(SANITIZED) POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000400070001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 198
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 7, 1969
• Content Type: MF

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Clifford Questions
Possible Alternatives to the Rolling Thunder Program
12 Apr 68 (The Case Where all Except Approximately Five Percent of
the Attack and Armed Reconnaissance Sorties in North Vietnam
are in Route Packages I, II, and III) (No. 7)
24 Apr 68 (The Case Where There is a Complete Cessation of Bombing in
North Vietnam and Laos) (No. 9)
8 May 68 (The Case Where There is a Complete Cessation of Bombing in
North Vietnam, with Increased Attacks Against Infiltration
Routes in Laos) (No. 8)
28 May 68 (The Case of a Bombing Program that Includes the Mining of the
Harbor Areas of Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha) (No. 12)
Jun 68 (Alternatives 1, 2, and 3)
3 Jul 68 (The case in which the Rolling Thunder program that existed before
31 March is resumed, but assuming that North Vietnam attempts
to infiltrate and support one, two, three, or four combat
divisions into South Vietnam) (No. 11)
5 Jul 68 (The case in which the Sea Dragon Program is extended north to the
Chinese Buffer Zone) (No. 5)
22 Jul 68 (The case in which the Rolling Thunder Program that existed prior
to 31 March is modified to include attacks against inland water
control facilities) (No. 4)
7 Oct 69 Carver to Col. Robert Pursley (DOD) memo re Amendments to CIA
Intelligence Memorandum dated 28 May 1968
(amendments attached)
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Seliret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
(The case in which the Rolling Thunder Program that
existed prior to 31 March is modified to include
attacks against inland water control facilities.)
(No. 4)
Secret
22 July 1968
Copy No. 12
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
I SXCLI DFD FROM ADTOMATIC
DOW NC RAW NG AND
DFf1AS IFi(ATION
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
July 1968
Possible Alternatives
to the Rolling Thunder Program
(The case in which the Rolling Thunder Program
that existed prior to 31 March is modified to in-
clude attacks against inland water control facili-
ties.) (No. 4)
Summary
Attacks against North Vietnam's dams and dikes,
particularly the latter, could add appreciably to
the adverse effects on North Vietnam of a resump-
tion of the March 1968 Rolling Thunder Program,
previously discussed in Question 10. A highly
successful campaign could destroy as much as 25
percent of the annual rice crop. These water
control facilities are not easily destroyed by air
attacks, however, and the international reaction
to the bombing of dams and dikes would be extremely
unfavorable to the United States.
With one possible exception -- the 850-foot-
long Dan Phuong Dam -- successful attacks against
locks and dams would have little impact on North
Vietnam's transport system or on Hanoi's war-
supporting capabilities. A successful attack
against the Dan Phuong Dam would cause serious
flooding of valuable farmland southwest of Hanoi,
but this dam would be extremely difficult to attack.
The most serious effects would result from a
successful breaching of the elaborate system of
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current
Intelligence and the Director's Special Assistant
for Vietnamese Affairs.
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dikes in the Red River Delta. In addition to its
impact on rice crops, a successful breaching of
the primary and secondary levees in the Hanoi area
would produce the following short-term severe
disruptions:
Most of the economic and military
activity in Hanoi and its suburbs would
be temporarily halted.
A number of significant military
and industrial targets are located in
potential flood areas. These include
the Gia Lam and Bac Mai Airfields, the
railroad yard and port facilities at
Hanoi, and several major military
barracks and storage areas and head-
quarters installations.
Key transport routes leading south
and west from Hanoi, including Route 1A
and the Hanoi-Vinh rail line, would be
disrupted.
A sizable diversion of labor would
be necessary for a period of weeks to
repair flood damage.
The most significant results (and the most diffi-
cult to obtain) would be accomplished by a
breaching of the levees during the high-water
period between mid--July and mid-August. A
successful attack at this time could produce
losses from flooding of as much as one million
tons of paddy rice. Hanoi would have to rely on
external sources to replace these losses. The
added import burden ---- up to 2,500 tons of milled
rice a day -- is well within the present estimated
capabilities of the rail and road connections with
Communist China.
The number of civilian casualties resulting
from this campaign would be small, and, with con-
tinued aid from its allies, North Vietnam could
soon adjust to the situation. Hanoi would, how-
ever, capitalize on opportunities presented by
the attack to launch a heavy propaganda effort to
put intense political pressure on the United States.
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Inland Waterways
1. The Red River Delta contains the most im-
portant waterways of Vietnam -- the Red River, the
Song Thai Binh River, and their two connecting
waterways, the Canal des Rapides and the Canal des
Bambous (see the map). These waterways connect
the country's principal urban centers -- Hanoi,
Haiphong, and Nam Dinh. Fertilizer, foodstuffs,
petroleum, and other imports are moved from Haiphong
in part by inland waterways, as is the coal mined
in the Hon Gai and Cam Pha areas. Since the Rolling
Thunder Program was inaugurated, an increasing
number of water craft have been used to distribute
POL directly from ocean tankers to dispersed storage
and transshipment sites along Delta waterways and
to aid in moving material from the port of Haiphong.
Most of North Vietnam's farmland is in the Delta;
it is dependent on irrigation during the dry months
and is endangered by flooding in the wet months.
Furthermore, much of North Vietnam's urban areas
in the Delta are below the wet-season crests of
these Delta rivers.
2. The Panhandle region of southern North
Vietnam also contains navigable waterways, but
they are less important than the waterways in
the Delta. The most important inland waterway
south of the 20th Parallel is the waterway between
Thanh Hoa and Vinh. There are no through inland
water routes from North Vietnam into Laos or South
Vietnam. However, infiltration movements south-
ward are facilitated by short overwater hauls and
the extensive transshipment capability of the
waterway system. For example, supplies shipped to
Vinh via rail and highway are frequently ferried
across the Song Ca River or moved in watercraft
on short-distance hauls toward Mu Gia or south
toward the DMZ. Other areas of watercraft activity
and transshipment are at Ha Tinh, Quang Khe, and
Dong Hoi. Waterways in. the Panhandle also support
small agricultural communities near Thanh Hoa and
Vinh.
Locks
3. The Song Thai Binh River is the only major
waterway in the Red River Delta that has naviga-
tion locks to control water levels and facilitate
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NORTH VIETNAM: Major Inland Waterways
Rood
Railroad (meter gouge)
Major inland waterway
L"2
91117 7-68 CIA
HaDong'.
Area
ong Thai Binh
Untler
r0'511 iIClicn
QOarig Tri
A souTH 1
VIETNAM%'
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transport along otherwise unnavigable stretches.
These locks control water traffic to Thai Nguyen.
Currently, water transport to Thai Nguyen is of
little importance because bomb damage to the
area's industry has sharply reduced transport
requirements. A number of secondary waterways in
the Delta have navigation locks, but these water-
ways do not handle significant amounts of traffic
for urban centers.
4. In the Panhandle, a large number of small
locks are found in and around Thanh Hoa and Vinh,
but only a few of these locks have significance
for waterway transport. The Ben Thuy Lock connects
the main north-south inland waterway in this
region with the Song Ca River at Vinh. The Trung
Luong Lock on the Song Nghen River connects Vinh
with Ha Tinh.
5. Because of their low profile and strong
construction, locks are not vulnerable targets.
Most of the locks consist of a single basin formed
by earth slopes faced on the water side with loose
stone or other masonry. Bulkheads containing
steel or wood entrance gates at the end of the
basins are usually made of reinforced concrete
backed by earth fill. The most vulnerable parts
of the locks are the gates. They can be destroyed
or rendered inoperative by a small bomb, but a
direct hit would probably be required. Severe
damage to locks probably could be repaired within
six months.
6. Successful attacks against North Vietnam's
locks would have little impact on North Vietnam's
transport system. Inland watercraft could be
diverted to waterways not dependent on locks.
Cargoes intended for water transport could be sent
by the many alternative rail or highway routes
that parallel the inland water network. Because
of accidental bomb damage, the Ben Thuy Lock and
two of the eight JCS-targeted locks are not now
being used, yet water transport in the vicinity
of the damaged locks seems to be unaffected.
7. Dams to control flooding and irrigation
are located throughout North Vietnam, primarily
in the Red River Delta. Some of these dams could
be breached by a small number of hits during
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periods of high water, when current velocities are
greatest and the high water creates maximum pres-
sure. The prospects for causing significant flood
damage or disruption of water transport are limited.
Most of the dams are small; they are made of packed
earth, are less than 60 feet long, and are less than
10 feet high. The few larger dams are constructed
of concrete and often have gates to permit through
navigation of watercraft. Earthen dams can be re-
paired quickly with primitive materials and almost
no construction machinery. A significant exception
to North Vietnam's small and unimportant dams is
the 850-foot-long Dan Phuong Dam near the junction
of the Red and Song Day Rivers that protects
valuable farmland southwest of Hanoi from flooding.
The dam is a low, massive concrete structure,
however, that would not be very susceptible to
air attack.
8. Dikes to control flooding and the course
of the waterways are located along all of North
Vietnam's major rivers, but they are most impor-
tant and most fully developed along the Red River.
The Red River dike system begins near Viet Tri,
which is only 43 feet above sea level although about
100 miles inland at the northwest head of the Delta.
From that point the river falls an average of
6 inches per mile to the sea. The great amount
of silt brought down from the mountains and
deposited along the river beds in the Red River
Delta has raised the waterways above the sur-
rounding countryside in many places and required
the constant elevation of the restraining walls.
In some areas, particularly around Hanoi, the
height of the dikes reaches 40 feet. The primary
system of dikes is backed up by a secondary
system, between 4 and 22 feet high, that runs
parallel to the main dikes. This secondary
system is designed to :Localize and minimize
damage if the primary dikes are breached. A
tertiary system of smaller dikes has also been
built to divide the rice-growing plains into
compartments and to assist irrigation. These
latter dikes also control the level of small
streams and local waterways. In addition, the
river dike system is complemented by small
natural or manmade dikes along the coast which
keep out brackish seawater.
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9. Dikes are particularly difficult to damage
by air attack. Those in the primary system can be
breached only by a series of overlapping craters
across the entire top of a dike. The dikes along
the right bank of the :Red River have a width at
the top of approximately 80 feet. Moreover, the
lips of the bomb craters must be sufficiently lower
than the surface of the river to initiate the flow
and subsequent scouring action of water rushing
through the breach. A destructive force equivalent
to a train of eleven 1,000-pound general-purpose
bombs, which would penetrate about 10 feet in
average soil and produce craters 37 feet in diam-
eter, would probably be needed to breach the Red
River dikes. To achieve a 50-percent assurance of
breaching a primary levee, five of these eleven-
bomb trains would be required. Furthermore,
simultaneous breaching at two or more points is
desirable to disperse salvage operations and to
obtain maximum flood damage. Additional strikes
against the secondary dike system would be necessary
to preclude these supporting dikes from absorbing
the effects of the breaching of the primary levees.
10. Various countermeasures are available to
the North Vietnamese even if the dikes are breached.
Barges could be floated into the opening and sunk,
creating the beginning of a temporary coffer dam.
Once the flow of water through the gap was under
control, the dike could be repaired quickly. In
anticipation of attacks on the water system in 1965
and 1966, the North Vietnamese apparently collected
barrage materials in the Hanoi area to fill breaches
in the dikes, and this material is probably still
available. Defensive :breaching of the dikes up-
stream from a bomb breach could cushion the impact
of the attack and could rapidly drop the level of
flood water at Hanoi by as much as six feet. In
this way, less important areas would be sacrificed
to save urban or key agricultural regions. Dams
and other water-control facilities along the major
waterways could also divert much of a threatened
river's volume. For example, an estimated 10 per-
cent of the Red River's flood volume could be
diverted into the Song Day River by the dam at Dan
Phuong. This is more than the Song Day can handle,
but the excess would be deposited on agricultural
areas which are presumably less valuable than the
urban areas around the capital.
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Flooding
11. The agricultural areas in North Vietnam
most vulnerable to flooding are the Ha Dong area,
a flat, densely populated rice-growing plain south-
west of Hanoi lying between the Red River and the
Song Day River, and the Gia Lam - Ban Yen Nhan
area, a flat, rice-growing plain east of Hanoi,
bordered by the Red River and Canal des Rapides
(see the map). The Ha Dong area is a saucer-like
plain only six feet above sea level at its lowest
elevation. It is frequently inundated by heavy
rainfall and probably could not be drained after
flooding in less than a month. The Gia Lam - Ban
Yen Nhan area, however, is high enough to be drained
readily even during high water.
12. The principal impact of flooding resulting
from air attacks against the dikes and dams would
be on the rice crop -- the staple food in North
Vietnam. If the dikes are breached between mid-
July and mid-August, when the Red River is at its
height, a substantial part of the tenth-month rice
crop -- normally about two-thirds of the annual
harvest -- would be completely destroyed by flooding,
if the submersion of the rice plants persisted be-
yond two weeks. The rice plants are also vulnerable
to shorter periods of submersion during mid-August
after transplanting. A successful attack that
managed to breach both the primary and secondary
levees could cause crop losses from flooding of as
much as one million tons of rice, or about 25 per-
cent of North Vietnam's estimated 1967 production.
13. Hanoi would have to turn to outside sources
to make up its rice losses. These amounts could
be provided by North Vietnam's Communist allies,
although they might be forced to procure offsetting
amounts of grain in the Free World markets. The
transport of these food supplies could be difficult,
depending on the extent of damage to transport
systems and the effectiveness of other interdiction
programs. The losses could be replaced over a nine-
month period during which the added import require-
ment would be a maximum of 2,500 tons of milled
rice a day.* This increase in import traffic is
well within the current capabilities of North Viet-
nam's rail and road transport connections to Com-
munist China.
This calculation is based on the assumption that
700,000 tons of milled rice would be imported.
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14. Most of the industrial, commercial, and
military activity in Hanoi and its suburbs would
be temporarily halted until the water receded.
Included in the installations that would be affected
are Gia Lam Airfield, the Hanoi Port Facilities,
the Hanoi Railroad Yard, the Hanoi Engineering and
Machine Tool Plant, the Hanoi Thermal Powerplant,
and a number of recently constructed modern indus-
trial facilities -- the Hanoi Rubber Products
Plant, the Hanoi Soap Plant, the Hanoi Machinery
Plant Gia Lam, and probably the 8th March Textile
Plant. Military barracks, POL and material storage
areas, air defense sites, and communications facili-
ties would also be affected. To mitigate the
effects of the flooding, Hanoi would be forced to
divert an undetermined but very sizable work force
away from other activities, including those of a
military-supporting nature, for a period of weeks
until the major damage had been repaired. Contin-
gency measures devised from operating under the
annual threat of floods, however, probably would
minimize serious physical damage, and it seems
likely that the flooding effects would be temporary.
15. In addition to halting economic and military
activity in the Hanoi area and submerging valuable
farmland, the destruction of dikes and dams would
disrupt transport routes. The transport routes
most vulnerable to flooding include the Hanoi-Vinh
rail line, Route lA between Hanoi and Phu Ly,
Route 10 southwest of Haiphong, Route 11A west of
Hanoi, and Routes 6 and 212 southwest of Hanoi.
Some portions of Route 5 between Hanoi and Haiphong
would probably also be affected.
16. The extent of destruction caused by flooding
in the Panhandle would not be as widespread as in
the Delta area. Land routes would probably become
blocked at least temporarily at the major river
crossings, hindering the southward movement of
goods.
17. The breaching of the dikes in the Hanoi area
would not necessarily result in a large number of
casualties. JCS pre-strike estimates of the
number of casualties resulting from the actual
bombing attacks do not exceed 200. This number
could be less in view of the population's experience
in taking shelter from air attacks. The number of
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casualties resulting from flooding would also be
limited because of North Vietnamese contingency
planning and countermeasures and because the areas
to be breached are areas in which flooding has
been common; housing, for example, has been built
to withstand high water levels.
Political Reactions
18. The principal effects of attacks on inland
water control facilities would fall on the civilian
population with only secondary effects on military
targets. If the attacks successfully breached the
levees and caused widespread flooding, world reaction
would be highly unfavorable. The campaign would be
viewed by most observers as an unconscionable esca-
lation of the war. It would be extensively exploited
in Hanoi's propaganda in order to put intense
political pressure on the United States.
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Top Secret
Intelligence Memorandum
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
(The case in which the Sea Dragon Program is
extended north to the Chinese Buffer Zone) (No. 5)
Top Secret
5 July 1968
25X1
Copy No . 12
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
5 July 1968
Possible Alternatives
to the Rolling Thunder Program
(The case in which the Sea Dragon Program
is Extended North to the Chinese Buffer Zone)
(No. 5)
S ummary
This memorandum analyzes the estimated effects
of an extension of the Sea Dragon Program north to
the Chinese Buffer Zone but under the target restric-
tions existing before 31 March. The analysis is
based on the assumption of a campaign against North
Vietnam's heartland by a force as large as three
cruisers, 22 destroyers, and the recently reactivated
battleship New Jersey, but subject to the same tar-
geting restrictions that applied to air attacks prior
to the March 1968 standdown.
An extension of the Sea Dragon Program would
add little to what has already been achieved by
previous air and naval attacks on North Vietnam.
Only a few significant military or economic targets
are within the 8 to 10 mile coastal strip that could
be subject to effective naval gunfire. All of these
targets could be attacked with equal or greater effec-
tiveness by aircraft.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current
Intelligence and the Director's Special Assistant
for Vietnamese Affairs.
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The indirect effects of an expanded Sea Dragon
Program might have a greater impact than the
physical attack on inland targets. The major
indirect effect would be the psychological impact
of the visible presence of Allied warships. As an
indication of Hanoi's inability to provide security,
this presence might depress the morale of the North
Vietnamese. Disruptions of fishing and agriculture
along the coast could easily be made good by
increased imports.
The nominal benefits, particularly the psycho-
logical impact, that might accrue to an extended
Sea Dragon Program could be more than offset if
North Vietnamese countermeasures resulted in the
loss of a major Allied warship. North Vietnam's
present conventional coast defense -- eight light
bombers, 14 torpedo boats, and numerous coast
artillery weapons -- could not deter a forcefully
prosecuted Sea Dragon effort and would probably be
hard pressed to sink or severely damage US ships.
The risk of loss could be substantially higher if
North Vietnam and its allies felt that the escala-
tion represented by the northward extension of the
Sea Dragon Program justified the introduction of
Styx or Samlet surface--to=surface missiles.
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I. Previous Sea Dragon Operations
Operation Sea Dragon, a US Navy surveillance
and interdiction operation conducted by surface
ships against the coast and offshore water traffic
of North Vietnam, has been limited to the southern
Panhandle of North Vietnam. The operation was
first authorized against offshore watercraft between
17? (the DMZ) and 17?-30' North latitude in October
1966. In February 1967, it was expanded to include
shore bombardment of military-associated targets
and to extend the range of the attacks to the 20th
Parallel. The operation has been restricted since
March 31 to those areas of North Vietnam south of
the 19th Parallel.
The Sea Dragon force has been small, with only
one cruiser and four destroyers normally on station
off the coast of North Vietnam. At least one of
these ships has always been equipped with surface-
to-air missiles. Australian and New Zealand ships
have frequently participated. Spotter aircraft
have usually been available for target identifica-
tion and fire adjustment in good weather, and, on
occasion, US aircraft have conducted coordinated
attacks with Sea Dragon ships.
Sea Dragon forces have attacked watercraft,
vehicles, roads, railroads, bridges, coast artillery,
radar and antiaircraft sites, supply depots, bar-
racks, and electric powerplants. The attacks have
been difficult to evaluate because strikes have
often been at night, in bad weather, without spotter
aircraft, or against targets that have been attacked
by aircraft. Secondary explosions have often been
observed, however, and watercraft sightings which
averaged 30 per day at the start of the program
have dropped to less than four per day.
Sea Dragon forces have sustained minor ship
damage and several casualties from North Vietnamese
shore battery fire. Twenty Allied ships have been
struck by small-caliber shells through December
1967. Five crewmen have been killed and 18 wounded.
North Vietnam's small air force and navy have not
attempted to attack Sea Dragon ships, probably be-
cause North Vietnamese air and naval bases have been
located too far north for effective opposition.
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II. Expanded Operations
The nature of an expanded Sea Dragon Program
above the 20th Parallel is not known. We assume
that the restricted bombing areas existing under
the March ground rules would continue. In addition,
the program would be subject to the following con-
siderations. A maximum of one battleship, three
cruisers, and 22 destroyers could be sustained on
station off North Vietnam without recourse to
further ship reactivation. The New Jersey can be
available for use against North Vietnam in October
1968. These ships would probably stage hit-and-
run attacks rather than maintain a constant patrol
in fixed locations that would invite North Vietna-
mese counterattacks. Sea Dragon attacks would be
limited generally to targets within 17,000 yards.
