambodian
Supply Route
29 Aug 69
Pacific Command Intelligence Digest Number 18-69,
29 August 1969, Logistical Importance of Cambodia to
the VC/NVA
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I/TLC Roat.Lng Slip
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 Approved For Release 2006/01~U RDP78TO2095R000200150001-1 fT
10 September 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, D/I
SUBJECT A Reappraisal of the Cambodian Supply Route
1. I Ireporting I provides comple-
mentary and corroborative evidence of a Peking-Phnom Penh agreement,
effective from December 1966 until early May 1969, authorizing the shipment
of Chicom supplies -- munitions included -- to Sihanoukville for forwarding
through select channels to Vietnamese Communist forces in South Vietnam.
Numerous questions remain to be resolved concerning the types and quantities
of supplies provided, and the division of these supplies between FARK and
Communist forces. There is little doubt, however, that during its effec-
tive period, the agreement gave the Vietnamese Communists a capability to
channel logistical support through Cambodia, with little or no restrictions
as to the content and volume of the shipments. Although the quantities
reportedly moved through this channel have not been validated, they could
have covered the estimated requirements of Communist forces in II, III and
IV CTZ in the period December 1966-April 1969.
2. The agreement aut orizing the Cambodian supply route reportedly was
arranged by Chou En-lai ar ethel Cambodian Defense Minister Lon Nol, and
approved by Sihanouk. The operation employed civilian transport equipment
and facilities under the supervision of a select group of officers re-
sponsible to Lon Nol. I ireporting indicating Sihanouk's
blessing6f the operation from its inception, it is unreasonable to assume
that the large quantities of munitions channeled to the Communists through
this system could have moved without Sihanouk's knowledge and approval.
3. The entire supply operation was halted by Sihanouk in early May,
however, apparently because of his conviction that the Vietnamese Communists
were supporting insurgent operations in the northeast. In response to
Communist appeals, the shipment of foodstuffs was resumed in early July,
but apparently only on a limited scale. There is no evidence that munitions
are now being forwarded, although large quantities of munitions consigned
to the Vietnamese Communists -- reportedly several thousand tons --
apparently remain in FARK hands. Whether Sihanouk will authorize their
release will depend upon in part the extent to which the Communists satisfy
him that they will not foment and support insurgency, and in part on his
estimate of the eventual balance of power in South Vietnam. For their part,
the Vietnamese Communists will undoubtedly seek to regain free use of the
Cambodian logistic channel while maintaining their capability to support
their forces via the overland route through Laos.
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Evaluation L- j Report on Su-0-ply
to the VC
Volume of Supplies
I
VC were sufficient for "three years fighting." The tonnage
reportedly delivered included all kinds of military supplies but
no food, the equivalent in US terminology to the total of Classes
II, IV, and V. It is not clear whether the "three year estimate"
applies for all of South Vietnam, or just those areas of South
Vietnam that would be supplied from Cambodia. I
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would probably have been knowledgeable of both
sets of requirements. However, it is most likely that he was
referring to the requirements consumed in areas under the control
of COSVN, roughly equivalent to OER's estimated requirements for
southern II, III, and IV Corps. The OER estimate for three years
of these Classes of supplies at the estimated 1967 consumption rates
i
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estimate is 50 percent
higher than OER's. In view of the numerous possibilities for error
in estimating enemy logistical requirements s not, 25X1
unreasonable.
For all of South Vietnam three years requirements at the esti-
mated 1967 rate for the appropriate classes of supplies amounts to
18, 000 tons.
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the 15,000 tons of supplies delivered to the
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that between May 1967 and the spring of
1969 an additional 10,000 tons of supplies were carried to the VC
including 6,000 tons of arms. The remaining 4,000 tons consisted
of food and other soft supplies. If it is assumed that one-half
of the 4,000 tons consisted of food, then about 23,000 tons of
Classes II, IV, and V supplies were delivered to the Communists
between December 1966 and May 1969, a two and a half year period..
