LAM SON 719

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000500320001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: AG

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NSC C--
aM
C
p,R 1973
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SUBJECT: Probable Reactions of Various Concerned
Parties to a Possible Allied Action in
South Laos
1. As requested, this memorandum postulates an
Allied raid against Communist logistic targets and
activities in the Tchepone area of south Laos. it
assumes a raid carried out by an ARVN ground force
of at least two divisions with extensive US air
support (both troop lift and tactical air combat
support from both rotary and fixed wing aircraft)
but without any US ground force participation.
II. PROBABLE EFFECTS OF GROUND INTERDICTION OF
THE TCHEPONE AREA
2. The Tchepon:e- Area As a Target. Subject to
the quali i at ns~iscusse below the Tchepone area
presents logistic targets which are potentially
highly lucrative. In and around the Tchepone area
the NVA operate significant logistics facilities,
and several of the major LOCs feeding supplies for
Cambodia and South Vietnam--Routes 911, 914 and
9=-run through the area.
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3. Although the Tchepone area has reasonably
high prospects as a target for ground interdiction,
it also has some potential disadvantages. It is
one of the two areas in the Panhandle (the other
being the Bolovens) with the heaviest concentration
of security forces and, further, is close to the
North Vietnamese border. In common with the rest
of the northern Panhandle, the Tchepone area has
a highly redundant road network. Thus the oppor-
tunities for leakage of supplies in even an inter-
dicted environment are considerably greater than
they would be farther south in the Panhandle.
Finally, the opportunities for uncovering supplies
are somewhat limited by the fact that stockpiles
and caches, particularly in the areas around Tche-
pone and the northern Panhandle, are widely dis-
persed.
4. Logistics. The probable effects of a
large-scale ground attack in the Tchepone area on
NVA logistic capabilities can be assessed in three
ways:
--first, the immediate impact in terms of
casualties sustained and the loss of supplies
captured or destroyed during the attack.
--second, the longer-term impact resulting
from the physical disruption of the logistic
system and the consequent need to rebuild it.
--third, the disruption of the Communists'
carefully laid plans for the resupply of their
forces in Cambodia and South Vietnam.
5. The.magnitude of these effects, particularly
the first, would be highly dependent on the timing
of the ground attacks. The results would also be
greatly influenced by whether the ground attack is
a one-time shot of relatively brief duration or in-
volves sustained physical occupation of the area
around Tchepone with intensive search and destroy
operations.
6. Timin Considerations. The movement of
supplies through ,the Laotian Panhandle, particularly
in terms of peak levels of activity, tends to follow
a surge pattern. The first surge occurs during the
early months of the dry season at the entry routes
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25.
VIETNAM
r`. 'Ron
Current Area of High
Es'irpated Peak in L Fstics"rf w
NORTHH
Tchepone Area between
Mid-and End-of"February
CAMBODIA
50 Miles
75 Kilometers
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f rnm Nnr h Vietnam
the cry season draws to a close the focus of ac-
tivity is in the Southern Panhandle and along the
exit routes in the Tri-border area.
7. After some initial delays, the logistics
offensive of the current dr season finally got
underway Thus the current levels
of high logistic activity are still in the Northern
Panhandle (the area generally north of Route 922).
Based on our observation of the timing and relative
volume of supplies moved during the 1969-70 dry
season supply push, we would expect the movement of
supplies in the Northern Panhandle to be at or ap-
proaching peak levels in another'4-6 weeks. We
cannot predict these peak levels with any high de-
gree of accuracy. However, assuming that the cur-
rent logistics offensive moves at about the same
pace as last year, the optimum time for ground at-
tacks in the Tchepone area would seem to be between
mid- and end-February. The prospects should be
good at that time that the transshipment facilities
in the area should be well stocked.
