APRIL 1968 OB CONFERENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000200210001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 5, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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April 1968 OB Conference
2 May 68
27 May 68
.3 May 68
Memo to DCI re Results of Community Negotiations on
Enemy Strengths in South Vietnam
Adams memo to IG, CIA., re Complaints About Research on
the Viet Cong
Walsh Memo of Conversation re 3 May 68 meeting called
by General Wheeler in response to Mr. Helms' offer
to brief the Chairman on the community problems in
estimating enemy strengths.
.2 May 68 Helms to Rostow memo re Estimates of Enemy Strength in
South Vietnam
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27 May 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General., Central Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT : Complaints About Research on the Viet Cong
1. Please accept my apologies for the delay in
forwarding this memorandum, which I promised to send you
after our conversation of 3 April 1968.
2. The conversation persuaded me that I had-both
immediate and basic complaints. The latter call into
question the overall conduct of intelligence research on
Pressing Complaints
3. The immediate grievances concern the state of research
on the Viet Cong infrastructure, generally regarded as the
most important part of the Comimmist apparatus in South Vietnam.
The Deputy Directorate of Intelligence (DDI) has yet to assign
anyone full time to conduct systematic research on the.infra-
structure. Although some research is being done in Saigon
on the infrastructure., by MACV, ICEX, and the CIA Station, it
is largely uncoordinated and., in the case of the MACV Political
Order of Battle:component,, principally directed at collecting
names.
4. As a result, the CIA is incapable of discussing
intelligently several topics of current importance. Since no
coherent research has been done on the large and well-organized
Viet Cong Military Proselyting apparatus, for example., we are
unable to inform policymakers on the extent to which enemy
proselyters have been able to cause or take advantage of
demoral.izat._on in the South Vietnamese which in some
areas seems to be dangerously weak. Nor, for the same reason,
can we discuss in detail the operations of the Viet Cong
Political Struggle organization as it attempts to sow discord
in the society and government of South Vietnam.
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5. I recommend that the'DDI assign at once several--
say, half a dozen--full time analysts to investigate
systematically and in detail the organization and methods
of operation of the Communist infrastructure. Such research
should be done in cooperation with the field and with the
DDP, under the direction of a person with a working'knowledge
of the infrastructure.
Basic Complaints
6. The present failings of intelligence research stem
from longstanding mismanagement. I level four basic charges.
There has been:
First, a misuse of research manpower,
Second, a misdirection of research effort,
'Third, a want of courage in advancing well-
documented findings concerning Viet Cong manpower,
and
Fourth, a lethargy in correcting past failures.
Charge One
7. The CIA has been inept in its allocation of research
manpower. The DDT did not assign a full-time researcher to
work on our southern adversaries until late 1966, about a
year and a half after our massive military intervention in
the South. "Task forces" formed and dissolved, individual
analysts studied the southern enemy sporadically, but the
detailed research necessary for coherent intelligence was
not done because virtually no one was assigned to do it.
A study group to conduct basic research on the Viet Cong
was not formed until August 1967.
8. Explanations advanced. to excuse the phenomenon
are inadequate. One excuse, that there eras a "lack of
manpower" to do detailed research, is absurd. A second
excuse, that the DDI Collation Branch (now called %b e
Research and Analysis Branch) in Saigon was designed to do
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in-depth research on the enerriy, was undercut by the statements
of a high-level DDI official last summer, who said that
Branch's purpose was a) to provide a training ground for
future DDI analysts, and b) to "support the Station." Until
late 1967, the Branch received almost no direction or
communications from headquarters.
Charge Two
9. The misdirection of research effort has taken at
least three forms:
a. A relative neglect of research on the
Viet Cong political apparatus.
b. An underemphasis of basic research on
the enemy.
c. A relative neglect, until very recently,
of primary sources on the enemy, such as
captured documents, POW reports, and
RAND interviews.
10. Although it is commonly said that the war in Vietnam
is "political," the civilian research community, in studying
the enemy, has devoted most of its energies to reporting the
operations of his army, while largely neglecting his political
apparatus. The DDI, for examples has written only one
detailed memorandum on the infrastructure,* leaving to
MACV the production of the best single work on Communist
organization.** The neglect of political intelligence on
the southern enemy has resulted in an all-too-frequent
misunderstanding at higher levels of the nature of the war.
The misunderstanding is usually coupled with a dismay that
we seem to be losing a struggle in which our military forces
are demonstrably superior to those of the enemy.
The Or enization, Activities and Ob'ek.tives of the Communist
Front in South Vietnam, CIA, 26 de-ptember119 an update of
a memorandum written a year earlier.
**The Viet Con, Political Infrastructure, CICV, may 1966.
or
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11. Part of the reason for the neg.-ect of the enemy's
political apparatus has been an underemphasis of basic-
research, which might have demonstrated political organization's
importance. Until very recently, most of our intelligence
production on the enemy in the south was oriented towards
"current intelligence," or in responding to short-term requests.