Thus, deliveries would have averaged about 9,200 tons a year
compared to 5,000 tons a year (15,000rc;z3) which was reported
This discrepancy doesn't necessarily contradict
because he was probably referring to require-
ments in 1967.* The escalation of the war in South Vietnam after
1966/67 undoubtedly increased these requirements. None of our
calculations, however, would indicate that they increased by over
80 percent, the increase inplicit in an increase of from 5,000 to
9,200 tons a year.
OER's estimate of enemy requirements for the period December 1966
through May 1969, a 2.5 year period, total 14,,000 tons rather than
10,000 tons.
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Shipping
During the period October 1966 through May 1967, 12 Communist
Chinese flag vessels called at Sihanoukville and delivered more
than 36,000 tons of cargo.* Of this total nearly:29,000 tons
as commercial cargo,
such as cement, foodstuffs, and metals. Identification of the
remaining 7,500 tons is spotty; 4,200 tons were unidentified,
almost 1,000 tons were identified as military, and 2,300 tons were
reported as military. Although there were a number of Free World
ships calling at Sihanoukville under charter to China during this
period, it is highly unlikely that they carried military cargoes.
Thus, only some 3,300 tons of military and reported military
cargoes entered Sihanoukville during the period under review.
Even if all of the 4,200 tons of unidentified cargo is assumed to
have been military, only 7,500 tons would have entered through
Sihanoukville. This would mean that if 12,500 of supplies were
about 5,000 tons would have
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had to consist of non-military supplies. Thus from available
shipping data the share of military goods
to the VC could have ranged from 25 percent
to 60 percent. The lower figure assumes that all reported military
goods were indeed military. The upper figure is based on the
unrealistic assumption that all unidentified deliveries were
military.
For even large volumes of military goods to have arrived
during the time period, these supplies would have had to arrive:
(1) on vessels unnoted in the intelligence community; (2) as part
of cargoes described as cement, metals, and so forth; (3) as
cargoes over and above registered deliveries. Alternative (1)
would be highly unlikely.
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any reliable indication that such large volumes of suspect cargo
arrived in Sihanoukville before May 1967. Alternatives (2) and (3)
would be very unusual, and such practices do not appear to have
been followed in recent suspect Chinese voyages to Cambodia. In
conclusion, it appears that no more than 7,500 tons of military
supplies, and probably much less, were delivered to Sihanoukville
for the Communists before May 1967.
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Overland Route
source to claim that large
quantities of rockets were moved south from Attopeu to Cambodia
and hence to the VC. The length of the rocket, reported
to be approximately 120 centimeters (47.3 inches) is close to
the length of the Soviet 140 mm rocket (length of round 42.8
inches, length of launcher 4+5 inches). As far as is known the
Chinese do not produce the 140 mm rocket, which is a possible
explanation, assuming
reporting is correct, as to why
the rockets moved overland into Cambodia rather than being shipped
through Sihanoukville. The reported tonnages moved, 2,000 tons,
would include up to 28,000 rockets, including packaging and
launchers. This is an impossibly large number of rockets.
During the first six months of this year only 7,000 rockets of all
South Vietnam.
calibers were fired in~all of Furthermore, more than 90 per-
cent of the rockets fired are 122 nun and 107 mm rockets.
Historically only negligible numbers of 140 mm rockets have been
fired or found in caches.:
2. OER has never identified the southward flow of munitions
However, the Communists did have the capability
at the reported time for moving supplies over the route indicated
The movement of 2,000 tons
from Laos to Cambodia during the December 1966 - May 1967 period
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a
would equal about 11 tons per day. Assuming the use ofA3-ton
capacity truck this would have required about 4 truck loads per
day.
3. The rockets moved during the dry season so that road
conditions would have been favorable. C
ment began at Attopeu, it not being clear
the ship-
to the town of Attopeu or the province of Attopeu. Movements from
the city of Attopeu would have been difficult as the town was
controlled by FAR forces at that time, as was most of Route 16
south to Route 110. However, southbound movement could have
occurred from depots and transshipment points in Attopeu Province
on Routes 96110.
4. By the end of May 1966, Route 96 had been extended from
south of Chavane to the Cambodian border. The road was estimated
to have been about 7-9 feet wide and suitable primarily for dry
season movement. Route 110 also was completed at this time,
extending east from the Cambodian border at the junction with the
Se Kong river to its intersection with Route 96 in the tri-border
area.