This limitation is determined by the offshore water
depths and ship drafts, as shown in the following
tabulation:
Ship Type
Destroyer
Cruiser
Battleship
Main armament
Range (yards)
5-inch
8-inch
16-inch
Maximum
18,000
29,000
42,000
Effective range a/
15,000
26,000
32,000
Ship draft (feet)
18
27
38
Average required
offshore distance
(yards)
10,000
12,000
15,000
Average effective
range a/ inland
(yards)
5,000
14,000
17,000
a. The longest range at which gunfire can be ac-
curately controlled. Technical standards for deter-
mining this range vary with individual classes of
weapons.
All of the areas capable of being struck by an
expanded Sea Dragon force could also be hit by air-
strikes, and in some respects there would be little
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to choose between the two modes of attack. Ships
would remain on station for longer periods of time,
firing continuously; but air ordnance would be
heavier than conventional shells, as shown in the
following tabulation:
Ship
Ordnance
Explosive Weight a/
(pounds)
Destroyer
5-inch
shell
7.2
Cruiser
8-inch
shell
21
Battleship
16-inch
shell
154
750-pound
bomb
386
a. The effectiveness of a bomb or projectile varies
as the one-third power of the weight of explosive.
Naval gunfire would be delivered more accurately at
short ranges and under conditions of adverse weather
and visibility, but air attacks would probably be
delivered with greater accuracy in good weather be-
cause of the extremely long gun ranges required by
sea forces to strike targets in the north. Air-
craft losses north of the 20th Parallel in the
heavily protected Delta area of North Vietnam would
be high, but the loss of a major warship would have
a tremendous psychological impact.
III. Targets
Few military targets of any significance would
be within effective gunfire under an expanded Sea
Dragon Program, except for air defense sites east of
Haiphong. Naval craft and bases in the Cat Ba
Island area are within range of effective naval gun-
fire, but these targets are well protected by water-
level caves. A few small barracks and storage areas
could be attacked, but these facilities could be
easily dispersed with little disruption to military
operations. The airfield at Cat Bi, east of Haiphong,
would be within range, but this field has been infre-
quently used. East of Haiphong, some air defense
sites, including three to six known SA-2 sites,
could be reached by naval gunfire. The neutralization
of these sites and the relocation inland of coastal
SA-2 battalions, radars, and antiaircraft artillery
weapons could conceivably open a less hazardous
avenue of approach for US aircraft attacking Haiphong
from seaward.
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25Ai i i
Few economic targets of any significance would
be within effective gun range. All rail lines,
major high-ways, and bridges are well inland, beyond
the effective range of the largest naval guns
available to Sea Dragon forces. Even offshore
watercraft would be relatively immune. Those craft
using coastal routes south of Haiphong could easily
be diverted to operating exclusively on the inland
waterway network, well out of range of naval guns.
Those operating north of Haiphong between Haiphong,
Hon Gai, and Cam Pha are well protected by numerous
offshore islands. There are no major industrial
facilities within effective gun range and few
storage sites. Twenty-two small dispersed petro-
leum storage tank sites with a capacity of approxi-
mately 3,000 metric tons, about 3 percent of the
total storage capacity of North Vietnam, are with-
in range, but these sites would be difficult to
destroy. The tanks are dispersed within the sites,
are buried in excavations, and are hardened with
earth covering.
Other military and economic targets in Haiphong,
Hon Gai, and Cam Pha could conceivably come under
attack by Sea Dragon forces, but attacks on these
ports would be highly inaccurate because of the
great ranges involved. Moreover, they would risk
heavy civilian casualties and damage to foreign
shipping. The New Jersey could deliver a 16-inch
projectile 42,000 yards, and the ranges to these
targets from likely offshore firing sites would be
between 32,000 and 42,000 yards. The average fir-
ing error at these long ranges, however, could be
as great as half a mile. Maximum effective range
for the New Jersey -- the range at which gunfire
could be delivered accurately -- is only 32,000
yards. Furthermore, shore bombardment is most
accurate when ships operate at firing ranges of
only a few thousand yards, at slow speeds, and near
familiar terrain -- conditions not likely to be met
near these cities. Attempts to close the range,
reduce speed, or remain in firing areas for lengthy
periods of time for familiarization would greatly
increase the risk of grounding or North Vietnamese
countermeasures. The waters off the coast of these
targets are shallow, poorly charted, and near the
sites of North Vietnam's strongest coastal defenses.
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IV. Indirect Effects
Fishing would be adversely affected, but even
large losses would have little effect on the North
Vietnamese economy. North Vietnam's major fishing
centers are located north of the 20th Parallel at
Mon Cay near the Chinese border, Haiphong, Do Son,
and Cat Ba Island, and these centers would undoubtedly
be harassed by warships conducting shore bombardment.
or searching for naval and logistics craft. Deep-sea
fishing, however, is as yet relatively undeveloped
in North Vietnam. The total annual fish catch before
the bombing for all of North Vietnam was only about
200,000 tons, of which about 110,000 tons was salt
water fish and the remainder fresh water fish raised
in the many ponds and irrigated fields in North
Vietnam. Most of the catch is intended for local
consumption because of the lack of refrigeration
facilities. In addition, deep sea fishing in the area
north of the 20th Parallel has already been adversely
affected by offshore air attacks against suspected
logistics or naval craft.
Agricultural production could drop slightly as
a result of the abandonment of farm land close to
military, logistic, and economic targets. A small
part of the cultivated area of North Vietnam could
be subjected to naval bombardment north of the 20th
Parallel, and some of this would be the highest
yielding land in North Vietnam.
Manpower requirements to support the war could
increase slightly, and fewer troops might be avail-
able to fight in the south. Extended Sea Dragon
operations would probably result in the increased
diversion of manpower to coastal areas to serve as
spotters, coast artillery gunners, and in other
coastal defense forces. The number diverted should
be only a tiny fraction of the total number of
workers so far diverted to war-related activities.
The necessary additional manpower probably could be
made up of farm workers who abandon farming opera-
tions because of the shelling. The presence of
enemy warships off the coast of North Vietnam's
heartland, however, would enhance North Vietnam's
invasion fears and might serve to freeze additional
military manpower in the north that might otherwise
be sent south.
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/_oX1
International shipping might be disrupted, but
such disruption would almost certainly be minimal.
Foreign-flag ships regularly transit the Tonkin
Gulf to and from Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha.
Almost 400 ships visited these ports in 1967 alone,
carrying 1.4 million tons of goods vital to North
Vietnam's economy. In addition, four or five small
North Vietnamese-flag merchant ships are believed
to operate regularly between Haiphong and Chinese
ports. US warships engaged in shore bombardment
off these ports or in close proximity to interna-
tional shipping lanes could conceivably help to
discourage these ships from calling at North Vietna-
mese ports. Intimidation of these ships, however,
would not likely enhance the effect already achieved
by air attacks on Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha
and by US air and naval forces operating in the
lower end of the Gulf.
Morale of the North Vietnamese population and
leaders would undoubtedly be affected by the visible
presence of naval warships off the densely populated
areas of North Vietnam north of the 20th Parallel.
The psychological impact of naval gunfire on civilian
and military personnel far exceeds that of air
attacks, according to survivors of both types of
attacks. However, in view of the demonstrated
resiliency both to air attacks and to naval bombard-
ment south of the 20th Parallel, it is doubtful that
North Vietnam's will to persist will diminish under
an extended Sea Dragon Program.
V. Countermeasures
The North Vietnamese might be able to sink or
severely damage one or more Allied warships partici-
pating in an expanded Sea Dragon operation with the
means currently at their disposal, although such
losses would probably not prevent Sea Dragon forces
from carrying out their missions. A small bomber
force -- eight IL-28 light bombers -- could be used
against naval ships, and MIG aircraft have been
noted conducting exercises over the Gulf of Tonkin.
A force of about 14 modern, fast torpedo boats, in-
cluding a new, Chinese-built hydrofoil boat, is
based in the Haiphong - Cat Ba Island area and could
operate against inshore Allied naval forces with a
minimum exposure to early detection. Thirty-seven
coastal defense sites, the strongest such sites in
North Vietnam, are located north of the 20th Parallel,
most of them guarding the sea approaches to Haiphong
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on the Do Son Peninsula and off-lying islands, and
nine of them make use of caves. The artillery at
these sites are mostly 100-mm and 120-mm field guns
with ranges around 20 , 000 meters, but weapons as
large as 152-mm and 130-mm guns with ranges out
to 27,000 meters have been identified. SA-2 bat-
talions could also attempt attacks on Sea Dragon
ships with their missiles in surface-to-surface
mode -- missile range in this mode is approximately
16 nautical miles. SA-2 attacks would probably be
ineffective, however, because of the small fragmen-
tation warheads and probable accuracy limitations.
Furthermore, SA-2 battalions would probably not be
moved from their air defense sites to combat sur-
face ships, because Sea Dragon attacks would almost
certainly be accompanied by a resumption of air
attacks. Mines and frogmen might also be employed,
should US warships attempt to penetrate shallow
waters at slow speeds in an attempt to improve the
accuracy of their fire.
The expansion of Sea Dragon operations, and
particularly the employment of the New Jersey,
might be viewed by North Vietnam and its allies as
a significant escalation of the war and might serve
to justify the introduction of surface-to-surface
missiles and other new weapons systems. Both the
Samlet and Styx anti-ship missiles could be deployed
in North Vietnam. The Samlet can carry a one-ton
warhead to a fuel-limited range of perhaps 70 nau-
tical miles, and the Styx can carry a warhead
weighing more than 800 pounds to about 25 nautical
miles. The operational range of both missiles,
however, is believed to be limited to the radar
horizon of the launch unit. Either missile could
be fired from ashore, but, because most of North
Vietnam's coast is very low, effective ranges might
not exceed the 10 to 15 nautical mile range of con-
ventional coastal artillery. Styx in a ship-to-
ship role mounted on North Vietnamese torpedo boats
would provide a more serious threat.
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Proposed Area of SEA DRAGON Operations
Ha Giang
Lao Cai
v i
t.
LAOS
Maximum range of 16-inch gun
(42,000 yards)
Effective range of 16-inch gun
(32,000 yards)
HANOI
yr/
Dinh Lap
,.} ti.. ! Qo~.g
\ 4..Q1)FFE f' "v
_- a- -a
C t ) 68 SEA DRAGON
4 9'CQ2'2 6 611 CIA
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 25X1
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25X1
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
POSSIBLE.ALTERNATIVES TO THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
(The case in which the Rolling Thunder program that
existed before 31 March is resumed, but assuming
that North Vietnam attempts to infiltrate and sup-
port one, two, three, or four combat divisions into
South Vietnam.) (No. 11)
Secret
3 July 1968
Copy No.
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION
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SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
3 July 1968
Possible Alternatives
to the Rolling Thunder Program
(The case in which the Rolling Thunder
program that existed before 31 March is
resumed, but assuming that North Vietnam
attempts to infiltrate and support one,
two, three, or four more combat divisions
into South Vietnam.) (No. 11)
Summary
The deployment of an additional four divisions
from North to South Vietnam would not place a major
burden on the Vietnamese logistical system. The
increase in the requirement for supplies from North
Vietnam would be an estimated 30 tons a day. if
the four divisions were deployed in areas where
other sources could be tapped for food supplies,
the added logistics requirements to be provided by
North Vietnam could be as little as 7 tons a day.
The logistics requirement resulting from the
new deployments would not place a major strain on
the Vietnamese logistical system, although the
movement would be more complicated and costly. The
movement of 30 tons a day would be only slightly
more than 10 percent of the estimated average daily
levels of traffic moved to the Laotian Panhandle
during the first three months of 1968. This high
level of resupply through North Vietnam and Laos has
not been seriously impeded by bombing in the past,
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current
Intelligence and the Director's Special Assistant
for Vietnamese Affairs.
qp(`.R pT 25X1
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1
including the concentrated level of attack since
31 March. The continued expansion and improvement
of the transport nets in North Vietnam and Laos
will provide the Communists with an even further
cushion against the effects of an attack.
SECRET
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c~VtCCI
Logistical Requirements
Logistical requirements from out-of-country
sources for the Communist forces in South Vietnam
have never been large. Viet Cong and North Viet-
namese forces currently in South Vietnam require
about 300 tons of logistical support daily, of which
only about 90 tons -- 30 percent -- must come from
external sources.
Augmenting the enemy forces in South Vietnam
by an additional four divisions would increase
total enemy logistical requirements by about 60 tons
a day, 30 tons of which would have to come from
external sources as shown in the table.
Estimated Daily Logistical Requirements
for Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
Regular and Administrative Support Troops
in South Vietnam
Short Tons per Day
Increment of
Current
Requirements
Four Additional
Divisions
Class
of Supply
Total
External
Total
External
I (food)
236.0
60.0
46.6
23.8
II and IV
(clothing and
equipment)
39.3
11.8
8.2
2.7
III (POL)
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
V (Ammunition)
21.6
20.6
4.6
4.1
Total
296.9
92.4
59.4
30.6
This estimate assumes that the four divisions
would (1) be deployed in the I Corps area, (2) be
able to obtain only one-half of their food require-
ments in-country and rely on North Vietnam for the
remainder, and (3) engage in a high rate of combat --
one day out of fifteen. If the forces were deployed
to the II Corps area, one-half of the food require-
ments would probably still have to come from external
sources, but they could be supplied with most of
these requirements from Cambodia rather than North
Vietnam. If the forces were deployed in the III
or IV Corps area, their external requirement could
SECRET
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be much less. In some areas, their food requirement
could be satisfied completely from in-country
sources. Under these circumstances the supplies
to be provided by North Vietnam would be limited.
They would include small amounts of clothing,
weapons, and ammunition totaling only about 7 tons
a day.
Route Capacities
Transport capacities in Laos and North Vietnam
are already in excess of the traffic flow required
to sustain an augmented Communist force in South
Vietnam.* Routes constructed during the past year
and construction currently under way will provide
the Communists with even more capacity to move
supplies by truck into Laos, and from Laos into at
least four major areas of South Vietnam located
between the Khe Sanh area and the tri-border area.
When a third major access road into Laos is com-
pleted later this year, the throughput truck capacity
from North Vietnam via Laos into South Vietnam will
be about 1,000 tons a day during the dry season and
200 tons a day in the rainy season. The only
restricting sector in this pipeline will be Route
92/96 in the southern part of the Panhandle, which
limits the movement to the tri-border area to about
200 tons a day in the dry season and 50 tons a day
during the wet season.
Air Attacks
Air attacks over Laos and North Vietnam have
increased the cost and complicated the movement of
supplies; however, even with increased intensity,
they are not likely to reduce the flow below that
needed to maintain an augmented enemy force in South
Vietnam. A record volume of traffic -- 240 tons
per day -- moved into the Laotian Panhandle during
the first quarter of 1968 in the face of heavy air
attacks. Even if the unusually high reported loss
rate of trucks and supplies in the first quarter of
this year is accurate and is sustained, losses could
be made good by imports from the USSR, China, and
Eastern Europe. Transport routes have considerable
SECRET
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OJGl.AiNr- 1
excess capacity, and, even with increased bomb
damage, the rudimentary transport system is easily
repaired and the network could support increased
traffic flows. Furthermore, the present repair
force could be augmented by additional local labor
or Chinese construction troops.
SECRET
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Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
(ALTERNATIVES 1, 2, AND 3)
Top Secret
Copy No. 12
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POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
(The case in which anmed neconna.izzance attac(z,6
atce pe muted against ?.inez a4 communication and
at { Lxed ,tang etas in Nan-th Vietnam except thane
tangex,s pnev.ious1y unauthorized which atr.e within
3 and 1.5 nauticat mites a4 the centenz oji Hanoi
and Haiphong, ne,6pect.ivety). (No. 1)
(The case in which existing Rotting Thunders gnaund
nu.2ez arse mod i ed to perm-%t coastak and neconna,its-
aance attacks again4t po,5.itiveIy -.denU.i6 ied Nanth
Vietnames e attack ena4.t and Zog-iz t.i.cs cna{-t out-
4-ide og 3 naut.iea2 ni ens o~ the eoazt at coaztat
i tand,s o ~ Nanth Vietnam). (No. 2)
(The ease in which the Rotting Thunders pnognam o j
Mauch 1968 ,iz mod-ii.ied to -%nc1ude at-tacfzz aga.in,~t
m.i.Eitany tang e.z in po putated anea~s with gtceatetc
?UzetLhood o~ h.ighen c-iv,iI,1an cazuatties and
cat.2a.tena2 damage) . (No. 3)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
June 1968
Possible Alternatives
to the Rolling Thunder Program
The cases where the Rolling Thunder Program
is reinstituted under March 1968 ground rules,
modified as follows:
Reduction of the restricted bombing
areas around Hanoi and Haiphong (No. 1)
Authorization of strikes against
North Vietnamese attack and Logistics
craft outside the 3-mile Limit (No. 2)
Authorization of strikes against
military targets in populated areas
(No. 3)
Summary
This memorandum examines the effects of a resump-
tion of the Rolling Thunder Program un.der.March 1968
ground rules, modified to permit strikes against pre-
viously unauthorized targets:
(a) all fixed targets except those within
3 and 1.5 nautical miles of the centers of Hanoi
and Haiphong, respectively; or
(b) North Vietnamese attack and logistics
craft outside the 3-mile limit; or
(c) any military target regardless of its
location in populated areas.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It
was prepared by the Office of Economic Research and was
coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence and
the Director's Special Assistant for Vietnamese
Affairs.
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The effects of any of these alternative programs
would not differ markedly from those achieved by a
resumption of full-scale bombing under the March 1968
ground rules.* Although alternatives 1 and 3, particu-
larly, would add-to the cost of North Vietnam's con-
tinued support of the war, their effects would in all
likelihood not be sufficient to alter the course of
the war. Alternative 2 would present such few addi-
tional targets that it would have little, if any,
impact on the war.
Under alternative 1 only one of 26 previously
unstruck targets in the Haiphong area and 20 of 49 un-
struck targets in the Hanoi area would be open to
attack. Few of these are of prime importance to North
Vietnam's war sustaining capabilities. Alternative 3
would expose a large number of significant targets to
attack, including the port facilities at Haiphong and
other major transport and industrial targets. The key
military command facilities that could be attacked are
believed to be in hardened sites. Attacks against
barracks areas would have little disruptive effect,
because the dispersal of large elements of the popula-
tion means that adequate housing should be available.
The major effects of the loosening of the March
1968 restrictions on the bombing program would be as
follows:
1. The initial strikes against storage
areas in Hanoi and Haiphong might result in the
destruction of 90,000 tons of supplies, or as
much as 5 percent of one year's seaborne
imports at present. levels. After these initial
strikes, however, these facilities would be
dispersed and later strikes would be much less
successful.
2. Transportation problems would be
increased. The flow of imports through Hai-
phong would become more costly and time con-
suming. The loss of important repair facili-
ties, particularly for railroad rolling stock,
would create localized transportation problems.
The heretofore largely undamaged machine
building industry that contributes to the
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maintenance of transport equipment could
be disrupted. The flow of men and
supplies to the south, however, would be
maintained. Supplies moving into South
Vietnam were only a small fraction -- 2
percent -- of daily imports in 1967.
The burden of any shortfall in imports
would be carried by the civilian popula-
tion.
3. Attacks against previously un-
struck targets in urban areas would cause
heavy collateral damage to civilian
structures and inflict an estimated 1,000
to 3,000 civilian casualties.
4. The morale of the North Vietnamese
people and leaders might deteriorate in
the long run. No accurate measure can be
made, however, of the amount of pressure
that the regime can withstand or the
price it is willing to pay before withdraw-
ing support of the war in the South.
5. The attacks would be carried out
at a high cost to US forces. Loss rates
for attacks in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas
during April 1967 through March 1968 were
almost seven times as high as for opera-
tions over all of North Vietnam. In addi-
tion, large numbers of US personnel being
held prisoner in compounds within urban
areas would also be endangered.
6. The attacks against Hanoi and
Haiphong would almost certainly cause the
North Vietnamese to break off the Paris
talks, unless the total war situation and
the status of negotiations led Hanoi to
believe that it was attaining success in
undermining the Saigon government. What-
ever the circumstances of the attacks,
Hanoi would mount a vigorous propaganda
campaign charging the United States with
terror attacks against defenseless civilians.
Despite what might be viewed as a justifi-
able action in the United States, a sub-
stantial segment of world opinion would
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probably echo these charges or, at a mini-
mum, be critical of the United States
for escalating the bombing even beyond the
original limits of the Rolling Thunder
Program.
7. Extension of the attacks to include
targets along the Chinese border would
increase the chance of violation of Chinese
air space and make US aircraft subject to
attack by Communist Chinese aircraft and
air defenses. The targets in the buffer
zone are almost exclusively transportation
targets. Their neutralization would be
short-lived and would have only a minor
impact on reducing the flow of imports.
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The case in which armed reconnaissance attacks
are permitted against lines of communication and all
fixed targets previously unauthorized which are
within 3 and 1.5 nautical miles of the centers of
Hanoi and Haiphong, respectively. (No. 1)
1. Prior to the 31 March restrictions in the
bombing of North Vietnam, the Rolling Thunder
Program had strict ground rules controlling air
attacks within 10 and 4 miles of Hanoi and Haiphong,
respectively, and along the Chinese border, and im-
posed lesser controls over attacks within 30 miles
of the center of Hanoi. and within 10 miles of the
center of Haiphong.* This section examines the
effects of modifying -- in the event full-scale
bombing is resumed -- the Rolling Thunder Program
to permit armed reconnaissance attacks against all
targets in North Vietnam except targets previously
unauthorized that are within 3 and 1.5 nautical
miles of Hanoi and Haiphong, respectively.
