THE COMMUNIST INFRASTRUCTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000400100001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 14, 1970
• Content Type: IM

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ARMY review(s) completed.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
August 1970
ARMY review(s) completed.
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Communist: Infrastructure
Introduction-
1. "InfJerastructure" is a term the US began using
in the early 1960s to characterize the extensive non-
military portion of the Vietnamese Communist organi-
zation. Although its definition has never been fully
resolved, it has usually been interpreted to include
enemy civilian personnel in South Vietnam engaged in
political, economic, propaganda, security, and other
activities.* Its membership has ranged from exec-
utives of the Current Affairs Committee at the na-
tional level to low-level security personnel who
serve i.n the hamlets. In territory under the con-
trol of the Communists, the infrastructure includes
the overt government; in areas that are contested or
under South Vietnamese control, it exists covertly
and has the primary goal of subverting the authority
and effectiveness of t:he South Vietnamese government.
2. The infrastructure has been defined by
Phoeni~c as: "... the political and administrative
organization through which ,~.~ Vietnamese Communists
seek control over the people of the Republic of
Vietnam. It embodies the Communist Party control
structure and the leadership and administration cf
front organizations from national through hamlet
level. It includes individuals who are members or
probationary members of the Vietnamese Communist
Party and those non-Communist members who perform
an enemy cadre function." The definition has been
open to broad interpretation.
* The Appendix gives a short description of the
Communist non-military organisation.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and coordinated r~ith the Office of Current InteZ-
Zigence, the Office of National Estimates, the
Director's Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs,
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3. Some analysts have thought of the infra-
structure in terms of abroad definition which
.would include all non-?military personnel who serve
the Communists in any capacity. An estimate based
on such a definition would be considerably larger
than those discussed below. Others have thought
of the term as applying to the key, or "cadre,"
elements of the organization in order to exclude
persons of lesser importance, most of whom are not
Party members. In describing the extensiveness of
the organized insurgency base, the former concept
is in order. However, the Party or the narrower
key personnel element is the more appropriate con-
cept for most of our rountersubversive activities.
The Phoenix definition attempts to approximate the
narrower definition.
4. In addition to the conceptual problem, the
complexity of the Viet Cong non-military structure
and the widespread use of part-time workers have
made it extremely difficult to arrive at estimates
of the size of the infrastructure. Largely because
of these difficulties, no consistent meaningful
definition has been developed. US analysts and
organizations have tended_to use several different
methodologies for estimating the infrastructure,
depending on their purposes. All of these defini-
tions have tended to exclude law-level and part-
time non-Party personnel. They have also largely
excluded the Communists' covert assets located in
South Vietnamese territory.
?5. The current Phoenix estimate ,of Viet Cong
infrastructure (VCI) is 67,000. The primary pur-
pose of the Phoenix?working definition is as a
management tool to "control" the quality of infra-
structure eliminations reporting. To this end,
Phoenix divides possible~VCI into three catego-
ries -- A, B, and C - roughly according to their
usefulness to the Communists' cause. The estimate
excludes the C category, The estimate also ex-
cludes most of the subversive personnel operating
in territory controlled by the South Vietnamese
government.
6. The Phoenix estimate of 67,000 is largely
based on reporting from the districts. Unfortunately,
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criteria for counting infrastructure personnel vary
considerably by area. In one province in the Delta,
for example, the local Phoenix estimator counts
only security police. In others, there is consider-
able confusion as to what constitutes a "cadre."
Furthermore, no province attempts to enumerate Viet
Cong cadres who operate in territory controlled by
the South Vietnamese government.
7. A CIA estimate of 80,000-100,000 was made
in early 1968. This estimate, based on extrapola-
tions from a limited number of captured documents,
counted all full-time civilian workers at district
level and above and large numbers of part-timers
at the village and hamlet level. Like the Phoenix
estimate, the CIA estimate did not attempt to enu-
merate Viet Cong cadres in GVN territory.
Trends in Strength
8. It is not possible to show numerically
whether the strength of the infrastructure is going
up or down. The main reason for the difficulty is
that definitions and accounting procedures have
changed so frequently that there is no compatible
series of statistics over the past five years.
Nor is there a relationship between overall infra-
structure estimates and neutralization totals.i
9. Phoenix neutralization statistics -- which
show 19,500 VCI "killed, captured, or rallied" in
1969, as compared with 15,776 in 1968 -- are mis-
leading for several reasons. The killed often in-
clude persons improperly identified. Many of the
captured are frequently released after a short
period of detention. Many listed as defectors are
actually false ralliers sent by the Communists into
Ghieu Hoi centers in order to obtain legal GVN
identification papers. On the other hand, the
neutralization figures include many important Com-
munist agents who are riot by definition part of
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the infrastructure. Furthermore, large numbers of
cadre who are killed or. quit do not show up in the
neutralization data. Nonetheless we believe that
experienced analysts can use the neutralization
data along with information from captured documents,
prisoners, and defectors to gain insight into the
magnitude and quality of personnel being lost by
the Communists.
10. These materials provide an adequate body
of evidence which makes it possible to draw some
general conciusa_ons about nori-military strength
trends during. ~~~., ~~~ast several years . According
to cap;taar=-:~a ~' ~.~tents and prisoner reports, some
element:. ~~ ` `-=infrastructure underwent expansion
prior to the 1968 Tet offensive but incurred heavy
losses through exposure during and after Tet. The
acce]erated pacification and Phoenix programs, which
went into high gear in late 1968, placed increasing
pressure on the infrastructure. All factors con-
sidered, there is genera]_ agreement that the overall
strength of the non-military portion of the VCI has
declined in the past two or more years. Although
most of the decline appears to have occurred at
the village and hamlet echelons, there is also evi-
dence of attrition at the district and province
levels .
11. The most persuasive evidence comes from the
Communists themselves in the form of captured docu-
ments, prisoners, and defector reports. A recent
report, purportedly reflecting the views of COSVN,
indicated that the Communists regard the Phoenix
and the accelerated pacific on programs as the
most effective threat to the infrastructure th.e
Allies have mounted so far. This same report,
covering the period from Tet 1968 to September
1969, stated that great numbers of cadres had been
killed and captured, and an especially large number
had defected to the GVN.
