BACKGROUND STATEMENT RE IM RECENT TRENDS IN EMEMY SUPPLY AND PERSONNEL INFILTRATION IN INDOCHINA

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000500190001-4
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Background Statements re IM
Recent Trends in Enemy Supply and
Personnel Infiltration in Indochina
No Date Summary of Logistics Data in SRG Studies, April 1971
and November 1971
No Date Series of tables re enemy logistics requirements and
inputs for 1970/71 dry season, estimated 1971 wet
season, 1971/72 dry season
No Date Notes to Paper for Dr. Kissinger, Recent Trends in
Enemy Supply and Personnel Infiltration in Indochina
(manpower requirements)
Report* E
R IM 71-218, Khmer rces in Cambodi
F 1~1" ~'?*I
REeport* ER IM, Recent Trends in Enemy Suooly and Pprcnnnr=~l
Infiltration ,n T-n ;nab
* Filed loose.
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Recent Trends in Enemy Supply and Personnel Infiltration
in Indochina
Secret
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
November 1971
RECENT TRENDS IN ENEMY SUPPLY
AND PERSONNEL INFILTRATION IN INDOCHINA
Introduction
1. A review of North Vietnam's logistical and
manpower infiltration into southern Laos, Cambodia,
and South Vietnam during the 1970/71 dry season and
the just-ended wet season provides benchmarks
against which to judge the current status of the
Communist forces in the war theaters as well as
some guide as to Hanoi's capabilities for mounting
major offensive activities during the current dry
season. This memorandum builds on the analysis
presented in the several studies completed last
spring for the Senior Review Group and adheres to
the basic methodological presentation in those
studies.
Summary
2. The Communists enter the 1971/72 dry season
in a manpower and logistics position not greatly
different from their situation last June. The main
logistic effort during the summer was directed at
maintaining and improving the system in southern
Laos and Cambodia. Although some supplies procured
in Cambodia moved into the system, we estimate that
there was a net drawdown of stockpiles in southern
Laos.
3. We estimate that Hanoi would have little
difficulty in moving supplies through the system
in amounts adequate to support a continuation of
a protracted war strategy throughout the war theaters
of Indochina. In fact, the various offensive strat-
egy options analyzed in our previous reports to the
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Senior Review Group appear logistically feasible
during the current dry season, except for that in-
volving a sustained countrywide offensive in South
Vietnam and Cambodia.
4. As for personnel infiltration, the enemy's
late start this dry season has not yet precluded
any strategy option except for the manpower buildup
required for a sustained countrywide offensive.
5. If the enemy soon starts his dry season supply
and infiltration activities in earnest, performance
above the levels set in the 1970/71 dry season - in-
filtration at an annual mark of 100,000 and supply
inputs on the order of 300 tons per day -- should
give the enemy freedom to choose from a number of
offensive options both during the dry season and
in the second half of 1972. Activity below these
levels would suggest an increasingly limited capa-
bility and/or a deliberate intent during 1972 to
reduce the scale of the fighting in South Vietnam
and Cambodia below that of 1971.
6. It is too early to make a confident pre
diction of Hanoi's plans for the 1971/72 dry season
on the basis of infiltration and logistics data
alone. Information from other sources does not
yet shed much direct light on Communist intentions.
Hanoi probably would still like to mount some sort
of highly visible military effort during the Presi-
dential election year in the United States. More-
over, the successive military callups of the last
year or so appear to have given Hanoi, quantita-
tively at least, a substantial reservoir of manpower
for such an effort. We note, however, that Hanoi's
spokesmen no longer seem to be calling for stepped
up action to achieve "strategic victories" as they
did during the first half of 1971. The reasons for
this change are uncertain, but whatever forced the
apparent change in strategy can presumably be ironed
out in relatively short order. Thus, there could
be a return to the aggressive policy that seemed
to be setting the tone in the first half of this
year. What little current evidence there is, how-
ever, points toward a low-to-moderate rather than
a high Communist military profile -- except for
North Laos where the enemy appears to be building
up for major military activity during the current
dry season.
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Discussion
The 1970/71 Dry Season
Logistics
7. During the 1970/71 dry season (October-
May) the North Vietnamese moved supplies into the
Laotian Panhandle at a daily average rate of about
270-345 tons. At the low end of the range this
input of supplies would have been just adequate to
support the enemy's supply requirements for pro-
tracted war; performance at the high end of the
range would have permitted some buildup of stockpiles.
Our judgment on the relationship of supply input
to the enemy's average requirement for externally
procured supplies during 1970/71 is made on the basis
of the size of the enemy force and assumes that
expenditures are made at the 1970 combat level with
adjustments made for supply losses resulting from
Allied ground actions and air interdiction. Several
factors lead us to assume that the enemy probably
entered the 1971 wet season with stockpiles neither
appreciably larger or smaller than they were the
preceding October -- the expansion of enemy forces
in southern Laos and the supply losses during
operation Lam Son 719 are noteworthy elements in
this judgment.
Personnel
8. During the 1970/71 dry season, about 106,200
men were infiltrated into Laos, Cambodia, and South
Vietnam. This total far surpassed the 1969/70 dry
season total of 65,700 -- chiefly because of the
greater number of troops sent to southern Laos,
The 1970/71 total, however,
is well below that achieved during the 1967/68 dry
season when the pipeline was flooded with about
250,000 personnel both to expand forces and to
replace the sizable losses resulting from the
several offensives undertaken during 1968. The
significant fact about the level of infiltration
in the 1970/71 dry season is that it was suffi-
cient only to maintain Communist forces at their
end-1970 level. Table 2 shows that VC/NVA combat
forces in South Vietnam declined by some 45,000-
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55,000 during 1970. The bulk of this decline --
25,000 to 30,000 troops -- was a result of VC/NVA
unit deployments to Cambodia and Laos; the re-
maining 20,000-25,000 reflect net attrition in
South Vietnam. As indicated in Table 2, this
erosion has continued through to the present time.
Estimated Strength of Communist
Regular Combat Forces in Indochina
Dec
Dec
Oct
1969
1970
1971
VC/NVA combat forces
130-150
105-120
105-120
South Vietnam
130-150
85-95
80-90
Cambodia
--
20-25
25-30
KC combat forces
N.A.
10-20
15-30
PL/NVA combat forces
55-65
60-70
65-80
Northern Laos
35-40
30-35
35-40
Southern Laos
20-25
30-35
30-40
9. Communist combat forces in Cambodia and
Laos have increased somewhat during the last year
and a half. It must be noted, however, that it is
more difficult this year than in the past to assess
the trends in Communist combat forces because of
a decrease in the volume of data on unit strengths,
losses, and replacements, particularly in Laos and
Cambodia. Thus, our calculations of the extent to
which forces in Cambodia and Laos have been aug-
mented this year should not be regarded as firm
estimates.
The 1971 Wet Season
10. In the Senior Review Group studies the
possibility of enemy infiltration activities during
the 1971 wet season was acknowledged but no attempt
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was made to introduce any numerical judgments into
the basic analysis. In retrospect, this appears to
have been appropriate.. The enemy during the past
several months has introduced only small numbers
of men and relatively small amounts of supplies
into the infiltration'pipeline, although extensive
preparations were under way during most of the
summer in preparation for the dry season logistical
activities.
Logistics
kept most of their personnel in place,
although limited numbers were withdrawn to North
Vietnam. The wet season itself was unusually mild
this year. Rainfall in the eastern Panhandle this
season measured about 60 to 70 inches for the period
June-October -- some 40 inches less than last year
and about 15-20 inches below the historical average.