8. Duration Considerations. ARVN operations
in the Tc epone area of only limited duration, (i.e.,
measured in days) would not significantly reduce
the enemy's capabilities to maintain a military
presence in South Vietnam and Cambodia. Either in
terms of material or human resources Hanoi would be
able to replace its losses in relatively short or-
der. The enemy has demonstrated time and time again
an impressive ability to repair the disruptions of
short-term interdictions and to mount impressive
surge operations to increase the flow of supplies
in the aftermath of such operations.
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9. A ground interdiction program involving a
sustained presence of ARVN troops--i.e. something
on the order of 4-8 weeks--would be.much more lucra-
tive and inflict significantly greater disruption
on the enemy. Furthermore, maintaining an active
ARVN presence in this area for such a period of
time would greatly complicate Hanoi's continuing
effort to rebuild the logistic system and restore
supply flows before the end of the current dry
season (normally in April).
10. Hanoi anticipated stronger allied ground
attacks against its infiltration routes in southern
Laos--including use of South Vietnamese regulars--
even before the coup d'etat in Cambodia last spring.
Its, concern rose sharply after the turnabout in
Phnom Penh, and during the second half of 1970
thousands of North Vietnamese troops were sent to
guard the routes in Laos. In addition, several reg-
iments in North Vietnam have shifted farther south
where they could be used to reinforce Communist de-
fenses in the Lao Panhandle. Thus, while the North
Vietnamese would be alarmed and would react strongly
to the proposed move, we do not think they would
be unduly surprised. Their troop deployments to
date have put them in a good posture to contest
such an operation vigorously and promptly.
11. For a few days or even longer the Commu-
nists might try to evade allied forces and just ac-
cept a temporary. disruption in their supply effort.
Fading away was their tactic when US and South
Vietnamese forces moved into Cambodia last spring,
and since then Communist forces have rarely tried
to slug it out with well-equipped South Vietnamese
units backed by strong tactical air support.
12. But a. sustained allied drive into the
Tchepone area would be an entirely different matter.
The target would not be an extremity of the Commu-
nist force structure that could be reconstituted
over time, but an artery that needs to function
now in order to sustain enemy military forces
farther south. Therefore, we think that any pro-
longed South Vietnamese operation in the Tchepone
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area, particularly at the height of Hanoi's annual
drive to move supplies, would prompt strong mili-
tary countermeasures by the Communists. They prob-
ably would commit a substantial portion of the units
they have nearby in Laos, South Vietnam, and North
Vietnam. Moreover, additional replacements and sup-
plies could be moved in rather quickly from North
Vietnam. In short, the so-called economy-of-force
strictures the Vietnamese Communists have been op-
erating under in most of Indochina for some time
would not be applicable in this situation. Hanoi
would be likely to do whatever it could to make the
position of the South Vietnamese in Laos untenable,
and it would be prepared to accept the heavy manpower
losses this might entail.
13. Although we think Communist military reac-
tions would center on South Vietnamese units in
southern Laos, Hanoi might over time decide to strike
out elsewhere. One possibility would be attacks across
the DMZ into MR 1. Another would be investiture of
the Mekong River towns in Laos. Or Hanoi could decide
to move in North Laos, where the Communists could
mount larger offensive operations. Hanoi's play of
its hand in Laos, however, would be heavily influ-
enc?.d by Souvanna's initial public reaction and Hanoi's
estimate of its chances of influencing his behavior.
We think Hanoi would be willing to scale down its ac-
tivities targetted against the Lao government and pos-
sibly even to pull back some forces if it was sure
Souvanna would come out publicly against the allied
operation.
14. Hanoi could also be expected, of course,
to pull out all the stops in denouncing the US for
expanding the war and in trying to stimulate opposi-
tion both in the US and elsewhere. Because the
stakes would be so high, there is at least some
chance that the North Vietnamese would suspend the
Paris talks in the hope that such a dramatic move
might build public pressure on the US to call off
the operation.