Airstrikes in the Reduced Hanoi Prohibited Zones
2.. If the prohibited zone around Hanoi were
reduced from a 10- to a 3-nautical-mile radius,
20 unstruck targets on the CINCPAC Rolling Thunder
Target List (RTTL) in the Hanoi area would be
subject to armed reconnaissance attacks. These 20
unstruck targets include the minor Van Dien and
Phu Thi railroad sidings, three storage and supply
depots, six dispersed POL sites, five barracks, a
military training school, the transmitter and
receiver facilities of the Hanoi international radio
statio , and the Hanoi chemical fertilizer plant
(see Tdble 1). In addition, 18 previously struck
targets in the RTTL, including the railroad/high-
way bridge and bypasses over the Canal des Rapides
and the Yen Vien railroad yard would lie between
the existing 10- and the proposed 3-mile prohibited
zones and could be brought under more timely and
frequent attack
For operating constraints applying to the
RoZZing Thunder Program as of March 1968, see
the Appendix.
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3. The effect of unrestricted airstrikes on
targets located between the 10- and 3-mile zones
around Hanoi would be only slightly greater than
that achieved during the 1967 bombing campaign.
Attacks on the two unstruck rail sidings would
have little significance. Sustained interdiction
of the Canal des Rapides bridge and bypasses and
of the untargeted rail bypasses to the Doumer Bridge
would increase the need for the North Vietnamese to
use time-consuming and more costly alternate
routes and modes of transport. There are enough
bypasses and alternatives, however, for goods to
continue to move through the Hanoi area. Attacks
on military barracks and training facilities
could be disruptive, but most of the functions of
these installations could be easily relocated. The
neutralization of the international radio facilities
would have no significant effect on war-related
communications and could quickly be offset. The
Hanoi chemical fertilizer plant produces nearly
10 percent of the country's phosphate fertilizer,
but the loss of the plant's output could easily
be made up by increased imports. Initial strikes
in the area between the 10- and 3-mile zones
would probably result in heavy destruction of
the transport equipment, military goods, and
economic supplies now using the area as a sanctu-
ary. After the initial attacks, however, supplies
and equipment would be quickly dispersed or moved
into the reduced 3-mile sanctuary area with little
loss of supply capabilities.
Attacks in the Haiphong Reduced Zone
4. The reduction of the prohibited zone around
Haiphong from 4 to 1.5 nautical miles would have
little or no impact on North Vietnam's support of
the war. Only one unstruck target on the RTTL --
a transformer station -- would be subject to un-
limited attack (see Table 2). The transformer
station connects the city of Haiphong into the
main power network, but, if destroyed or damaged,
it could be bypassed, and the city could function
on local power from diesel-generating stations.
Nine targets located between the existing 4-mile
and the proposed 1.5-mile zones have already
been struck, including the Haiphong Cat Bi Air-
field, the Haiphong Highway Bridge SSE on Route 5,
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strikes
and some barracks and storage areas. Only two of
these struck targets -- Cat Bi Airfield and the
Haiphong Petroleum Products Storage Area -- re-
main as active targets on the RTTL. Unlimited
attacks against these targets would have little
impact beyond that achieved by previously authorized
Attacks in the Buffer Zone
5. A large number of unstruck transportation
targets are in the buffer zone along the Chinese
border, including the important Dong Dang railroad
yard, 10 other rail targets along the Hanoi-Dong Dang
line, 16 rail bridges along the Hanoi-Lao Cai line,
and about 300 highway bridges throughout the zone.
Attacks against these targets, however, would hinder
but not seriously impair transport operations. The
most serious effect would result from attacks
against the Dong Dang rail bridge and the rail yard
that contains some railroad car repair facilities.
Although the bridge and rail yard are the most
important in the China border area, they can be
effectively bypassed. The unstruck bridges on the
Lao Cai line are small and can be quickly repaired
or bypassed. Attacks against the many highway
bridges in the buffer zone would hamper transport,
particularly on Routes 1A, 1B, 3, and 4, but by-
passes are sufficient to assure the continuation
of traffic. Initial airstrikes in the existing
sanctuary area along the Chinese border would
result in a substantial destruction of supplies
and transport equipment, but these items would
probably soon be relocated across the Chinese border
and supply movements would continue unabated.
Civilian Casualties
6. Air attacks against targets close to densely
populated areas would probably result in a high
number of North Vietnamese civilian casualties,
although effective civil defense measures and an
adequate warning system would tend to minimize
casualties after the first few attacks. As many
as 1,000 casualties might be inflicted in attacks
against previously unstruck targets, based on the
estimated 2,000 civilian casualties that resulted
from strikes against a. larger number of similar
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targets in 1967. These casualties would probably
serve only to enhance the effectiveness of North
Vietnamese propaganda, rather than to weaken the
morale of the populace.
US Air Losses
7. An increase in air attacks against targets
within 10 and 4 miles of Hanoi and Haiphong,
respectively, would most likely result in a
substantial increase in US aircraft losses. Forty-
two US attack aircraft were lost in combat over
Hanoi and Haiphong during April 1967 through March
1968, a loss rate of 16.6 per 1,000 attack sorties,
compared with an overall loss rate of only 2.4 per
1,000 attack sorties. Moreover, increases in the
number of attack sorties against targets in Hanoi
and Haiphong have resulted in a greater than pro-
portionate increase in the number of combat losses.
8. Aircraft hitting targets in the Chinese
buffer zone might be subject to attack by Communist
Chinese aircraft or AAA, if they strayed across the
border. Chinese air defenses have reacted strenuously
under these circumstances in the past. The Chinese
air defense system along the border with North
Vietnam has been strengthened recently by the intro-
duction of additional AAA units. A regiment of MIG-19
jet fighters has been deployed to Ning-ming, and
would be capable of launching attacks against actual
or alleged US air intrusions.
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The case in which existing Rolling
Thunder ground rules are modified
to permit coastal and reconnaissance
attacks against positively identified
North Vietnamese attack craft and
logistics craft outside of 3 nauti-
cal miles of the coast or coastal
islands of North Vietnam. (No. 2)
9. A modification of the Rolling Thunder Program
as it existed in March 1968 to permit air attacks
against North Vietnamese naval and logistics craft
outside of 3 nautical miles of the North Vietnamese
coast would have little impact on the'war. Such
attacks have been previously authorized throughout
most of the Tonkin Gulf -- below 20? 42'N latitude --
but few lucrative targets have been available, and
opening the upper reaches of the Gulf to air attack
would make few new targets available.
Past Air Operations
10. The Rolling Thunder Program of March 1968
permitted armed reconnaissance air attacks against
identified North Vietnamese naval and logistics craft
in almost all areas of the Tonkin Gulf 25X1
South of 20? 42'N latitude -- about 9 nautical miles
south of the center of Haiphong -- all such craft
could be attacked without limitation. North of this
latitude to the buffer zone (25 nautical miles south
of the Chinese border), armed reconnaissance was
authorized against positively identified North Viet-
namese craft sighted within 3 nautical miles of the
coast and offshore islands of North Vietnam. North
Vietnamese naval and logistics craft were free from
attack only when they were outside of the-3-nautical-
mile limit north of 20? 42'N (the upper reaches of
the Tonkin Gulf) and then only if they did not fire
on US aircraft.
11. Despite the sweeping authorization for attack,
only a negligible share of the Rolling Thunder Program
has been directed against watercraft in the Tonkin
Gulf. Only 105 attack sorties were directed at off-
shore vessels in 1967, and most of these attacks were
within 3 miles of the coast. These sorties delivered
about 120 tons of ordnance -- 0.1 percent of the total
delivered against all transportation targets in North
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Vietnam. Two PT-boats were sunk off Thanh Hoa in
July 1967, and various watercraft were reported
destroyed or damaged.
Potential Targets
12. Coastal junks and barges regularly move from
the coal ports of Hon Gai and Cam Pha to Haiphong and
further inland via coastal waterways. Coal is the
principal commodity moved, but other economic goods
are probably moved to the coal ports. These craft
normally use the coastline for shelter and it is un-
likely that they move outside of 3 nautical miles of
the coast.
13. The small North Vietnamese Navy, which con-
sists of about 40 Soviet and Chinese-built patrol
boats, gunboats, torpedo boats, and subchasers, is
often in the Haiphong and Hanoi areas to supplement
the air defenses of the two cities. These craft
seldom venture beyond Haiphong-or the coastal islands
east of Haiphong, however, and are rarely seen on the
open seas in the areas now proposed for air attack.
14. Four to five North Vietnamese merchant
coasters regularly operate between-Haiphong and certain
Chinese ports, usually Whampoa on the Pearl River near
Canton. In the past, these coasters- exported cement
and coal, primarily to Hong Kong. In 1965, the last
year for which such data are available, North Vietna-
mese vessels carried at least' 56,000 tons of cargo,
of which 51,000 tons were exports. These ships are
believed to hug the Chinese coast, however, making air
attack impractical. Even if sunk, the tonnage lost
would be small, and the North Vietnamese could easily
counter any disruptions by moving material via rail,
road, or vessels under other than the North Vietnamese
flag.
15. A few high-speed infiltration trawlers are
suspected of transiting the upper Gulf en route to
South Vietnam. These vessels presumably avoid running
the length of the heavily patrolled North and South
Vietnamese coasts by sailing through the Hainan Straits
and down the eastern side of Hainan Island. Such
voyages are probably infrequent; only one known attempt
has been made to date in 1968 to approach the South
Vietnamese coast from the direction of Hainan Island,
and three of the four trawlers involved in the attempt
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were sunk. Further, the run in the Tonkin Gulf could
be made almost entirely within Chinese territorial
waters if necessary.
16. Major fishing centers are located at Mon Cay
near the Chinese border, at Haiphong, at Do Son, and
off the island of Cac Ba. Fishing boats from these
centers would probably be harassed by pilots searching
for naval and logistics craft in the upper Gulf.
Deep-sea fishing, however, is as yet relatively un-
developed in North Vietnam. The total annual fish
catch before the bombing was only about 200,000 tons,
of which about 110,000 tons were salt water fish and
the remainder fresh water fish raised in the many
ponds and irrigated fields in North Vietnam. Seventy
percent of the salt water fish catch was obtained by
fishing close to shore and only 30 percent was the
result of deep-sea fishing. Deep-sea fishing in the
area north of 20? 42'N latitude has already been
adversely affected by the Rolling Thunder Program
since most fishermen have had to pass through the
3-mile unrestricted zone.
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The case in which the Rolling Thunder
Program of March 1968 is modified to
include attacks against military targets
in populated areas with greater ZikeZi-
hood of higher civilian casualties and
collateral damage. (No. 3)
17. A renewed bombing program that brought all
military targets under attack without regard to popu-
lation concentrations would add to the cost of North
Vietnam's continued support of the war, but these
attacks would not in themselves alter the course of
the war.* This alternative would open to attack 29
targets in Hanoi and 25 targets in Haiphong (see
Tables 1 and 2).
Transport Targets
18. In Hanoi, attacks against transport targets
in populated areas that have not been subjected to
airstrikes -- including the Hanoi railroad station
and classification yard, Gia Lam Airfield, Areas B
and F of the Hanoi port, a small boatyard, and six
vehicle repair shops -- would not be excessively dis-
ruptive. The Hanoi railroad station and classification
yard contains the country's largest locomotive and
rail car repair facilities. Damage to this yard
could hinder rolling stock repairs and disrupt rail
traffic through Hanoi. Bypasses, however, probably
would provide for the continued movement of goods.
The nearest alternative for rebuilding locomotives
would be in Communist China, but other facilities
would be available for servicing and for light repairs.
Areas B and F of Hanoi port employ primitive offload-
ing methods and are relatively immune to neutraliza-
tion. Gia Lam Airfield is North Vietnam's principal
airfield for international passenger service, and
attacks against the airfield would likely have adverse
international political repercussions.
19. In Haiphong, air attacks against unstruck port
targets -- the dock area, five shipyards, a rail yard,
and a cable bridge -- could seriously hinder the move-
ment of the large volume of imports that are vital to
the economy and to the maintenance of lines of
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communication.* The Haiphong dock area receives most
of North Vietnam's seaborne imports. The destruction
of the dock area would make it necessary to increase
the use of lighters for offloading in the port area
or to offload at Chinese ports and move the goods in-
to North Vietnam by coastal craft, rail, and truck.
Although less efficient, substantial amounts of sea-
borne imports could be unloaded by using lighters,
and transport routes from China have considerable
unused capacity.
20. Five unstruck shipyards in Haiphong, together
with the accidentally damaged Shipyard No. 4 and a
naval base, provide an important part of the country's
capacity for ship repairs. Watercraft could be
serviced and repaired at dispersed-locations, but
major repairs to seagoing ships would be disrupted by
strikes against Shipyard No. 4 and the naval base.
21. Haiphong's rail yard is one of the country's
primary rail facilities, containing a car repair shop,
engine house, and general repair facilities. Exten-
sive damage to the rail yards would hinder rail
clearance from the port, congest port operations, and
reduce rolling stock repair capabilities. However,
the impact on transport capacity would be far from
decisive. Port operations and clearances of cargoes
were maintained in 1967 although through rail traffic
to the port areas was cut for an extended period by
the interdiction of the Haiphong railroad/highway
bridge.
Storage Facilities
22. The denial of sanctuary for storage of goods
in urban populated areas would hinder present logis-
tical procedures and would require the initiation of
alternate methods for storage and distribution.
Five unstruck storage and supply depots are in the
Hanoi area; in Haiphong, there are six major unstruck
storage facilities including warehouses and open
storage in the port. Initial attacks on storage areas
could render heavy damage to accumulated imported
goods . An estimated 30 , 0 00 to 40 , 000 tons of goods
could be stored in the Hanoi port area, and the
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Haiphong port at any one time might contain as
much as 50',0'0'0 tons of miscellaneous cargo includ-
ing motor vehicle tires,. barge sections, trucks,
jeeps, construction materials, and POL drums.
.Military Targets
23. Attacks-against barracks areas .and headquarters
compoundswould have little disruptive effect. Key
command facilities are believed to be in hardened
sites. The elimination of barracks would place an
added burden on available civilian housing., but with
the evacuation of large numbers of young and old from
Hanoi and Haiphong, housing should be more than
adequate for those air defense and military units re-
maining in the cities.
Targets in Industry
24. The most important unstruck industrial instal-
lations in populated areas_ are the machine building
plants. The Hanoi machine tool engineering equipment
plant, the Hanoi engineering plant, and the Hanoi
machinery plant are-the largestand most productive
of North Vietnam's small machine-building industry.
Their output probably contributes. significantly to
the maintenance of transport equipment. Successful
strikes against these plants would eliminate a large
share of the country's output of diesel motors, small
electric motors, generators, water pumps; and machin-
ery spare parts, adding significantly to import
requirements. Attacks against these facilities might
lead to further dispersal of an already decentralized
industry with the consequent inefficiencies.
25. Other unstruck industrial facilities in popu-
lated areas contribute products that support the home
front or are not essential to the war effort. In
Hanoi, a rubber products plant produces consumer goods
and a concrete products plant produces civil defense
shelters, among other products. In Haiphong, a con-
crete products plant, three POL tank fabrication shops,
and four diesel powerplants are relatively unimportant
targets.
Casualties and Collateral Damage
26. Air attacks against previously unstruck targets
in densely populated areas would result in a higher
number of North Vietnamese civilian casualties, although
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I I
effective civil defense measures and an adequate warn-
ing system would tend to minimize casualties after the
first few attacks. The number of civilian casualties
inflicted on these strikes might be as high as 3,000,
based on the estimated 2,000 casualties inflicted by
less intensive strikes against targets-in populated
areas in 1967. This level of casualties might
increase the effectiveness of North Vietnamese propa-
ganda.
27. In addition to civilian casualties, collateral
damage to civilian structures wouldbe increased.
Damage to residential housing and public buildings
in Hanoi and Haiphong has been light thus far,
although in Nam Dinh, the third. largest city in North
Vietnam, collateral damage has been particularly
heavy. Although casualties have been played down,
collateral damage has figured prominently in Hanoi's
propaganda.
28. Casualties may also be inflicted on US POW's,
as a number of. the targets in Hanoi and Haiphong are
located close to compounds in which US flying person-
nel are being held prisoner. Of the more than 1,200
US personnel who have gone down. with disabled aircraft
over North Vietnam, about 20 percent have been reported
captured and more than a third of the 550 listed as
missing may have been captured. In Hanoi, there are
four confirmed POW detention camps and .10 reported,
but unconfirmed; in Haiphong, US POW's ,are reported
to be in one compound. Almost all of the compounds
are clustered in the built-up urban areas, and eight
of those in Hanoi are :near targeted facilities.
25X1
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I I
Operating Constraints Affecting the March 1968
Rolling Thunder Program
The Rolling Thunder Program at the end of March
1968 in general authorized air attacks against
military-associated targets throughout North Vietnam
except in the Hanoi, Haiphong, and Chinese border
areas described below and against certain JCS
targets -- locks, dams, and mining areas -- outside
these areas. Attacks and reattacks against these
proscribed areas and JCS targets had to be specif-
ically authorized by Washington except as indicated.
1. Communist Chinese buffer zones: the area
within 30 nautical miles of the Chinese border from
the border of Laos eastward to 106?E, and the area
within 25 nautical miles of the Chinese border from
106?E to the Gulf of Tonkin. Airstrikes were per-
mitted against rolling stock within the zone south
of the Lang Son railroad/highway bridge on the
Hanoi-Dong Dang rail line.
2. Hanoi prohibited area: the area within
10 nautical miles of the center of Hanoi. Airstrikes
were permitted against rolling stock on the Hanoi-
Dong Dang rail line and in associated yards and
spurs within the area north of the Doumer Bridge.
3. Hanoi restricted area: the area within 30
nautical miles of the center of Hanoi, excluding
the Hanoi prohibited area. Armed reconnaissance
could be conducted against specified lines of
communication including associated ferries, fords,
bypasses, and transshipment points. In addition,
most other targets within the area could be attacked
without specific authorization after prior notifica-
tion to Washington of intention to attack.
4. Haiphong prohibited area: the area within
4 nautical miles of the center of Haiphong.
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5. Haiphong restricted area: the area within
10 nautical miles of the center of Haiphong, ex-
cluding the Haiphong prohibited area. Attacks
could be conducted against specified lines of
communication including ferries, fords, bypasses,
and transshipment points. In addition, most other
targets within this area could be attacked without
specific authorization after prior notification
to Washington of intention to attack.
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Table 1
Targets in the Hanoi
10-Nautical-Mile Prohibited Zone
Map
Target Key JCS/BE Number
I. Targets Opened to Attack
by Alternative I a/
Phu Thi Railroad Spur 38
Van Dien Railroad Siding 9
Hanoi International. Radio
Communications Transmitter 16
Hanoi International Radio
Communications Receiver 23
Hanoi Barracks W 1
Hanoi Barracks NNW 24
Hanoi Barracks WNW, Mai
Dich 21
Mai Dich Barracks 1. 2
Mai Dich Barracks 2 3
Mai Dich Training School 4
Hanoi Barracks/Storage
Depot 6
Hanoi Supply Depot, Xuan 34
Hanoi Supply Depot WNW 22
Duong Xa POL 37
Phu Thi POL 32
Hanoi POL, Thanh 13
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Targets in the Hanoi
10-Nautical-Mile Prohibited Zone
(Continued)
Map
Target K-'. JCS/BE Number
Hanoi POL, Thai 18
Phu Dong POL 36
Co Nhue Vien POL 19
Hanoi Fertilizer Plant 11
II. Additional Targets Opened
to Attack by Alterna-
tive III b/
Hanoi Railroad Classifica-
tion Yard and Shops
Hanoi Vehicle Repair, Bac
Mai
Hanoi Vehicle Repair, SW
Hanoi Vehicle Repair
Hanoi Tank Truck Facility
Hanoi Vehicle Maintenance S
Hanoi Vehicle Repair S
Gia Thuong Shipyard
Hanoi Port Facilities
(Areas B and F)
Hanoi/Gia Lam Airfield
Hanoi Radcom Station
Hanoi NVN ADD Headquarters
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Targets in the Hanoi
10-Nautical-Mile Prohibited Zone
(Continued)
Target
Hanoi MND/MZ Headquarters
Hanoi Telephone
Hanoi Barracks W, Yen
Hanoi Barracks W, Tay
Hanoi Barracks, Giap
Hanoi Barracks, Giang
Hanoi Barracks 3
Hanoi Open Storage 1
Hanoi Open Storage 2
Hanoi Storage, Quinh
Hanoi Storage Gia, NE
Hanoi Warehouse
Hanoi Machine Tool
Engineering Plant
Hanoi Rubber Products
Plant
Hanoi Engineering Plant
Hanoi Machinery Plant,
Gia Lam
Hanoi Concrete Products
Plant, Tay Ho
Map
Key JCS/BE Number
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Targets in the Hanoi
10-Nautical-Mile Prohibited Zone
(Continued)
Map
Target Key JCS/BE Number
III. Targets Previously
Destroyed or Declared
Inactive
Hanoi Railroad/Highway
Bridge - Red River
Hanoi Railroad/Highway
Bridge - Canal des
Rapides (and Bypass) 35
Yen Vien RR Classification
Yard 33
Hanoi RR Car Repair Shops,
Gia Lam
Kinh No Railroad Yard 27
Trung Quan RR Yard 31
Duc Noi RR Yard 29
Van Dien Vehicle Depot
Complex
Kinh No Vehicle Repair
Depot 28
Hanoi Port Facilities
(Areas A, C, D, E)
Hanoi Shipyard Thuong 7
Thuy Phong Shipyard 26
Ha Dong Shipyard 15
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Targets in the Hanoi
10-Nautical-Mile Prohibited Zone
(Continued)
Map
Target K JCS/BE Number
Hanoi/Bac Mai Airfield
Hanoi Radcom Receiver
Station 8
Hanoi Radio Station 17
Ha Dong Barracks/Supply
Depot 14
Chuc Son Barracks, N 12
Van Dien Army Supply Depot
Hanoi Storage Area, Bac Mai
Hanoi Storage Area,
Gia Thuong 5
Hanoi Petroleum Products
Storage, Thanh Am
Nguyen Khe Petroleum
Products Storage, SE
Hanoi POL, Duc Noi 30
Hanoi Thermal Powerplant
Hanoi Transformer Station
Hanoi Concrete Products
Plant 25
Van Dien Battery Plant 10
a. A reduction of the prohibited zone from a 10
to a 3 nautical mile radius.
b. Attacks against military targets regardless
of location in populated areas.