The months of heaviest rainfall came early -- June
and July -- then tapered off to unusually low levels.
As in past years, the season's tropical storms and
typhoons were responsible for most of the damage
and disruption to the enemy's transportation system.
This year, however, the storms were widely spaced*
so that the system did not experience any wide-
spread or sustained damage during the rainy season.
12. During the summer, in
southern Laos conducted an unprecedented road main-
tenance and repair program and began construction
of several new roads which should soon become
trafficable. Communist road crews also kept most
major roads in the Panhandle motorable, and by the
end of September the road net in southern Laos was
in better condition than at any comparable time
in the war. Work on access routes across the DMZ
gave the system further redundancy and enhanced
Hanoi's capability for quick resupply or reinforce-
ment of its forces in MR 1.
* The major storms and typhoons affecting the area
were: Typhoon Harriet on 6 June; tropical Storm
Kim on 12 June, tropical Storm DeZZa on 30 September,
tropical Storm Elaine on 9 October, and Typhoon
Heater on 23 October.
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13. In northeastern Cambodia, monsoon weather
closed crossborder Route 97/110 from southern Laos
to vehicle traffic in late June or early July, but
other key roads in the area remained motorable and
supported light to moderate traffic. In addition,
I Imaintained an extensive river
transportation system on the Mekong and Tonle Kong
Rivers. Consequently, the enemy has maintained a
viable and much improved transportation system over
that which existed last year at this time.
14. Paradoxically, detected supply movements
in the Panhandle were much lower this wet season
than last despite the extensive road maintenance
program and the relatively light level of rainfall.
As a result, stockpiles in the Panhandle were un-
doubtedly drawn down to. support logistic forces
maintained there during the wet season, and through-
put of supplies to South Vietnam was light. Although
we detected very little logistic activity throughout
southern Laos during the rainy season-E-=
an impressive level of logistic activity. Large
tonnages of supplies -- mainly rice and petroleum --
were transported from south to north, while signif-
icant amounts of arms, ammunition and eguipment
were moved.';southward.
IThe Communists were
pro a y able to augment their stockpiles of rice
and petroleum in northeastern Cambodia this summer.
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The great majority of
recen in i rees appear to have been ear-marked
for duty in southern Laos or in the area of north-
eastern Cambodia Most
of the troops so tar committed to southern Laos/
northeastern Cambodia probably have been assigned
Rear Services roles or may be security forces
deployed to protect the infiltration corridor.
Current Status of the System
Logistics
17. Hanoi's ability to support the war effort
with military supplies continues to be dependent.
on aid from its allies. Military aid thus far in
1971 has been at a level adequate to support the!
present scale of the war and to offset losses in-
curred by the North Vietnamese during the Allied.
thrust into Laos last spring. As shown in the
following tabulation, military aid to North Vietnam
during the first six months of 1971 was valued at
$100 million, a slightly higher rate of delivery
than in 19 70 .
Jan-Jun a/
USSR 290 120 70 40
Communist China 100 105 85 60
a. Preliminary.
18. Military deliveries during the second half
of 1971 will probably continue at a higher rate
than in 1970, given the buildup in antiaircraft
defenses which has been under way for some months
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as well as the continued replenishment of supplies
lost or expended against Lam Son 719. Furthermore,
Communist Chinese Politburo member Li Hsien-nien
during the course of their recent visits to Hanoi.
there are indications of substantial military aid
commitments for 1972. Communist willingness to
supply North Vietnam with continuing military aid
was affirmed by Soviet President Podgorny and
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19. There is significant evidence that logis-'
tical preparations in North Vietnam are near a
dry season posture and that major stocks of supplies
now in storage there will facilitate the dry season
push through the Laos Panhandle once it is ini-
the North Vietnamese/Laos border have been estab-
lished and are sustaining heavy activity, while
some older facilities have been enlarged or upgraded
and are sustaining a higher level of logistical
activity than a year ago. Significant new con-
struction has been observed in the Hanoi, Haiphong,
and Vinh storage areas, where 107 new storage-type
buildings have been completed or under construction
since mid-1970.
supply stockpiles within southern North Vietnam.
A number of new truck parks/storage areas near
20. Other developments in North Vietnam seem
to indicate that the Communists are preparing for
a major logistic push. Significantly augmented
antiaircraft defenses in the southern Panhandle
have improved the North Vietnamese ability to
defend their resupply system. Possibly as many as
17 antiaircraft regiments and 14 SAM battalions
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may be located in Quang Binh Province, which is
unprecedented and is by far the largest concen-?
tration of air defense firepower ever observed
in southern North Vietnam. Some of the antiair-
craft units probably will move into Laos to defend
the corridor from Allied bombing.
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of Laos is in better shape than in previous years
at a comparable stage of the season. The orgarLi-
21. Similarly, in southern Laos and northern
Cambodia, the logistical system appears to be in
good condition. Despite Typhoon Hester, which
struck in late October, reporting indicates that
this has been the driest transition phase in
southern Laos in some years. The road net in most
zational structure appears solid.
indications that the Communists may be abou to
embark on their dry season campaign.
E--
an important indicator of tra is
levels and patterns in Laos, increased sharply
over the low levels of previous weeks. The in-
crease coincided with a period of high moon il-
lumination, a period favored by the Communists
for kicking off accelerated logistic activities.
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Personnel
23. In North Vietnam there are numerous indi-
cations that the enemy should be ready to start
the normal dry season infiltration drive. Avail-
able evidence suggests that Hanoi has maintained
normal cycles of induction and training during
the current year* so that in manpower terms Hanoi
is capable of supporting the war,at present or
even markedly accelerated levels.
24. North Vietnam has called up a substantial
number of men for military service during the
first 10 months of 1971, somewhat over 100,000.
The first wave of recruiting occurred in the winter
after an "appeal" of the Party and the Government
on 10 December 1970 for increased preparedness
following US air attacks in support of the Son Tay
raid over North Vietnam in late November. News-
papers and radio broadcasts claimed that large
numbers had "volunteered" for military service.
The volume of articles tapered off in mid-January
but then rose again in late March and continued
at a substantial level through May. In mid-June,
Politburo member Truong Chinh made reference in
a speech to military recruitment plans for the
second half of 1971, and there is evidence in the
press of another upswing in recruiting in the sum-
mer. During August and September, for example, the
army newspaper carried a steady flow of photographs
of recruits departing for induction s.
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ions o recruiting campaigns during
spring, and summer.
We estimate that recruitment
in 1970 was on the order of 150,000 persons. The
1971 campaign, based on evidence now available,
should result in about the same number of recruit-
ments.
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* The major floods in August and September may
have interrupted some training activities for a
time but should not have had an appreciable effect
on the availability of troops for infiltration.
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Prospects for the 1971/72 Dry Season
Logistics
26. Several signs point to a judgment that the
Communist must implement and sustain another major
logistics drive this dry season. The reduced
throughput of supplies during the past dry season
and the low level of activity during the summer
imply that stocks probably have been drawn down
substantially. Added to the need to further re-
furbish the logistic system is the fact that, as
each week passes without major logistical movement
through the system, the basic resupply requirement --
just that needed to support a protracted war strategy --
becomes progressively more burdensome. It should
be noted, however, that the launching of this
season's logistic offensive is not behind schedule.
A mid-November to early December dry season start
for sustained traffic movement is not unusual.