Basic research on the enemy's organization, manpower and
dynamics was left to such organizations as MACV or RAED.
Such deferrals of responsibility seem inexcusable, since it
has been clear for some time that MACV's reporting has left
much to be desired. For example, its Order of Battle carried
the number of Viet Cong irregulars at exactly 103.,573 between
late 196+ and May 1966, and the number of "political cadres"
at precisely 39,175 from late 196+ until well into 1967.
12. The dearth of basic research has had a number of
unfortunate consequences. By far the worst was that the
intelligence community vastly underestimated the strength
of the enemy and therefore the scale of the Vietnamese war.
It was not discovered until late 1966, for example., after a
most cursory examination of the evidence., that we had
underestimated the number of organized Viet Cong by close
to 100%. Likewise., we did not find out until late 1967
and early 1968 that estimates of recruiting and infiltration
were probably far too low. A second consequence was that
CIA attempts to penetrate the infrastructure have met with
scant success., in part because we knew so little about what
we were operating against.*
- 13. A corollary of the neglect of basic research has
been--until very recently--a relative inattention to
captured documents, POW reports and RAND interviews. Although
*To put this consequence in perspective, it should be noted
that an ignorance of the target organization is only one of
the reasons for the overall failure of CIA espionage operations
in Vietnam. Another more obvious cause, not specifically related
to the problem of intelligence research discussed in this paper.,
has been that the number of Agency case officers in the field
who could speak Vietnamese has always been considerably less
than half a dozen.
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several offices "scanned" the documents,none assigned analysts
to read then full-time until the middle of 1967. Since it
takes several months to build up enough experience to read
captured documents properly, coherent intelligence based on
primary sources has only just begun to flow.
Charge Three
14. When the CIA (or specifically, the DDI) discovered
in late 1966 that the evidence strongly suggested the size
of the enemy forces in South Vietnam had been badly under-
estimated., its apparent reaction was to sweep the discovery
under the rug. The want of mettle continued until at least
30 January 1968, the day the Tet offensive began.
15. Its reaction in the latter half of 1966 t,?a series
of memoranda concerning Viet Cong manpower--a subject on
which I have specialized since early 1966--was highly unusual.
For example:
a. A draft memorandum written on 21 August
suggesting that MACV was underestimating the
strength of the Viet Cong irregulars by at
least 100% was returned to me with virtually
no comment. A second, unrequested, version of
the memorandum was finally published on
8 September 1966 in limited edition as a "draft
working paper." I doubt that it would have.been
issued even in this form had I not insisted at
length, and in the face of what seemed to me
considerable reluctance on?the part of the DDI
front offices.
b. A draft memorandum of early December 1966
suggesting that MACV had underestimated the
number of Communist service troops in South
Vietnam by over 500% was returned to me with
no indication that MACV had been told of a
possible discrepancy. I doubt that MACV would
have been so informed had I not insisted in
x.d-December that, a cable be cent to the DDI
representative in Saigon requesting that he tell
MACV about the questions the memorandum raised.
(The cable also questioned the accuracy of
MACV estimates of the number of "political cadres.")
SEC.
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c. A memorandum written in the fourth quarter
of 1966 concerning Viet Cong irregulars suggesting
that their strength was "250,000--300,000 or more"
(instead of the 112,760 then carried in MACV's
Order of Battle) was killed by the DDI in February
1967 for the statc!7. reason that MACV was about
to publish a new set of irregular figures. MACV
did not do so until October. The memorandum--
some 60 pages long, with over 80 footnotes, most
referring to captured documents--is still the
most comprehensive single work written on Viet
Gong irregulars.
16. The timidity continued throughout 1967. For example,
strength estimates; contained in various drafts of National
Intelligence Estimate 14.3-67 (concerning the Viet Cong's
ability to continue) were progressively lowered from the
Estimate's first draft of 14 June 1.967 until it was finally
published in November. (See comments on the last draft,
attached.) The final version followed "agreements" in Saigon
in September between CIA, DIA and MACV, concerning enemy
strength figures. The "agreements" primarily consisted of
a series of capitulations by CIA representatives to MACV.
17. 'Deere have been some exceptions to the overall
pattern. In January 1967, for example,'the Board of National
Estimates indicated in a memorandum that the size of the
Viet Cong irregular forces was larger than had been hitherto
estimated; and in May 1967, the CIA published a limited-
distribution memorandum which estimated the overall numbers
of Viet Cong at some 500,000. Neither exception directly
challenged MACV figures, however. When a direct confrontation
occurred in September 1967, CIA retreated..
18. Since 30 January 1968, the day the enemy'Tet
offensive began, the CIA has apparently determined to confront
MACV on strength estimates. The show of pluck, it appears
to me, came too late.
Charge Four
19. rAlthough some of the deficiencies noted in the
previous paragraphs have been partially righted, the pace
of reform has been glacial.
S E G
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20. Production elements of the DDI hive been lethargic
in, assigning full-time analysts to work on the southern Viet
Gong:
a. The Office of Research and Reports did not
do so until September 1966. The assigned analyst
worked with only minimal direction until August
1967, when a South Vietnam Branch was created
under the newly-organized Office of Economic Research.