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Targets in the Haiphong
4-Nautical-Mile Prohibited Zone
Map
Target Key JCS/BE Number
I. Targets Opened to Attack
by Alternative I a/
Haiphong Transformer
Station
II. Additional Targets Opened
to Attack by Alterna-
tive III b/
Haiphong Railroad Yard
and Shops
Haiphong Vehicle Repair
Haiphong Cable Bridge 1
Haiphong port:
Haiphong Shipyard No. 3
(Area B)
Haiphong Naval Base
(Area D)
Haiphong Docks (Area E)
Haiphong Shipyard No. 1
(Area F)
Haiphong Shipyard N
(Area G)
Haiphong Shipyard, Central
Haiphong Shipyard, Le Loi
Haiphong Air Defense
Control
a. A reduction of the prohibited zone from a 4-
to a 1.5-nautical-mile radius.
b. Attacks against military targets regardless of
location in populated areas.
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I I
Targets in the Haiphong
4-Nautical-Mile Prohibited Zone
(Continued)
Map
Target K JCS/BE Number
Haiphong Warehouse, Port
Haiphong Warehouse
Haiphong Open Storage, Mall
Haiphong Open Storage
Haiphong Storage 5
Haiphong Storage 2
Haiphong Concrete Products
Haiphong POL Tank/Drum
Fabrication
Don Nghia POL Tank
Fabrication
Haiphong Tank Fabrication
Haiphong Diesel Power-
plant E
Haiphong Diesel Power-
plant 3
Haiphong Diesel Power-
plant W
Haiphong Diesel Power-
plant 4
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Targets in the Haiphong
4-Nautical-Mile Prohibited Zone
(Continued)
Map
Target K JCS/BE Number
III. Targets Previously
Attacked or Declared
Inactive
Haiphong Highway Bridge, SSE
Kien An Highway Bridge
Haiphong Railroad/
Highway Bridge
Haiphong Highway Bridge
Haiphong RR Yard, W
Haiphong Port:
Haiphong Shipyard
(Area C)
Haiphong Shipyard
(Area A)
Haiphong Shipyard, W
(Area H)
Haiphong Shipyard Thuong
Haiphong Shipyard Loch
Haiphong/Cat Bi Airfield 3
Haiphong Barracks, SE,
Cat Bi
Haiphong Ammunition Depot,
Kien An SW
Haiphong Storage Area, SE
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Targets in the Haiphong
4-Nautical-Mile Prohibited Zone
(Continued)
Map
Target Key JCS/BE Number
Haiphong Warehouse Area, W
Haiphong Petroleum
Products Storage Area 2
Haiphong Cement Plant
Haiphong Thermal Power-
plant, West
Haiphong Thermal Power-
plant, East
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25X1 Top Secret
Top Secret
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Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
(The Case of a Bombing Program that Includes the
Mining of the Harbor Areas of Haiphong, Hon Gai,
and Cam Pha.) (No. 12)
Top Secret
28 May 1968
Copy No. 9
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
May 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Possible Alternatives
to the Rolling Thunder Program
(The Case of a Bombing Program that Includes
the Mining of the Harbor Areas of Haiphong, Hon
Gai, and Cam Pha.) (No. 12)
Summary
This memorandum analyzes the effects of a
Rolling Thunder program that is carried on with-
out the restrictions imposed on March 31 and
includes the mining of North Vietnam's principal
seaports. The campaign analysed assumes a sus-
tained and intensive effort at interdiction of
the key lines of communications connecting Hanoi
with Communist China as well as attacks against
the Haiphong port facilities.
A mining program would serve as an effective
means of interdicting North Vietnam's normal sea-
borne commerce. The disruption to this trade
would be widespread but temporary, given Communist
China's cooperation. Within a short period --
two to three months -- North Vietnam and its
allies would be able to implement alternative
procedures for maintaining the flow of essential
economic and military imports. Shipment of goods
from the USSR and Eastern Europe by overland routes
would raise costs and constitute a small additional
burden on Hanoi's Communist allies.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current
Intelligence and the Director's Special Assistant
for Vietnamese Affairs.
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There seems, in brief, to be no way of over-
coming Hanoi's ability to sustain a continuing
flow of essential material support from abroad,
to distribute these goods internally, and to forward
them to its forces in South Vietnam, except in the
unlikely event of Chinese intransigence. The exist-
ing capacities of the railroad, highway, and river
connections with Communist China -- some 14,500
tons a day -- are almost three times the daily
volume of North Vietnamese imports. In addition,
North Vietnam can resort to small coastal craft,
lightering, and even airlift, if necessary, to
maintain the flow of supplies. The experience of
three years of bombing makes it clear that these
alternative routes cannot be interdicted to the
point that traffic would be cut below present
levels.
A mining-bombing program would carry with it
significant liabilities. The possibility of
damage, sinking, or entrapment in port of foreign
shipping is high. This would present the USSR,
particularly, with difficult decisions and create
new risks of a Soviet-US confrontation. If the
mining were effective and forced a shift to alternate
overland supply routes, it would require more
extensive cooperation and assistance on the part
of the Chinese. This conceivably could result in
strengthening Chinese political influence in Hanoi
at the expense of Soviet influence. We doubt,
however, that any shift would be significant in
terms of influencing Hanoi's war policy, since the
North Vietnamese have tended, despite considerable
dependence on China in the past, to set their own
strategy and make their own decisions.
A mining program would also evoke protest and
critical reaction from Free World maritime states.
Almost all world powers would see the program as
further intensification of the war, even if the
program were to follow a breakdown of the Paris
negotiation.
If the negotiations were in process when the
mining program was started, Hanoi would probably
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break off the talks. However, any such North
Vietnamese decision would probably be based on the
total war situation, including the status of the
fighting in the south and the success of the talks
in undermining the position of the Saigon govern-
ment.
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Mining the ports, coastal, and inland water
ways of North Vietnam would result in the widespread
disruption of normal seaborne transport. The
intensity of this disruption and its duration would
depend on the amount of warning time given and the
extent of preparations that North Vietnam has made
in anticipation of the mining. A number of foreign-
flag ships might be caught in port and others en
route would have to be diverted.* The North Viet-
namese would have to quickly adopt alternative
distribution procedures; reroute import traffic;
reallocate small craft, rolling stock, and trucks;
and reassign personnel.
An uncompensated loss of seaborne imports would
be a serious threat to the North Vietnamese economy
and war effort. Seaborne imports -- 1.4 million
tons -- were about 80 percent of total imports in
1967. Imports of vehicles, machinery, generators,
steel products, and petroleum have been essential
to programs to repair domb damage and to maintaining
the transport systems, while imports of foodstuffs
and fertilizer have helped sustain the populace.
'i A mining program might catch a number of foreign-
flag ships in the ports, although it is possible for
mines to be equipped with delayed-action fuses to
provide sufficient time for foreign-flag ships to
clear the port. The average number of ships at
Haiphong per day during the first quarter of 1968
included 22 freighters (7 Soviet, 2 Eastern European,
7 Free World, 5 Chinese Communist, and 1 Cuban) and
1 Soviet tanker. The actual number in port on any
one day during this period ranged from 12 to 26
ships. One or two ships were loading coal at both
Cam Pha and Hon Gai on any given day. In addition,
an average of 8 to 14 ships can be expected to be
at sea and to have declared for North Vietnam.
These ships would either be diverted to Chinese
ports, continue to North Vietnamese waters for
Zightering operations, or possibly even return to
home ports, depending on contingency plans.
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present
reserves and maintaining, present imports by
rail.
The high rate of imports during the past
18
months
has probably permitted the accumulation
of
reserve
supplies of petroleum, metals, construction
The North Vietnamese, however, could sustain
the economy and the war effort at present levels for
about two to three months solely by drawing down
materials, and transport equipment. Imports of
foodstuffs during 1967 totaled almost 450,000 tons
and have been at a higher monthly rate thus far in
1968. This level of imports exceeds the estimated
crop shortfalls during the last 18 months and
suggests that food reserves on hand are adequate
for several months of consumption.
By the end of three months, the North Vietnamese
could have taken the necessary countermeasures to
the mining program by rerouting essential seaborne
traffic to one or more of the many alternative
transportation routes. Two rail and eight highway
routes connect Hanoi with Communist China. The
upper reaches of the Red River from China provide
another route that can carry many kinds of imports.
These land alternatives were used to less than 10
percent of their capacity during 1967 and are being
used even less at present. Shallow-draft lighters
could be used to unload cargo from oceangoing ships
anchored in waters outside the mined areas. Large
numbers of coastal ships and junks could move
cargoes from ships diverted to the southern Chinese
ports of Fort Bayard, Canton, or Peihai and unload
in ports, over the beaches, or move into North
Vietnam's network of inland waterways. An airlift
from Chinese airfields to Gia Lam, which handles
international traffic and has not yet been struck
by air attacks, could potentially provide a means
for importing a large volume of high-priority goods.
Imports formerly received by sea could move by rail
all the way from the USSR and Eastern Europe or they
could be transshipped from South China ports without
placing a noticeable strain on either the Soviet or
Chinese rail systems. Two trains (of 35 freight cars
each) arriving each day from China could carry the
.entire volume of Soviet and Eastern European sea-
borne goods imported by North Vietnam in 1967. For
selected transportation facilities in North Vietnam
and South China, see the map.
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ttLuang Piabang
M gi 14d D
p9,00 tons :ach wa71 per,day
, I
, svty da onseoc e averaos
Dien Bien Phu
Phuc Ypn'
HANOI
VIE T VA
I
OVERLAND IMPORTS DURING 1967.
w.'-1,000 tons per day
Nidg-ming I..
Yt per day
Lei chow
Peninsula
u 'D RIVER ` P} C!IY
.8 tons per clayyaaverage
Selected airfield
-~? Road
---'-- Railroad (meter gauge)
Railroad (standard gauge)
SECRET
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I I
All of the countermeasures to a US mining pro-
gram, except for direct lightering from ships to
the shore, would require the cooperation of the
Chinese. If all Soviet and East European seaborne
shipments were diverted to an overland route via
the Trans-Siberian railroad, the Chinese would have
to permit a sixfold increase over the 1967 volume
of Soviet and East European traffic transiting
China. Using Fort Bayard, for example, would
require a willingness on the part of the Chinese
to transship cargo by rail 668 kilometers from
Fort Bayard to P'ing-hsiang. The Chinese would
probably be reluctant to emphasize the importance
of Soviet aid to North Vietnam by cooperating in
this manner. However, faced with the alternative
that the North Vietnamese could not continue the
conflict without major infusions of Soviet and East
European aid, the Chinese would probably be forced
to help maintain the flow regardless of the nation-
ality of the donors.
Levels of Import Traffic
During 1967 North Vietnamese imports reached
record levels totaling almost 1.8 million tons as
shown in the following tabulation:
Economic goods
Annual
Daily
Bulk foods
447,000
Fertilizers
147,000
POL
256,000
Miscellaneous
809,000
1,659,000
4,600
Military goods
125,000
300
Total imports
.7,784,000
4,900
During the first four. months of 1968 imports
have been at levels 10 to 15 percent higher than
in the corresponding period of 1967. Most of
this increase has been in imports of foodstuffs
and petroleum.
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The volume of imports maintained by North Viet-
nam has been in excess of the current best estimates
of consumption patterns and requirements. Part of
the surplus may be to compensate for disruptions-to
production or to distribution and storage systems.
On the other hand, it is likely that this high
level of imports reflects an element of contingency
planning by Hanoi to build up reserves and stock-
piles in the event that the port of Haiphong is
closed.
The importance of Haiphong is apparent in the
fact that seaborne imports during 1967 averaged
3,900 tons a day, or about 80 percent of North
Vietnam?s total imports. Thus if the use of Haiphong
were denied, North Vietnam could possibly be required
to move almost five times as much cargo over its
existing land transport connections with Communist
China. The added burden on the land transport
connections could be reduced to the extent that
North Vietnam is able to cut back on its total import
requirements. On the other hand, North Vietnam
should be able to transfer some part of the import
burden to other means of transport such as coastal
shipping, lighters, and air transport.
Land Route Capacities and Import Requirements
The daily capacity of the railroad, road, and
water routes from China to the Hanoi area of North
Vietnam totals 14,500 tons and far exceeds the
daily tonnage requirements needed even if all seaborne
imports were shifted to land routes (see Table 1).
The high volume 1967 import program would exceed
the capacity of the existing road and inland water
systems and could conceivably exceed the interdicted
capacity of the railroads. When the land transport
routes are viewed as a single system, however, the
combined capacity is almost three times greater than
traffic requirements.
While there would be initial delays and con-
fusion, the North Vietnamese would be able to obtain,
deploy, and operate the required number of trucks,
railroad rolling stock, and water craft to shift all
of their seaborne imports-to land lines of com-
munication. The North Vietnamese would probably
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Table 1
Comparison of Import Requirements
to Capacities of Lines of Communication
Tons per Day
Imports as a Percent
of Capacity
_
Actual 1967 imports
4,900
Capacities
Total surface
lines of communication
14,500
34
Railroads a/
9,000
54
Roads
4,000
122
Red River
1,500
327
cz. These are uninterdicted capacities. Although the Hanoi-
l;ao.Cai line is given a current capacity of 700 tons a day,
its normal capacity of 3,000 tons a day is used here. It is
assumed that the alternate facilities that give a capacity of
700 tons a day at the Viet Tri, interdiction point are more
than adequate to meet current small traffic requirements.
For the purpose of this memorandum, it is assumed that if a
higher traffic requirement existed, the North Vietnamese
would raise capacity to whatever level was necessary. More-
over it is estimated, on the basis of their demonstrated
capability, that the necessary alternate crossings could be
established and in operation within three months.
receive additional logistical support from the
Chinese in terms of rolling stock, engineering
troops, and transport specialists. To move the
entire volume of 1967 imports -- 4,900 tons a day --
by rail from P'ing-hsiang to Hanoi would require
the employment of about 300 standard gauge freight
cars in about seven trains arriving daily, without
even using the roads or Red River to move a portion
of the traffic. The roads and Red River have a
combined capacity of 5,500 tons a day. This provides
a cushion that is more than adequate to accommodate
whatever volume of traffic cannot be moved by rail.
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I I
Water and Air Alternatives
North Vietnam can use other alternatives to
maintain its import traffic and thus avoid complete
reliance on its overland transport connections.
These alternatives include lightering of oceangoing
ships outside mined areas, the use of coastal
shipping from China, and the use of air transport.
In the case of lighters and coastal craft, North
Vietnam has adequate inventories to move import
traffic even at the higher levels of 1967. As a
practical matter the use of these water alternatives
would probably be limited. The off-loading of some
types of cargo -- bulky machinery and transport
equipment -- would be difficult. Also in the face
of air attacks and a widespread use of the MK-36
mine, it is possible that cargo losses might be too
heavy to warrant sustained use of lighters or
coastal shipping. They could, however, be used
sufficiently to be a significant means of easing
pressures on overland transport routes.
The use of air transport would probably be
limited to the import of high-value or urgently
needed imports. An air transport program would
be almost wholly dependent on Soviet and Chinese
assistance. Because the Chinese could not provide
the aircraft necessary to sustain a large airlift
without disrupting air transport in China, the
USSR would have to furnish the aircraft to sustain
such an operation. The Soviet military inventory
of high-performance transport aircraft as of
1 January 1967 included about 640 AN-12's designed
for short take-offs and landings on unimproved run-
ways. About 100 AN-12's could provide an airlift
between South China and North Vietnam at the 1967
import rate of 4,900 tons a day.
The Chinese would have to permit the Soviets to
transit Chinese territory to a much greater extent
than they have thus far and permit Soviet personnel,
aircraft, and maintenance facilities on Chinese
airfields. Because an airlift would not be required
to move all imports, it is doubtful that the Chinese
would make such concessions. Furthermore, the
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Soviets themselves would probably not be willing to
risk the escalation of the war which might occur
if Soviet aircraft were destroyed during US air
attacks on North Vietnamese airfields.
The Experience of Past Interdiction Campaigns
An air campaign aginst the northern lines of
communication in circumstances when they are
required to carry all of North Vietnam's imports
should achieve greater interdiction of supplies
than any US effort to date. Target density -- in
terms of traffic volume -- would be about five
times that which moved over these lines during
June-August 1967, the high point of past US inter-
diction efforts. It is probable that the railroads
alone could not bring in the 1967 volume of imports
if they were kept under sustained air attack. The
1967 volume of imports would require slightly more
than one-half of total rail capacity, and an
intensive and sustained air interdiction program
may have a good chance of reducing rail capacity
by more than this amount.
However, on the basis of all the modes of
transportation that are available to the North
Vietnamese, an air interdiction effort against the
lines of communication from the China border is
not likely to be successful. Air attacks would
have to overcome the same problem that has pre-
viously hampered such efforts -- the combined
capacities of the routes greatly exceed the
requirements for traffic. Even a highly successful
air interdiction campaign against railroads could
not be expected to reduce their capacity to the
level necessary to impede the flow of essential
economic and military goods. The capacities of roads
and waterways would supply an additional cushion
or guarantee that adequate capacity was available.
Results of the June-August 1967 air interdiction
campaign, the heaviest of the war so far, support
the contention that an interdiction effort, even
against a heavier concentration of targets, will
not exact a prohibitive cost. from the enemy or
"succeed" where earlier efforts have failed. The
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heavy attacks during the June-August period damaged
bridges, interdicted roads and rail yards, and
forced the Vietnamese to use elaborate time-consuming
and labor-consuming bypass systems that consisted
of alternate semipermanent bridges, pontoon bridges,
causeways, and motor truck and railroad car ferries.
Nevertheless, the North Vietnamese transport system
was still able to function effectively.
Strikes in August against the Hanoi-Dong Dang
rail line -- the rail line most used for import
traffic from China, the USSR, and East Europe --
were effective in stopping through service for a
total.of only ten days. It was not possible to
interdict through traffic for a longer period of
time mainly because each bridge attacked had one or
more bypass bridges available. Photography taken
throughout the period indicates that several yards
were sometimes unserviceable for through rail
service after they were struck but had at least one
through track open for traffic within a short time.
Strikes against the three highways which generally
run parallel to the Dong bang line and can serve as
alternates for the rail line -- Highway Route lA and
two other highways from Mong Cai and Cao Bang --
were probably even less effective. Observed
countermeasures indicate that no significant or
sustained reduction of capacity was made.
Strikes against the Hanoi-Lao Cai rail line
--
the other rail line used for import traffic from
China, the USSR, and Eastern Europe -- did not
reduce the capacity of the line below the 700 tons
achieved by the destruction of the-Viet Tri bridge
in 1966. The line's capacity of 700 tons was
maintained by a rail car ferry'at the site of the
still unrepaired Viet Tri bridge. If more capacity
had been required, there is every reason to believe
that additional facilities would have been installed
at this location to restore the through capacity of
the line.
Strikes against the two highway routes that
parallel the Lao Cai rail line were equally ineffective.
Highway traffic around the destroyed bridge at Viet
Tri was moved throughout the June-August period by
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ferries, a pontoon bridge, and in part by a cable
bridge. Damage to other highway bridges attacked
on the two routes was not significant; structures
were quickly repaired or bypassed.
