PROPOSED ARVN OPERATION MAY 1970

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000500210001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1970
• Content Type: AG

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Proposed ARVN Operation
May 19 7 0
14. May 70 Helms to Laird memo re Comments on the Proposed ARVN
Operation
May 1970 Map showing NVA troop locations in Cambodia
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
14 May 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Melvin R. Laird
The Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT : Comments on the Proposed ARVN Operation
This memorandum constitutes the response to
your request for comments on intelligence data or
matters relevant to the proposed operation in which
approximately 8, 000 ARVN troops will be committed
to the southeastern portion of Cambodia up to a line
extending roughly from the Neak Luong ferry crossing
to the sea coast at the port of Kampot.
I. Situation in Southeastern Cambodia
A. Enemy Actions
1. During April-May 1970, Communist forces attacked
a number of key towns and transportation junctions in southern
and southeastern Cambodia, including Takeo, Angtassom, Kampot,
and the Mekong River ferry crossing south of Phnom Penh at Neak
Luong. These places are of considerable importance as they are
astride transportation routes south of Phnom Penh. Although the
ferry crossing is back under government control, after being held
temporarily by the Communists, the towns are still under heavy
enemy pressure, particularly Takeo. The extent of Communist
activities in the southern regions of Cambodia is illustrated by
current reports which indicate some Communist forces have begun
operating as far west as Route 4 in Kampot and Kompong Speu Provinces.
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B. Enemy Strengths
3. At this time it is not possible to estimate the number of
enemy troops currently operating in southeastern Cambodia. The
total strength of units and staffs astride the southern Cambodia-
South Vietnam border -- from the coast as far north as Base Area
709 just south of the Parrot's Beak'-- is probably between 6, 500
and 7, 000 men. Units comprising this aggregate are: the 88th
North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Infantry Regiment, possible
elements of the 95th NVA Infantry Regiment, Headquarters (Communist)
Military Region 2 (MR 2), 195th Transportation Battalion, 1st NVA
Division, 101 D NVA Infantry Regiment, 18B NVA Infantry Regiment,
and rear service security and other support elements. Of these
forces, however, probably only about 4, 000 Communist troops are
presently posing an immediate threat to. the area of the proposed
operation in Cambodia. The disposition and estimated strengths
of all enemy units believed astride the border are as follows:
-- 88th NVA Infantry Regiment - The headquarters of
this unit has been located in Base Area 709, just south of the
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Parrot's Beak. We know that some of its
subordinate elements had been assigne a mission of
increasing pressure on ARVN units and pacification in Kien
of any of the regiment's four infantry battalions.
Tuong Province. We do not now know the current location
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-- Headquarters (Communist) Military Region 2 (MR 2)
has been located.just northeast of Base Area 704, west of
The headquarters and staff of MR 2 is estimated at about--
1, 100 men, of which some elements are located well within
South Vietnam.
-- The 195th Transportation Battalion also operates out
of Base Area 704 and possibly also in Base Area 400 in South
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I levidence indicates that the unit opera es
out of Cambodia, supplying combat forces in western VC MR 2
and MR 3. The strength of the battalion is currently estimated
at 500 men.
-_ 1st NVA Division and support elements -- The head-
quarters has been operating in Base Area 400 in South Vietnam
and may be coordinating the activities of its subordinate regi-
ments - 101 D and 18B - with Headquarters, MR 2,. The
headquarters and support elements of the division are estimated
at about 1, 450 men although some of these may not be in Base
Area 400.
-- 101 D NVA Infantry Regiment - The unit's headquarters
has been located in Base Area 400 since its deployment with
its four battalions to IV Corps from III Corps in late 1969.
The unit, currently located slightly west of the base area across
the Cambodian border, is carried at a strength of about 1, 000
men. At least one of the battalions was located near the border
on 1 May 1970.
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-- 18B NVA Infantry Regiment - The unit arrived in Base
Area 400 in August 1969 with four battalions. In April of this
year, the unit shifted slightly southward of Base Area 400.
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I The battalions are
currently unlocated. Although the unit 'is estimated at a strength
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of 1, 200 men, probably not all of them can be considered
as part of immediate threat to Cambodia.
4. In addition to these forces mentioned above, it is also
probable that Base Area 709, 704, and 400 contain rear service
security and possible other su ort elements which we have as
yet not been able to identify I
Moreover, we carry two independent NVA sapper
battalions in VC An Giang Province which are currently un-
located but which may possibly be in Cambodia or along the
border. These units probably have a combined strength of
300 to 500 men.