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15.. In sum, if Hanoi read the Tchepone raid
as signalling either a sustained allied ground pres-
ence. in Laos or a series of large-scale assaults
throughout the Panhandle, Hanoi would undoubtedly
be greatly concerned. The psychological impact of
having the Laos system physically disrupted after
months of hard work and the large-scale commitment
of military manpower would be unsettling. This de-
velopment would also be seen as a further narrow-
ing of Hanoi's limited options for maintaining a
viable logistics system. It would, moreover, signif-
icantly impair Hanoi's capabilities, for providing
the logistic support essential to raising the scale
of military activity above the current extremely low
levels. A sustained and successful ground interdic-
tion program in southern Laos would deprive Hanoi
of any realistic capability for big unit warfare'
(except possibly in northern I Corps) at least un-
til the closing months of the 1971-72 dry season.
For all these reasons Hanoi can be expected to
contest the.Tchepone raid with whatever resources
it can muster.
16. An ARVN foray into the Laos Panhandle on
the scale contemplated in this paper would be a mat-
ter of deep concern to both the Soviets and the Chi-
nese. They would almost certainly recognize that
such an operation had the potential for disrupting
seriously the flow of supplies 'to Communist main
forces in Cambodia and much of South Vietnam. North
Vietnamese efforts to dislodge the intruding forces
could themselves be costly to Hanoi in terms of man-
power losses. Both Moscow and Peking would recog-
nize that the ARVN effort, if reasonably successful,
could lead to additional major operations in south-
ern Laos and Cambodia that might critically under-
mine the Communist structure and organizations es-
sential to protracting the armed struggle in South
Vietnam at any effective level.
17. Thus both Moscow and Peking would expect
Hanoi to request its Communist friends and allies
to provide fresh military and political assistance
in dealing with this potentially disastrous situa-
tion. They would feel that their responses would
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have an important bearing on Hanoi's future pros-
pects in the struggle and on their respective posi-
tions of influence in Hanoi.
18. For the Russians, the response would be
particularly difficult since there is little that
they could do to help with the military situation.
They could, and almost certainly would, take the
lead in beating the propaganda drums around the
world against this "expansion" of the war and in
raising the specter of great dangers to world peace
in an, effort to force a withdrawal of US support
from the GVN. A verbal campaign of this sort would
cause the already poor climate of Soviet-American
relations to deteriorate further, and. presumably
make negotiations of other issues--Berlin, the
Middle East--more difficult. It is unlikely, how-
ever, that in the Soviet scale of priorities, what
happens in the Laos Panhandle.would justify an en-
largement of risks in more crucial areas, say by
provoking a diversionary crisis.
19. The Soviets may no longer see any net ad-
vantage in a prolongation of the Vietnam war, but
they have been unwilling or unable to do more in
Hanoi than to let nature take its course. It is
possible that Moscow might take the occasion of a
large-scale intrusion in the Laos Panhandle to
nudge Hanoi in the direction of more serious polit-
ical initiatives at Paris or even toward an enlarged
Indochina conference. It is more likely, however,
that Moscow would wait for Hanoi's lead, meanwhile
providing material, moral, political and propaganda
support to Hanoi in its chosen course.
20. Peking would almost certainly make highly
ominous and threatening noises in support of Hanoi.
It would also respond positively to any requests
from Hanoi for increased arms, food, etc. But on
the gut question, we doubt that Peking would solicit
or Hanoi would levy any request for Chinese troop
assistance in the Laos Panhandle. Peking's posture
will be influenced by its continuing concern over
the Soviet threat on its northern borders, and by
the chances of becoming involved in direct hostili-
ties with the US. So long as the territory of
North Vietnam itself remains essentially intact
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251
and the grip of the Hanoi regime on the north is not
challenged, Peking will probably rest on its essen-
tial position that armed liberation movements must
rely basically on their own forces.
21. Peking would probably encourage Hanoi to
persevere in a protracted struggle, cutting down
further on large-unit warfare if necessary, and re-
lying on guerrilla tactics, terror, and political
and psychological action to maintain a presence in
South Vietnam. If Hanoi should decide that the
"objective situation" required that a respite in
the struggle be gained through negotiations, Peking'
would probably accede to Hanoi's desire and claim
a role in any Indochina-wide settlement.