Prospects for Interdiction of Alternative Routes
An air interdiction campaign against North
Vietnam's lines of communication in conjunction with
a mining program must allocate the total number of
sorties available to a conventional mining program
against oceangoing shipping; the MK-36 mining pro-
gram.; strikes against fixed targets such as bridges,
ferries, rail lines and highways; and strikes against
fleeting targets -- railroad rolling stock, trucks,
and watercraft.
The essential problem is to reduce the capacity
of 14,500 tons per day that is avaiable to the North
Vietnamese for moving supplies south from China to
a level that puts a meaningful ceiling on traffic
flows. This objective requires interdiction of
facilities or equipment to a much greater extent
than has been achieved thus far in the air war.
Three years of air war in North Vietnam have shown --
as did the Korean War -- that, although airstrikes
against rail and road segments will destroy transport
facilities, equipment, and supplies, they cannot
successfully interdict the flow of supplies, because
so much of the damage can frequently be repaired
within hours.
The complexity of the interdiction effort is
apparent in the multitude of targets that must be
kept under attack. North Vietnam, for example, has
650 permanent bridges on the principal lines of
communication that could be used to circumvent the
mining of Haiphong. If all of these permanent
bridges were provided with alternate crossings to
the same extent as the bridges on the vital Hanoi-
Dong Dang line, there could be as many as 2,000
fixed transport targets. In addition, the North
Vietnam logistics target system includes large
numbers of transport vehicles that must be
neutralized. North Vietnam could commit to its
resupply programs an estimated 120 locomotives,
2,000 to 2,300 freight cars, 11,000 motor trucks,
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and more than 30,000 water craft. Only a small
share of these vehicles would be required to
maintain import programs at 1967 levels.
From June through August 1967 the lines of
communication in North Vietnam were subjected to
the heaviest scale of attack achieved to date. On
the basis of an assumed 50 percent increase in the
scale of the attack (from an average of 285 to 425
sorties a day) and damage effects similar to those
achieved to date, the prospects for an escalated
interdiction campaign can be estimated. The results,
summarized in Table 2, show clearly that even this
heightened campaign offers little promise of reducing
the flow of supplies significantly.
If this campaign were flown exclusively against
fixed targets, hits against facilities such as
bridges or alternate crossings would range from 24
to 47 a day, depending on the ordnance mix. If the
attack were flown solely against fleeting targets,
it is estimated that 75 vehicles a day would be
effectively destroyed. In either case, or in any
combination of attacks, it is probable that weather
and operational problems would make it impossible
to maintain this extent of damage on a daily basis.
The frequency with which bridges and bypasses
could be kept under attack would obviously be less
than the time required to offset damage effects.
On the basis of past effectiveness of North Viet-
namese countermeasures, an interval as short as two
to four. days would be more than enough to repair
the bomb damage done to the majority of the specific
facilities or to institute substitute means of con-
tinuing traffic.
In 1967, only the attacks against the key Doumer,
Canal des Rapides and Haiphong bridges required a
repair time in excess of 30 days. In all three
of these cases, however, the North Vietnamese have
built numerous high-capacity bypasses that have
been more than adequate to keep traffic moving.
Numerous other examples exist to show that even
heavily damaged bridges were repaird within a few
days of being hit. When two 53-foot spans. were
dropped at the Bac Giang Railroad/Highway Bridge on
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30 April 1967, the Vietnamese and Chinese had it
repaired and serviceable one day later. The isolated
and intermittent cuts that can be expected along the
various lines of communication would not be sufficient
to seriously impede the flow of supplies.
The maximum attack against fleeting targets
could be expected to deplete the inventory of
freight cars and motor trucks* committed to import
operations within four or five months. This prospect
is lessened by several factors:
1. Inventories of transport equipment could
be maintained through increased imports.
The Chinese inventory of standard gauge
railroad cars would be available to move
essential supplies from China to the Hanoi
area. Imports of trucks would have to
increase substantially, but total imports
would not have to exceed 1,800 per month.**
2. It is doubtful that previous kill ratios --
heavily weighted by operations in the
panhandle of North Vietnam where antiair-
craft fire is much less than over Route
Package VI --? can be maintained.
* It is assumed that, because of priority uses in
North Vietnam and Laos, only one-half of the total
inventory of motor trucks, or some 5,500 vehicles,
could be allocated to the import operation.
** This would not be an impossible drain on Com-
munist truck production. During the Korean War,
the enemy was estimated to have had 8,500 vehicles
in operation. Some 48,000 were destroyed and
damaged during an eleven-month perid by the US
Air Force alone. The operable inventory of vehicles,
therefore, was replaced or rebuilt more than five
and one-half times during this period if the Air
Force claims were accurate. To maintain the
operable inventory of 8,500 during the eleven-
month period, about 4,400 vehicles would have had
to be imported or restored each month, more than
double the monthly vehicle kills of 1,800 estimated
for North Vietnam under the assumed escalation of
the airstrikes.
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3. Furthermore, the experience of the air war
has shown that, because of bad weather,
intensive attacks against lines of com-
munication cannot be maintained over long
periods of time. For example, during
July 1967 a daily average of 120 attack
sorties were directed against targets in
Route Package VI. In December 1967,
bad weather reduced this average to only
27 attack sorties.
Both of the damage effects discussed in this
section represent maximum results from a concentration
of the attack on either fixed facilities or fleeting
targets. The effects of a mixed target program would
be between the extremes discussed here. Whatever
the mix of targets, it is apparent, however, that
the attacks contemplated in this section -- up to
50 percent greater than those accomplished so far
against the lines of communication -- would create
widespread problems for the North Vietnamese and
there would be a much higher rate of destruction
of transport equipment and cargoes than has been
achieved thus far during the air war. It is probable
that for certain periods of time -- days or even
weeks -- the North Vietnamese could not move the
total volume. of 1967:imports, 4,900 tons a day,
Over the longer pull, it seems certain, however,
that by using all facilities available to them, and
by receiving additional aid, the total volume of
military and economic goods necessary to continuing
the war could be maintained.
Targets in the Haiphong Port Area
There are a number of targets in the Haiphong
port complex that could be included in a complete
interdiction campaign. These targets include:
JCS
Number
BE
Number
Facility
Haiphong Docks (Area E)
Haiphong Naval Base (Area D)
Haiphong Shipyard 3 (Area B)
Haiphong Shipyard 1 (Area F)
Haiphong Shipyard North (Area G)
Haiphong Railroad Yard Shops
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JCS BE
Number Number Facilit
Haiphong Warehouse Area, Port
Haiphong Warehouse Area
Haiphong Shipyard Vinh
Don Nghia POL Tank Fabrication
Haiphong Shipyard Central
Haiphong Air Defense Center
Haiphong Open Storage Mall
Haiphong Storage 5
Haiphong Open Storage
Haiphong Storage 2
The attacks would compound distribution and
storage problems and deprive Hanoi of a valuable
sanctuary, and initial attacks might destroy large
quantities of stockpiled supplies. Many of these
targets, however, would lose their lucrative
character after the first attacks. The open storage
and warehouse areas, particularly, would not be
used after attacks against this area. Stockpiles
would be moved to dispersed storage areas, and
little new materiel would be entering Haiphong dur-
ing a mining campaign..
The effects of successful attacks on port and
shipyard facilities might have some immediate
significance, but these effects would be short-lived
for several reasons. The shipyards taken under
attack contribute a relatively small percent of total
North Vietnamese shipbuilding and ship repairs
capability. These yards are engaged principally in
building and repair of small craft and barges. This
type of activity is easily transferred to other
locations, and the production that is lost can be
replaced by new imports or transfers of Chinese
small craft and barges. More to the point, a complete
cessation or sharp decrease in seagoing commerce
resulting from a mining program would mean that these
facilities would fall into disuse as imports are
transferred to alternative routes. The use of such
alternatives as lightering and coastal shipping
generally would not require the use of Haiphong port
facilities.
All of the targets listed are located within a
radius of 1.5 miles from the center of Haiphong.
They are located in formerly prohibited zones that
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are built up and heavily populated. It would be
almost impossible for air operations to avoid
spilling over into areas where civilian casualties
would be at high rates.
Finally, these targets are located in one of
the most heavily defended areas of North Vietnam.
The experience of previous campaigns showt that
attacks against targets in the immediate areas of
Hanoi and Haiphong have resulted in loss rates for
US aircraft from seven to eight times greater than
the rate for operations over all of North Vietnam.
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Hypothetical Escalated Attacks Against
the Northern LOC's in North Vietnam
Scale and Weight of Attack
Average
Sorties per I)
June-August 1967
285 a/
Fixed targets
Assumed escalation
425 b/
Permanent railroad bridges
141
Allocation of sorties
Permanent highway bridges
500 +
sorties
Total permanent bridges
65 0
MK-36 program
40 c/
Other targets
385
Total potential fixed
transport targets
2,000 d/
Total per Day Locomotives
Hits on fixed
facilities 24 to 47 e/
Mobile targets
Freight cars
Motor trucks
120
2,300
11,000
Mobile targets
destroyed 76 f/ Junks, sampans, and barges 30,000 +
a Average against all Lines of communication (rail and highway) in North
Vietnam.
b. An increase of about 50 percent above the June-August 1967 rate con-
centrated against northern Lines of communication only.
c. The MK-36 program calls for 13,000 weapons to be delivered per month by
mid-1968, which would require an average of 40 sorties per day. About 385
sorties would therefore be available for delivering standard ordnance --
about 1.7 tons per sortie -- the rate at which it was dropped during attacks
on the Lines of communication during June-August 1967. For the purpose of
this illustration, it is assumed that most of the MK-36's will have to be
used to attempt to halt Zightering operations.
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Hypothetical Escalated Attacks Against
the Northern LOC's in North Vietnam
(Continued)
d. Tota permanent bridges plus improvised alternate faciaties
extrapolated at the rate that they exist on Yen Vien - Dong Dang line.
e. A case study of the attack on 48 JCS-targeted bridges in North Vietnam
during the period February'1965 through December 1966 reveals that on the
average one hit was scored for every 47 bombs dropped. Using this
experience, 550 tons of conventional ordnance has a good probability of
providing 47 hits with 500 pound bombs, or one-half that number with 1,000
pound bombs. A hit was defined as causing the collapse of one or more
spans or causing structual damage to piers or abutments.
f. During 1967, it is estimated that there was one effective loss to a
vehicle (locomotive, freight car, motor truck, or watercraft) per .5.1
armed reconnaissance sorties flown. Therefore, 385 sorties per day would
destroy about 75 vehicles.
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25X1 Top Secret
Top Secret
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Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
(The case where the Rolling Thunder Program is
reinstituted under the March 1968 ground rules
limiting attacks within 10 and 4 miles of the centers
of Hanoi and Haiphong, respectively, and within the
Chinese Buffer Zone.) (No. 10)
Top Secret
22 MAY 1968
COPY NO. 12
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25X1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
22 May 1968
Possible Alternatives
to the Rolling Thunder Program
(The case where the Rolling Thunder program
is reinstituted under the March 1968 ground
rules limiting attacks within 10 and 4 miles
of the centers of Hanoi and Haiphong,
respectively, and within the Chinese Buffer
Zone.) (No. 10)
Summary
This memorandum examines the effects of a
resumption of the Rolling Thunder program under
the March 1968 ground rules. These rules permitted
all of North Vietnam to be taken under attack
except for targets within restricted bombing areas
around Hanoi and Haiphong and within the Chinese
Buffer Zone.
A return to the Rolling Thunder program as it
existed before 31 March, particularly if undertaken
during the second and third quarters of the year,
when good weather predominates, could have the
following major effects in the short-run:
1. Restoration of key industrial
facilities, already accomplished or in
process, would be quickly neutralized.
Consequently, electric power output
would again decline to 20 percent of
national capacity, and cement and
fertilizer production would cease.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current
Intelligence and the Director's Special Assistant
for Vietnamese Affairs.
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2. Coal exports, which in April
1968 had been brought up to 60 percent
of pre-attack levels, would again de-
cline, and prospects for exports of pig
iron, cement, and apatite would be
indefinitely postponed.
3. The restoration of through
traffic on the principal rail and
highway systems, which is being accom-
plished by the repair of key bridges,
would be disrupted. The restored
bridges and rail lines, enlarged truck
parks, and open-storage stockpiles
would constitute lucrative targets in
the logistic supply system. An esti-
mated 20,000 full-time North Viet-
namese workers and 40,000 Chinese con-
struction troops have been devoted to
the restoration of this system since
the partial cessation of bombing on
1 April.
4. It would again be possible to
take under attack the major airfields
in the north holding jet fighter air-
craft. The in-country air Order of
Battle now consists of 13 MIG 21's,
12 MIG 17's, and 4 IL-28 bombers.
5. There would be an immediate
decline in the morale of the North
Vietnamese population, since they
would again be faced with the hard-
ships and stress associated with the
bombings. There would be increased
local temporary shortages of food,
more widespread shortages of consumer
goods, and renewed requirements for
extra work in repairs, civil defense,
and other activities. Casualties,
which amounted to approximately 36,000
killed and wounded in 1967 under the
previous Rolling Thunder campaign,
would again make a significant impact.
6. Since the resumption of a
full-scale attack on the north would
probably follow as a consequence of
the complete impasse of peace negotia-
tions and a continuation of a high
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level of infiltration of North Viet-
namese forces into South Vietnam,
presumably the Hanoi regime would
have taken into account the conse-
quences of its intransigence.
7. Although a large segment of
world opinion would be critical of
the United States for resuming the
general bombing program, the extent
of this criticism would depend on
the circumstances under which the
bombing was resumed. These criticisms
would be particularly vocal if the
bombings were expanded while the Paris
talks were still going on, but pro-
portionately less if they had broken
off and heavy fighting continued in
the south. The South Vietnamese
would view the resumption as an indi-
cation of the resolve of the United
States to continue the war.
In the long-run, the most significant effects
of the bombing resumption would probably be on
the labor force because between 500,000 and 600,000
workers would continue to be diverted either full-
time or part-time from normal civilian occupations
to civil and air defense tasks, to repair work,
and to assistance in the movement of goods. There
would also be a continuing drain of military sup-
plies and equipment, not only material moving down
the lines of communication to Laos and South Vietnam
but also material associated with the air defense
system. In combination, we believe these drains
would have the following long-run effects:
1. Hanoi's allies would be required
to maintain a high level of military and
economic assistance in order to replace
losses. This assistance would be largely
uncompensated for because exports would
be curtailed. Levels of supplies such
as those flowing in through Haiphong and
over the land lines from China during
the first quarter of 1968, however, would
appear to be adequate.
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2. After an initial period of
disruption, Hanoi would be able to
cope with the increased costs and
difficulty of maintaining essential
traffic movements and the current
high-level flow of men and supplies
to South Vietnam. In summary, the
military situation would return to
what it was in March, with North
'Vietnamese countermeasures and in-
creased imports acting as an effec-
tive offset to the destruction caused
by bombing.
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It, I N A
k4yn Thuy
ng
Ning-ming 1
'-* /-.Under
" construction
Parallels Associated With
Current Bombing Restrictions
Khe
Sant
DEMARCATION LINE
Dong H.
Q1ang Tri
n SOUTH
H.e
T H A I L A N D
North Vietnam
i Area of bombing
restrictions, March 1968
Road
Railroad meter gouge)
Major inland waterway
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I. Scale of Rolling Thunder Operations
Through 31 March
The intensity and scope of Rolling Thunder air
operations. have increased each year since the air
war began. During 1967, more than 191,000 sorties
were flown over North Vietnam, almost as many as
were flown in the two previous years combined, and
a third of all the sorties flown over Southeast
Asia. Approximately 60 percent of all sorties
flown over North Vietnam were attack sorties.
Ordnance delivered against targets in North Vietnam
during 1967 was almost double that during 1966. The
average tonnage of ordnance delivered per attack
sortie has increased from 1.3 tons in 1965 to 2.3
tons in 1967, largely because of the increasing use
of B-5.2 bombers in the southern part of North Viet-
nam. Total sorties, attack sorties, and tons of
ordnance by US and Vietnamese Air Forces for the
years of the Rolling Thunder program are shown in
the following tabulation:
Year
Total
Sorties a/
Attack
Sorties
Tons
of Ordnance
1965
55,560
25,880
34,300
1966
147,840
82,170
128,590
1967
191,250
107,070
247,520
Jan-Mar
1968
35,230
14,800
34,000
b/
a. Vietnamese Air Force sorties constitute Less than
one percent of total sorties.
b. Tonnage is estimated for March.
Unfavorable flying weather restricted the level
of attack sorties flown in the first and fourth quar-
ters of each year, as shown in the tabulation below.
The unusually low number of sorties in the first
quarter of 1968 resulted from bad flying weather,
self-imposed bombing restrictions, and the diversion
of a number of sorties to operations in the Khe Sanh
area.
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Quarter 1965 1966 1967 1968
First 280 2,480 6,850 4,930
Second 1,870 5,900 10,590
Third 3,560 11,450 10,700
Fourth 2,930 7,560 7,540
Most of the Rolling Thunder campaign has been
directed against targets in Route Packages I, II, and
III. Two-thirds of all attack sorties were in these
Route Packages in 1967 and about 75 percent in the
first quarter of 1968. Attacks against targets in
Route Package VI, particularly in the Hanoi and
Haiphong areas, were increased in 1967 to about 20
percent of all attack sorties.
Lines of communication have been the principal
targets in the air war. Almost one-half of the
ordnance delivered against North Vietnam in 1967 was
against lines of communication. Slightly less than
40 percent was against non-transport military tar-
gets, and a small portion was against industrial
targets.
Two-thirds of all the ordnance dropped on lines
of communication in 1967 was directed against the
highway system. About 25 percent was on roads and
trucks; almost 30 percent on road crossings such
as bridges, culverts, and causeways; and almost 15
percent on road supply handling areas. The follow-
ing tabulation shows the distribution of ordnance
on lines of communication during 1967, by type of
targets:
Average Number
of Attack Sorties
per Month
Route Segments Bridges,
and Culverts,
-Equipment and Causeways
Roads
Railroads
Waterways
28,720
2,045
9,710
34,285
9,315
560 a/
. Locks, Zevees, and embankments are inc
Supply
Handling Areas Totals
16 ,10 5
15,110
1,720
79,110
26,470
11,990
uded in this category.
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Most of the ordnance on military targets in
North Vietnam during 1967 was against ground forces
and ground forces installations. About one-third
was against military troop areas, one-third against
gun emplacements, including antiaircraft artillery,
one-fourth against storage and supply areas, and less
than 10 percent against airfields, naval bases, radar,
and SAM sites.
US losses of aircraft and personnel have been
substantial, but aircraft losses have not increased
as rapidly as the scale of operations, see the table.
A total of 823 fixed wing aircraft and ten helicopters
have been lost in combat action over North Vietnam
from 1965 through March 1968, and about 1,200 person-
nel have been reported downed with their aircraft.
Aircraft losses have been declining, however, in
proportion to the total number of sorties over the
past three years.
Attacks against industrial and other targets in
heavily defended areas, particularly in Route
Package VI which contains Hanoi and Haiphong, have
had the highest combat loss rates. Attacks against
industrial targets suffered loss rates of 21.4 air-
craft per 1,000 attack sorties in 1967, and a loss
rate of 17.9 per 1,000 attack sorties was sustained
in attacks against targets within 10 nautical miles
of Hanoi and Haiphong during the last three quarters
of 1967. By comparison, the average for all targets
in 1967 was 2.4 aircraft per 1,000 sorties, and losses
for attacks against lines of communication were only
2.1 per 1,000 attack sorties.
The cost to the United States of Rolling Thunder
air operations has gone up each year with the
increasing intensity of the air campaigns. The
production cost of aircraft lost, the direct opera-
tional cost of sorties flown, and costs of ordnance
delivered during 1966, 1967, and the first quarter
of 1968 are shown in the following tabulation:
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Sorties, Losses, and Loss Rates of US Fixed Wing Aircraft over North Vietnam
1965-67 and January-March 1968
/
Sorties a/
Losses
Combat Losses
per 1,000 Sorties
1965
25,270
129
5.1
1966
81,360
226
2.8
1967
106,940
252
2.4
Jan-Mar 1968
14,800
31
2.1
228,370
638
Support missions
1965
29,570
39
1.3
1966
65,660
57
0.9
1967
84,180
76
0.9
Jan-Mar 1968
20,430
13
0.6
199,84o
185
1965
54,840
168
3.1
1966
147,020
283
1.9
1967
191,120
328
1.7
Jan-Mar 1968
35,230
44
1.2
428,210
823
Combat and operational
losses
,
1965
54,840
185
3.4
1966
147,020
316
2.1
1967
191,120
366
1.9
Jan-Mar 1968
35,230
54
1.5
428,210
921
a. Attack sorties carry out strike and flak-suppression missions. Support
sorties make up the remainder, which conduct photo and electronic recon-
naissance, combat air patrol, search and rescue, electronic countermeasure,
refueling, and forward air control missions.