5. Although the roads were open, roadwatch reports through
May 1967 from several teams along Routes 92 and 96 indicate a
southbound level of truck traffic too low to support an average of
4 trucks a day. The same was true for Route 110 during the period.
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Pilot reports of truck sightings on the southern portions of Route
96 and on Route 110 during the period also were less than 4 trucks
per day. However, as has been pointed out in other reports and
briefings we believe that both pilot sightings and roadwatch
reporting probably understate truck traffic in the southern
Panhandle.
6. River traffic on the Se Kong from the Cambodian border
south was reported on by various sources of undetermined reliability
during December 1966 - May 1967. Most of the sources reported on
movement of boats travelling north on the Se Kong to the Laotian
border. However, some did indicate movements of supplies south
and reported numbers of boats large enough to move well over
2,000 tons during the 6-month period ending May 1967. Therefore,
if the supplies were moved to the Cambodian border at the Se Kong
they could have been shipped farther south into. Cambodia from
Laos. One of the sources reporting on the river traffic was a
Laos official who obtained his information from a coolie who worked
on one of the motorboats between 5-10 December 1966. He said about
200 motor boats were involved in supply activity that was continuing
around the clock. The coolie said foodstuffs and other cargo was
moved up-river and on the return trip a number of boats carried
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ammunition and grenades to Ban Khalong (near Stung Treng).*
Another source ho defected on
He said that he"knew that 20-30 boats worked the
Se Kong each night and that each boat carried up to 2 tons.**
* If one quarter of the 200 boats carried ammo and grenades
and each boat could carry about 3 tons about 150 tons could be
carried on each return trip. It would take only 14 return trips
to carry 2,000 tons.
If each boat averaged a one-ton load and made trips into
Cambodia and returned the next day, 25 of them could carry about
375 tons a month or 2,250 tons over the six-month period.
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 SEGRET
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17 September 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, D/I
SUBJECT . New Sources of Information on Delivery of 107mm
Rockets and Other Ordnance to Rear Service
Group 100 in Southern III Corps
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1. Two new sourcesl Li 25X1
have given us valuable new evidence on transport of ordnance to
RSG 100 in the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border area in southern
2. Although neither source has had his bona fides established,
the striking similarities between their reports lend them considerable
credence. Both sources state that convoys brought ordnance to speci-
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WNT
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CROUP 1
E-c uded from sutoroefi;
downgrading Anil X1
decinssiticyIon
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Pied areas north and south of Route 1 near the South Vietnamese
border as often as 3 times a month and as seldom as once every
2 months. According to both sources the trucks, which are driven
by Cambodian army soldiers, arrived at their delivery points
around midnight. The ordnance boxes were hidden beneath bananas
that were carefully unloaded and reloaded onto the trucks when
the boxes were emptied. Source 1 said that the ordnance came from
Phnom Penh while Source 2 said only that it came from Cambodia.
3. Both sources include 107tpm rockets (H-12's) in their lists
of the types of ordnance transported to RSG 100 in this manner.
Although a considerable number of these weapons have been used in
III and IV Corps since January 1968, these 2 sources are the first
to give a fairly comprehensive explanation of the supply route over
which they are moved. The cons icious absence n-P e 107's from
the types of ordnance listed leaves no firm
basis to support the north-south supply route to southern III Corps
for this particular weapon. The case for Cambodia as a source of
supply for other weapons is not so conclusive, but the reports
from these 2 sources cannot be summarily discredited.
Analyst, Logistics Branch
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as 40 t to 2,20
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asommd ta be divVed ' " -
42 permat are needed to *Dw z.*
39,617
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wattlo= reodwd t
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7. Saw of the evIlveries I
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MqAdrawtts '~t 2,,2500 plug the VOMIble cat& '
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Logistic Requirements and Flows:
R4adwa c Reporting, and lasses
Method ol2
1. Assume the MACV position Is correct, namely, that I
Corps and northern II Corps are supplied from Laos and that
southern II Corps, III Corps and IV Corps are supplied solely
from Cambodia. (For convenience I Corps and northern II Corps
are referred to as "the North" and the remaining areas supplied
from Cambodia are, "The South".)
reporting that during the period December
1966 through May 1969 about 21,000 of military supplies, (Classes
II, IV and V) were delivered to the VC.