12. The documents indicate the Communists are
hurting worse in some areas than in others. They
have been hit hardest in Saigon itself. From
October 1968 to April 1969, six of Saigon's nine
Precinct Party Committees were rolled up by the
Special Police. Recently captured documents indi-
cate that the Saigon operations of COSVN's Strategic
Intelligence Office (SIO) -- which runs high-level
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penetrations in the South Vietnamese. government --
were seriously curtailed last year. A document of
early 1970, for example, stated that a fifth of the
SIO's assets in Saigon were arrested or had de-
fected" during 1969, that twa-fifths were withdrawn
from the city because of compromise or improper
papers, and that only two-fifths continued to op-
erate as before. Among those arrested were at
least one member of the National Assembly, two
South Vietnamese Army majors who had served in the
National Police Special Branch, an ex-deputy police
chief of Hue, the ex-assistant head of the counter-
intelli.gence branc}~i of FRt~N's Military Security
Service (MSS3 , a~~,d .a Sp~~ial' 'assistant in the office
of President Thieu. The buffeting the Communist
structure has received in Saigon is ap.parentl.y re-
flected in the decline in the rate of terrorist
incidents there. The incident rate in the city is
now the lowest it has been for several years. Evi-
dence of a similar decline in fortunes has been
received from Da Nang.
13. Although the government probably has done
better in cities than in the countryside in wrapping
up cadres, there is considerable evidence that the
infrast..r_ucture has been hurt in many rural areas.
14. To help ma}ce up for VCI personnel losses,
Hanoi has continued to send civilian personnel to
South Vietnam, and the share of northerners in the
VCI has grown.* According to Phoenix reporting,
~ There is a tendency to conclude that the use of
North Vietnamese in Communist infrastructure is a
sign of weakness because northerners cannot be as
effective in the south because of regional animos-
ities. There is evidence, however, that a large
North Vietnamese presence in the infrastructure
does not necessari Zy diminish the prose Zyting po-
tential of the Zoeal apparatus. Many northern
cadres perform important technical and political
functions which do not entail much public exposure.
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between 20o and 30~ of cadre slots in Phu Yen are
now filled by northerners. A recent high-level
defector estimated early this year that as of late
1969 some 30,000 civilians had come south. Other
information lends credence to his claim.
15. Local recruiting of Party members has
clearly fallen off in most regions, yet reports
indicate that it is still going on, even in areas
under nominal government control.
16. In any case, the true strength of the
enemy's infrastructure is less a matter of gross
numbers than the qua]_ity of these personnel and
the environment in which they operate. For example,
of the estimated 20,000 military proselyting agents,
only about 10$-20g are Party members. Of the total,
about one-half are carried on the Communist roles
as "sympathizers." These personnel will be greatly
affected by trends in the_overall situation.
17. The damage inflicted on the infrastructure
in the past two years should not be exaggerated.
Many developments counted as gains also have nega-
tive implications which should be weighed in a
final assessment. Although several important pene-
tration agents have been arrested in Saigon, their
very presence demonstrates the effectiveness of
the enemy's espionage and subversive systems.
Furthermore, the gains of the pacification program
remain highly perishable in many areas, as evidenced
from recent experiences in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen
Provinces, where the Communists appear to have
reversed positive trends almost overnight. The
pacification program may in fact contain seeds of
its own weakness. As large numbers of people come
under GVN control, many inevitably are vulnerable
to the underground "legal" network that the Commu-
nists are attempting to enlarge.
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Prospects for the Future
18. The Communists' ability to maintain or ex-
pand their structure depends on a number of factors,
of which the overall course of the war is primary.
When things go well for the Communists, replace-
ments are easier to come by; when the apposite is
true, they~are harder to find. Whether the Viet
Cong structure grows or contracts also depends on
the enemy's strategy for fighting the war. When
the Communists stress main force warfare, battle-
field losses are high, and the non-military as well
as the military organizations suffer for competent
cadres. When the enemy assumes a low battlefield
profile, as he has done for the past year and a
half, the Communists have greater freedom to shift
trusted personnel from the military to the political
arenas of the conflict. Finally, the size and
quality of the Communists' non-military structure
depends in part on the level of civilian infiltra-
tion from North Vietnam. The future viability of
the Communist Party structure in the south over
the next year is discussed below in terms of a
number of alternative assumptions.
19. This ease assumes that~eeasefire occurs
and both NVA and US troops regroup or wzthdrau~.
Both s~.des are free to use poZzticaZ action pro-
grams to improve their relative positions. During
this period, pacification at least holds its ozvn
or makes some slow progress; economic and political
conditions remain serious, but no worse than they
are today.
20. Under these circumstances the Allies' greatest
asset -- its offensive military force -- would be
neutralized while the Communists. would have their
subversive structure intact. The relaxation of
Allied military pressure would make it easier for
the enemy to mount operations in GVN territory.
It would also encourage large numbers of persons
to return to their homes in Viet Cong territory
where they would be prime targets for enemy pros-
elyting efforts. Because the Communists would be
able to transfer large numbers of cadres from their
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military farces, the infrastructure would probably
expand in size and quality. The Military Pros-
elyting Section, Security Section, the Political
Struggle Apparatus, and components of the Civilian
Proselyting bureaucracy would almost certainly ex-
pand the most. In addition, there would ,be a tend-
ency to send increasing numbers of cadres into GVN
territory.
21. At the same time the various components of
the Party structure operating in GVN territory
would probably become more vulnerable as the expo-
sure of Communist cadres increased. The extent to
which the GVN could take advantage of the increased
vulnerability is difficult to predict, however.
Assuming the most optimistic of plausible assump-
tions -- as this case does -- there might be some
further attrition of the structure a year after
the ceasefire. Even so, the hard core would cer-
tainly remain intact and reasonably effective. As
one moves away from the most optimistic set of
assumptions, the prospects for the enemy's infra-
structure greatly improve. Furthermore, there is
the psychological effect of a US withdrawal from
South Vietnam. Unless the GVN is able to maintain
momentum and improve its image, the Communists' claim
that they had forced the withdrawal of the foreign
army might well be regarded as credible by the
population. In this case, the Party structure
would almost certainly be larger, more aggressive,
and more highly motivated than it is today.
.22. This ease assumes that there is no cease-
fire but that US troops continue to withdraw. As
under Case I, it is assumed that pacification at
least holds its own or makes same slow progress;
economic and political conditions remain serious,
but no worse than they aye today.
23. The principal difference between this Case
and Case I -- which assumes a ceasefire -- is that
the Allies would have the continued use of their
strongest asset, their main forces. These would
continue to be used to support pacification by
providing a shield against enemy main forces.