For example, the 1970/71 dry season logistics cam-
paign did not get fully under way until mid-November,
while that of the previous season was not initiated
until early December.
27. If, as seems likely, the Communists soon
get their logistics drive under way, we estimate
that they should be fully capable of matching their
1970/71 dry season input performance (on an average
basis, about 300 tons per day). Such an attainment
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would mean that from the logistics point of view,
Hanoi would have essentially the same options we
attributed to it during the last dry season. With
the exception of the logistic inputs required to
sustain countrywide offensives in South Vietnam
and Cambodia, the logistics requirements for the
remaining options could be met during this dry
season, as shown in Table 3.
Probable Period
of Satisfying Logistic Requirements
During the 1971-72 Dry Season
Early Mid-Season Late
(Nov-Dec) (Jan-Feb) (Mar-May)
GVN MR 1 X
GVN MR 2 X
GVN MR 1 and 2 X
Cambodia X
GVN MR 1/Cambodia
GVN/Cambodia Not attainable
28. One of the major logistic constraints
facing Hanoi would be the difficulty of pre-posi-
tioning and moving supplies within South Vietnam.
Area by area, the following comments pertain.
29. The current northeast monsoon will probably
restrain offensive activity through the remainder
of 1971 and possibly January 1972. However, be-
cause of the proximity of major supply arteries
in Laos and the new road through the DMZ the enemy
could quickly build up supplies for an offensive.
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30. Enemy capabilities to support an offensive
in this military region are much more dependent on
the performance of the logistics system in Laos.
If the enemy successfully moves supplies through
Laos and into the region in the next few months --
as he appears prepared to do -- a substantial
offensive could be undertaken late in 1971 or
early in 1972 against targets especially in the cen-
tral highlands. The enemy still would face a for-
midable task in attempting to position supplies
and troops to support an offensive in the populated
coastal sectors of MR 2. Given the present security
situation in MR 2 and the status of friendly forces
there, it is unlikely that the Communists can mount
a major, sustained offensive in the coastal provinces
during the coming dry season.
31. The enemy is in a less favorable logistic
position in MR 3. The logistics resupply system
into this region cannot be expected to function
effectively until well into the 1971/72 dry season.
The priming of the su ly system in southern Laos
this past summer
should facilitate the delivery of supply somewhat
earlier this year than last, but initial shipments
will undoubtedly be used to replenish stocks. It
is doubtful if the enemy will have established a
secure enough logistics base from which to confi-
dently launch widespread and sustained attacks
into this area during the 1971/72 dry season.
32. The enemy's logistic posture is most
tenuous in MR 4. Although there is an identifiable
supply element linking Communist forces here with
the logistic system in Cambodia, Communist forces
in MR 4 have experienced significant resupply
problems over the past year. Operating from a
very weak logistic base, the enemy is unlikely to
launch major military actions in MR 4 this dry
season. However, the tight logistics situation
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could change abruptly through a series of success-
ful sea infiltration attempts or in a matter of
several months with the movement of supplies down
through Cambodia. As in MR 3, however, the Com-
munists in MR 4 are likely to restore depleted
stocks before initiating widespread attacks. Thus,
no major offensives are envisioned this dry season.
33. We foresee no major logistic impediments
to sharp increases in enemy offensive activity in
Cambodia. Logistically, the Communists could with
little prior warning support a major offensive
north and east of Phnom Penh early in 1972 because
of this area's proximity to Communist bases in
Kompong Cham Province, which are supplied by major
lines of communication from Laos. The Communists
have access to abundant rice supplies in Cambodia.
In addition, substantial deliveries of arms and
ammunition could be accomplished
34. As the current dry season starts, certain
facts about the enemy manpower position are clear:
even with the absence from combat of most US ground
combat forces (but assuming current levels of US
combat support), North Vietnam probably will have
to provide about 100,000 infiltrators (fillers for
all theaters) just to maintain its current force
levels.
35. This assessment is supported by an analysis
of the changing disposition of US and ARVN maneuver
battalions in South Vietnam during the period
1968-71. Since its peak in April 1968, the total
number of US and ARVN maneuver battalions in South
Vietnam has decreased by 62, from 278 to 216 as
of September 1971. The total number assigned to
combat operations, however, has been reduced by
only 13. The number of ARVN maneuver battalions
currently assigned to combat operations is up by
73, and the number assigned to security, pacifica-
tion, training, and reserve operations is down by
49.
36. In part, this progress was made possible
by the success of the pacification program in
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South Vietnam in expanding South Vietnamese govern-
ment influence and control over the rural popula-
tion. The complementary factors of an erosion
of VC/NVA Combat Forces and Guerrillas since 19158
and a concurrent upgrading of South Vietnamese ter-
ritorial forces aided and abetted the pacification
successes, as has the overall qualitative improve-
ment in the performance of ARVN maneuver battalions.
37. The 100,000 level of infiltration, then,
represents a lower limit for Hanoi's manpower
commitment if the force structure is to be kept
intact and at a level which would permit the con-
tinuation of the combat strategy pursued over
the past three years. If Hanoi were to opt for
any of the other logistically feasible strategy
options analyzed in our previous studies for the
Senior Review Group, the additional infiltration
and force augmentation requirements would range
from 20,000 to 80,000 troops.* Even though the
enemy is now approximately one month into the "normal"
dry season, there still remains sufficient time to
meet the personnel requirements -- from the stand-
point of infiltration -- for these strategy options.
The force augmentations could all be completed in
a maximum of four months. Force augmentations re-
quired for major offensives in the western sectors
of MRs 1 and 2 could be completed in six to eight
weeks. Force augmentations for an all-out offen-
sive in Cambodia would require four months to
complete.
The View from Hanoi
38. There have been almost no recent indica-
tions from any quarter that the Vietnamese Com-
munists are preparing for a higher level of
military activity in the coming dry season than
they attained in the last couple of years. This
is a change from the first half of 1971, when
Hanoi's spokesmen seemed to be calling for stepped-
up action to maintain the momentum of Communist
"strategic victories" in southern Laos and Cambodia.
* These estimates exclude the additional manpower
requirements needed to sustain infiltration and
augment forces to the level required for a sus-
tained countrywide offensive throughout South
Vietnam and Cambodia.
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What happened to alter the message can only be
guessed at: perhaps the Vietnamese Communists were
thrown seriously off stride beginning in July by
the prospect of big-power summitry; perhaps the
change stemmed from a more pessimistic appraisal
in the field of their near-term potential in Indo-
china. It could also be -- although this is un-
likely -- that flooding in the summer and fall
forced a postponement of whatever North Vietnam
was planning to do during the dry season. But
whatever the reason, there is little question that
the cutting edge has .been missing from nearly all
Vietnamese Communist pronouncements, public and
private, since mid-1971.
39. It appears at this point in time that the
coming dry season may be much like the last one:
the Communists will be concentrating on efforts
to extend the southern end of their supply system
and to improve their political and military access
to the populated areas of South Vietnam. They
will also keep up an available level of military
pressure and on some battlefields -- parts of MR
1 and the central highlands of South Vietnam and
parts of Cambodia -- the fighting could become
fairly extensive. The Communists will be particu-
larly alert for opportunities to deal ARVN a sharp
blow, as they did this year at Snuol and they tried
to do recently in the Krek-Tay Ninh Province
fighting.