V. PROBABLE LAO REACTIONS
22. The proposed ARVN operation into the
Tchepone area would confront Souvanna Phouma with
the most serious political problem he has faced
since 1962. Whatever its rationale, the operation
would be widely interpreted as a major departure
in the war in Laos and a clear-cut violation of the
1962 Geneva Accords on Laos. Souvanna would find
it difficult to publicly countenance military oper-
ations by large numbers of South Vietnamese troops
on Laotian soil without appearing.to discredit his
foreign policy and the underpinnings of his coali-
tion government. If he were to state publicly that
he supported the operation or that he now considered
the ground war in the Laotian Panhandle in the same
way that he has long considered the air war--namely,
an affair that principally concerns Hanoi and Wash-
ington rather than Vientiane--then he would risk
losing the acquiescence of the Soviets, the North
Vietnamese and even the Chinese Communists. All
three Communist countries still maintain diplo-
matic relations with Souvanna's government and still,
at least tacitly, recognize his position as a leader
of the Vientiane government. His utility to the
Communists, or so Souvanna might reason, would be
seriously--perhaps fatally--impaired if he were to
go this additional step in supporting large allied
operations in the infiltration corridor or failed
to effectively, or at least for 'the public record,
oppose them.
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23. On the other hand, if Souvanna comes out
against the ARVN operation, he jeopardizes his posi-
tion with the US, on whom he is now almost totally
dependent. If he attempts to obstruct the operation--
for example, by threatening to step down as prime
minister--he runs the risk of prompting into action
those rightist leaders who would be only too glad
to send him packing, and who are-already pressing
him for closer military cooperation with South Viet-
nam, Cambodia, and Thailand.
Ambassador Godley to "tell Washington" that if South
Vietnamese troops intervened in southern Laos he
would order Lao troops to fire on them and he him-
self would "clear out." This past fall he again
stated publicly that he has always rejected bring-
ing foreign troops into Laos "as I rejected the ex-
tension of the McNamara line into Laos." Only last
week, he turned aside a proposal by the rightists
that-Laos form an anti-North Vietnamese alliance
with a.crack about it could be done after he had
left the scene.
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26. We cannot guarantee. how Souvanna will
react to an issue so charged with. conflicting po-
litical--and emotional--considerations as the
postulated Tchepone operational
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28. In estimating reactions to the proposed
move into the Tchepone area, the possibility of more
profound shifts in the Communist conduct of the Indo-
chinese war merits examination. The key question here
would be Hanoi's estimate of the success of the Tche-
pone raid and what that operation might portend. If
the ARVN probe were repulsed by Communist forces and
Hanoi thus gained a major victory, the North Vietnam-
ese would be encouraged to continue their current
strategy. But if the Tchepone operation led--or in
Hanoi's estimate seemed likely to lead--to a situa-
tion in which allied ground activity in Laos could
deny the NVA an effective logistic system, Hanoi would
be compelled to re-examine the basic validity of its
over-all strategy in prosecuting the war.
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29. Merely to persevere throughout most of
South Vietnam in a low-level guerrilla effort, on the
pattern of the early sixties, might appear fruitless
to Hanoi in the face of Saigon's expanding internal
security and military capabilities. Negotiation from
a position of public weakness would almost certainly
appear highly unpromising. In desperation, the Com-
munists might lash out militarily in northern Laos
and the DMZ area in a deliberate effort to restore
the escalatory atmosphere of 1965-68 to the Indochi-
nese theater and, in Hanoi's view, incite strong do-
mestic pressures in the US (and internationally) for
prompt negotiations of the conflict on terms not un-
favorable to the Communist cause.