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24. The assumption that pacification at least
holds its own or makes some slow progress is a crit-
ical one, not only in terms of the situation in
general, but also in i:erms of the continued strength
and viability of the ~.nfrastructure.
i was cone u e< a e presence of the U5
maneuver units was a critical factor in the control
situation and that as a result of US troop reduc-
tions over the next year, GVN control losses were
almost certainly to take place in several heavily
populated key provinces. Overall, we were not op-
timistic that the GVN could significantly increase
its control over the countryside during 1970.
25. Two developments since these conclusions
were reached seem significant. First, the Commu-
nists' local assets (:Local Forces, Guerrillas,
and infrastructure) have been successful ~in main-
taining high levels of 'terrorism, harassment, and
propaganda in many contested and nominally GVN-
controlled areas. Evidence of a determined effort
to maintain and augment these local assets with
main force personnel continues to come in. This
suggests that the Party structure may be holding
its own.
26. The second development is the Cambodian
situation -- both the Communist effort to topple
the Lon Nol government and the Allied operation
which has upset or impeded Communist plans. The
situation in Cambodia. not only has diverted sub-
stantial numbers of VC/NVA main force troops from
operations in South Vietnam, but also has resulted
in some unanticipated levies for financial, mate-
riel, and personnel resources. Thus 'the immediate
effect of the changed situation in Cambodia has
been to reduce the capabilities of the Party struc-
ture at least in the short term. What effect Cam-
bodia will have on the infrastructure over a longer
period is impossible to predict. Much will depend
on the ability of the GVN to overcome its funda-
mental shortcomings and on the viability of the
Lon Nol government.
27. Another difference between this Case and
Case I is the continued requirement by the Commu-
nists to maintain military forces in order to
counter the Allied armies. The Communists would
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be unable to augment the infrastructure freely with
cadre from the military. Second, the threat posed
by Allied offensive activities against base areas
would make it more difficult for them to mount
political, subversive, and terrorist activity.
Finally, refugees -- and, for that matter, ARVN
soldiers -- would be less prone to return to their
homes in Viet Cong territory. All of these aspects
would make it difficult for the Communists to ex-
pand the infrastructure.
28. If one assumes that GVN security forces
improve and that no major dislocation occurs --
such as a coup, or a Communist takeover in Cam-
bodia -- one could imagine a situation in which
the Communist Party structure would continue to
find itself with many of the same problems it has
now: attrition of its cadres and a reluctance on
the part of the South Vietnamese people to .cooperate
with it actively. Even under this assumption, it
is likely that the hard-core of the Communist infra-
structure, including a large part of the subversive
apparatus within the government, would continue to
operate, although not as effectively as before.
29. However, the continuing withdrawal of US
troops makes the Allied main forces a dwindling
asset. It is probable that--in those areas where
US maneuver units leave, the infrastructure will
be able either to maintain the status quo or to
improve its prospects. These prospects would be
heightened if US withdrawals were accompanied by
political turmoil in S?uth Vietnam, a collapse of
the present regime in Cambodia, or a worsening of
South. Vietnamese economic problems.
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APPENDIX
Communist Non-Military Organization
In running the Communist organization, the Hanoi
Politburo sees Vietnam as a single country, the area
south of the 17th Parallel being as much its re-
sponsibility as the Vietnamese provinces north of
the DMZ. However, because. of the difficulty in ex-
ercising its authority over the southern reaches of
South Vietnam, Hanoi in late 1960 created an advance
headquarters which US analysts call the "Central
Office of South Vietnam?' (COSVN).* COSVN directly
controls, operations in the southern half of South
Vietnam (that is, everything south of the southern
border of VC Region V). Hanoi maintains more direct
control of operations in the northern half of the
country. Whether under the direct control of Hanoi
or of COSVN, the Communist structure is generally
the same both in its vertical and horizontal organi-
zation.
There are six echelons in the Communists' organi-
zational structure: (1) national, (2) region, (3)
province/sub region, (4) district/city, (5) village,
and (6) hamlet. At each echelon of command, there
is a Viet Cong structure responsible for the per-
formance of all the functions of government, rang-
ing from public health to internal security. At
district level and above, the agencies are formal,
highly structured, and manned by full-time personnel.
In the villages and hamlets, the organization is
relatively loose, is staffed mostly by~part-timers,
and does not always include all components.
Within the structure, orders are transmitted
from upper to lower echelons through two channels.
The first is the Party channel which starts at the
Politburo in Hanoi and extends through the Party
Current Affairs Committees of the lower echelons.
A directive decreeing a major policy change would
* "Central Office of South Vietnam" is a mistransla-
tion of a Vietnamese phrase meaning "Central Office
of the Southern Area. "
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move through the Party channel. The second command
channel is administrative. Each specialized
bureaucracy uses its own administrative channel to
give instructions to and exert control over i.ts sub-
ordinates. An example of an administrative order
would be a police directive traversing the security
apparatus chain of command from the Ministry of
Public Security in Hanoi to regional or provincial
security sections.
At each echelon, the Communist organization con-
sists of a number of agencies. In Hanoi, they are
called Ministries and Departments. At COSVN and other
echelons in the south, they are most often called
"Sections." A typical. Communist organization at the
province level consists of the following elements
(see the chart)
a. The Current Affairs Committee,
which directs the province's day-
to-day activities. It is made up
of about half a dozen senior cadres,
including the Party Secretary, the
head of the Security Section, and
the chief of the echelon's mili-
tary forces. _.
b. The Administrative Office, which
handles the Current Affairs Com-
mittee's correspondence.
c. The Organization Section, which
is the Party personnel office.
d. The Finance and Economy Section,
which controls the Viet Cong economy,
collects taxes, and deals with other
financial matters .
e. The Forward Supply Council, which
oversees the recruitment and deploy-
ment of civilian laborers and related
logistic problems within the province.
f. The Civil Health Section, which
supervises civilian clinics and health
services.
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g. The Political Struggle Section,
which tries to foment disorders in
territory controlled by the South
Vietnamese gover?nment.*
h. The Propaganda and Training
Section, which controls the school
system, publishes newspapers and
pamphlets, and runs propaganda cam-
paigns.
i. The Security Section, which runs
the Viet Cong police and controls a
counter-intelligence espionage net-
work within South Vietnamese security
and intelligence organs.
j. The Military Proselyting Section,
which runs the subversive effort
against South Vietnamese military and
security organizations.
k. The Civilian Proselyting bureauc-
racy, which tries to persuade South
Vietnamese citizens to support the
Viet Cong cause. It does so through
such organizations as the National
Liberation Front and the~Alliance of
National, Democratic, and Peace Forces.