A Note on Northern Laos
40. Communist logistical capabilities in northern
Laos are largely independent of those in other areas
of Indochina. Whereas southern Laos, Cambodia, and
South Vietnam all require support via the Ho Chi
Minh Trail, support of the Plaine.des Jarres sector
does not. Nevertheless, the northern Laos logis-
tical system is vulnerable to the same seasonal
influences as the Panhandle system and thus receives
only limited use during the rainy season months.
This pattern was clear during the 1971 rainy season,
when Communist logistical activity in the Plaine
was at a very low level -- probably sufficient only
to maintain their forces in place once most of them
had redeployed or been pushed back to the eastern
Plaine area. No substantial flow of supplies beyond
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the northeastern Plaine area was necessary, because
of the small number of Communist troops to the west.
Similarly, their requirement for weapons and ammuni-
tion was relatively low, as the level of combat during
the rainy season remained at a low level, even in
the face of Vang Pao's drive across most of the
Plaine.
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41. Initial preparations for the 1971/72 dry
season in northern Tans heaan to be noted as early
as mid-September.
aye identified a-significant
level of logistic activity now under way in the
northeastern Plaine area where roads reportedly
are in good condition and sustaining moderate to
heavy vehicle activity. Increased activity is
particularly noticeable in the Khang Khay area
where the Communists are reportedly now building
substantial stockpiles in anticipation of their
expected dry season offensive on the Plaine. Re-
porting on route conditions east of the Plaine
toward North Vietnam is sporadic, but the most
recent information available
indicated that Route 7 was open and appears
o e supporting a light to moderate level of
vehicle traffic -- good evidence that some supplies
and personnel are now moving into the Plaine des
Jarres area.*
42. From a logistics point of view, the Commu-
nists should have no trouble winning back the Plaine
once the dry season is under way and the route sys-
tem has been completely refurbished. The capability
of their logistic system to support an offensive
there was amply proved in 1970 when friendly irreg-
ulars were driven from the Plaine in a matter of
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weeks. The Communists will have more difficulty
supporting offensive action west of the Plaine,
where the rudimentary supply system has been badly
disrupted by the Irregular drive this summer.
Assuming that the government forces maintain a
credible military capability in the area, it might
be well into the dry season before the enemy would
be in a logistical position to sustain a drive
west of the Plaine.
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44. Some of the deployment probably is to re-
place losses, but the magnitude suggests that
there will be an overall increase in the Communist
force level near the Plaine. The deployment of
forces, probably to the Plaine area, is in prep-
aration for the anticipated communist offensive
to retake the Plaine.
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Secret
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 Approved For Release 2004/08/03 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500190001-4
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Khmer Communist Combat Forces in Cambodia
Secret
ER IM 71-218
November 1971
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 I Approved For Release
fI
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
November 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
KHMER COMMUNIST COMBAT FORCES IN CAMBODIA
Introduction
1. One of the more vexing problems facing the intelligence
community is to delineate the size, disposition, and functioning of the
Khmer Communist (KC) combat forces in Cambodia. Available reporting
has provided a mixed bag of fragmentary and often contradictory data that
at best provide only spotty insights on the development of this force
structure. The data, however, do provide a consistent theme on the nature
of these forces. First, most KC units include Vietnamese Communist cadre,
and, second, some of these units are attached to larger Vietnamese
Communist formations. This memorandum provides a preliminary
assessment of the development and the size of the KC force structure and
offers judgments on its current capabilities.
Discussion
Background
2. The Vietnamese Communists began to pressure forces of the
government of Cambodia about two weeks after the fall of Prince Sihanouk
in March of 1970. In April they began offensive action to expand control
north and west of their border base areas, and, by May 1970, Communist
forces had moved as far as Siemreab in northwest Cambodia. By the end
of July the enemy had taken over most of the area north and east of
the Tonle Sap and north of Route 7 and established pockets of control
south and southwest of Phnom Penh (see the map).
3. After driving Cambodian forces from these areas, the Communists
began to recruit the local Khmer populace into military units. In addition,
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and coordinated within CIA.
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 Jbon Ratchathaif #i
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FRIENDLY/COMMUNIST
CONTROLLED AREAS.
Friendly
Communist
Contested
Province boundary
Road
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they sought to create a KC political infrastructure to administer local
government in the Communist- controlled areas and to provide Communist
military units with food collected as taxes from the local population.(1
KC Military Regions (KC MRs) were established throughout the country
apparently based on former Khmer Rouge and possibly Viet Minh
administrative areas. Thus far, only two of these regions, MR 203 -- in
Svay Rieng, Prey Veng, and southern Kandal Provinces -- and MR 304 --
covering much of northwest Cambodia -- have been positively identified.
There is evidence, however, to indicate that KC MRs have been established
in other areas. These KC MRs are in addition to those created by the
Vietnamese Communists for the control of their main force units in
Cambodia.(2)
4. The development of KC military forces initially departed from
the traditional Communist pyramidal pattern noted in the South Vietnamese
insurgent movement. In that insurgency the Communists first established
guerrilla units at the village and hamlet level; then local force units at the
district and province level; and, finally, main force units at the military
region level. In Cambodia, however, building of all three echelons of the
insurgent force structure was pushed simultaneously, with the VC/NVA
main force units serving as the principal element around which indigenous
Communist forces were established. Although the short time frame available
to develop an occupation force was the most significant consideration
underlying this new approach, the historic animosities between the Khmers
and the Vietnamese -- as well as the fact that indigenous support for the
Communist movement in Cambodia itself has been very shallow -- were
also contributing factors.
KC Combat Strength
5. KC combat strength is currently estimated to be within a range
of 15,000 to 30,000 men. This estimate includes only those personnel
believed to have a significant combat capability. Thus, it does not include
personnel assigned to the KC political infrastructure, administrative services
units, or the village and hamlet guerrilla forces. The low end of the combat
force range represents those forces actually identified in Cambodia, while
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the upper end of the range attempts to quantify what the force could be --
based on a set of "reasonable" assumptions. Information that would permit
direct quantification of the total Communist force structure (both
Vietnamese and Khmer) is not currently available. In addition, there are
insufficient data to separate the Khmer out of the combined force structure.
As a result, it has been necessary to employ an indirect estimating
methodology based on a broad range of assumptions about the Communist
recruiting success in Cambodia. This approach takes the known recruiting
successes for the few identified KC units and extrapolates that experience
over the Communist-controlled and contested areas of the country.
6. These 15,000 to 30,000 men are organized into battalions
subordinate to KC sub-regions(3) or companies subordinate to KC districts
or are integrated directly into VC/NVA main force regiments. The KC
sub-region battalions and district companies comprise the Communist local
force structure in Cambodia; while the Khmer integrated into the
Vietnamese-dominated main force regiments comprise the KC input to the
Communist main forces.
7. Sub-region and district forces have been formed in the
Communist-controlled and contested areas in Cambodia. Although the
evidence of their formation is incomplete, a fairly clear picture of their
organization can be constructed. The KC sub-region unit is subordinate to
the sub-region party committee and consists of a headquarters and from
one to three combat battalions. The headquarters usually contains a number
of Vietnamese cadre who hold key control positions and carry out most
of the specialized staff functions. Vietnamese cadre are also heavily involved
in the headquarters training unit, which is responsible for the indoctrination
and training of local Khmer recruits. It is believed that sub-region units
have been established in at least 10 of Cambodia's 19 provinces, and possibly
in all 19.
