OB INFORMATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000500070001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 28, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1969
• Content Type: AG

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23 May 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Indochina Division
SUBJECT: Background data on understanding differences
in MACV's and tiI CIA/DIA estimates of
Administrative .Services "u s04-;rti vlET4vr'
1. More than 10,000 of the 19,000 difference between MACV's
Administrative Services study estimate and our estimate of AS
troops, is in the treatment of province and district headquarters
and staffs (H & S). The remaining 9,000 difference consists of
higher strengths carried by CIA/DIA for specific AS units and
command echelons as well as the inclusion of units and commands
not as yet picked up by MACV. MACV lists 27 province H & S
compared to our 30. Of this difference, MACV apparently felt that
in two cases the evidence was too sparce to estimate the H & S
strength and in the third case the province just appears to have
been omitted entirely from the study, a possible oversight which
they may correct in future estimates. Of the remaining 27
provinces carried by MACV, we essentially agreed with the field
on 16 H & S strengths, including 7 cases of rounding MACV's
number. Of the remaining 11 cases. we carried higher strengths
2. A much larger difference exists between MACV's and
CIA/DIA estimate of district H & S. The net difference in strength
amounts to some 8,400 men. The major reason for the difference is
that MACV's study excludes, as best as we can determine, on the
order of 200 out of the total number of 240 VC districts in South
Vietnam. MACV itself conservatively estimates these missing
districts at about 2,400 men but does not adequately explain why
they were not included in the total AS strength figure. Tn addition,
rgehcrHS
we also have raised MACV's estimate of district H & e in cases
where we felt that evidence warranted such a change. While we
cannot determine precisnel MACV's methodology for estimating district
H & S strengths, ob,,,ase on an estimate; of average strengths for
all districts in a given area. These average strengths were derived
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District H & S strengths ranged from a low of 20
men per is rict for VC Military Region 10 to a high of 70 men
per district for the subregions of III Corps. In some of the
subregions we agreed with MACV's estimate for the districts
listed but added on to their number for missing districts.
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15 May 1969
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDt
SUBJECTS Movement of a Major III Corps Regiment to IV Corps
1. The 15 %Y issue of the Now Y sk Ti a carries an article
indicating that "large numbers" ofroops have been sent to the
Mekong Delta. The article refers to the 273rd VC Regiment of the
9th VC Division. It further states that the strength of the Regiment
is 1,500 men, but with supporting elements it might have 2,000 seen.
Of the total, 75 percent are said to be North Vietnamese.
2. As yet, we have no information to corroborate the details in
the article.
3. The 9th VC Division, and its subordinate regiments, tradi-
tionally has operated in III Corps' Tay Ninh Province. The 271st and
272nd Regiments have been active in the post-Tat 1969 offensive and
have suffered heavy casualties. Early in May, the 271st Regiment lost
the Cambodian border.
4. MACV carries the strength of the 273rd at 1,450 men, with a
November 1968 date of information. This was the figure we included in
the IIC submission to the field for 31 January 1969. Our next
submission, as of 31 March 1969, may drop the figure to 1,100. In any
event, the supporting units are integral to the Regiment and not in
addition to it an suggested by the Times article. Of the 1,450 men
we carried in the ITC submission, we estimated 60 percent (870) to be
NVA.
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5. We cannot explain why the enenr would shift (if, in fact, it
has) at this time a major regiment from the main infiltration route to
Saigon to an obscure corner of the country. It is possible that they
are merely in transit, since the area contains the infiltration corridor
leading to VC Military Region 3 Headquarters in Each Gia Province. The
movement of the 273rd into the Delta could reflect efforts to beef up
IV Corps units for possible offensive action during the next few months.
The strength of VC Main and Local Force battalions ae sharply decreased` l v
since 196?. Available information indicates that the enemy s average -
battalion strength in IV Corps fell from 425 to 325 during 1968, and is
believed to have been reduced further since the beginning of the year.
Guerrilla strength also has dropped significantly since late 1968.
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W-71
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Enemy Strength In South Vietnam
l? (S) No joint DIA/CIA estimate has been established since that formulated
for 31 December 1968. The focus of attention has been on the phased requirements
of the Interagency Intelligence Committee: and the establishment of a recurring
all-source report by MACV. The Phase I requirement (NVA presence); with MACV
COmr cnts,? is* enroute to MIA. Phase II (NVA fillers in VC units) and Phase V
(VC stren&th) workups are to be dispatched for field comments on 28 April 1969.
2. (S) The following is a comparison of the working-level DIA all-source
strength breakout, the IIACV Spring-derived strength estimate, and the
CINCPAC estimate for 31 March 1969: 1
FACT SHEET
Cai'cfor DIA
rIACV CINCPAC
MVA Subt
otal
118,000
108,000
137,
500
Combat
(79,000)
(71,000)'
(100,
500)
Filler
in VC units
(24,000)
(20,000)
(20,
000).
Admini
strative Scrvice
(15,000),
(17,000)
(17,
000)
VC Subto
tal.
105,000
79,000
79,
000
Combat
?
(42,000)
(41,000)
(41,
000)
Ad.mini
s
trative Service
(63,000)
(38,000)
(38,
000)-
Guerrill
as
``0 000
. 55 , 000
55x
000
Total Mi
litary Threat
283,000
242,000
271,
500
3. (S) Tko reasons for the differences between the MACV and DIA
UVA c.or "at strength are unkno,nn since the detailed field printout is not
available. The very significant difference between the DIA and MACV
25X1 NVA t.ow'3at strength in comparison to that of CINCPAC is caused by.. CINCPAC's
inclusion of units "which have displaced from South Vietnam, but could be
1
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4. (S) Recent conversations with CINCPAC representatives indicate that 1MACV
has formed a seven-man section to formulate a recurring all-source report.