The branch chief, although competent, had no
experience working on the Viet Cong.
b. The Office of Current Intelligence had no one
studying the Viet Cong full-time until December 1967.
The person then assigned, although competent, had
had no previous experience working on Vietnam.
Until then, OCI's Indo-China Division--several of
whose analysts had worked on occasion on the Viet
Cong--was not organized in such a way as to allow
for systematic study of the enemy in the South.
c.. The Office of Strategic Research, by charter,
does not work on the Vietnam problem.
21. The lethargy occurred despite frequent prodding.
For example:
a. In mid-January 1967,.the Staff for the Special
Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs (SAVA) sent a
memorandum to the DDI recommending that the DDI
conduct research with all "deliberate speed" on
the neglected pbrtions of the OB. The DDI did
not begin such research until-December 1967.
b. In May 1967, a draft memorandum written in
SAVA pointed out that the CIA paid insufficient
attention to captured documents. The memorandum
received virtually no distribution, and systematic
exploitation of the documents did not begin until
late 1967.
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c. In August 1967, a draft memorandum written in
SAVA recommended the-formation if a Viet Cong
research group to study the enemy's infrastructure.
As yet, no such group has been formed, and DDI study
on the infrastructure is at a virtual standstill.
General Comments
22. History will probably record that one of the principle
reasons the United States became mired in the Vietnam war was
a failure in intelligence. We did not realize what we were
getting into, did not know what we were looking at when we got
there, and are only now discovering the consequences of our
ignorance and myopia. Certain medium and low-level intelligence
officials familiar with Vietnam warned what might happen, but
their warnings were too often disregarded, or drowned in the
babble of the uninformed .
23. Once the US was heavily involved in Vietnam--one
might remember that over 10,000 American soldiers were there
in 1962--.the lack of foresight in developing a coherent body
of research on the southern enemy became inexcusable. In
failing to do its homework, the research community has
allowed its country, with inadequate warning, to sink deeper
.and deeper into the Vietnamese mire, with increasingly little
hope of honorable extrication. The disservice came about
because of sloth, timidity, and bad scholarship.
Specific Requests
24. In view of the gravity of the charges, and my desire
to get them aired, I respectfully submit four specific requests:
a. That the Inspectorate General take steps to
initiate a thorough investigation of the charges
to determine their merit, and that I be apprised,
in writing, of progress towards this end.
b. That copies of this memorandum be forwarded
to appropriate members of the White House Staff,
and to the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board, and that I be informed, in writing,
when this is done.
ttagg 7
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c. That copies of this memorandum be forwarded
to the Office of the Director and to the Office
of the Deputy Director of Intelligence, and that I
be informed, in writing,, when this is done.
d. That the Inspector General provide me with a
modest, amount of safe-space for the safekeeping of
relevant memoranda which have been collected over
the past two years.
25. I would hope that any investigation would result in
recommendatiQns on how to prevent a repetition of circumstances
that prompted this memorandum.
26. I respectfully await your reply.
25X1
Samuel A. Adams
OER/I/SV
25X1
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CIA: The Director, Mr. Richard ie
Mr. Paul V. Walsh
JCS: The Chairman, General Earle C. wheeler
Lt. Gen. George 3. Brown
Executive Col. D.P. McAuliffe
Maj. Gen. William E. Depuy
Col. A. C. Edmunds
DIA: The Director, General. Joseph ?,arroll
I I
? .r. eting convened at 1030 on 3 May 19 .:. It w -,s
..1?-d by :" er e .-ii Wheeler in response to Mr. Helms ? cf 'er to
oriel t'ze Chairman on the community problems in est_:nating enemy
strenj hs .
2. 'r
i- ? Ims opened the meeting by explaia.in- -enera,l.ly
the inaccility )f the intelligence community to re-c agreement on
estimate;:, ai einmy strengths in South Vietn~.irn. He ,~;inced out
that in addition to differences in estimates on agr 3 O.F3
categori_3 t.iere was a fundamental difference on tar" trier certain
c._,.Ce --or i: 'orces -- the so-c-ii.l.ed irregular grour_,s -- should
nd included in the estimates.
3. Mr. ?lalsh gave a brief run-down on the CIA eoacept of a
iiisu ' er cy :zse and the elements contained in it, ant presented a
comparison if the CIA and MACV estimates.
4. "general Clrroll and Mr. Walsh discussed the various pro-
blem areas in the estimates, the points of disagreement and
possible alternative,; for their resolution.
5. The conseno_~s of the meeting is summarized in the follow-
-iw pointa:
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r.a of 1 - H.
. These estimates have a high degree of political
sensitivity and all concerned should exercise the utmost
discretion in dealing with them and cofitrollirg their
dis scraination.
There is a real need to present these estimates
in su^_a a way that the combat threat is clearly distin-
c- zis:ie a from political or irregular threats. The
caua-L..t