All but three of the above components operate in
both Viet Cong and GVN territory. The exceptions
are the Current Affairs Committee, its Administra-
tive Office, and the Organization?Section. These
components almost invariably stay in territory under
Viet Cong control. The headquarters elements of the
other components are also stationed in Viet Cong
territory.
Obviously, some components of the infrastructure
are more threatening to the South Vietnamese
* Not aZZ areas have formal Political Struggle Se~-
tions. In areas inhere they do not exist, their
functions are performed by other elements. They are
more common in the northern half of the country than
in the south.
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government than others. Of those listed above, the
most dangerous are the Security Section,* which
contains some of the Viet Cong's most efficient and
ruthless cadres, and the Military Proselyting Sec-
tion, which has an extensive agent network within
the South Vietnamese armed forces and security
agencies.
* The Securitz~ Section provides a t~pieaZ example
of the problems in defining the VCI. The Security
Sections maintain quasi-miZitar~ armed Security units
r~hich could reasonabZg be counted as part of the
enemg combat forces.
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Subsequent to the completion of this paper analyzing the strength
and structure of VC Local Forces in Kontum and Pleiku Provinces, a
document was received providing a detailed picture of some Local Forces
in Pleiku Province (see Annex 1). The document not only helps to
substantiate the analytical method used in the paper,- but also provides
a basis for strength estimates somewhat larger than presented in the
paper. ?
l/'~
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Summary
A methodology for arriving at Order of Battle estimates for Viet
Cong provincial military organizations is presented in this paper. It
utilizes a standard VC organizational structure in interpreting evidence
on the strength and structure of individual provinces. The OB for two
provinces -- VC Gia Zai and Kontum -- has been examined to demonstrate
this organizational approach to Order of Battle estimates. Many here-
tofore unrecognized UC military units in both provinces were found and
total VC force levels for the two provinces are estimated to be several
thousand personnel greater than previously estimated.
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Introduction
1. The purpose of this memorandum is to demonstrate a method for
arriving at an Urder of Battle (OB) estimate for VC provincial military
units in South,Vietnam. The memorandum employs an approach to the OB
which sees the VC in context, by taking standard VC military structure
in the provinces as a guide and as a reliable indicator where the
documentary evidence is slim or non-existent. Besides utilizing a
standard VC Table of Organization and Equipment, the paper makes
extensive use of captured documents and related material. By viewing
the documentary material~in the structural context, estimates can be
made that more accurately assess enemy strength than can a simple
totaling of the strength of units that have had multiple confirmation.
Two cases -- those of VC Gia Lai (GVN Pleiku)?and VC Kontum Provinces --
are scrutinized in presenting the OB method and the evidence. In the
case of Gia Lai Province, the evidence is abundant and of relatively
high quality. The evidence for Kontum Province is much less satis-
factory. In both cases, however, VC provincial strengths are estimated
to be considerably higher than those previously estimated. This paper
utilizes VC boundaries, but little distortion is introduced by this
factor as they are similar to GVN boundaries.
2. In arriving at strength estimates for VC military components
of the two provinces, a number of assumptions are made: first, that VC
military organization is fairly uniform, at least at province and
district levels; second, that the captured documents used are not
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fabrications, and that the numbers and unit designations contained
therein are accurate insofar as the VC believed them to be accurate.
3. The memorandum first describes a standard VC military structure
for a province, and then discusses the extent to which the Gia Lai and
Kontum Provinces measure up to the standard. .
The Province Unit Structure
L,.. Viet Cong Provincial Military Organizations are structurally
similar, both in their vertical and horizontal organizations.
5. Vertically, the Province -- the military headquarters -- has
province, district, village, and hamlet echelons. Almost invariably,
the province headquarters also has a city unit assigned to the province
capital and on an organizational par with.the districts. In some
provinces there are also area (or yang) units .t A Vun~ is an echelon
usually positioned between the district and village levels. Soldiers
assigned to province, district, city, and ~ echelons are ordinarily
designated Local Force troops. Those subordinate to the villages-and
hamlets are called "Guerrilla~Militia."
6. Horizontally, provincial echelons appear to have a standard
organization. Besides the headquarters, there is usually one or more
combat battalions (infantry or sapper), and several smaller combat units,
such as sapper, engineer, special action, reconnaissance, and heavy
weapons formations. Supporting the combat units are military, political,
~~.nd rear services staffs, together with associated support units such
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as transportation, medical, training, and ordnance. In some provinces,
but apparently not all, there is also a military post office. The US
intelligence community calls the staffs, their associated units, and
the military post office the "Administrative Services." The province
battalion(s) is often referred to as "the concentrated unit" and the
entire provincial military organization is sometimes referred to as
"the province unit."
7. The horizontal military organization of a VC district closely
resembles the provincial horizontal organization. Instead of an infantry
battalion, as at province level, the district usually has an infantry
company. Districts also have a number of smaller independent combat
and "Administrative Services" formations from cell to platoon in size,
directly subordinate to the district m~.litary`headqua.rters. The district
also possesses the. three staffs, and sometimes a military post office.
S. Village military structures usually have a rudimentary organi-
zation. Ideally, a village has a guerrilla platoon (light infantry),
supported by couriers, intelligence personnel,. and laborers assigned to
village workshops (repairing rifles, making grenades, etc.). Actually,
few ~rillages meet the ideal,, and what are supposed to be platoons, are
frequently reinforcod squads. Usually a platoon or squad of self defense
militia supports the guerrilla unit at the village level.
g. Hamlet military organizations are even smaller. Usually an
ill-equipped guerrilla squad supported by a few self defense militiamen --
who are seldom armed -- comprise the hamlet unit.
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10. From time~to time during the course of the insurgency, but
especially since the beginning of the 1967-1968 Winter-Spring Campaign,
UC provincial military personnel have been subjected to large, sometimes
wholesale transfers. For example, district companies have formed the
nucleus of new provincial battalions and new companies have been formed
from guerrillas. Sometimes these formations are permanent, sometimes
temporary. But the basic organizational structure remains the same and
almost invariably new units (personnel) are formed (or recruited) to
replace those lost to the higher level.