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Million US $
1966 1967 Jan-Mar 1968
Production Cost 605.6 739.0 125.9
Operational Cost
of Sorties Flown 330.4 451.2 79.1
Ordnance 311.5 479.2 70.6 a/
Total 1, 247.5 1,669.4 275.6
a. Cost of ordnance is estimated for 1968.
In addition to direct costs, there are substantial in-
direct but unmeasurable costs associated with the bomb-
ing.
The direct cost to the United States of inflict-
ing one dollar's worth of damage on North Vietnam
declined from $10.98 in 1966 to $7.07 in 1967, but
the possibilities of a continued decline are limited
as the number of significant economic targets
decreases. During the first quarter of 1968, for
example, cost of damage inflicted was estimated to
be $18.0 million and direct operational costs were
estimated to be $275.6 million, an average cost of
$15.30 for each dollar's worth of damage inflicted.
Ii. Effects of the Rolling Thunder Program
A. Value of Damage
The value of measurable damage inflicted on
the North Vietnamese by the Rolling Thunder campaign
reached $436 million through March 1968. Economic
damage reached about $300 million through March 1968,
of which about $158 million was inflicted in 1967.
Attacks against North Vietnam's military establish-
ment -- SAM's, aircraft, radars, barracks, supply
depots, airfields, naval equipment, and the like --
have inflicted additional damage estimated at about
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$136 million since the start of the bombing. In
addition, North Vietnam has incurred other signifi-
cant but unmeasurable losses from the bombing. An
estimated 500,000 to 600,000 civilian workers were
diverted to full-time and part-time repair and
defense work related to the bombing. The lot of the
average citizen became more trying; families have
been separated, some cities have been partly evacu-
ated, and loss of life and property has been sub-
stantial. Large quantities of military and economic
aid, however -- $1 billion in 1967 alone -- more
than offset the cost of damage inflicted by air
attacks.
B. Transportation
The rail system has been extensively damaged,
but it continues to move a substantial volume of
supplies. Attacks against the rail lines have been
heaviest on the Hanoi-Vinh line south of Hanoi, and
through rail service from Hanoi to Vinh has been
effectively halted during much of the air campaign.
In mid-June 1967, railroad targets on the Dong Dang
and Lao Cai lines in the north and in previously
restricted areas of Hanoi, Haiphong, and the buffer
zone along the Chinese border were brought under
repeated and heavy attack. Key bridges in Hanoi and
Haiphong were interdicted for varying periods,
hindering through rail service in and out of Hanoi
and the port of Haiphong. The Doumer Bridge over
the Red River has been out of service for rail traf-
fic about 80 percent of the time since August 1967,
and continuously since being extensively damaged by
air strikes in mid-December. The Hanoi Railroad/
Highway Bridge over the Canal des Rapides near Hanoi
has been out of use almost 40 percent of the time
since late April 1967. The Haiphong Railroad/High-
way Bridge was out of service continuously from
28 September 1967 to April 1968. However, rail
service on the Dong Dang line -- the primary over-
land import route from Communist China -- to the
Canal des Rapides Bridge near Hanoi has continued
almost without interruption. Elsewhere, at least
shuttle service between interdicted points has been
maintained and most interdicted rail bridges have
been bypassed by multiple ferry and pontoon crossings.
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Despite the Rolling Thunder campaign, the
capacity and f lexibi li ties of the rail system have
been increased by new construction and improve-
ments -- much of it by Chinese construction units.
The Dong Dang line from Ping-h'siang to Kep, and
the Thai Nguyen to Yen Vien line, have been con-
verted to dual gauge;* together with a standard
gauge route from Kep to Thai Nguyen, these lines
provide a standard gauge route from the China border
to the Hanoi area with a. capacity almost double that
of a meter gauge system. Portions of the Hanoi-
Dong Dang line south of Kep to Yen Vien are now
being converted from meter gauge to dual gauge. In
addition, a new rail line is under construction
from Kep east to Hon Gai, a secondary port and coal
producing area.
The highway system has not been seriously
disrupted by the Rolling Thunder program, although
the system has been heavily attacked. Most of the
airstrikes against highways have been concentrated
south of Thanh Hoa along Routes 1A and 15 and against
key bridges in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas. In-
tensive armed reconnaissance strikes have also been
maintained against routes leading into the DMZ and
Laos. An increased volume of truck traffic has been
noted in recent months, however, and substitutes for
damaged highway bridges in Hanoi, Haiphong, and else-
where are less vulnerable and have capacities higher
than the roads which they support.
Despite the Rolling Thunder program, the
highway system has been continuously improved and
expanded, with construction in the north aided by
Chinese road construction units. In the northeast,
a new all-weather road linking the Ning-ming area
of China with Haiphong is near completion and will
increase the transborder road capacity to this major
Chinese logistic center. In the Panhandle of North
Vietnam, Route 101, a major north-south inland
alternate to Route 1A, and Route 137, a second
major route for infiltration into Laos, have been
7 The term " ual-gauge" refers to the use of three
or four rails on the same roadbed, making possible
the use of both meter gauge and standard gauge roll-
ing stock. It is not to be confused with "double
tracking" -- two separate tracks on two or double
road beds with a total of four rails.
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completed. A new all-weather road, a third major
Laotian infiltration route, is under construction
from the vicinity of Dong Hoi toward the southwest-
ern corner of the DMZ. A number of bypass and
connecting roads have also been built and many old
roads improved. In the northwest, construction and
improvement of roads will provide a more direct
motorable link between China and northern Laos
through North Vietnam.
Inland waterways have not been seriously
disrupted by air attacks. The main attacks against
inland water transportation have consisted of armed
reconnaissance strikes against watercraft and water-
way facilities, including transshipment points. In
addition, from June 1967 through April 1968, 26,000
MK-36 mines were seeded to harass watercraft and
disrupt waterway operations. However, a substantial
volume of traffic continues to move over inland
waterways, and the North-Vietnamese have demonstrated
the ability to use mined areas soon after seedings.
Transport equipment has been destroyed and
damaged in large quantities, but increased imports
and domestic repair and construction have maintained
or improved equipment inventories. Pilots have
reported the destruction and damage of large numbers
of railroad rolling stock, motor vehicles, and water-
craft in North Vietnam, and reports of truck destruc-
tion increased significantly in early 1968. However,
inventories of railroad rolling stock and trucks
have actually been increased above the prebombing
levels by imports from North Vietnam's allies.
Domestic construction of boats and imports of barges
and prefabricated barge sections probably have com-
pensated for most of the watercraft losses.
C. Other Economic Target Systems
North Vietnam's modern industries have been
either inoperative or operating at partial capacity
since the initiation of intensive attacks on
industrial targets in early 1967. Electric gen-
erating capacity was reduced by bombing to 20 per-
cent of the prestrike capacity of 187,000 kilowatts
from June through October 1967. However, the respite
from bombing since November 1967 has permitted
electric generating capacity to be restored to 30 or
40 percent of prebombing capacity. If the bombing
pause continues, output of electric power could
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increase to about 60 percent of capacity in about
six months. The Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Plant
has been inoperative since being heavily damaged
in mid-April 1967. The Haiphong Cement Plant was
inoperative for one year until late April 1968,
when repairs apparently permitted a test run on at
least one kiln. Bomb damage also halted production
at the Bac Giang Chemical Fertilizer Plant, the
Phu Tho Phosphate Fertilizer Plant, the Lang Chi
Explosives Plant, the Viet Tri Paper Plant, and
portions of the Hon Gai and Cam Pha coal-processing
facilities. In addition, the Viet Tri Chemical
Complex was inoperative for a large part of the
year as a result of a shortage of electric power.
Repairs, however, have permitted at least some
production to resume at the Phu Tho Fertilizer
Plant, the Viet Tri Chemical Complex, and the coal
facilities at Hon Gai and Cam Pha. The direct cost
of restoring industry damaged by bombing totals
more than $50 million, and reconstruction would
require up to two years to complete.
The machine building industry has been
relatively undamaged by US airstrikes. Small re-
pair shops and foundries are widely dispersed
throughout the country, and the three plants in
Hanoi and Haiphong that account for the principal
output of machinery and machine tools are within
restricted bombing zones. The products and services
of this industry are oriented primarily toward
support of transportation and of agriculture. In
its support of transportation, machine building
comes closer than any other domestic industry to
direct support of the war in the south. Capacity
for machine building and metal processing probably
has been enlarged since the beginning of the air
war through substantial imports of machinery and
equipment. Most imports of machine tools during
1966 were appropriate for repair work and probably
were intended for the dispersed repair shops. How-
ever, during 1967 a large portion of imports were
high-output machine tools, suggesting that the three
central machine building plants are engaged in pro-
duction of significant quantities of agricultural
pumps, generators, and diesel engines.
Most of North Vietnam's petroleum storage
facilities that existed before the bombing have
been destroyed. Use of dispersed tank sites and
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petroleum drums, however, has reestablished satis-
factory supply and distribution of petroleum
products and has enabled the North Vietnamese to
maintain a three-month reserve supply of petroleum.
The cumulative measurable loss in North
Vietnam's seaborne exports attributable to the
Rolling Thunder program reached about $35 million
at the end of 1967, but these losses have had little
adverse effect on the economy. Measurable export
losses represented less than 20 percent of the value
of North Vietnam's annual exports before the initi-
ation of the bombing program and were small compared
with the estimated $340 million of economic aid
contributed by the Communist countries in 1967 alone.
Stepped-up attacks on industrial facilities during
the first half of 1967 accounted for almost one-half
of the cumulative export losses. Exports of pig
iron and cement have not, been observed since May
1967, and exports of coal, which averaged about
78,000 tons per month in 1966, were reduced to only
21,000 tons per month in the second half of 1967.
Agriculture and fishing have been adversely
affected by bombing, although neither has ever been
targeted nor suffered more than minor accidental
bomb damage. The decline in rice output since the
beginning of the bombing -- only partly attributable
to the air campaign -- has been valued at about $60
million. The agricultural labor force, about 70 per-
cent of the total labor force, has been the main
source of manpower for defense and construction work
generated by the bombing program. The low per capita
productivity of agricultural workers, the unskilled
nature of the work, the high agricultural underemploy-
ment, and the ready substitutability of women for men
undoubtedly mitigated the effects on agriculture of the
diversion. The Rolling Thunder program has also
contributed, in conjunction with the Sea Dragon
Program, to a decline in salt water fishing esti-
mated to be valued at $12.5 million. Despite reduced
rice and fish production, however, minimum diets
have been maintained by strict rationing, by sub-
stituting less palatable foods, and, in 1967, by
greatly increasing imports of foodstuffs.
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D. Military Targets
The most significant damage inflicted by
the Rolling Thunder program on the North Vietnamese
military establishment has been against the air
defense system, particularly against aircraft. Cumu-
lative destruction of fighter aircraft through the
first quarter of 1968 amounted to 32 MIG-21's and
87 MIG-17's. All major airfields except that at Gia
Lam, an international commercial airport as well as
a military airfield, have been struck repeatedly.
Attacks against airfields have forced the deployment
of most of the inventory of about 23 MIG-21's and
114 MIG-17's to airfields in southwest China.
Numerous early warning and ground-control intercept
radars, antiaircraft artillery, and SAM facilities
and equipment have been destroyed or damaged, and
airstrikes have probably reduced the efficiency of
SAM units by forcing frequent redeployment of equip-
ment.
However, countermeasures, imports of
equipment, and rapid repair work have offset the
damage inflicted to the air defense system. Replace-
ment of MIG-21's from the USSR and MIG-17's from
China have been sufficient to maintain North Vietnam's
MIG inventory at a relatively constant level. A
small effective force of 25 MIG's continues to stage
out of North Vietnamese airfields, and the capability
of this force has improved. MIG-21 operations have
expanded from defensive patrols around the Hanoi and
Haiphong areas to areas as far south as Vinh and over
the border into Laos. Damage to airfields has been
quickly repaired, and all primary jet airfields were
capable of supporting fighter operations at the end
of March. The North Vietnamese radar system has
become increasingly formidable and sophisticated.
The proficiency of operating personnel has improved
with experience and training
During the
past year the North Vietnamese have also maintained
an inventory of at least 6,000 antiaircraft artillery
pieces of 37-mm or larger and SAM defenses of about
30 active battalions; nearly 200 prepared or pre-
surveyed SAM sites are available for use, including
six or seven in the vicinity of the DMZ.
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Valuable military supplies, equipment,
storage facilities, barracks, and ordnance depots
have also been destroyed or abandoned because of
air attacks, but the loss of these supplies and
facilities has not seriously impaired the overall
effectiveness of North Vietnam's military capabil-
ities. Imports of supplies and equipment from the
USSR and China have exceeded destruction at depots,
and the North Vietnamese have adequately adjusted to
the loss of fixed facilities by the dispersal of men
and supplies. The North Vietnamese have had no
serious difficulty in supporting increased military
activity in South Vietnam.
Nearly one-third of North Vietnam's naval
base support facilities have been destroyed or
rendered inactive, and 12 naval craft have been
destroyed by air attacks under the Rolling Thunder
program. However, the small North Vietnamese navy --
about 40 patrol boats, gunboats, torpedo boats, and
subchasers -- has played a relatively minor part in
the war effort, and it has been largely confined to
the Hanoi and Haiphong areas to bolster the air
defense system.
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25m
Top Secret
Top Secret
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POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
(THE CASE WHERE THERE IS A COMPLETE CESSATION
OF BOMBING IN NORTH VIETNAM. WITH INCREASED
ATTACKS AGAINST INFILTRATION ROUTES IN LAOS)
(NO. 8)
COPY NO. 1.3
TOP SECRET
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
8 May 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES
TO THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
(The Case Where There Is a Complete Cessation of
Bombing in North Vietnam, with Increased Attacks
Against Infiltration Routes in Laos.) (No. 8)
Summary
This memorandum examines the effects of shifting
the weight of the present Rolling Thunder campaign
to Laos. There would be a complete cessation of
bombing in North Vietnam itself.
A bombing campaign confined to Laos would be
directed solely at transportation-logistic targets,
since that country's military significance derives
very largely from its role as the key infiltration
corridor to South Vietnam from the north. however,
the transportation-logistic systems in Laos are
less attractive targets than their counterparts in
North Vietnam, even including the present restricted
Vietnamese Panhandle system, which is confined to
targets below the 19th Parallel as a consequence of
a self-imposed US restriction. The Laotian trans-
port system is a more rudimentary one than the
North Vietnamese system. It has a small and
declining number of significant logistic targets
that are susceptible to detection and attack from
the air, and as a consequence, the post-attack
repair problems are considerably less burdensome.
We believe that concentrating the air effort
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current
Intelligence and the Director's Special Assistant
for Vietnamese Affairs.
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against Laos would have the following direct
effects:
1. Increased numbers of trucks,
supplies, roads, and bridges in Laos
would be destroyed or neutralized, par-
ticularly if the United States continues
to enhance its capabilities of carrying
out night air operations. however, ex-
pansion of the capacity of the trans-
poration routes in Laos will soon permit
the throughput of 1,000 tons of supplies
per day during the dry season and 200
tons during the wet season, in the
absence of bombing attacks. The road
network is used to only a small share
of its capacity; we do not estimate that
increased bombings would be able to slow
down the present high level of infiltra-
tion of men or supplies.
2. The weather and availability of
suitable aircraft would impose serious
constraints in utilizing the available
aircraft sortie capability now devoted
to attacking North Vietnam. In 1967,
more than twice as many attack sorties
were flown against North Vietnamese
targets as against those in Laos. But
instead of a 200-percent increase in
attack sorties, we estimate that the
actual increase from the proposed shift
to Laos would be closer to 50 percent.
Under these circumstances, the present
rapid repair schedule could be main-
tained by the shifting of a small number
of repair crews -- not more than 5,000
men -- to Laos from North Vietnam.
3. The North Vietnamese, as soon
as they were convinced that the bombing
lull over North Vietnam was to be pro-
longed, would begin shifting more anti-
aircraft weapons into Laos. Most of
these weapons, we believe, would be of
small caliber with a few larger conven-
tional antiaircraft guns and perhaps a
token number of SAM's. When completed,
this shift could triple the present
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low loss rate of US aircraft operating
against Laotian targets to a level
closely approximating that experienced
against North Vietnamese targets.
The cessation of bombing attacks on North
Vietnam, even though attacks on Laos continued,
would be regarded in Hanoi as a propaganda and
political victory. The regime would have accom-
plished one of its major purposes in freeing its
territory from aerial attack and it would there-
fore be encouraged in its belief that the United
States would yield to additional pressures. It
is unlikely that the proposed shift in the bomb-
ing program to Laos would have any significant
effect on Hanoi's position with respect to mean-
ingful negotiations with the United States.
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/_oX1
I. Air Operations over Laos
A. Character of Previous Operations
Attack sorties over Laos against the Com-
munist infiltration and logistic system, base areas,
and other military facilities during the period 1965
through March 1968 totaled 128,000, about one-half
the number flown over North Vietnam.* About two-
thirds of the attack sorties over Laos during both
1966 and 1967 were flown in the first and fourth
quarters, when the weather was relatively good for
air operations. The 22,000 sorties flown during
the first quarter of 1968 was the highest quarterly
total of the war. Attack sorties over Laos, by
quarter, are given in the following tabulation:
Quarter
1965
1966
1967
1968
January-March
440
19,820
17,670
21,880
April-June
2,130
14,190
9,440
July-September
2,760
4,290
4,580
October-December
5,500
10,180
14,480
Total a/
10,840
49,120
46,160
a. Because of rounding and post-yearly correc-
tions, components may not add to the totals shown.
Air operations over Laos are divided be-
tween two operational areas: the Barrel Roll area,
extending along the North Vietnamese border in
northern Laos, and the Steel Tiger area, roughly
equivalent to the Laos Panhandle, extending south
from Route 8 to the Cambodian border. These areas
are further subdivided into seven alphabetically
designated sectors, Alpha through Golf (see the
map, Figure 1).
'F In addition, 903000 support sorties were flown
over Laos during this period. During 1967, about
one-half of the support sorties carried out forward
air control missions, 20 percent were reconnaissance
missions, 12 percent were combat air patrol and
refueling missions, and the remaining were supply,
defoliation, and search and rescue missions.
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Savannak et
Vinh
NORTH=
Tche`one
;'Saravane
THAILAND
F wane VIETNAM
CAMBODIA
+Attopeu
90584 5-68 CIA tStung Treng
Figure 1. Laos: Road Network and Steel Tiger Boundaries
Road added or improved
since Jan., 1965
SOUTH
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About four-fifths of the attack sorties
over Laos during 1966 and 1967 were against targets
in the Steel Tiger area of the Laotian Panhandle.
During the first quarter of 1968, attacks in the
Steel Tiger area increased further to almost 90
percent of all attack sorties flown over Laos.
During January-March 1968, emphasis within the
Steel Tiger area shifted from the Echo sector,
adjacent to the major logistical routes from North
Vietnam into the Panhandle of Laos, to the Foxtrot
sector, just west of the Khe Sanh area of South
Vietnam. The share of Steel Tiger attack sorties
flown against the Foxtrot sector increased from
about 25 percent in 1967 to 50 percent during this
period.
Most US sorties continue to be flown during
daylight hours, despite the increased use of detec-
tion devices (see the Appendix) that have been
developed to locate trucks that move largely at
night. In 1967 in the Steel Tiger area, there
was a ratio of two day sorties to each night sortie.
In the fourth quarter of 1967, the ratio changed
to one day sortie to each night sortie. However,
in 1968 the ratio again returned to two day sorties
to each night sortie.
There were 112 combat losses of attack air-
craft over Laos during the period 1965 through
March 1968.* During 1967, 31 fixed-wing aircraft
were downed in Laos by Communist defenses while
participating in a total of 46,160 attack sorties --
a loss rate of less than 0.7 aircraft per 1,000
sorties.** Propeller-driven aircraft flew about
one-fifth of the attack sorties but sustained
almost one-half of the losses by attack aircraft
during 1966 and 1967. however, in 1967, attack
sorties by propeller-driven aircraft were restricted
to less heavily defended areas, and the loss rate
* In addition, 33 combat Losses of support air-
craft, and 20 operational Losses of attack and
support aircraft, were sustained during the period.
Total Losses from all causes over Laos, therefore,
were 165 fixed-wing aircraft.
** The comparable Loss rate over all of North
Vietnam was 2.4 aircraft per 1,000 attack sorties --
more than three times the rate in Laos.
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by these aircraft fell to about one-half of that
sustained in 1966. The trend in combat losses of
fixed-wing aircraft and corresponding loss rates
over Laos during attack missions since 1965 are
shown in the following tabulation:
Year
Attack
Sorties
Combat
Losses of
Attack Aircraft
Losses per
1,000 Sorties
1965
10,840
17
1.6
1966
49,120
47
1.0
1967
46,160
31
0.7
Jan-Mar
1968
21,880
17
0.$
Total
128,000
112
More than three-fourths of the attack
sorties against targets in Laos during 1967 were
carried out by 11 different types of jet-powered
aircraft, mostly F-4's, F-105's, and A-4's. The
characteristics of these aircraft -- high speed,
high altitude, and high fuel consumption charac-
teristics -- limit their loitering times and
target-spotting capabilities and reduce their attack
effectiveness against fleeting targets. Accordingly,
most jet strikes in Laos during 1967 were against
fixed targets such as truck parks, bridges, supply
areas, and defense sites.