30. These actions would involve substantial
risks of large-scale manpower losses and might have
the effect of tearing apart the 1962 Geneva framework
in Laos. But Hanoi might in the circumstances assume
that these risks were unavoidable. We cannot, of
course,.predict with any degree of certainty that
all this will occur in the wake of the Tchepone ac-
tion. But it will clearly be in the Communist's. inter-
est to intensify concerns world-wide about the course
of the war and a degree of boldness and (inevitably)
sacrifice might appeal to the Communist leadership if
it appeared that the only viable alternative was the
indefinite postponement of the achievement of its
objectives in South Vietnam.
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4 February 1971
]:. The North Vietnamese over many years have developed
a complex logistical system in the Laotian Panhandle
-- the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail -- to support
their forces in South Vietnam. Always important to
the enemy's war effort in northern South Vietnam, the
Trail is now the vital life line for the Communist
forces in all of South Vietnam and Cambodia.
1:1. Hanoi's success in making this system work during
this dry season will determine whether or not we see
a marked upswing in enemy offensive actions during
1971.
A. There are at least 1,500 miles of main and bypass
roads within the system plus thousands of trails
and two waterways.
B. In addition, in the northern areas of the Laos
Panhandle there are two POL pipelines.
C. To move supplies through the system and into South
Vietnam and Cambodia, the Northern Vietnamese use;
trucks, watercraft, pipelines, oxcarts, bicycles.,
and porters. But the main mode of transport is by
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truck. The majority of them are of Russian make,
each carrying about 4 tons of supplies.
D. The North Vietnamese logistical units have been
in the Lao Panhandle a long time.
E. Supplies enter the Panhandle of Laos from North
Vietnam through three major corridors:
1. The well-known Mu Gia Pass
2. Ban Karai pass which opened in April 1966
3_. A western DMZ road complex which began
operating in October 1969.
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F. Supplies move within the Panhandle through a
series of interconnecting roads and bypasses which
give the Communists various options for lessening
the effects of the bombing.
G. Supplies exit the panhandle to South Vietnam and
Cambodia on a number of east-west roads that extend
from the A Shau Valley in northern South Vietnam
to Cambodia in the south. Also, the Sekong river
is used for movement into Cambodia.
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year as many as 500 trucks will be on the
road at one time, almost entirely during the
hours of darkness. The total truck inventory
committed to this effort is about 2,400 trucks.
III. There is a distinct seasonal pattern of operation for
the logistics system in the Laotian Panhandle. The
major throughput of supplies occurs in the dry season
that extends from October through May. The general
pattern of logistical operations is:
A. October - early December. Restoring the system.
Repairing road damage caused by heavy rains and
.accumulated bomb damage.
B. December -.early January.
Restocking the system.
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C. January - spring. The throughput stage
1.. It's purpose is to move supplies through the
system to rebuild stockpiles for its combat
forces fighting in South Vietnam, and this
year, Cambodia as well.
IV. There is no way of accurately measuring the total volume
volume of supplies that are moving through the system
at any one time, or the extent of enemy stockpiles
in any one location. But we have sufficient evidence
to say with assurance that the enemy maintains very
large stockpiles and that the system handles large
volumes of supplies.
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Current Situation
A. The enemy's logistical reaction to events in
Cambodia has been pronounced.
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3. No supplies were moved through the system
during the rainy season but the North Vietnamese
did improve and maintain the system in an
effort to get a quick start once the roads
dryed out in October.
B. Delays, however, have characterized this dry
season's effort.
.l. Heavy rains continued well into October.
2. The heavy bombing of the entry routes further
compounded the enemy's problems.
3. It was not until early December that the
enemy's resupply effort got underway. F
IAt this point in
time the peak level of activity is in the northern
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Panhandle, in the area north of Route 922. It is
still too early to determine how it is going, but
our last assessment in late January was that,
barring further delays, the enemy was headed
toward moving more throughput this year than
ever before.
2. The volume of supplies detected moving into
the panhandle so far has been at a very high
level.