11. At province level, Gia Lai military units appear to be somewhat
larger than the national average. Captured documents and POW reports
suggest the province contains the following combat formations: the H15
Local Force Battalion,l the newly formed X45 Local Force Battalion,2 the
X17 and X1g Engineering Companies,3 the C1 Independent Company,~+ a
sapper company,5 a combat support company,6 the X11 Signal Platoon, and
the X12 Reconnaissance Platoon.g
12. Less specific information is available on the VC "Administrative
Services" at province level. Captured documents indicate, however, that
the military staff contains signal, intelligence, personnel, militia,
operations and training, engineering, sapper, recon, farm production,
and administrative components.9 The overall-size of the military staff
is unknown, although its signal component apparently averaged 42 members
through 1967.10 Although a docurrient confirmed the existence of a
political staff, no information z.s available as to its size.11 Usually
~..
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political staffs are small. Other documents indicate the Rear Service
Staff had quartermaster, ordnance, repair transport, finance, medical,
convalescence, school, and rice depot components.l2
13. At district level, Gia Lai Province appears to be developed
along standard VC lines in most respects. Captured documents indicate
the province contains nine district units and one urban formation, the
Pleiku City Unit.13 The documents in which district and urban concen-
trated units figure are voluminously" and are largely confirmed by POW's,
including a captive taken during the Tet offensive who. claimed to be
the head of the H15 Local Force Battalion.15 Captured documents suggest
that at least five of the nine district units are company size, as the
documents contain orders for two or more platoons of different district
units, and exhortations to rebuild district units to their company size
after sending replacements to province.16 The size of the other
district level units are unclear. They may be presumed to platoon
size or larger.
1y,.. At the village and hamlet levels, a captured VC report dated
30 March 1967 indicated there were 8,830 guerrillas in Gia Lai including.
912 females and 62'7 "youngsters (under 16)." The document stated the
guerrillas were equipped with "713 small weapons, 92 mines, and 623
grenades."17 During the .first quarter of 1967 the guerrillas had laid
"638 spike pits, 1,3.9 booby traps, and 150 shell traps." A second
document, dated May 1968, indicated the VC had 831 guerrillas in one of
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v:1s:. ~w1:_..~?. ~. i~
the province's nine VC districts.~~g This would suggest that guerrilla
strength province-wide was still :in the thousands in the spring of 1968.
15. The Gia Lai guerrilla force, as portrayed in the March 1967
document is abnormal in two respects:
a. First, the force had proportionally fewer firearms than
normal; a ratio, it would appear, of one firearm for 14 guerrillas..
In this regard, the Gia Lai force resembles that of Ninh Thuan,
which at one time had virtually the same ratio, but is far different
from the guerrilla force of Tay Ninh, where almost all guerrillas
are armed. Available evidence indicates that a countrywide ratio
of firearms to guerrillas is between 1:2 and 1:3.
b. Second, fewer Gia Lai guerrillas are women than is usual.
In most VC areas between one-fourth and one-third of all guerrillas
are women. (How old the 627 "youngsters" are cannot be ascertained.
It is probable, however, that a-large majority of them are 11~. or 15,
since guerrillas younger than 14 are extremely rare.)
16. If the figures contained in the documents are accepted, two
conclusions can be draw!z concerning the Gia Lai guerrilla force. First,
it is relatively ineffective in a combat situation. This presumption
tends to be borne out by a document which described its inept performance
during the 197 summer-autumn campaign.l9 Second, the guerrillas provide
a large pool of partially trained manpower on which higher level units
can draw. Thus, one would expect that Gia Lai province and district level
formations are able to replace casualties with relative ease.
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...v ~ co ~vL.,c e l 1i ll,
17. In conclusion, at province level, there are probably on the
order of 825 combatants: H15, 250; Xl.~5, 250; five companies at 60 men
each, 300; and one recon platoon, 25. The MACV OB of May 1968 estimated
province level combatants at 75. The province level administrative
services in Gia Lai probably number about 300-350.
18. At district level, there are probably some 500 combatants
(50 x 10 district level units), conservatively estimated. The size
of the administrative services at district level is probably at least
250 (a ratio of one administrative service soldier for two combatants).
19. There are at least 5,000 guerrillas in Gia Lai; that is, some
3,800 less than in March 1967. T:he estimate here is derived by extra-
polating the guerrilla strength figure of the one UC district (831),
making allowance for the fact that this district is one of the more
populous ones in the province. This estimate should include the obser-
vation that the combat effectiveness of the force is far less than its
size would indicate.
The Kontum Province Unit
20. Whereas Gia Lai Province military units are well-documented on
every level, information concerning those in Kontum Province is much
less extensive. The principle evidence used in this memorandum to
document the size of the military components of Kontum Province is a
series of reports captured from a provincial ordnance depot on 7 June
1968. Very few personnel strengths of the Kontum formations are
~~~gy~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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a
available. However, weapons inventories for various units have been a
useful tool in estimating unit sizes.
21. At -province level, Kontum Province military units are somewhat
smaller in number than in neighboring Gia Lai Province. Captured
documents and POW reports indicate that in mid-February 1965, province
level combat forces consisted of a battalion (the 30~.th Infantry),20
an engineering company,21 and a reconnaissance platoon.22 Weapons
inventories suggest that the size of the 30L,,th was then about 300 and
that the engineering company had about 65 men. (Large numbers of
documents indicate that in VC infantry formations, there are usually two
individual weapons for every three soldiers, and in specialized units
such as sappers and engineers, one individual weapon for every two
soldiers.)
22. At least some evidence suggests the Viet Cong planned to
increase Konturn province level combat forces considerably this year.
One document, for example, indicated the enemy planned to create an
additional infantry battalion, several additional infantry companies,
and a combat support company some time after February.z3 Whether they
have done so..is unknown, although there has been at least one reference
to a 306th Battalion -- possibly a new one.2~
23. As in Gia Lai, information on the Kontum province le~~el adminis-
trative services is sketchier than that on the combat forces. While
captured documents suggest that the Military Staff had a signal platoon25
v~d~~i 1~,~~...~~L
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and a security guard2? associated with it, as well as personne127 and
training schoo128 components, it is difficult to assess the staff's
overall size. Likewise, information is inadequate to show the strength
of the Political and Rear Services Staffs, although the personnel
strength of the ordnance depot, at one time ~5 men,29 suggests Rear.
Service components are probably large. (An informal CIA study came to
the conclusion that ordnance personnel comprise something less than
ten percent of the total Administrative Service at province and district
levels.)
24. At district level, captured documents make it clear that each
district as well as the province capital, Kontum City, has its own
unit. The number of districts in Kontum is six.