C. Logistical Importance to the Communists
5. We have little recent information on VC/NVA logistic
activities in Kampot, Takeo and southeastern Kandal Provinces
in Cambodia. The only base area in these provinces known to
be active is Base Area 704 located at the borders of Kandal,
Takeo and South Vietnam. The 195th Transportation Battalion
operates in the southern part of this base area but the size and/
or location of its supply storage facilities are not known. Base
Area 704 supplies at least four enemy regiments that operate
out of Base Area 400 located in Chau Doc Province. *
6. The only other area of known logistic significance, former
Base Area 705 (located midway between Base Area 704 and the
coast), apparently ceased to be active in early 1968. Prior to this
time this base area was thought to be a storage area for supplies
being moved into Base Area 400 (Seven Mountains area) inside
* Base Area 400 is located entirely within South Vietnam in an
area southeast of the planned area of operations. The Commu-
nists- probably consider Base Area 400 as secure as any area
in Cambodia and have used this base area as they used base
areas in the Parrot's Beak and Fishhook areas to supply and give
sanctuary to their forces in the southern delta.
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D. Location of Cambodian Forces
7. When hostilities broke out between Cambodian and
Communist forces two Cambodian battalions were located
fairly close to the South Vietnamese border, one in Kandal
Province and the other in Takeo Province. By late April
one battalion had withdrawn to Angtassom and the other to
Kampot. Numerous border posts, manned primarily by
paramilitary troops prior to the hostilities, are believed
to have been abandoned or overrun.
8. About 10, 000 Cambodian troops are presently located
in the area of Cambodia's Military Region (MR) II that extends
from the border to Route 4 and from the Mekong River to the
south. The nearest Cambodian troops to the proposed area of
operations are at Kompong Trach, which is located about 8
miles from the border, and Takeo, about Z5 miles from the
border. Throughout MR II the bulk of the Cambodian Army
(FANK) units are deployed in static defensive positions in or
near the major towns as indicated in the following table:
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The Impact of Allied Actions on the Position of the Lon
Nol Government
9. After two weeks of large-scale allied operations in
eastern Cambodia, on its rivers, and along its coasts, the
proposed action -- of itself -- would not represent a major
new political element in the Indochinese equation. Communist
expectations of ever-broadening allied cross-broder activity
would be confirmed and Hanoi would feel further harassed.
At least at the outset of the proposed operation, Phnom Penh's
hopes for assistance in coping with VC/NVA attacks in this
southerly sector would be fulfilled, Lon Nol would be elated,
and the morale of the Cambodian Army and populace strengthened.
10. The actual military impact of the allied action would
be contingent upon several factors, including the degree of
surprise achieved. We are not sanguine on this score. In
all likelihood, the Communists will have sufficient warning
of the attack to avoid entrapment of their major units. On
the other hand, unless they are willing to stand and fight
against superior allied arms -- rarely the case in recent
Cambodian operations -- the Communists will probably be
compelled to abandon current efforts to take and hold major
towns and outposts in the area of operations. Thus, the
regime in Phnom Penh would be able to reassert control of
such.towns as Takeo, Angtassom, and Kampot, and the
routes between them and the capital.
11. As allied operations progressed, however, there would
be increasing concern among the Cambodians lest Communist
forces, following established tactics, evade the allied thrust
and retreat northward toward Phnom Penh and its environs
(including the government military depots at Kampong Speu).
Such a northward move, even if Communist forces are in re-
treat, would generate alarm in Phnom Penh and probably produce
loud appeals for direct allied assistance for the defense of the
capital region.
12. Expecting such panicky reactions and aware, moreover,
of the resultant discomfort that would be caused in Washington,
the Communists will probably try to exploit any opportunities
to increase military pressures against Cambodian towns and
military units in districts close to the capital. These would
probably be in the nature of sporadic attacks, however, rather
than part of a concerted military drive on Phnom Penh itself.
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Though such actions would unnerve the Lon Nol regime, the
impact would not necessarily be lasting.
13. We consider unlikely a major Communist drive into
the capital region as a reaction to the projected allied assault.
Communist forces ranged within striking distance of the capital on three sides -- do not appear sufficiently strong to be assured
of success in such an effort, even against purely Cambodian forces.
Moreover, there is the likelihood, in the Communist view, that
ARVN ground troops and U. S. air units would assist Lon Nol in
countering any such move. Finally, there is clearly no necessity
for the Communists, in evading the planned allied thrust, to
withdraw toward Phnom Penh. They are not in a cul-de-sac;
there are broad and familiar marshy zones to the south and
east and well-established mountain and forest refuges to the west.