This section's in.itial task is commenting on+rhe IIC phased breakouts.. The
Mr,CV est;irnate derived from Spring, as shown in paragraph 2 above, was submitted.
in response. to a C114CPAC levied requirement for a recurring report.
Action :~s being taken by MACV to reconcile the differences resulting from an
?411-source unit by unit tabulation and the loss/gain derived Spring estimate.
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
ilOD n1D r.-An in a
O
Prepared by:
r.S 4%V1 APPLY . ? DIAAP-4A2/57801
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1 Enclosure
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Defense intelligence Agency
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CIA/DIA AGREED ESTIMATES OF*ENMIY MILITARY-POLITICAL
STRENGTHS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS OF 31
DECEhIBEtt IP,G8
M,111L)TARY THREAT
Combat Forces
150 000 180,000
N\tA
3,05,000-125, 000
VC hfF/Z.,
450000- 55"00 0
Administrative Services
55', 000 75, 000
NVA
10,000- 20,000
VC
45,1000 550000,
Guerrillas
G0~000-100,000:
Total Military Threat
265,000-3,56,000.
OTHER IRREGULAR ORGANIZATIONS
Self Defense Forces
80,000-120,000
Assault Youth
10, 00 20000
Total.
00,000-140,000
POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
80,000-100,000
An estimated 20,000-2.5,000 of these NVA troops
are serving in VC units. The estimate of NVA combat
for-: os excludes all estimated '28,000 troops not
representing an immediate threat, deployed north of
the DMZ.
WW The military threat represented by the guerrilla
forces is not on a parity with that of Main and Local
Forces because probably only about one-third of the
guerrillas are well-armed, trained, .and organized.
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP
DATE
TO:
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
REMARKS:
STATINTL
FROM:
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
EXTENSION
FORM
1 FEB 55 241
REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.
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We have looked over DIA's projections of Communist manpower losses and
gains for the first half of 1969. It's conclusions are not markedly
dissimilar from those expressed by General Abrams in his recent cable. The
following outline. summarizes our comments.
First, and most important:, we have serious reservations about the use
of manpower balances to quantify possible changes in Communist forces in
South Vietnam. This tool is useful in describing the pattern of Communist
military activity, but it is far too rough to accurately estimate possible
changes in enemy order of battle. Although,we have consistently worked on
the problem, our knowledge of enemy losses, and to a lesser extent, gains,
is too weak to preclude the possibility of significant error. Rather small
changes in underlying analytical assumptions can cause marked shifts in the
pcssible size of projected enemy gains or attrition.
Nearly all analysts examining aspects of VC/NVA military manpower --
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including (privately) this paper's author -- recognize
these important weaknesses of manpower balances. We believe that the balances
are useful for illustrating the direction of change of the enemy's military
fcrce structure, but are of little usefulness in measuring its magnitude.
The following exercise illustrates how a minor change in assumptions or
slight difference in estimates can result in different projected changes in
fcrce level.
Comparison of DIA and CIA 1st half 1969 balances:
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1. Infiltration -- DIA - 78,000; CIA - 100,000-120,000
2. Recruitment -- DIA - 36,000; CIA - 24,000-36,000
DIA uses MACV estimate of 7,000 per month suggested by "field" for
first 3 months, and 5,000 per month for second 3 months (1968 MACV rate for
sane period).
3.
Total inputs -- DIA - 114,000; CIA - 124,000-156,000
4.
Total losses -- DIA - 150,000; CIA (using MACV data and
procedures - 145,000
5.
Net change -- DIA - (-36,000); CIA - (+11,000 to -21,000)
There is some danger in projecting an enemy manpower balance into the
future because some of the key assumptions regarding both losses and gains
may not be physical constraints but policy options. Based on our crude
estimates of his gains and losses during the first quarter, we believe that
he has probably sustained some net loss in manpower. If this net loss was
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on the high side -- say 20,000 or more which assumes some combination of
heavier losses and smaller inputs than we calculate -- then given his control
over rate of combat and losses, we would not expect that he would apt for a
strategy that would duplicate the first quarter and run his forces down
another 20,000. Further, we believe that the Communists adhere to a policy
of maintaining their force levels at about their present size. Although they
will certainly be willing to tolerate some attenuation from time to time,
particularly after offensives, they will not opt, for a strategy that would
entail an irreversible or prolonged strength drop.
It should also be noted that DIA has started their projection from
310,000 (the mid-point of the then agreed 265,000-355,000 range). More
recent work indicates that both ends of this range should be pushed upward,
although, of course, this would not affect the projected net change in force
level.
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 i Approved F
Inter-Agency Committee on the
NVA Presence in South Vietnam
22 March 1969
SUBJECT: Preliminary Report on Phase I and II: NVA Troops in NVA and in
VC Administrative Service Units
1. As of 31 March 1969, the total number of VC/NVA troops in Adminis-
trative Service (AS) Units in South Vietnam is estimated to total nearly
67,000 men, of which more than 21,000 are NVA and nearly 46,000 are VC.*
OE the 21,000 NVA troops, about 12,000 were estimated in NVA units and nearly
9,000 in VC/NVA units.**
2. The estimate of 67,000 AS personnel subordinate to commands in
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