25. The average size of the district units is difficult to deter-
mine. Ordnance reports giving district unit weapon inventories usually.
do not differentiate between weapons assigned to the district itself
and those assigned to villages and hamlets subordinate to the district.
Thus, we have the information that one district unit had 558 individual
weapons assigned and another had /~.L,,1 on hand in early 1968.30 How many
of these belonged to district local forces and how many to the guerrillas
is unknown. On the basis of ratios established in other areas between
the weapons assigned to districts and those to subordinate echelons, it
is estimated that some 40 percent of individual weapons were in the hands
of district echelons with, the remaining 60 percent assigned 'to the
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guerrillas. If this ratio were applied to the district unit above which
had 537 such weapons assigned, some 215 of them belonged on district
level and 322 were assigned to the guerrillas. This would imply a
district level strength somewhat over 300 (almost certainly including
both combatants and administrative services). While such a number seems
high as an average strength figure for the district units, it would
appear to be supported by evidence that at least one Kontum district
unit has two infantry companies (Clj.1 and CL,.2) .31 On balance, the
average number of district level combatants could be estimated at 150.
26. Captured documents concerning the Kontum City Unit indicate
that it had some 53 individual weapons in both February and March 1968.32
This would imply a unit strength of about 100.
27. Given the vagaries of estimating thetsizes of district combatant
force in Kontum, an~attempt~to estimate the size of administrative
services must be even more tenuous. Based on the ratio of one adminis-
trative service personnel to two combatants, these support troops would
average about 75 per district.
25. At village and hamlet levels, information concerning guerrilla
strengths is scanty indeed. One district is 1967 had some 319 indivi-
dual-weapons assigned to guerrillas.33 This would imply a guerrilla
force in this district of between 600 and 900, since the ratio of
individual weapons to guerrillas nationwide is between 1:2 and 1:3. If
this unidentif:~ed VC district is representative, there are at least
3,600 to 5,L~00 guerrillas in the six UC districts of Kontum Province.
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Iiowever, the 1:14 ratio in the neighboring highland province of Gia
Lai suggests the number of guerrillas may be even higher.
29. In conclusion, at province level, there were probably at least
some 390 combatants in February (304th Infantry, 300; the engineering
company, 65; the recon platoon, 25; with the possibility of there being
considerably more now, if new units have been activated as planned).
Based on the size of Kontum's ordnance component (45 men), it is
estimated that there are at least 400 province. level administrative
service personnel in Kontum.
30. Thera are an estimated 1,000 combatants serving at district
level (150 x 6 districts + 100 belonging to the Kontum Oity Unit).
There are an estimated 450 administrative services personnel serving at
district level (75 x 6 districts).
31. There are possibly 3,600 to 5,400 guerrillas in Kontum.
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ANNEX
A comparison of strength figures from the document
and estimated strengths is as follows. The
document disclosed~739 district troops in Gia Lai Province; 500
district combatants were estimated. The document revealed 6,934
guerrillas in the province; the estimate was 5,000. The document also
substantiated the paper's assertion that a new provincial battalion
(the XL,.S Battalion) had been activated, and disclosed the existence of
a second new provincial battalion (the X67). The document confirmed
the estimate of the strength of two provincial engineering companies.
It gave their strengths as 65 each; the estimate was 60 for each unit.
In this respect, the estimate of 825 provinci~a.l military personnel is
little affected; however, once the strength figure for the second new
battalion (the X67) taken from tYie document is added in, the provincial
military personnel are increased from 825 to .1 ,022._
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 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23 :CIA-RDP78T02095R000400100001-3
ument Denied
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~.~ August 2968
~uesearcl~ Ef Port on '~~ i1i~1; 0c~ I~lft3cal. 3n#'rastructure
Head ~~z'~ R~~earch
~. ~aeaa~ch at Headquarters an the Vf.et CQng infrastructure .,_
the ~sitic~tl anc~ administrative contras argani~e:tion ~-- is candueted
primarily within the D~'~'ice of ~c~n+c~ic Research. The Office aP
~urrerit Iatelligence and the Director's 8~ecial Assistant fcsr
Vietna~pese ~4ff'airs have aa~lyate who sp~eciasize in the Viet Lang
~3.iti.cas #nfarastructure and whoa prepmre r+~ports and briefings on
a eurrerrt bspit~.
2. The ~sauth Vietnam Breneh t~f the 4i'fice c~~' Ec?nomic F~sesrch
has facuaec9 research primari3.,y an the Vict f,'ang m;iltaxy ark politicos
oxganizetion o~ the North Vietr~meee Arnty mil,itarym~npower in South
Tf! ._ 1._ ....
~.+rry p +ro s.ai Y3i.i.CF FS"C471C:I~ ~,L.7.h ~~reu~.~w~~ ~.M,7i{/~ {:
exclusively with analysis of the Viet Cc+ng and North Vietnamese
miiteryf strategic ,position in South Vietnam, w~ark full.
'time an the Viet Lang politicos infrastructure. A senior ar~lyst
who is ~ Vf+etnam specialist by virtue ai'duty tours anc9 work 'experience,
cues most t~f his t~.z~e to the infrastructure problem. In addition,
.,.i.. ~.~ ~~cr,~rvcaty~.u,tc ~vr
r+eseorch on the Viet Cang military proselytizing sections and th+~
c~rge~ni~~zt~.an of the Viet Cong agpart~tus. The other
wc'rking can the Viet C~ng a.nd North Vietnamese Arty ,are engaged prinz~arily
in research to produce quantitative estixttotes of the regul.or Viet Cong
SECRET ExciaOed from auiamaflc
daw?ngrading s~~
-----....-.~ .... ro
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f'orees, the irregular fC?S"C8:3a and the overall Ct~mtaun#st mar~pc3wer
balance in St>uth Vietne~m r~s refLe~cted in recruiting, n#'3ltration o~
h Vietx.~mese, and losses.
`,~'he South Yietr~,t Bx~?znch cux~r~ently is D~~ri~ ~ report 't3~st
will describe the opgartization, theory and magnitude of the Viet
Cong militaxy proselytizing ef#'tart. ~'he suecees eat this prc~,~3:ytizfz~g
nce can be z~asured by the rates of AR'~1' defecti~sx~s~
end deser'~iorxs, Research is also being carried an tv rei~ix~ th,e basic
estimates a~ the str+~ngth s~f the Viet Long pollttcal infrastructure $~
to improve Bx+snch x'esources opt ap~ecf`i,c aa~ets t~f the Viet Long control
a~paratua.