Three types of propeller-driven aircraft --
A-1's, A-26's, and T-28's -- flew the remaining
attack sorties over Laos in 1967. Most attack
sorties by propeller-driven aircraft were against
trucks and other moving targets. Attack sorties
during 1967 by propeller-driven and jet-powered
aircraft over Laos and North Vietnam are given in
the following tabulation:
Type of North Laos and North
Aircraft Laos Vietnam Vietnam Combined
Jet 35,170 103,350 138,520
Propeller 10,990 3,590 14,580
Total 46,160 106,940 153,100
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B. Stepped-Up Attacks Against Laos
Weather constraints and the limited avail-
ability of suitable aircraft and technical equip-
ment will probably restrict an increase in attack
sorties over Laos to perhaps 50 percent above 1967
levels, and many of the additional sorties would be
of marginal effectiveness. About 107,000 additional
attack sorties could be made available for use over
Laos as a result of a bombing pause in North Viet-
nam. On the basis of a comparison with 1967
Rolling Thunder statistics, however, most of these
sorties would be flown by jets: 85 percent by
F-4's, F-105's, and A-4's alone. Only about 6,000
of the jet attack sorties would be flown by A-6
aircraft equipped for radar bombing against fixed
targets during poor weather and at night, and only
about 3,600 attack sorties would be performed by
propeller-driven aircraft. Furthermore, heavy
rains and low, dense clouds brought by the South-
west Monsoon generally would sharply limit attacks
in Laos during a part of each day from approximately
mid-May to mid-September, regardless of the poten-
tial number of sorties available. Figure 2, which
compares average rainfall and attack sorties over
Laos, reflects in part the effect of weather on
the sortie rate.
Figure 2. Attack Sorties Compared with Rainfall over Laos, January 1965-March 1968
6,000
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C. Communist Air Defense
Communist air defenses in Laos are composed
of at least 15 antiaircraft battalions, with a
total of 3,200 air defense personnel and about 150
to 300 14.5-mm weapons and 250 to 400 weapons of
37-mm or larger. The weapons are mobile and dif-
ficult to locate and can be deployed in more remote
areas where transportation problems hinder the
movement of heavier weapons. The 14.5-mm weapons
have a maximum effective range of 4,600 feet and
are used against low-flying strike aircraft,
drones, and helicopters. The 37-mm weapons have
a maximum effective range of 8,200 feet. A few
57-mm weapons with a maximum effective range of
19,600 feet may also be in the Panhandle. Thirteen
of the battalions have been identified as Pathet
Lao, one as a Deuane/Pathet Lao battalion, and
one as a North Vietnamese battalion. A minimum of
six battalions, about. 40 percent of the total air
defense strength in Laos, are known to be located
in Southern Laos.
In the event the Rolling Thunder program
were halted, the air defense system in the Laotian
Panhandle could be readily augmented by redeploying
as many as 1,500 antiaircraft weapons and 6,000
antiaircraft personnel from North Vietnam without
a serious impairment of North Vietnam's air defense
capability. About 60 percent of these could
consist of weapons of 37-mm or larger. Such a
redeployment could be accomplished within a month
and would at least double and possibly triple the
number of antiaircraft weapons presently in the
Laotian Panhandle. Trucks available in North
Vietnam could readily transport the required
ammunition, and resupply requirements would not
impose a significant burden on the transport system.
Up to five SAM firing battalions and one
support battalion could be deployed to the Laotian
Panhandle from the Hanoi-Haiphong area without
seriously impairing the air defense system in
North Vietnam. It is probable that any deployment
of SAM's in Laos would be restricted to the Echo
and Foxtrot sectors of the Steel Tiger area against
which most US air attacks in Laos are concentrated.
To support five firing battalions, about 25 SAM
sites would probably be built. Construction of
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the sites and feeder roads would require up to
2,000 engineering workers and would take at least
six weeks to complete. The SAM equipment, weighing
3,000 to 3,500 tons, and personnel, numbering less
than 1,000, could easily be moved to these sites
during the dry season. A more limited and less
rapid movement of SAM equipment could be made
during the rainy season.
Although the introduction of SAM's into
Laos would have considerably more than a nuisance
value, it is doubtful if the SAM's would be an
effective air defense system in view of the kind
of air war presently being fought in Laos. The
SAM's have proved to be relatively more effective
in defending industrial and fixed lines of com-
munication (LOC) targets in the Northeastern
areas of North Vietnam than the fleeting and
widely dispersed targets characteristic of the
air war in Laos. It is likely, therefore, that
the North Vietnamese would deploy only one or two
SAM battalions involving five to ten sites in the
Laotian Panhandle, thus providing a threat to US
strike forces with a minimum expenditure of
resources. A system of this magnitude could be
completed in less than three weeks, would involve
the movement of around 1,000 tons of SAM equipment,
and would require up to 700 construction workers
and 350 SAM personnel.
A small MIG effort could be conducted
against US aircraft over the Laos Panhandle. MIG's
can now be staged from an airfield at Vinh and an
airfield under construction at Bai Thuong, but it
will take six months before construction of the
Bai Thuong airfield can be completely finished.
Aircraft losses as a result of these rein-
forcements in the defense system could be expected
to increase, possibly from the 1967 rate in Laos
of 0.7 aircraft per 1,000 attack sorties to a rate
closer to the average of 2.4 aircraft per 1,000
attack sorties experienced in North Vietnam.
II. The Logistic System in Southern Laos
A. The Road Network
The great bulk of the logistical supplies
moved by the Communists into and through the Panhandle
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of Laos is moved by truck. The movements are sup-
plemented by primitive transport -- bicycles,
porters, and carts -- on innumerable trails and by
small craft on a few minor waterways during the
rainy season.
The road system has been progressively
expanded and upgraded until it now contains more
than 1,600 kilometers of road (see Figure 1). Dur-
ing each dry season, engineer units and laborers
construct new roads, bypasses, and fords, and repair
and improve existing roads. New road construction
is usually halted during the rainy season except
for short bypasses to keep the routes open. Since
1964 the Communists have added about 1,300 kilome-
ters of roads to the Laotian network.* The most
significant routes completed during this time in-
cluded a second major access road (Route 137/912)
into Laos, a limited all-weather road** (Route
92/96) to the tri-border area, and six roads pushed
across the Laotian border into South Vietnam. About
670 kilometers of this construction, consisting of
the primary trunk road system, was built in the
1965-66 dry season. During the recent 1967-68 dry
season, another major construction effort resulted
in about 350 kilometers of new roads, mainly con-
sisting of roads extending eastward into South
Vietnam. A third major access road from North
Vietnam into Laos is also nearing completion, pos-
sibly by May or June of this year. Most of the new
roads appear to have limited all-weather capability
and should remain open to vehicular traffic for a
major part of the rainy season.
Currently, there are an estimated 12,000
full-time workers, including engineering units,
assigned to repair and maintain the road net in
h included in this total are 68 kilometers of
roads in North Vietnam '42 kilometers of Route 137
and 26 kilometers of a new unnumbered road) and 127
kilometers of extensions within South Vietnam.
** A Limited aZZ-weather road has greatly reduced
capability in the rainy season, but with proper
construction and appropriate maintenance or repair
techniques it remains open for a Low level of daily
traffic during the rainy season except for occasional
periods of a few days.
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the Laotian Panhandle, supplemen ad by some 4,000
part-time laborers or conscripted villagers. The
full-time workers also operate ferries and fords
and are responsible for traffic control. At the
peak of road construction in Laos in 1965-66, an
estimated 25,000 workers, comprised mainly of North
Vietnamese army troops, were engaged in road expan-
sion.
Materials utilized in constructing and
maintaining the Laotian road net are, for the most
part, obtained locally. Small amounts of cement,
steel, asphalt, and fuel must come from North Viet-
nam, but there is no apparent shortage of those
items required for the primary routes. Only small
numbers of bulldozers, rock crushers, and road
graders are in the Panhandle, but additional con-
struction equipment could be easily obtained from
equipment parks in North Vietnam. A standdown of
the bombing in North Vietnam would probably result
in a major effort to improve the all-weather capa-
bility of the road system in the Laos Panhandle.
About 10 major Communist base areas and
many shelters have been built along the supply
routes in the Panhandle. These facilities are often
located under heavy tree cover or in caves at least
several hundred yards distant from the main road.
Their locations can sometimes be detected by
determining where the trucks leave the main road. The
number of such facilities was greatly increased in
1965 and 1966, probably as a result of a step-up in
the war and as a countermeasure to aerial attacks.
A network of fixed wirelines apparently
intended for logistics functions has been under
rapid construction by the Communists since November
1967 from north of the DMZ, through the Laotian
Panhandle, and into South Vietnam. The fixed
character of the wirelines, involving laborious
clearing of vegetation and mounting of poles, testi-
fies to the extent of the North Vietnamese logistical
buildup in Laos. Construction of wirelines is under
way for more than 300 kilometers, with poles and
wires in place for much of the way. The wirelines
apparently will parallel supply and infiltration
routes at a distance of a kilometer or more from
the roads. The precise location of all of the lines
is unclear, but the northern end of the network
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seems likely to be near Route 10', about 30 kilome-
ters north of the DMZ, where it would link up with
the North Vietnamese wireline network. At the
southern end, vegetation has been cleared all the
way to the A Shau area and slightly beyond. Prob-
ably only a Sepone - Ban Bac segment of the network
and a north-south line located east of Sepone are
operational.
B. Capacity
The capacity of the roads in Laos and the
distance that supplies can be moved forward by truck
from North Vietnam is steadily increasing. In 1964,
Route 15/12 through Mu Gia Pass was the only all-
weather route available from North Vietnam into
southern Laos. It had a capacity of about 400 tons
a day during the dry season and 100 tons a day in
the rainy season. At that time, trucks could move
south to Muong Nong, a straight line distance of
more than 150 kilometers from the Pass, during the
dry season. During the rainy season, trucks could
move only about 13 kilometers south from Mu Gia
Pass. Thus most of the supply movements by truck
into Laos took place during the dry season, supple-
mented by small movements over the trail network
around the DMZ during the rainy season. Supply
movements south of Muong Nong and east into South
Vietnam were totally dependent on primitive trans-
port.
After the major construction of the 1965/66
dry season a total of about 650 (dry season)/150
(wet season) tons a day could enter the Laos Pan-
handle on the two major access roads, and about
400/100 tons a day could be delivered by truck to
several points within a few kilometers of the South
Vietnamese border. About 150/30 tons of this total
could be delivered about 500 kilometers south to the
tri-border area. From these points along the border,
primitive transport still had to be used for forward
movements.
The routes constructed during the past year
and the construction currently under way, however,
will provide the Communists with a considerably
higher capacity to move supplies by truck into Laos
and from Laos into at least four major areas of
South Vietnam located between the Khe Sanh area
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and the tri-border area. When the third major
access road into Laos is completed in the near
future, the throughput truck capacity from North
Vietnam via Laos into South Vietnam will be about
1,000 tons a day during the dry season and 200 tons
a day in the rainy season. The only restricting
sector in this pipeline will be Route 92/96 in the
southern part of the Panhandle, which limits the
movement to the tri-border area to about 200/50
tons a day.
C. Operation
of the Transport System
The Laotian supply system is an extension
of the North Vietnamese logistical supply system.
The North Vietnamese Ministry of National Defense
establishes general policies for the procurement
of supplies destined to transit Laos, and its
General Directorate of Rear Services (GDRS) is
responsible for detailed planning and supervision
of procurement, storage, issue, and distribution of
supplies. The movement of supplies into Laos is
controlled by the Transportation Directorate, GDRS,
which also furnishes vehicles to units that need
them, and North Vietnamese trucks move directly to
supply depots in Laos. Transportation in the Com-
munist part of southern Laos is primarily the
responsibility of the 559th Transportation Group.
This group has two main subordinates: the 70th
Transport Regiment, which is responsible for trans-
portation from the Mu Gia area south to the A Shau
Valley area and Route 92, and the 71st Transport
Regiment, which is believed to be responsible for
transportation in the rest of the Panhandle area.
Most supplies are moved at night by truck
into base areas and other smaller storage areas
located only a few kilometers apart. The trucks
travel about eight hours a night at about 10 kilome-
ters an hour with little or no lights. The trucks
are probably loaded and fueled in the late after-
noon and unloaded, drained of fuel, and camouflaged
early the next morning to counter air attacks during
the daylight hours. Porters and other forms of
primitive transport are used when trucks are not
available or cannot be used because of poor road
conditions.
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D. Traffic Flows
The daily volume of goods delivered from
North Vietnam into the Panhandle has increased
markedly during the last three years, as shown in
the tabulation below. The increase was especially
high in the first quarter of 1968, an estimated
90 percent greater than during the same period
last year. Preliminary data for April indicate
that traffic may have increased again, by as much
as 40 percent above the March level.* There are
indications, however, that some of the trucks mov-
ing south in recent months have carried troops
instead of cargo.
Year
Tons Per Day
Percent Increase
Over Previous Year
1965
35
1966
75
114
1967
95
27
The above estimates are based on roadwatch
team reports of trucks counted moving south toward
Mu Gia Pass on Route 15. During 1967, for example,
an average of 17 trucks a day moved into southern
Laos over Route 15. If each truck carried an average
load of 3 tons of supplies, then more than 50 tons of
supplies would have been moved daily on this route.
During 1967 there were no roadwatch teams consistently
reporting on traffic movements on Route 137. However,
if Route 137 was used to the same percent of its capa-
city as was Route 15 -- an assumption supported by
pilot sightings of traffic on Route 137 -- then about
35 tons per day would have entered Laos over this
route. An average of 8 tons a day was believed to
have been delivered over trails around the DMZ.
Reporting for the first time in over a year from
a team Located along Route 912 covering about three
days in March and most of April indicates that truck
traffic on this second major access route may not
have been as high since the beginning of 1968 as
has been estimated. However, this team is located
about 3 kilometers from the road and, therefore,
may not be able to see or hear all the truck traffic
moving past it on the road. There is ample other
evidence that the total traffic into Laos has been
increasing throughout this dry season., Furthermore,
traffic during April is normally the highest of any
month of the year, as preparations are made for the
rainy season that usually begins in May.
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III. Air Attacks on the Logistics System
A. Truck Losses
The North Vietnamese have lost an estimated
5,300 trucks in Laos since 1965. Reported truck
losses have increased dramatically since the fall
of 1967 and have continued at a high level in the
first quarter of 1968. Almost as many trucks were
lost in the first quarter of this year as in all of
1967. During 1967, 22 sorties were flown for each
truck destroyed, but since January 1968 the ratio
has been 11 to 1. Estimates of the yearly losses
in Laos are given in the tabulation below:
Year
Effective Truck Losses
1965
45
1966
1,153
1967
2,072
1968
(Jan-Mar)
2,039
a. To arrive at an estimate of effective
truck Losses in both North Vietnam and
Laos, pilot reports are first adjusted to
eliminate double counting Then a de-
flation factor is applied to adjust for
inaccuracies in the data and for the
North Vietnamese ability to repair and
rebuild trucks. Inaccuracies are caused
by high aircraft speeds; poor visibility
resulting from weather, smoke, and dust
after attacks; night operations; and
intense antiaircraft fire. The formula
for computing effective Losses used by
CIA and DIA is as folZows: ?5 percent of
those trucks reported destroyed and 25 per-
cent of those reported damaged are con-
sidered to be effective losses and are
deducted from the inventory For 1966,
however, the number of trucks reported
destroyed and damaged was further
deflated by a factor of 20 percent.
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Some of the increase in truck losses is due
to the high number of sorties flown at night, when
the majority of the trucks are operating; the in-
creased use of Forward Air Controllers in spotter
aircraft; and the increased use of new technical
devices to detect and attack trucks. The new
technical devices (see the Appendix) have enabled
aircraft to more effectively attack moving targets
at night.
The unusually :Large number of trucks reported
destroyed, however, particularly in the first quarter
of this year, may be overstated. Part of the reported
losses may be the result of changes in pilot criteria
for reporting numbers of trucks destroyed, compared
with the number damaged. In Laos during January-
September 1967, 62 percent of the trucks were re-
ported as destroyed, while 38 percent were reported
as damaged. In North Vietnam the ratio has been
about one to one. In the last quarter of 1967 and
the first quarter of 1968 the ratio in Laos has
changed to nine reported destroyed to one reported
damaged. It is not clear why the ratio should
have changed so dramatically, and it is possible
that the formula (see the footnote to the tabulation
above) for computing effective losses should be re-
vised to further deflate pilot reports of enemy
truck destruction. Many of the trucks reported
destroyed or damaged by pilots were attacked at
night, when it is extremely difficult to assess the
effectiveness of an air attack.
Data from roadwatch teams also indicate that
data on truck losses may be overstated. The team at
Mu Gia Pass, one of the entrances to the road net
in the Laotian Panhandle from North Vietnam, has
reported slightly more than 3,700 trucks moving
southbound and slightly fewer than 3,700 trucks
moving northbound between October 1967 and March
1968; yet during the same period, 3,200 trucks were
effectively lost according to pilot reports. Recent
reports from roadwatch teams on Route 912, although
incomplete, indicate that approximately the same
volume of traffic on that route is moving northward
as is moving south.
Furthermore, there has been no apparent
shortage of trucks in either North Vietnam or Laos.
Compared with reported losses of about 10,500 trucks
in the two countries from 1965 through the first
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quarter of 1968, imports of more than 13,000 trucks
during the same period have increased the North Viet-
namese truck inventory from about 9,000 trucks at
the beginning of 1965 to more than 11,000 at the
present. Each year, newer and larger trucks have
been observed in Laos by roadwatch teams and in
aerial photography. If truck losses have in fact
increased sharply, the USSR and East European Com-
munist countries could step up their supply of
vehicles because production rates are ample.
B. Supply Losses
The total loss of supplies sustained by the
Communists in Laos is now assumed to be about 20
percent of the tonnage delivered into Laos. In
1967, 8 percent of the supplies moved into the Laos
Panhandle may have been lost as a result of the
destruction of trucks, with about five trucks a day
destroyed. If half of these trucks were loaded with
three tons of supplies -- trucks delivering supplies
would probably be fully loaded, trucks returning
would probably be empty -- about 7.5 tons of supplies
were destroyed daily, compared with the 95 tons of
supplies moving into the Laos Panhandle. Daily
destruction of trucks in the first quarter of 1968
has reportedly been four times the daily rate in
1967, raising the calculated losses of supplies to
30 tons a day, or 12 percent of the 240 tons of
supplies per day estimated to have been moved into
the Laos Panhandle during the same period. In
addition to the direct loss of cargoes resulting
from destroyed trucks, the Communists also suffer
losses from air attacks on storage depots and base
areas and suffer additional losses from pilferage,
spoilage, or other normal causes. The above esti-
mates of supply losses are extremely tenuous, how-
ever, because of the limited amount of intelligence
available on losses.
C. Fixed Targets
During 1966 and 1967, pilots flying attack
sorties over Laos reported destroying or damaging
a total of about 24,000 fixed targets. More than
one-third were roads cratered or cut, one-quarter
were buildings, one-quarter were ammunition and
supply areas and miscellaneous targets, and the
remainder were weapons, bridges, and tunnels.
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Numbers of each type of fixed target reported by
pilots to be destroyed or damaged in Laos during
1966 and 1967 are given in the following tabulation:
1966
1967
Total
Percent
Road craters or cuts
4,146
4,605
8,751
37
Buildings
4,731
1,758
6,489
27
Ammunition and supply areas
and miscellaneous
3,294
2,186
5,480
23
Bridges and tunnels
1,258
397
1,655
7
Weapons
536
855
1,391
6
Total
1
3, 965
9,801
23,766
100
Attacks against fixed targets have had
little lasting effect on the logistics system.
There has been a sharp decrease in the number of
buildings, storage areas, and bridges attacked in
1967 compared with 1966, reflecting the inability
of pilots to find suitable targets under the jungle
canopy. Road cuts and craters -- about one cut or
crater daily per 150 kilometers of road in the
Panhandle during 1967 -- have not seriously impeded
traffic flows, and the roads have been quickly
restored.
D. Increased Air Attacks
An increase in attack sorties over Laos
made possible by a cessation in the bombing of
North Vietnam would increase the cost and complicate
the movement of supplies through Laos; however, it
would not likely be any more successful than previous
attacks in reducing the flow below that needed to
maintain enemy forces in South Vietnam at present
or even increased rates of combat. Bridges, buildings,
and storage areas would be more heavily attacked, but
Laos has a small and declining number of significant
fixed targets that are susceptible to detection and
attack from the air. Even if the unusually high
reported loss rate of trucks in the first quarter
of this year is accurate and is sustained, losses of
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trucks and supplies could be made up by increasing
the volume of traffic, by bringing in more trucks
from North Vietnam, and by importing additional
trucks from the USSR and Eastern Europe. Transport
routes have considerable excess capacity -- the
road network has not often been used to more than
15 percent of capacity in the past -- and even with
increased bomb damage, the network could support
increases in traffic flows caused by the need to
make good a greater loss of supplies, increased
consumption within Laos, or higher levels of combat
in South Vietnam. The rudimentary road system is
easily repaired, and the present repair force could
be quickly augmented by relocating repair crews
idled by a bombing pause in North Vietnam. Further-
more, an increase in air attacks would almost
certainly be countered by an increase in air defenses,
which would lower the accuracy of attacking aircraft.