8. The low end of the range for sub-region force strength was
estimated by assuming, on the basis of firm reports for several provinces,
that the Communists have established sub-region units of at least one
battalion in each of the 10 Cambodian government provinces in which a
Communist infrastructure has been identified. The high end of the
sub-region estimate was reached by assuming that the Communists had
established at least one sub-region battalion averaging 250 men in all 19
of Cambodia's provinces and an average of two additional battalion
equivalents in each of the 10 provinces with identified infrastructures (based
on evidence that this had been done in Kampong Thum, Prey Veng, and
3. A KC sub-region (also known as a sector or zone) appears to be roughly
equivalent to a Cambodian government province in echelon.
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Kandal Provinces). This procedure yields an estimate of from 2,500 to
10,000 men in KC sub-region units.
9. KC district units, like their sub-region seniors, are subordinate
to the appropriate party committee. They consist of a headquarters and
one or more combat companies and have a small detachment of Vietnamese
advisers who perform many of the same functions as those at the sub-region
level. It is currently estimated that the Communists have established district
units in at least 53 of Cambodia's 131 districts. These districts have been
under Communist control for some time and are believed to have organized
KC infrastructures in place. The Cambodian government is believed to
control about 40 districts and, therefore, is able to prevent the formation
of combat-effective district units in these areas. There is very little
information available on the remaining contested districts, and the total
number of KC district units in them is unknown.
10. The estimated low end of the number of district units was
obtained by identifying the number of districts believed to be actually under
enemy control and assigning a district unit to each. The high end of the
range was reached by taking the number of FANK-controlled districts and
subtracting them from the total number of districts in Cambodia. This
methodology yields a range of from 53 to 90 districts with KC units.
Multiplying these figures by the reported average district strength of 130
men per unit yields a range of from 7,000 to 12,000 men in district units.
The average district strength of 130 men includes two infantry companies
and their associated combat support personnel. Some district administrative
services personnel also may be included in this average, but available
evidence does not permit them to be broken out.
11. In addition to the discrete sub-region and district forces, other
Khmer have been recruited directly into Vietnamese-dominated regimental
echelon units. The number of Khmer in these units varies considerably.
he 203rd Regiment in Siemreab Province
has as many as 750 F. mer in its ranks, whereas the 201st Regiment in
Kampong Thum Province is reported to be mostly Vietnamese. In order
to account for the Khmer recruited into these mixed Vietnamese/KC units,
an assessment was made of each enemy regiment in Cambodia to determine
the probable number of Khmer battalion equivalents attached to it. This
assessment produced a range of from 5,000 to 8,000 Khmer directly
recruited into enemy main force units. Combining the estimated strengths
of the Khmer in sub-region, district, and main force units (and rounding
the figures) yields a total KC combat strength of 15,000 to 30,000 men.(4)
4. The remaining components of the KC force structure, the village and
hamlet guerrilla units, are not included in the combat strength estimate.
These units are generally of platoon size and are lightly armed with older
weapons. The local Khmer in these units have had relatively little training,
usually only amounting to a week or two of instruction from a Vietnamese
soldier. Because of their small size, light armament, and lack of training,
these units are usually relegated to such duties as standing guard, intelligence
gathering, spreading propaganda, and collecting supplies from the local
population. - 5 -
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Recruitment
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12. Khmer Communist forces initially were recruited in the areas
contiguous to the traditional VC/NVA base areas along the Cambodia-South
Vietnam border. Some local Khmer were recruited directly into the
Vietnamese main force units, while others were formed into lightly armed
local units and instructed in the defense of their own villages. As the
Vietnamese forces moved deeper into Cambodia, this pattern of recruitment
was continued. More Khmer were recruited into the VC/NVA main force
structure and Vietnamese cadre were placed in villages and began to recruit
more local military units. When the KC political infrastructure began to
operate above the village level, additional KC units were recruited and
attached to the infrastructure at the provincial and district echelons.
13. In addition to the Khmer currently being recruited in Cambodia,
ethnic Khmer trained in North Vietnam have been re-infiltrated to join
the KC ranks. These personnel were recruited in Cambodia during the Viet
Minh, Sihanouk, and post-Sihanouk periods and sent north for training; in
Communist doctrine and military science. The total number of Khmer
personnel re-infiltrated from North Vietnam thus far is unclear. 25X1
indicate that at least several hundred
Hanoi-trained Khmer have come down the trail, and on 25X1
uggests that the number coming down since 1962 runs
to several thousand.
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14. In general, the Khmer have been reluctant to join the
Vietnamese-dominated KC military units owing to their traditional distrust
of the Vietnamese. Many Khmer have been drafted into service, while others
have joined in hopes of making things better for their families in the
Communist-controlled areas. At best, most of the KC personnel are reluctant
soldiers, and many have deserted or rallied to FANK at the first opportunity.
Even the Communist groups established in Cambodia prior to the fall of
Prince Sihanouk are often reluctant to cooperate with the Vietnamese.
Initially the Vietnamese attempted to dominate these groups and to
incorporate them into the developing KC infrastructure. This effort has not
been entirely successful, however, and in many areas they seem to operate
as quasi-independent organizations. Nevertheless, the military units
associated with these groups have been included in the combat force
estimates, even though some of them may be operating independently.
Disputes and Desertions
15. There have been numerous reports of disputes between the KC
and their Vietnamese mentors. They have arisen over such things as the
distribution of tax receipts, travel restrictions (some imposed by the
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VC/NVA on the Khmer, others imposed by the Khmer on the VC/NVA),
and the reluctance of the Vietnamese to equip some KC units with modern
arms. Some of these disputes have even resulted in fire fights between the
two ostensible allies.
16. One prominent example of the failure of KC and VC/NVA to
agree on objectives is the case of the VC/NVA-proposed attack on Kampot
City. the KC refused to participate in, or give
permission for, the attack. This refusal at least temporarily prevented the
Vietnamese from proceeding on their own. The Khmer are reported to feel
that the VC/NVA should concern themselves only with attacking and driving
Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces from Cambodia and
should leave attacks on FANK positions to KC discretion. There have also
been numerous reports of KC desertions or of KC rallying to the Cambodian
government. In the Kompong Trabek area of Prey Veng Province, for
example, 60 KC rallied to FANK units operating in the area during the
period 22 through 28 July 1971. Since 18 March 1971, FANK claims to
have received more than 4,500 KC ralliers.
Current Combat Capability
17. The present combat capability of the KC forces is estimated to
be much lower than that of their Vietnamese counterparts. This lower
capability stems from three main causes: low motivation, relatively poor
training, and a lack of modern arms for a large part of the force structure.
A low level of motivation stems from the fact that many of the KC are
serving under duress, are not well treated, and do not trust the Vietnamese.
The poor training results from the absence of good training facilities coupled
with a shortage of Vietnamese who speak the Khmer language. The lack
of modern arms apparently stems from Vietnamese mistrust of the
Khmers -- the usual practice is for many KC units to be loaned newer
weapons only for the conduct of specific Vietnamese-directed missions.
After the mission is completed the weapons must be returned to the
Vietnamese.
18. The combination of these three factors has resulted in making
many KC units, especially those with few Vietnamese in them, unreliable
in head-on confrontations with FANK forces. An example of this may be
seen in the attempted ambush of a small FANK security force by six KC
and one Vietnamese adviser. Five of the KC had had no previous battle
experience and suddenly broke and ran as a result of FANK resistance.
All six KC and the Vietnamese adviser subsequently were captured by the
FANK unit. Even mixed Vietnamese/KC units have had little success against
recent FANK large-unit operations. In operation Chenla II the combined
efforts of the 201st and 205th regiments were not adequate to stop FANK
from reaching Kampong Thum. It was not until regular Vietnamese units
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from the Ninth Division entered the area that FANK began to have serious
difficulty.