SECRET
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~t6,Kt d
MA#
Research Effort
~, Zn etdditior~ to A2ACV'e psrticSpet~ox~ in operatiana
~iUenix Pa?c-gram, ir~t~lligence cn t2~t Viet Cox~g palitice,l i~-fx'$atructure
nt~.y ~~ beiz~ ct3mptled +~xad aralyeed by th+e P+t>].itie+~7. 4x~dex of
ct3.an cif ~ ~t~'~,gic Raeesxch and At~I,yei,~ branch cif
~ombir,~d Ir~te~.3:tg~n~s C+euttr, Vi~traam ~ CI~LV
coxnprtssd ot` about 18 e~naly~ta, itaelt~ing f~sux afficere, end to
r~e~po~aeible for de~lt~pixt~ 3.nterll.iganca on Viet Cvug infraetxruct~zre,
bCti3ldl~~iCB, loeatic~na, e~tructur+e, strength, vulr~x~bilitie~ ~n~
ae~Civities. Much cif the work of the ssetic~n is taken up wit~a
'ice input data t`or euta~a'tic date proces~fng of infrastructure
perst~r~2.ities. a ~e~ta 'Sava ~~ 'being built up t'rc~n a wide veari,ety
t~f eoureers 8,nsi ADP sert-$cee on the Vint Cc~r~g infrastructure are
pxc~vided four the int~lliger~ce vanity. A CICV 1~weletter z~n t2~e
VC ~litical Ini`rastrueture ill ~r~ed ~,Aerit~tica,l3,y. ~ eonter~t;~
oi' these newsletters to data have nqt indicated muck depth ixi
r~'saarch sir anphietiaatic~n in analysis an this prQb3esn,
SECRET
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Indochina Division
14 August 1970
SUBJECT The VCI Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger.
1. The VCI memorandum how being typed by St/P should
be ready for transmittal to Dr. Kissinger. An earlier draft
was coordinated with ONE (Bobby Layton). The present draft
has a number of changes in it resulting from critiques by
OCI and VNO. I believe all of OCI's requested changes were
made. (OCI?di copy with notes is attached).
too t ear commen s into
consi eration an resu matted the a er. Attached are written
comments to this draft from along with my 25X1
notes indicating that I have made a number of major changes
3. There are only twa remaining issues as far as I can
see.
uncomfortable about the discussion of how
wood the VCI estimates and eliminations data are.
They would have liked more verbatum 25X1
for what reason I am unaware. As far as the num-
bers go, they are all really much worse than we say
they are, and I think the way we explain them is
as clear as any proffered alternative. 25X1
is wrong on many counts in this area. Anyone who
wants to know how bad the computer esti- 25X1
mate is should talk. to in OCT. 25X1
Bob Komer's piece on Phung oang oenix) expresses
what many of us think of the eliminations data.
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 ~?
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b. The other issue is our case studies ending in
the paper which OCI and VNO found too simple. That
may be the case, but Dr. Kissinger is intimately
familiar with the details of these cases from the
VSSG Cease Fire paper and d(~~Sgi't need a f~311er dis-
cussion. There i_s no difficulty with the judgements
made, however.
Chief, South Vietnam Branch
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
November 1969
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM '
.SUBJECT:- The Control Situation in__Binh_Dinh Province.
I. .Overview -- Binh Dinh
1., The Communists have demonstrated that they have the resiliency,
cohesiveness, and recuperative power to sustain a presence in Binh
~i.nh Province, This has been accomplished in South Vietnam's second
most populous province in the face of massive Allied efforts and in
spite of serious reversals. Although-the Communists have been seriously
weakened during the past year, the chances are slim that by themselves
the South Vietnamese will be able to erase Communist influence in this
province in the near future,
2. Slow but steady progress i_n expanding military security and
the trappings of pacification marked the Allied effort in Binh Dinh
from mid-1965 to mid-1967. After setbacks, the Allies in late 1968
began to-roll forward and, according to several indicators at present
the province has reached the highest general level of security yet
xecorded. The improvements in security conditions between 1965 and
T967 and since mid-1968- have resulted largely from US and Korean
assistance which continues to provide essential support for the GVN.
~c~~~-~
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' 3, Operation Washington Green, carried out in northern Binh-Dinh,
has also contributed-substantially `to the improved HES scores-=for the
province. This.large-scale.local operat~.on.has been_able.to provide
security in. areas wYiich previously were bastion-s~of VC strength. At the
beginning of the operation in April 1969, the US battalion input was
nearly-doubled (from four to seven). At the same time, the remaining
enemy. Main and Local Force battalions had long since moved away or
become inactive. With this use of US and Korean battalion forces,
was .possible to establish and susi~ain Allied presence and begin the job
of rooting out the VC. infrastructure and Local Forces, as well as
developing a local GUN security structure capable of dealing with the
VC elements that remained...
L,.. - Although security is a pry;requisite for .initial pacification
success, the preservation and consolidation of pacified areas depends
to a large measure upon the ability of the South Vietnamese to establish
a viable political-military-.base and obtain some degree of popular
.support, In this respect and particularly in respect to its ability
._
to provide apasitive alternative to- the influence of the Communists,
.the?South Vietnamese government Yids scored its least.. success.n.Binh ,
? At this-point in time US and Korean forces may-have almost made
their maximum contribution to improving security in Binh Dinh. Communist
forces generally are not operating in company and larger size. units.,
S~'~~~1
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 uL~~ i.~ t
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because they. cannot. mass and maneuver these units without .suffering
high casualties. Moreover, with such large .numbers of Allied forces
deployed within the province, the enemy has emphasized tactics of
harassment, including low-key-hard to quantify incidents-such as
propaganda.
II. Analysis of Changes in Control
6. Three basic indicators of control have been used in this
analysis. The-first two -- percent of total rural population rated AB,
and percent rated DEVC -- are shown in Graph 1. The third indicator
used is-shown in Graph 2 and is an index of weighted HES security
scores, 3`
7a These three indicators are all basic measures of control.
However, even though they are sim_21ar, they do seem to show slightly
different trends. All three indicators show that Allied control began
to deteriorate in November 1967. Also all three agree that security
began leveling off from this fall sometime around February-March 1968.
An interesting difference occurs, however, in showing trhen the Allied
control began to improve. Both the percent of the population rated
DEVC and-the weighted security scores show that Allied control began to
improve rapidly in September 1968. ~In both indicators, the improvement
'has been sustained until?July 1969 when both show new highs of`Allied
Control. The percent of .the population-rated AB, however,- does not. show
#Weighted by multiplying hamlet population times hamlet security;
"and dividing the totalby total hamlet population.