IV. Personnel Infiltration System in Southern Laos
A. Infiltration Intelligence
Intelligence on the numbers and timing of
North Vietnamese infiltration of troops through
Laos into South Vietnam is limited but improving.
Aerial photography and air observers are of
little help in providing additional evidence of
infiltration because the trails used are covered
by the jungle canopy. Friendly guerrilla teams
occasionally report troop movements in the Laos
Panhandle but can provide few details.
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Most of the intelligence on the infiltration
network has been derived from captured documents
and prisoner interrogations; this information is
still somewhat limited, however, because of the
compartmentation applied to all phases of the
infiltration system. For example, prisoners have
reported that way stations on the infiltration
trails are usually located about a kilometer away
from the bivouac areas used by the infiltrating
troops. Apparently, only the commanding officer,
communications personnel, and occasional supply
carriers from the infiltrating groups are permitted
to go to these base areas. The same principle is
applied in keeping base personnel at adjacent way
stations from knowing the locations of each other's
sites. Those who are assigned to guide infiltration
groups customarily meet their opposite numbers from
the next station at some intermediate point along
the trail and pass over control of the groups at
that time. Nevertheless, a good deal has been
learned about the infiltration network from captured
documents and personnel.
All infiltration groups transiting Laos are
supported and controlled by an effective organization
of administrative, logistic, communications, and
transport personnel. This system extends over a
complex network of trails as far south as the delta
region below Saigon, through lengthy portions of
eastern Laos and Cambodia, and extreme western
South Vietnam.
Way stations are scattered along all the
infiltration trails at intervals of about a day's
march. In much of North Vietnam these stations
are established in or around villages or hamlets,
but, as the infiltration routes approach the North
Vietnamese border and pass into Laos, sites are
selected in remote jungle areas. Way stations have
two major functions: to provide rest and replenish-
ment areas for infiltrating personnel and a base
for the individuals who control and support the
infiltrators. The stations vary in their facilities
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from mere stopping points in the jungle to major
depots equipped to provide food, shelter, and
medical care.
The infiltration network is highly efficient.
Small craft are provided at every water way which
the infiltrators cannot ford. Prisoners have re-
ported little delay or confusion at these potential
bottlenecks and have remarked on the competence
of the network personnel.
C. Level of Infiltration
Hanoi probably has committed more than a
quarter of a million men to the conflict in the
south
Infiltration groups have ranged in size
from about 20 to 2,000 men. The small groups prob-
ably are composed of personnel whose unique training
or responsibilities justify the formation of a
special infiltration unit. The larger units appear
to be made up of regular army formations or groups
of unassigned replacement personnel. The typical
infiltration group is battalion size -- about 400
to 500 men. This figure probably represents a
practical number in moving personnel on the
infiltration trails and suggests that large groups
are subdivided into marching elements of about this
size. In the case of a regular North Vietnamese
battalion, the component companies appear to move
separately at intervals of a few kilometers between
each unit. Infiltrating battalions are normally
separated by at least a day's march.
The infiltrators are usually not accompanied
or supported by supply vehicles on the trip south.
Bicycles may, however, be employed to carry some
items of heavy equipment, such as communications
gear. Each man carries his own food, medicine,
field equipment, and weapons and is periodically
resupplied from depots along the route of march.
The infiltration groups are kept apart from the
supplies that they will eventually use in South
Vietnam.
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D. Method of Movement
The great majority of the infiltrating
personnel have proceeded on foot, although current
have sugges e that a substantial percentage of
the infiltration during the first quarter of 1968
has been accomplished by truck. Over the years,
however, infiltration by vehicle has been confined
to high-ranking cadre or individuals with special
skills -- such as medical or weapons technicians.
Prisoners have indicated that infiltration by truck
can be accomplished in two weeks or less; by foot,
at least six to eight weeks are required. Infiltrators
shift from a night to a day march schedule on entering
Laos from North Vietnam, probably because US air
interdiction efforts are less intense in Laos and
because of the concealment afforded by heavy jungle
growth in this region. The group normally sets out
about 0600 and will march for about six to nine
hours, depending on terrain.
prisoner interrogations
Every effort is made to conceal the presence
of the unit. For example, temporary planking is used
when crossing dirt roads in order not to leave foot-
prints. Infiltration groups are careful to keep
away from main lines of communications in Laos.
Prisoners have reported hearing supply trucks on
parallel routes, but for the most part, the
infiltrators move on trails which are a safe
distance from the often-bombed supply roads.
E. Attrition
Infiltrators face a variety of perils on the
way south. Malaria is the most frequent problem
encountered by the infiltration groups. Reports
from captured troops indicate that among some
groups as many as 100 percent of the infiltrators
contract this disease in varying intensity at some
point during the march south. Each man is supplied
with anti-malaria medication, however, and most are
able to complete the trip. Dysentery, beri-beri,
and respiratory diseases also are reported to plague
the infiltrators. Morale declines in response to
the increasing hardships as the troops move south,
particularly during the rainy season. The proportion
of personnel lost en route varies widely, captured
documents and prisoners reporting from 5 to 50 per-
cent. It is likely, however, that very few casualties
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I I 26X1
are permanent and that after a period of recuperation
or re-indoctrination, the detained individuals join
another group and continue south.
V. Attacks on the Personnel Infiltration System
Air strikes in Laos have not had an appreciable
effect on personnel infiltration, and intensifed air
strikes are not likely to. Air harassment has prob-
ably indirectly increased the sickness and desertion
rates. Several prisoners of war have recounted
being bombed by US aircraft. Air attacks on
occasion may have made the resupply of food and
medicines to way stations in Laos difficult. How-
ever, interrogation of infiltrators who traversed
the trails during 1967 indicates that a small
number of those leaving North Vietnam became
casualties of air strikes.
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New Detection Systems In Laos
Several new detection systems recently intro-
duced in Laos have significantly increased the cost
to the enemy of moving supplies from North Vietnam
to the south. Most enemy traffic in Laos moves
by truck at night, and previously with little risk
of detection and destruction. These new devices
have enabled Allied air operations to increase the
detection and destruction of trucks and other
logistics targets at night.
1. Starlight Scope
The Starlight Scope is a device used for
night observation which passively captures and in-
tensifies ambient light emitted from the sky, ground,
and general surroundings without emitting any light
itself. It does not see through direct obstacles
to vision such as low clouds, jungle canopy, and
terrain features such as hills and trees and can
be limited in effectiveness by small differences
in contrast between target and background. The
smallest and most common model of the Starlight
Scope weighs six pounds and is about one-half meter
in length. It has a field of view of 10 degrees
and is capable of identifying a human-sized figure
at 400 meters. The Scope may be attached to a rifle
or used as a hand-held observation piece. The most
fruitful application of the Starlight Scope has
been in Forward Air Control missions in the Laos
Panhandle where it has played an important role in
the recent increase in sightings and destruction of
enemy trucks. The Scope is in use as a hand-held
observation piece by all Forward Air Controllers in
the Steel Tiger area. Starlight Scopes also have
been provided to roadwatch teams and to some armed
helicopters.
.2. Night Observation Device
The Night Observation Device is used aboard
C-130 aircraft and armed helicopters. It weighs
forty pounds, is mounted on a tripod, has a range
of up to 1,000 meters on a moonless night, and
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provides better resolution and a larger optical
gain than the Starlight: Scope. The effectiveness
of the Device is enhanced on C-130 aircraft by the
presence of other equipment such as a Xenon search-
light capable of providing light in the ultraviolet
and infrared spectrums as well as the visible spec-
trum. This enables the Device, with its limited
field of view, to be trained more quickly on suspect
targets. Only small quantities of the Night Obser-
vation Device are currently available, but production
is now being accelerated. The Device is not used on
high-performance jet aircraft because its effective-
ness would be limited by the speed and altitudes of
these aircraft, the visibility limitations imposed
by canopies, the small field of view of the Device,
and the need for viewing through an eyepiece.
3. Low-Light-Level Television
The Low-Light-Level Television (LLLTV) con-
sists of a light intensifier tube similar to that
used in the Starlight Scope connected to a TV camera
tube with a standard TV display. The LLLTV has a
20-degree field of view -- double that of the
Starlight Scope. The TV screen is a more conven-
ient viewing mode than the eyepiece of the Starlight
Scope, although it has a slightly degraded image
compared with the Starlight Scope. The TV appara-
tus can be tied in with a camera and is particular-
ly useful in conjunction with fire-control equip-
ment. The LLLTV system is currently in use on
three B-57's flying missions over Laos and South
Vietnam. An LLLTV system with a longer range and
an improved image display is planned for installa-
tion on some sixteen B--57's by March 1969. An im-
proved system is also planned for installation with
a fire-control system on several UH-1 helicopters
in 1969.
4. Aerial Surveillance Device
The Aerial Surveillance Device will, when
deployed, augment a Starlight Scope or LLLTV on
helicopters; it will utilize a pulsed laser illum-
inator to provide better target contrast when a
target is viewed through a Scope or on a TV screen.
Some three or four devices are expected to be in
operation soon.
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5. Infrared Sensors
New infrared sensors permit fast detection
by aircraft of heat-emitting vehicles and camp-
fires. Earlier infrared systems did not provide
advance notice of targets being approached by high-
speed aircraft because the detection systems were
aimed directly downward and had to photograph in-
frared emissions before alerting pilots to targets.
Current systems are "forward looking" and provide
immediate target information to pilots. The system's
effectiveness is limited over heavy jungles and by
occasional incorrect target identification caused
by emissions of heat from land masses or bomb craters.
6. HARK-1
HARK-1 is a radio-counter used by indigenous,
non-English-speaking roadwatch teams in Laos to
notify Allied forces of the type and quantity of
observed enemy traffic. The observgr turns picture-
labeled knobs, pushes a button, the device relays
information to a plane flying on station, and equip-
ment on the plane relays the information to a tele-
printer at a ground station. About 200 of these
units have been made available to roadwatch and
guerrilla teams operating in Laos and South Vietnam.
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TOP SECRET
I TOP SECRET
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
(THE CASE WHERE THERE IS A COMPLETE CESSATION
OF BOMBING IN NORTH VIETNAM AND LAOS.) (NO. 9)
Secret
24 APRIL 1968
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUY I
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNOI ADINC AND
UECLASSITICATIUN
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SJ;JR1 l'
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
April 1968
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES
TO THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
(The Case Where There Is a Complete Cessation
of Bombing in North Vietnam and Laos.) (No. 9)
Summary
This memorandum analyzes the anticipated
effects of a cessation of the present Rolling
Thunder program. Present geographic-restrictions,
which apply only to North Vietnam, permit attacks
on targets below the 20th Parallel. This self-
imposed US restriction has removed the main
industrial. areas and transportation centers of
North Vietnam from exposure to bombing attacks.
It has, in turn, given a clear-cut indication of
Hanoi's probable actions in the face of a complete
cessation of attacks. Since the present US
geographic bombing limitations began, the North
Vietnamese have been making temporary repairs to
key rail and highway bridges in the northern areas
and restoring the damaged, but repairable, portions
of electric power generating capacity.
We believe that a full bombing halt against
both North Vietnam and Laos would probably bring
about the following short-term results:
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current
Intelligence and the Director's Special Assistant
for Vietnamese Affairs.
SECRET 25X1
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Z:)L U_K_. I
1. The extension into the Panhandle of
the program for the full restoration of
through service on the principal rail
and highway links, by repairing key
bridges which are currently out. Mines
would also be removed from the inland
waterways.
2. In consequence, this restoration
not only would permit the more effi-
cient movement of goods within North
Vietnam, but also would improve the
capability of moving war-supporting
supplies into the North Vietnamese
Panhandle, and into Laos. The efficiency
of truck operations would be vastly
improved because daylight movements
would be greatly increased and the need
for camouflage and evasive action would
be ended. Much larger tonnages of
logistic support and increased numbers
of personnel could be moved through
Laos to South Vietnam with no increase
in the size of the truck inventory.
3. The improvement immediately of
morale and living conditions of the North
Vietnamese people would ensue. Within the
six-month period, many civilians who had
been evacuated from urban areas would
return to their homes.
4. The redeployment of a small por-
tion (perhaps 15 percent) of antiaircraft
strength to South Vietnam to afford
protection for VC/NVA operations in that
area would be possible. This might
entail the movement of 1,500 weapons
and about 6,000 men.
SECRET
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OF-%_4I J1I
5. North Vietnam would be capable of
redeploying a few thousand additional troops
to the south, but there would probably be
no significant immediate redeployment
since the initial logistic repair effort
would absorb about the same size force as
is currently employed on maintenance
of lines of communication. Casualties,
which reached a level of about 36,000 in
1967 as a result of the Rolling Thunder
campaign, would come to a halt.
6. A clear-cut propaganda and political
victory would be seen, in Hanoi's view.
It would see the United States forced to
take action as a result of political
pressures. The regime would be
encouraged in its belief that the
United States would ultimately tire
of the war and that Hanoi's firm
policy had forced the United States
to retreat.
In the long run, if the bombing halt persisted,
Hanoi would be encouraged to move from a program
of temporary repairs to one of full rehabilitation
of industry and transportation. The regime is
known to have developed detailed plans for the
post-war period. A continuation of the bombing
pause beyond six months would probably tempt Hanoi
to put its long-term rehabilitation plans into
effect, unless the state of the war were such that
an early resumption of US air action appeared to
be imminent. The long-term effects, apart from the
increased possibilities of full economic restora-
tion, would be:
SECRET
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1. An improvement in agricultural
output as more domestic fertilizer and
agriculture equipment were made avail-
able. Given normal weather conditions,
most, but not all, of the food deficit
would probably disappear.
2. The addition of perhaps 100,000
to 150,000 men to the manpower pool as
the restoration of the transportation
system was completed. They would be
available for military training and
eventual redeployment to South Vietnam
if Hanoi believed such redeployment could
safely be carried out -- that is, if
Hanoi believed that large-scale bombing
against the north probably would not be
resumed.
SECRET
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I. Impact on the Economy of North Vietnam
A complete standdown of the Rolling Thunder progam
would afford the North Vietnamese an opportunity to
begin a general program for restoration and recon
struction of economic damage. During the short run --
the first six months -- the primary effort would be
to begin the restoration of the electric power
industry. Evacuated civilians would return to the
cities, and there would be a significant immediate
improvement in living conditions and morale, Pro-
ductivity would quickly improve, particularly in
transport, construction, and manufacturing. A bombing
halt would have little impact on agriculture in the
short run, the fifth-month rice crop already being
planted.
An extended standdown on the order of one to two
years would result in major progress being made in
repairing bomb damage throughout North Vietnam, but
only if the Hanoi leadership believed there was no
likelihood of the resumption of the bombing. The
restoration of all damaged industries, and the
planning of new industries, some of which are already
contracted for, would probably be well advanced.
Those-manufacturing processes that have not operated
efficiently under the dispersal program would be
returned to urban areas. Agriculture might make
some progress toward :increased yields, but this is
generally a longer range problem that involves
changes of deep-seated practices. The speed with
which the reconstruction effort progressed would be
largely dependent upon the material and technical
assistance the North Vietnamese obtained from the
USSR, the Eastern European countries, Communist
China, and Free World countries,
A. Industry
A cessation of the bombing probably would
result in only nominal improvement of North Viet-
nam's industries in the short run. Full recovery
would require from one to two years and involve
reconstruction, some relocation from dispersed
sites, and foreign technical and material assistance.
North Vietnam lacks the necessary skilled labor
force, raw materials, and finished goods to construct
SECRET
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Or'k-AiLf'L 1
modern industries by itself. Industries that supply
essential services, support agriculture, and earn
foreign exchange are most likely to be reconstructed
first, and in that order.
Restoration of the electric power industry
will be a formidable task because the power industry
has sustained the heaviest damage of any North Viet-
namese industry. At present, only about 40 percent
of the total nationwide pre-bombing generating
capacity is in operation. Moderately damaged
equipment probably could be repaired within six
months., and such repairs would increase serviceable
capacity to about 60 percent of the pre-bombing
national total. Much of the remaining equipment,
however, is so severely damaged that increases of
capacity beyond this level would require major
reconstruction and time periods of up to two years
for full restoration (see Table 1). Restoration
of many undamaged industrial facilities presently
not in operation can be accomplished by restoration
of damage to electric power facilities. Several
heavily damaged electric powerplants probably will
be scrapped and entirely new electric power facilities
constructed.
Some industrial plants would be back in
partial production within six months, although
several of the heavily damaged plants would require
one to two years to be completely repaired (see
Table 2).
The Haiphong Cement Plant was severely
damaged by bombing raids in April and May 1967 and
has been inoperative since that time, but the North
Vietnamese have already started repairs and have
begun negotiations with Rumania to import machinery
for the plant. Delivery is scheduled in 1969 for
much of the new equipment, although some motors
were delivered in late 1967. The plant could prob-
ably be placed in partial operation within six
months at 20 to 30 percent of its original capacity
of 700,000 metric tons per year. It would take
about two years to restore the plant to original
capacity.
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SECRET
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Estimated Restoration of Damaged Electric Power
Generating Plants Six Months after a Bombing Halt a/
Pre-Bombing
Serviceable Capacity (Percent)
Powerlant
Capacity
(Megawatt:s)
April 1968
Six Months Later
Hanoi
32.5
75
75
Haiphong West
10
0
50
Haiphong East
7
0
0
Viet Tri
16
25
50
Thai Nguyen
24
50
Bac Giang
12
Uong Bi
24
Hon Gai
15
Nam Dinh
7.5
Thanh Hoa
5
Ban Thach
1
100
Co Dinh
1.5
Ben Th uy
8
a? Total restoration in most cases will require one to two
years.
Subtotal
163.5
Other (undamaged)
23.5
Total
187.0
SECRET
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Estimated Recovery Times for Selected Large Manufacturing Plants
Thai Nguyen Iron and
Out of
Limited,
Steel Complex
operation
one-third
prestrike
capacity
Haiphong Cement
Out of
Limited,
Plant
operation
one-fifth
Construction
capacity
work in
progress
Nam Dinh Textile Finishing Limited,
Plant shops in one-fourth
operation capacity
Hanoi 8th March Partially Full
Textile Plant dispersed;
finishing
shops in
operation
Viet Tri Paper Out of Full
Plant operation
Bac Giang Chemical Out of Full
Fertilizer Plant operation
Frequent bombings of the Thai Nguyen Iron
and Steel Complex during March-June 1967 destroyed
or damaged much of the complex A number of the
workshops and fabricating buildings were destroyed
or damaged; the coke by-product plant, the coke
battery, the sintering building, all three blast
furnaces, and a number of ancillary facilities were
rendered useless. The incomplete open hearth and
rolling mill buildings were also heavily damaged,
as were research facilities and administrative
Current Projected Operational Status
Status as of
April 1968 Six Months Later One to Two Years Later
SECRET
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buildings. Since the end of June 1967, the plant
has been completely inoperative. The plant could
be restored to one-third of its pre-strike capacity
to produce pig iron in about six months, but complete
restoration and the completion of steel making
facilities previously under construction that had
never been completed would take two years.
Relocation of dispersed shops of manufacturing
plants probably would be one of the first steps in
recovery. The only known dispersals of relatively
large plants, however, include the Hanoi 8th March
Textile Plant, the Nam Dinh Textile Plant, and the
Haiphong Fertilizer Plant. Much-publicized claims
of industrial dispersal appear to have referred to
small and light industrial establishments such as
handicrafts, repair shops, and some sections of the
two textile mills.
Export of industrial commodities other than
coal is not likely to change significantly in the
short run. Resumption of pig iron and cement exports
will require full reconstruction of damaged manufacturing
facilities. Repair of bomb damage to coal-processing
facilities, however, has allowed a steady increase
in the export of coal since September 1967, bringing
the current level to about 60 percent of that
maintained during the first quarter of 1967. The
pre-strike level of coal exports probably could be
attained within six months.
The North Vietnamese apparently have already
been preparing for the reconstruction that would
follow a permanent cessation of bombing. During
1967, formal negotiations were conducted with
Communist and non-Communist countries for assistance
in rebuilding a number of-destroyed plants. Most
of the negotiations involved preliminary estimates
and surveys, and frequently resulted only in agree-
ments for the services of-specialists and technicians
or for training. Deliveries of machinery and
equipment for basic industry under contracts signed
in 1967 were usually deferred, in some cases until
late 1968. A North Vietnamese industrial delegation
visited Paris in the fall of 1967 to discuss post-
war construction with a number of French firms.
More substantial talks are expected when the war
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