19. Recent activities of KC combat units have included the occupation
of territory "liberated by VC/NVA forces," the harrassment of Cambodian
government lines of communication, small attacks against ill-defended
government facilities, and the defense of local areas against minor FANK
incursions. KC forces, exclusive of those predominantly Vietnamese main
force units, have not been identified as being heavily involved in any of
the larger confrontations between Communist and Allied forces. When
FANK or South Vietnamese units have moved into an area in force, the
KC units have engaged only in light harrassing actions and then withdrawn.
Given the present level of equipment and training, KC units are not believed
to be capable of independent offensive operations into FANK-controlled
territory.
20. Clearly, the mutual distrust harbored by the Khmers and the
Vietnamese coupled with a Khmer lack of enthusiasm for the Communist
cause is at the core of the problem not only of a low level of KC combat
capability, but also of the high level of disputes and desertions. Despite
these problems, however, the Vietnamese have succeeded in creating a
sizable KC force structure. This has been accomplished partly by threat
and impressment, as well as placing formerly discontented Khmer in
positions of apparent authority in the KC structure. Many Khmer in
Communist-controlled areas thus find it in their best interests to continue
to cooperate with the Vietnamese.
Near-Term Outlook
21. The KC force structure is expected to continue its growth -- both
quantitative and qualitative -- in the near future. Several new training camps
have been constructed with a reported total capacity of several thousand
men. These new camps coupled with the growing number of both
Vietnamese and Hanoi-trained Khmer cadre being infiltrated into Cambodia
should improve the instruction and indoctrination of the KC troops. The
increasing use of ethnic Khmer cadre should also serve to relieve many
of the problems resulting from Khmer hatred of Vietnamese. If the
Vietnamese decide that they can trust the KC enough to equip them with
modern small arms and crew-served weapons, KC military effectiveness will
be greatly improved. The possession of modern arms not only should
increase KC fire power but also would improve morale and increase KC
independence. This increased independence may not appear to be entirely
desirable to the Vietnamese, however, and they may withhold modern arms
from many local KC units since the KC can still perform their population
control function without them.
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22. Even with the projected increases in KC strength and capability,
they will probably not be able to pose a serious offensive threat to FANK
forces in the near term. They are not likely to improve at a much faster
rate than FANK, nor are they likely to be able to expand enough to
outnumber FANK forces. Their primary role for the foreseeable future will
continue to be the occupation of VC/NVA-liberated territory, with an
increasing ability to defend that territory against minor FANK incursions.
They also can be expected to become increasingly bold in striking
lightly-defended FANK outposts. As the KC continue to expand, they can
be expected to relieve some of the VC/NVA main force units currently
tied down protecting major Communist lines of communication in
Cambodia. These units could then reorient their activities toward Allied
forces in Cambodia and adjacent areas in South Vietnam.
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DATE
TRANSMITTAL SLIP A., 2
TO: ADDI
ROOM NO. I BUILDING
REMARKS:
For your approval prior to
dissemination.
St/?/ER-Control
ROOM NO.4F4l I BUILDING
FORM NO 1 REPLACES FORM 36-8
I FEB 55 . f4 WHICH MAY BE USED.
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 25X1
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Summary of Logistics Data in SRG Studies
April 1971 and November 1971
In the April studies the logistic performance during
the 1970-71 dry season was estimated to be 295-370 tons per
dELy. This was compared to an input requirement for
protracted warfare of 278 tons per day and input requirements
for various offensive strategies ranging from 280-364 tons
per day. The input requirement was based on average OB and
expenditures for 1970.
In the November study the logistic performance during
the 1970-71 dry season was estimated to be 270-345 tons per
day. This was not explicitly compared with input requirements
but additional information permits us to -revise these based
on 1971 OB and expenditures. For the protracted warfare
characteristic of 1971 (excluding Lam Son 719) the input
requirement is set at 263 tons per day. From this base,
input requirementsfor various offensive strategies range
from 266 to 351 tons per day.
While these changes do not alter any judgements made in
the April studies they permit us to present a forecast for
1971-72 based on the most recent experience. To recapitulate:
270-345 tons or supplies per day inputed into Laos during
1970-71 matched against a minimum requirement of 278 tons per
day for the 1970-71 dry season and the 1971 wet season.
During the 1971-72 period if the enemy is able to equal
1970-71 input performance (270-345 ton) this would be matched
against requirements as follows:
Case
1 (
pro
tracted)
263
Case
2 (
MR
1) 29
4-312
Case
3 (
MR
2) 26
6-268
Case
4 (
MR
1,2) 29
7-317
Case
5 (
Cam
bodia) 27
3-281
Case
6 (
MR
1, Cambodia) 30
5-331
Case
7 (
Gen
eral) 31
9-351
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ESTIMATED 1970/71 DRY SEASON (OCTOBER-MAY)
INPUT TO THE LAOTIAN PANHANDLE
Minimum
Daily
Dry
Estimate
Average
Season Total
Trucks
270
11 65,000
Maximum
Estimate
Trucks
65,000
Waterway
1,200
Pipeline
16,800
83,000
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Estimated 1971 Wet Season (June-September)
Input to the 'Lao tian Panhandle
Minimum estimate
Short Tons
Wet Season
Daily. Average Total
1,996
Maximum estimate
Trucks
16 1,996
Waterway 0 0
Pipeline 3* 366
Total 19
E tt mis ate based on 1971 wet season POL
requirement, no allowance was made for
stockpiling. This compares with the
7th AF estimate of 3 tons pe^week.
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2,362
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1971/72 Dry Season Supply Flows Needed
to Meet Requirements for Sustained Offensive
Operations
Short Tons
(Including 25% BDA)
Daily
Requirement
Cumulative
Dry Season Inputs
1971/72 dry season
144
34,560
1972 we.t season
75
9,000
Minimum Requirement:
South Vietnam and
Cambodia
54
19,619
Total
63,179a/
Daily input require-
ment
263b/
Military region 1,
low combat elsewhere
75-87
26,888-31,275
Total
70,448-74,835a/
Daily input require-
ment
294-312b/
Military region 2,
low combat elsewhere
56-58
20,250-20,700
Total
63,810-64,260a/
Daily input require-
ment 266-268b/
a. Including southern Laos tonnages, above.
b. The daily input requirement is calculated on the basis
of a 240 day dry season (October-May) and includes and allowance
for air losses.