? s~c~~r
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 tiE~.l.1~1~.!
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this sharp increase in Allied control beginning in September 196$..
.While there is an inflection point in September,. the, AB control does
-not show significant improvement before March 1969. Since March, the
AB control has increased significantly-but by July had still failed to
-reach the mid-1.967. high point of control. ?
8. All three control indicators were used in the regression
analysis. While the effect of the independent variables upon each was
slightly different, the relationships were generally similar for the
percent AB and weighted security scores indicators, Also, as would be
postulated, the relationships associated with the percent DEVC indicator
-was nearly the opposite of those for the others. .Therefore, in the
section that follows, most of the .discussion will deal with the factors
which 'influence the percent AB control indicator.
-4-
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YII. Factors Affecting Control.
9. The strength of US and tYiird::nation forces. as well as
enemy strength appear_to be the most-important .f actors affecting--con-
trol in Binh-Dinh Province. Graph~3 indicates.that~changes in US
and-third nation strength preceed changes in the precent AB control
indicator by one or two months. The remarkably close correlation
which .seems obvious from the graph is confirmed by regression
analysis; the coefficient of correlation between the two series is
.85. US and-third nation strength peaked during May 1967 and began
a sharp drop that continued until February 1968, the beginning of the
Tet offensive.. This pull-out of US forces was followed closely by a
.precipitous drop in control. Beginning in November 1967, control as
measured by the percent AB indicator dipped sharply until leveling off
in April 1.968.- Regression analysis indicates that a change of .10,000.
US and-third nation troops in Binh Dinh would change the percent AB
population by about 2 percent. .Graph 4.shows that changes in.VC~NVA
force strength do not lead changes in control as measured by percent
AB .control inda.cator.(and are not as strongly correlated.by it_).
However, changes in enemy strength are more effective in :explaining
changes in the percent population in the DEVC HES categories.
10. Changes in Allied battalion days of operation are also im-
portant in explaining changes in AB control. Regression analysis
.suggests. that approximately 100 battalion days of operation are re-
quired to improve `.control by one percent' (normally about' /.25 batta-
lion days are conducted per month).
nrnns-r
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' 11. Changes in tons of ordnance dropped by US aircraft. are
.another useful factor in explaining changes. in AB control. Because
of the close correlation of this series with. US and third .nation...
strength, it is nat~possible to meaningfully analyze?regression
equation coefficients. Communist attacks of less- than battalion
intensity are-not particularly useful in explaining changes in AB
control. .Rather, changes in the level of attacks appear to follow
rather than lead changes in control.- Incidents of harassment, terror,
-and sabotage are highly correlated with attacks, and are also not
particularly useful in explaining changes in control.
12. Changes in US and third nation strength, allied battalion
days of operation, tons of ordnance, and enemy attacks explain more
than 95 percent of-the changes in .AB control (an R2 of .95). It should
be emphasized, however, -that this regression analysis must be consid-
.eyed-preliminary because of problems with. data which are discussed in
the section that follows.
IV. Problems in ,Analysis
13. The analysis described in this study must be considered pre-
liminary and .interpreted cautiously. because of a number of problems.
-The HES data which is the input for the dependent variable (control)
contains periods. of inconsistency. There is a 15.5 percent drop in
the percent of the rural population rated AB between November and
December .1967. This does not. appear to be a true reflection of-.the
.change which occurred between-these months, but possibly a province-
wide revision of the HES accounting system. Other apparent
c~~~~r
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inconsistencies in the HES figures occurred in the~last few months of
data for 1969; the percent of rural population rated DEVC seems to
drop too fast. Since this ..last few months data is subject to revis--
ion, perhaps these figures will be revised to become mare consistent.
Still another limitation upon the analysis discussed within this
paper is the absence of ARVN data. Because of this problem, it is
impossible to evaluate what the effect would .be of substituting ARVN.
for US forces. In addition, the limited amaun.t of data received on
RF and PF forces also make any conclusions as to their effectiveness
virtually impossible.
V. Conclusions
1/.,.. Changes in the main force war in Binh Dinh Province appear
to be the-most important factors in the changing control situation in
the province. It is apparent that changes in the number of US and
third .nation troops in Binh Dinh have preceded changes in AB control.
-These troops have been employed a,s a security screen in Binh Dinh;
during the period prior to mid 1967 (when they were sharply reduced)
and during Operation Washington-Green these battalions have been de-
ployed in relatively stat~.c, security-oriented .positions. This. analy-
sis suggests that the-bong-term presence of these screening forces is
vital to making and maintaining pacification progress.
15. No .attempt was made to evaluate the effects of the Local
Force war on the control situ.a,tion in Binh Dinh. Data on the terri-
torial forces begins in January 1968;-its inclusion would require
dropping all of 1967 from the regression. Guerrilla. data is not
c+rnnt'T
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available for Binh Dinh Province.
16. Enemy strategy and tactics.-- Communist actions, as contrasted.
to-their .capabilities -- do_not appear to ..determine control in Binh Dinh,
although they are useful in explaining changes in control. UC/NVA
attacks and incidents of harassment, terror, and sabotage are moderately
highly correlated to control, but do not."lead" control. This would
suggest that normal changes in these indicators do not in and of them-
selves lead to changes in control
17. Similarly, US support (air and artillery, etc.) does not seem to
.determine control. Tons of air-delivered ordnance is moderately highly
correlated to control, but not in such away as to suggest it has an
important 'determining effect. It is posBible, however, that tons of air
ordnance, enemy incidents, and UC~NVA attacks have partial effects which.
are. not obvious individually, but when combined have a more direct effect
on control.o
1g. These results presented above are preliminary and represent our
first.look" at the data distributed yesterday. We believe that given
enough time to collect and carefu:l.ly analyze the data, we will be able
to reach more definite and useful conclusions, For example, we have not
been able.to obtain data on the number of ARUN troops deployed in Binh
Dinh; i~t is possible that this information can be obtained in Saigon.
We believe that it is more useful to consider changes in the level of
.control rather than its absolute level (the first difference. of control).
It also seems reasonable that looking at changes irk control will go a-
long way towards getting around the problem of auto-correlation,
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DATE.
~,/' O~
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
REMARKS:
FROM
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
EXT NSION
I FEB 55 ~L4 ~ REPLACES FORM 36-8 GP0:1957-0-439445 (47)
WHICH MAY BE USED.
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