D. We do not know how many supplies Hanoi wants to
move through. The first need will be to refill
their depleted stockpiles in South Vietnam and
Cambodia. The extent to which they are able to
move greater amounts will also determine whether
we will see renewed or widespread offensive
activities in 1971.
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E. If they are not successful in meeting the goals
the resulting logistic
constraints will probably mean that any grandiose
military ambitions on Hanoi's part will have to
wait until next year to be.carried out.
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SUBJECT: The Probable Consequences of the
Termination of Lam Son 719
1. Parameters of the Problem
1. This memorandum is based on the controlling
assumption that a decision has been made to terminate
the Lam Son 719 operation and to extract the ARVN
forces engaged in it from Laos as rapidly as possible
in an orderly fashion. Taking that hypothesis as a
given, the memorandum attempts to assess the impact
of Lam Son 719, and its manner of termination, on
Hanoi's over-all capabilities, especially in the
logistics field, and on the current military balance
in Indochina. It also addresses the over-all impact
of Lam Son 719 on Vietnamese Communist attitudes and
intentions, the South Vietnamese armed forces, the
South Vietnamese populace, and on President Thieu's
political position.. and prospects.
2. The assessments presented below are offered
with considerable diffidence. They are perforce ten-
tative and should be read as such. The information
available at this writing is conflicting, confusing
and considerably less than complete. Furthermore,
the ultimate impact of Lam'Son 719 on the groups and
matters addressed in this memorandum will be signifi-
cantly influenced by at least three sets of critical
variables.
3. The first is.what actually happens in the
next week or two. Much depends, for example, on the
balance struck--or at least the balance that appears
to be struck--between making the extraction of GVN
forces from Laos rapid and keeping it orderly. Much
also depends on that GVN forces, especially those in
Milit-ary Region 1, then do, or do not do; for example,
whether or not they soon launch another cross-border
operation Communist behavior and
actions i d weeks will also in-
fluence final judgments on the matters here considered.
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We expect Communist forces to make a maximum effort
to harass and cut up GVN units being withdrawn from
Laos. From a political and psychological perspective,
it would clearly be in Hanoi's interests to continue
pressing the attack even after Lam Son 719 has ended.
Whether or not the Communists make such an attempt
will tell us a good deal about the immediate impact
on their over-all capabilities of the heavy casual-
ties they have clearly sustained in the recent fight-
ing. In short, the actual behavior of GVN and Commu-
nist forces in the Lam Son/MR 1 area over the next
week or two will do much to shape at least popular
judgments on whether Lam Son was a "victory" for one
side or the other or a stand-off draw.
4. Secondly, the real measure of Lam Son 719's
impact will be made manifest in the pattern and level
of Communist activity, particularly military activity,
in South Vietnam and Cambodia over the next several
months, say between now and the October 1971 presi-
dential elections. In the sense of rendering any
final verdict on Lam Son 719, the jury will have to
remain out until we see what the Communists prove
themselves able, or unable, to do during what Hanoi
clearly regards as a critical year.
5. The third set of variables is rooted in the
truism that people's political judgments and be-
havior are more influenced by what they believe to
be the case than by what others might think could be
proved to actually be the case. Hanoi, well aware
of this, is already building up a propaganda and
psychological warfare campaign which, in its eyes,
could be as important as the conduct of the actual
fighting on the ground. anoi c early intends to
extract maximum advantage from the way Lam Son 719
has been treated in the US press and media. The
outcome of the propaganda struggle will probably
have as much influence on Lam Son's ultimate impact
as what actually happened during the course of the
operation itself. The development over time of a,
widespread conviction among the ARVN and the GVN
populace at large that the Communists have suffered
a major setback significantly crimping their capa-
bilities for future action will produce one set of
political and psychological consequences. Quite a
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different set of consequences will be produced if
the belief or impression that ARVN has suffered a
major defeat gains wide currency and general accept-
ance in South Vietnam and abroad, including within
the United States.