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 25X1
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1971/72 Dry Season Supply Flows Needed
to Meet Requirements for Sustained Offensive
Operations
Short Tons (Including 25% BDA)
Daily Cumulative
Requirement Dry Season Inputs
Military regions 1 & 2,
low combat elsewhere 77-91 27,788-32,625
Total 71,348-76,185a/
Daily input require-
ment 297-317b/
Cambodia; low combat
elsewhere 61-66 22,050-23,850
Total 65,610-67,410a/
Daily input require-
ment 273-28lb/
Case 6
Military region 1 and
Cambodia, low combat
elsewhere 82-99 29,588-35,775
Total 73,148-79,335a/
Daily input require-
ment
305-33lb/
Country-wide South
Vietnam and Cambodia 92-113 32,962-40,725
Total 76,522-84,285a/
Daily input require-
ment 319-351b/
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a. Including southern Laos tonnages.
b. The daily input requirement is calculated on the basis of a
240 day dry season (October-May) and includes an allowance for
air losses. Approved - 02095R000500190001-4
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LAOS PANHANDLE REQUIREMENTS
1971/72 DRY SEASON (240 DAYS)
Daily
Cumulative
Class I
43 x
(240)
10,320
Class II & IV
11 x
(240)
2,640
Class III
46 x
(240)
11,040
Class V
15 x
(240)
3,600
115 x (240)
27,600
Total with 25% bomb
damage (BDA)
144 x (240)
34,560
1972 Wet Season (120 Days)
Class I
43 x
(120)
5,160
Classes II & IV
11 x (120)
1,320
Class III
3 x
(120)
360
Class V
3 x (120)
360
Total
60 x (120)
7,200
Total with 25% BDA
75 x
(120)
9,000
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Case 1: Minimum Requirement for Forces in
South Vietnam and Cambodia
Daily Cumulative
MR 1 Class I 20 (365) 7,300
Classes II, IV, V 5 (365) 1,825
MR 2 Classes II, IV, V 2 (365) 730
MR 3 Classes II, IV, V 2 (365) 730
MR 4 Classes II, IV, V 2 (365) 730
Cambodia Classes II, III, IV, V 12 (365) 4,380
Total 43 (365) 15,695
Total with 25% BDA 19,619
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Case 2: Requirement for High Level of Combat
in MR 1, Minimum Requirement Elsewhere
Daily Cumulative
Class I
(low
combat)
20 (180)
3,600
(buildup) 25xl.5 (180)-
25x2.0 (180) 6,750- 9,000
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat) 5 (180) 900
(buildup) 14xl.5 (180)-
14x2.0 (180) 3,780- 5,040
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat) 2 (360) 720
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat) 2 (360) 720
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat) 2 (360) 720
Cambodia Classes II,
III, IV, V
(low
combat) 12
(360) 4,320
21,510-25,020
26,888-31,275
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 Approved Fet' R000500190001-4
CASE 3:
REQUIREMENT FOR HIGH LEVEL OF COMBAT IN MR 2,
MINIMUM REQUIREMENT ELSEWHERE
MR 1 Class I
(low combat)
Classes II, IV,
V
(low combat)
MR 2 Classes II, IV,;
V
(low combat)
(buildup)
MR 3 Classes II, IV,
V
(low combat)
MR 4 Classes II, IV,
V
Cambodia
Classes II, III,
IV, V
Daily Cumulative
20
5
2
(360)
(360)
(180)
7,200
1,800
360
4*1.5 (180)-
4:k2.0 (180)
1,080-1,440
2
(360)
720
2
(360)
720
12
(360)
4,320
Total
16,200-16,560
Total with 25% BDA
20,250-20,700
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 Approved Fgor Release 2004/08/03 : CIA-RDP~8T02Q95R000500190001-4
CASE 4:
REQUIREMENT FOR HIGH LEVEL OF COMBAT IN
MRS 1 AND 2, MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS
ELSEWHERE
Daily Cumulative
MR 1 Class I
(low combat)
(buildup)
Classes II, IV, V
(low combat)
20 (180)
:25x1.5 (180)-
25x2 (180)
5 (180)
3,600
6,750-9,000
900
(buildup)
14x1.5 (180)-
MR 2 Classes II, IV, V
(low combat)
(buildup)
14x2 (180)
2 (180)
4x1.5 (180)-
4x2 (180)
3,780-5,040
360
1,080-1,440
MR 3 Classes II, IV, V
(low combat)
2
(360) 720
MR 4 Classes II, IV, V
2
(360) 720
Cambodia Classes II,
III, IV, V
12
(360) 4,320
Total
22,230-26,100
Total with 25% BDA
27,788-32,625
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 Approved RPiPanp 70na10RIns ? (IA-Rnp178T02Q 5R000500190001-4
CASE 5:
REQUIREMENT FOR HIGH LEVEL OF COMBAT
IN CAMBODIA, MINIMUM REQUIREMENT ELSEWHERE
Daily
Cumulative
MR 1
Class I
(low combat)
20
(360)
7,200
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
5
(360)
1,800
MR 2
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
2
(360)
720
MR 3
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
2
(360)
720
MR 4
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
2
(360)
720
Cambodia
Classes II, III
IV, V (low
combat)
12
(180)
2,160
(buildup)
16x1.5 (180)-
16x2.0 (180) 4,320-
5,760
Total
17,640-
19,080
Total with 25% BDA
22,050-
23,850
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 Approved F'r
Q$5 R000500190001-4
Case 6: Requirement for High Level of Combat in
MR and in Cambodia, Minimum Requirement Elsew ere
Daily
Class I
(low
combat)
20
(180)
3,600
(buildup)
25x1.5
(180)-
25x2.0
(180)
6,750- 9,000
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
5
(180)
(buildup)
14x1.5.
(180)-
14x2.0
(180)
3,780- 5,040
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
2
(360)
720
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
2
(360)
720
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
2
(360)
Cambodia
Classes II,
III, IV, V
(low
combat)
12
(180)
2,160
(buildup)
16x1.5
(180)-
16x2.0
(180)
4,320- 5,760
23,670-28,620
29,588-35,775
Approved For 2095R000500190001-4
 Case 7: Requirement for Forces in South Vietnam and
Cambodia to Prepare for General Offensives
Short Tons
Daily
Cumulative
Class I
(low
combat)
20
(180)
3,600
(buildup)
25x1.5
(180)-
25x2.0
(180)
6,750-
9,000
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
5
(180)
900
(buildup)
14x1.5
(180)-
14x2.0
(180)
3,780-
5,040
MR 2 Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
2
(180)
360
(buildup)
4x1.5
(180)-
4x2.0
(180)
1,080-
1,440
MR 3 Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
52
(180)
360
(buildup)
7x1.5
(180)-
7x2.0
(180)
1,890-
2,520
MR 4 Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
2
(180)
360
(buildup)
3x1.5
(180)-
3x2.0
(180)
810-
1,080
Cambodia
Classes II,
III, IV, V
(low
combat)
12
(180)
2,160
(buildup)
16xl.5
(180)-
16x2.0
(180)
4,320-
5,760
Total Approved For Release 2004/08/03: CIA-RDP78TO2095Rb6O5AJ-N 96AA5 0
Total with 25% BDA F- 1 32,962-40,725
25X1
 Approved 4g Release 2004/08/03 - -
TIME REQUIRED TO BUILD STOCKPILES
The estimated time which will be required
for the Communists to augment their stockpiles
to levels sufficient for carrying out the various
strategy options are shown in the table. The
number of days required to build stockpiles is
equal to the required stockpile buildup divided
by the daily supply availability: the former
estimates are made in the April WSAG study;
the daily supply availability represents the
difference between the midpoint of the supply
input range (2.70--345 .308. STPD) minus the daily
requirement for maintaining protracted warfare
(263 STPD), that is 308-263 =.45 tons daily.
Approved F r Release - 095R000500190001-4
 25X1
Approved For Releh-se
Case 1
Low Combat
Case 2
High Combat, MR 1
(midpoint)
Case 3
High Combat, MR 2
(midpoint)
Case 4
High Combat, MRS 1
& 2
(midpoint)
Case 5
High Combat,
Cambodia
(midpoint)
Case 6
High Combat, MR 1
& Cambodia
(midpoint)
Case 7
High Combat, GVN &
Cambodia
(midpoint)
Required Stockpile Available Supplies
Buildup -- Midpoint (Daily)
No stockpile buildup
required.