3. Compare this reported volume of deliveries with 0FR's
estimated enemy requirements for the same Classes of supplies and
time period.
4. From the total flow of supplies into the Laos panhandle
subtract consumption and losses in Laos to determine the volLme
of supplies available for use in South Vietnam (or stockpiling in
Laos). Compare this amount with enemy requirements for "'lhe North".
5. Compare the two ratios, availability requirements for
the two areas.
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Computations
6. During the period December 1966 through May 1969 it
is estimated that from 138,000 to 142,000 tons of supplies,
excluding food, entered the Lao Panhandle. The lower estimate is
based on roadvatch reports; the higher estimate is based on pilot
sighting
7. Consumption and losses in the Panhandle for the same
period of time are estimated to range between 76,000-88,,000 tons.*
Obtaining a maximum possible spread by subetracting the highest
losses from the minimum input and vice versa gives a range of
50,000 to 66,000 tons of supplies available f oor "the North".
The requirements for this area for the relevant time period were
19,000 tons. Thus the ratio of availability of supplies to
requirements (as estimated by OER) ranged from 2.6 to 3.5.
total eneur consumption is estimated at 53, 000 tons. Fnery
losses, including losses due to secondary explosions and fires
which are almost certainly overstated, range from 23,000 to
35,000 tons. The lower estimate uses COACT data which the higher
estimate is based on a reportedly more complete IDH$ Mission
aummary file.
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8.
were delivered
these supplies
during the relevant period 21, 000 tons
VC. It is,, ae stated above, assumed that
e destined only for southern II, III or IV
Corps or "the South". Enemy requirements (min, as estimated by
OER) for this area for the relevant time period totalled 14,000
tons. Thus, the ratio of availability to requirements in "the
South"ws only 1.5 compared to 2.6 to 3.5 in "the North".
9. The major difference in "the North" and "South" ra
is hard to explain. It could be maintained that the air war in
Laos requires a greater flow compared to requirements in "the
North" than in "the South': However, there is a generous
allowance for both cone moption and losses in Laos ewd th
ed is long enough, almost years, to dampen
the effect of a greater stockpiling requirement that may have
existed in "the North" because of the air war. A more likely
conclusion is that the original hypothesis of the analysis was
wrong. That is,. the ratio in "the North" is larger than in
South" because a portion of the supplies that move into the
Panhandle of t&os move south into southern II Corps and III Corps.
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Xethodology
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mates of the volume of supplies available for South Vietnam are
accurate. However, the MACV position is discarded as being
inconsistent with the substantial differences between the
to-requirement ratios in the two pct:ts of the country.
a orb U2. Instead, it is assumed that the ratio of 4 -t '~
}reporting and OED's esti-
requirements will be the ea for all of South Vietnam. A portion
of the excess supplies in the North" are moved to "the South"
until the ratio of fl-to-.requirements is the same in both areas.
Then, by comparing the total volume of supplies available in
"the South"
it is possible to determine the share of supplies that "the South"
receive by the overland route and the share received from Cambodia.
Thus, under the assumptions established in this exercise it be-
c s possible to quantify the Cambodian-l os logistical problem.
Calculations
3. OER's estimate of requirements for South Vietnam for
period is as follows;
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 tons Percent
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"ti-,e :North" 19,000 58
21# 00
70 ?- 76
24
It.", to 1 T1,000 - 87, 000 1 00
9. The t tal volme of supplies, available, 71, 00
t-mns, is distributed within flouth Vietnam according to
stimate of requirMnts. That is, 58 percent of all
ppli.ee are needed in "tbg North" and 42 percent are needed in
0ER''s requtremnts may be
006! that a prudent exaenY co3 nder may have required a larger
t' fl :~v that indicated by aER's "replacement requirements."
the )ther haxx:, if R's requirnts have
c- j..r little reason to believe that they would not have the
kias thr''ugh the country.
It -,
the Glmthr'
T:'tal
14,000 42
' x the s period the availability Of supplies for
uth Vietneri is *6 fOllOts.
50,000 - 66,000
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