14. As for political considerations, the weight of argument
similarly falls on the side of Communist restraint vis-a-vis
Phnom Penh as a reaction to the proposed allied action. Not that
we expect the Communists to tolerate indefinitely a hostile
Cambodian regime. Indeed, it is apparent that Hanoi and Peking,
if not the Russians have written off any possibility of a "deal"
with Lon Nol and are embarked on a long-range campaign to crush
him. Of course, it may be that Hanoi presently sees great value
in adapting a more urgent timetable for unseating him and bringing
Sihanouk back into the country at the head of some trumped-up
"Indochinese liberation" force. Though not ensuring the restoration
of their border "sanctuaries," the fall of Lon Nol (and return of
Sihanouk) would provide Hanoi with a needed psychological lift,
restore a degree of rear-area security to its Cambodian-based
forces, and greatly embarrass the U,. S. Government inter-
nationally and at home.
15. For Hanoi, however, the critical element in the allies'
Cambodian operations is the degree to which they may permanently
and seriously impair VC/NVA freedom of action in eastern Cambodia.
Should Hanoi become nervous about the longer term impact of allied
operations, a bolder and more energetic effort to get rid of Lon Nol,
perhaps by taking Phnom Penh -- to install a friendly regime and
to reassert Communist mastery of eastern Cambodia -- would
become increasingly urgent.
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16. In a larger context, there are a number of signs that
recent events in Cambodia have, stimulated Hanoi toward a
major policy review which may be resolved long before the
net impact of current allied operations in Cambodia can be
measured. There are, for example, some indications that
the Communists are considering a shift in priorities -- from
South Vietnam to Laos or Cambodia. An appraisal of the new
difficulties in waging "protracted warfare" in southern South
Vietnam might have made more attractive a strategy focussed
on administering massive political-psychological shocks to the
U. S. in Laos and Cambodia, where incremental increase, in
Communist military efforts might appear to offer promise of
decisive results -- the fall of both the Souvanna and Lon Nol
regimes. Such actions might be followed by tempting peace
overtures involving all of Indochina.
17. In short, one more allied operation into Cambodia,
of itself, is not likely to alter the overall Communist view of
the Indochina situation. Hence, it is unlikely, of itself, to
stir Hanoi to an immediate military adventure against Phnom
Penh, though some sporadic military attacks in the vicinity,
for limited purposes, cannot be ruled out. But the proposed
action, taken in the context of allied moves of the past two weeks,
particularly to the extent that these are successful in limiting
Communist capabilities against South Vietnam, will indeed bear
heavily on Hanoi's decisions and actions vis-a-vis the Lon Nol
regime.
III. Effects in IV Corps of the Diversion of ARVN Troops to the Proposed
Cambodian Operation
18. Communist military units in`South Vietnam's IV Corps
would undoubtedly like to mount some sort of offensive operation
to take advantage of absence of South Vietnamese troops committed
to the Cambodian front, but major actions against prime target
areas seems unlikely in the near future.
19. The bulk of the North Vietnamese Main Force units
that moved into IV Corps last year and early this year are
holed up in remote base areas in the mountains of southern
Chau Doc Province and the inhospitable swamps of the U Minh
Forest in western An Xuyen Province. Most Viet Gong first-
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line fighting units, heavily laced with North Vietnamese fillers,
are also well away from key targets. While there has been
some planning for future upsurges of hostilities as part of the
May phase of the current "spring" campaign, there has been
no hard evidence that major Corps-wide actions are imminent
or that areas from which ARVN combat forces have been
drawn are under immediate threat.
20. At present, 3, 500 South Vietnamese troops from IV
Corps are involved in cross-border operations just north of
the IV Corps-Cambodian line while some 3, 200 others were
pulled back into South Vietnam on 13 May. There has been
no significant enemy action in the delta provinces since these
operations began and it appears that if any increase in offensive
activity is staged, it will be limited in scope and intensity.
21. On the other hand, if South Vietnamese forces which
have been holding particular enemy units at bay, or have been
providing necessary back up for the territorial forces in certain
sectors are drawn upon for future out-of-country operations,
the Communists may try to test the defenses of the remaining
units with increased actions. Other serious situations could
develop in -some border regions. if ARVN units which have been
acting as blocking forces move out. Also, if the more mobile
ARVN units which normally respond to crisis situations in the
delta provinces are.committed elsewhere, localized problems
could develop. Precise judgments on the impact of the proposed
operation are, of course, heavily dependent on the particular
ARVN units involved and the areas from which they are drawn.
a_
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Richard Helms
Director
Attachment - Map
DCI/SAVA/GACarver, Jr:taw:14May70
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