9,730
7-82
45
1,125
10,855
3,600
13,330
17,490
7-82
45
Days Required to
Build Stockpiles
119-1,390
216 (7 mo.)
14-161
25 (1 mo.)
132-1,551
241 (8 mo.)
.44-51.4
80 (3 mo.)
163-1,904
296 (10 mo.)
213-2,499
389 (13 mo.)
25X1
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 Approved Fwr Release 2004/08/03 : CIA-RDP78T02jl95R000500190001-4
Approved For Release 2004/08/03 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500190001-4
 ApprovedFor Release 2004108103 ? CIA_RDP78iT02Q 5R000500190001-4
Notes to Paper for Dr. Kissinger,
Recent Trends in Enemy Supply and Personnel
Infiltration in Indochina
Table 1 is the manpower requirements table from the
26 April 1971 report. Note that the Case I line is our
end 1970 OB. The other cases were established from the
following augmentation requirements:
Strategy Augmentation
Total
Infiltration
Case I (1970 level
Protracted Warfare)
100,000
Case II (MR 1)
20,000
120,000
Case III (MR 2)
10,000
115,000
Case IV (MR 1 & 2)
30,000
135,000
Case V (Cambodia) 20,000
150,000
Case VI (MR 1/Cambodia)
40,000
180,000
Case VII (GVN/Cambodia)
60,000
250,
000-300,000
Since Dec. 1970 our OB by MR has changed as follows:
Dec.
70
35
23
17
15
25
115
Oct.
71
34
21
12
14
25
106
Note that 106 is at the low end of the 105-120 range
shown in the new paper. We are at the low end of our range
because we are at the end of the wet season hiatus in
infiltration arrival. Although it could be argued that our
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 Approved Fbl'Reflease 2004/08/03 : CIA-RDP78T02Qg5R000500190001-4
augmentation requirements would have to go up to compensate
for these reductions they are small in comparison to the
kinds of requirements estimated except for MR 3.
The reasons for the MR estimate changes are:
MR 1 includes the threat area -- 12,000 up from
10,000. Internal forces eroded from 25,000 to 22,000.
MR 2 and MR 4 reflect erosion.
MR 3 has seen erosion of units and even disbanding
of units as well as the shift of one more regiment to
Cambodia (the 1st NVA). Thus, for a high level of
offensive activity, force levels there would have to
be augmented by 15,000 instead of the 10,000 calculated
in the April studies (12,000 to 27,000 instead of
17,000 to 27,000). However, MR 3 figures only in
Case 7 which postulates infiltration of 250,000-
300,000, a total more than adequate to absorb the larger
buildup requirement in MR 3.
Cambodia. Despite the 5,000 increase in our
ranged OB estimate made earlier we have used the same
25,000 (high end of earlier estimate, low end of new
one) here because of the heavy casualties of the past
two months.
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 Approved F.rlRelease 2004/08/03 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500190001-4
TABLE 1
MR 1
MR 2
MR 3
MR 4
Cambodia Total
Case I (Dec 1970
Protracted Warfare) 35
23
17
15
25 115
Case. II (MR 1) 55
23
17
15
25 135
Case III (MR 2) 35
33
17
15
25 125
Case IV (MR 1 & MR 2) 55
33
17
15
25 145
Case; V (Cambodia) 35
23
17
15
45 135
Case VI (MR 1/
Cambodia)
55
23
17
15
45 155
Case VII (GVN/
Cambodia)
55
33
27
20
40 175
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 Approved F'Or Release 2004/08/03 : CIA-RCIP78T02 95R000500190001-4
Table 2 elaborates our view that the modest growth
but. substantial shift in missions of ARVN forces has taken
up much of the slack caused by the departure of U.S. forces.
We believe that this analysis is a superior substitute for
thE! crude quick look provided previously (Varient 1 and
Varient 2). It also takes account of the decline in enemy
forces.
Analytically this approach looks only at the main
force war. It assumes that GVN local security forces
including not only PSDF, NP, PF, and RF, but those few
remaining regular battalions on pacification duty can
handle all VC elements below battalion size. Our main
force ratio compares all VC/NVA battalions with friendly
battalions on combat status. (Two small opposing biases
would still be present: all VC/NVA battalions would not always
be on a combat status and on the friendly side the loss of
Third Nation Forces would tend to lower the ratios some).
Also of course, the analysis assumes a 1 to 1 substitutability
for US and ARVN infantrymen. Even though the three VC/NVA
Divisions included in Cambodia have picked up an additional
task of parrying FANK and protecting previously secure
areas they are properly included. With this we see that
the ratio is somewhat better than first quarter 1968 but
lower than during 1970 when Allied momentum was high.
Approved F r Release - 8T02095R000500190001-4
 25X1
Approved F
aa~~ Table 2 //
Ratio of US/ARVN-to VC/NVAbManeuver Forces In
South Vietnam, 1968-1972
1st Qtr
1st Qtr
3rd Qtr
JanuaryC/
Bns
1968
Strength
Bns
1970
Strength
1971
Bns Stre
ngth
Bns
1972
Strength
SVN
172
123,100
204
135,800
159 96,
700
151
90,200
261
74,600
285
57,300
223 38,
000
223
38,000
1.7
2.4
2
.5
2.4
(159 96,
700)
(151
90,200)
(238 45,
000)
(238
45,000)
(2
.1)
(2.0)
MR 1
.53
41,700
64
48,100
44 30,
800
40
27,600
85
30,600
82
19,000
63 17,
300
63
17,300
1.4
2.5
1
.8
1.6
MR 2
.30
22,200
25
15,500
14 8,
000
14
8,000
153
17,000
57
13,700
51 8,
800
51
8,800
1.3
1.1
.
9
.9
MR 3
58
41,000
73
48,500
58 33,
600
54
30,300
69
18,000
84
12,600
38 4,
800
38
4,800
2.3
3.9
7
.0
6.3
58 33,
600)
( 54
30,300)
73 11,
800)
( 73
11,800)
(2
.9)
(2.6)
MR 4
31
18,300
42
23,700
43 24,
300
43
24
300
44
9,000
59
12,000
51 7,
000
51
,
7,000
2.0
2.0
3
.5
3.5
a. Includes only those US and ARVN maneuver battalions assigned to
combat operations.
b. Figures in parenthesis include VC/NVA maneuver forces in Cambodia
which represent a threat to MR 3.
c. Assumes no US maneuver battalions will be assigned to combat
operations.
25X1 Approved WGF Release 8T02095R000500190001-4
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Table 3 shows the dramatic changes that have occurred
within US and ARVN maneuver battalion totals since 1968.
The number of ARVN maneuver battalions assigned to combat
operations has been increased from 78 to 151, while the
number of US maneuver battalions has been reduced from 94
to 8. Simultaneously, the number of ARVN battalions in
a pacification and security status has been reduced from
87 to 38.
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 Approved fee r Release 2004/08/03 : CIA-RDP78T 5R000500190001-4
Table 3a/
ARVN
US
CBT
SCY/PAC/
TNG/RES
Total
CBT.
SCY/PAC/
TNG/RES
Total
1st Qtr 1968
78
87
165
94
19
113
1st Qtr 1970
138
42
180
66
12
78
3rd Qtr 1971
151
38
189
8
19
27
Jan. 1972
151
38
189
--
16
16
+% 1968-1972
+ 94%
-56%
+ 15%
--
-16%
- 90%
a. CBT = Combat Operations
SCY = Security Operations
PAC = Pacification Operations
TNG = Training Operations
RES = Reserve Operations
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