1.11. Logistic and Manpower Considerations
6. Impact to Date: Operation Lam Son 719
brought about considerable disruption of the North
Vietnamese logistic support system and forced a
heavy reorientation of that system. In addition to
coping with the normal dry season task of pushing
large amounts of supplies through the Panhandle, the
North Vietnamese since 8 February have had to meet
the added logistic requirements of an expanded force
structure fighting at very high combat levels.
7. Through 20 March ARVN forces reported the
seizure or destruction of almost 2,800 tons of sup-
plies in operation Lam Son 719.* The foodstuffs
lost would feed all the enemy forces in the Tchepone
area for about two months. The ARVN forces also
destroyed or seized 389 vehicles (281 trucks, 108
tanks) and about 600 tons of POL.
8. Communist weapons losses included more
than 4,500 individual weapons and more than 1,600
crew-served weapons. These losses were enough to
equip more than 12 combat battalions. Ammunition
losses through 20 March amounted to more than 600,000
rounds.
9. In addition to these losses, the Lam Son
719 operation significantly raised the North Viet-
namese logistic burden because of the need to sup-
port a combat force which has increased by more than
15,000 troops since 8 February. On the basis of re-
search still in progress, we estimate that logistic
support of these forces as well as the previous
"This discussion excludes consideration up-
ply losses resulting from bombing. The data re-
quired to quantify these losses are not yet aa.~aiZ-
able in Washington.
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expansion of forces undertaken in anticipation of
allied incursions increased the burden on the sys-
tem by 35-50%. This burden would be substantially
greater if the North Vietnamese felt compelled to
replace the supplies lost as a result of ARVN ground
actions.
10. A final logistic impact of operation Lam
Son 719 is that it forced an unplanned and acceler-
ated drawdown of supply stocks in Laos and forced
the diversion of some supplies which otherwise would
have moved toward South Vietnam and Cambodia.
11. Enemy Efforts to Move Supplies: Despite
the considerable disruptions and losses sustained
as a result of Lam Son 719, the North Vietnamese
did not lose sight of the need to maintain a south-
ward flow of supplies destined ultimately for their
forces in South Vietnam and Cambodia. At the same
time that they were maintaining an intense resistance
to the allied incursions, the NVA also launched "crash"
programs to maintain a high level of supplies around
the Tchepone area and southward throughout the sys-
tem. The preliminary and highly tentative results
of research still in train point to two general con-
clusions-
b. The volume of supplies which has moved
into these southern areas during the period 1
October-18 March would appear to be at least
4,000 tons and could be as much as 8,000 tons.
Given the low level of combat in these southern
areas and the smaller numbers of enemy forces
deployed there, this volume of traffic, if con-
firmed, would appear to be adequate to provide
for a throughput of supplies at least equal to
that needed to sustain the low levels of combat
observed in South Vietnam and Cambodia during
1970. These tonnages are roughly equivalent to
the amounts taken from the Cambodian base areas
during 1970.
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12. Effects of Terminating Lam Son 719: Term-
ination of Operation Lam Son 719 will have the im-
mediate impact of lightening the burden and disrup-
tions placed on the NVA logistic system. It will
also provide the NVA a period of time during which
conditions will probably be favorable for Offsetting
the disruptive effects of the operation.
13. We do not know at this point what volume
of supplies Hanoi intended to move through the sys-
tem during the current dry season. At a minimum,
the Communists probably wanted to move enough sup-
plies to compensate for the loss of Sihanoukville.
They also undoubtedly wanted to move sufficient sup-
plies to provide them with a greater choice of of-
fensive options than they were able to exercise in
1970.
14. Given the disruptions of Lam Son 719, the
accelerated withdrawals of stockpiles, and the di-
version of some of the supplies intended for South
Vietnam and Cambodia, Hanoi's logistic goals have
undoubtedly been set back. The immediate priority
after the cessation of Lam Son 719 will almost cer-
tainly be to compensate for these shortfalls and
to restore the logistic system.
15. The North Vietnamese have at least four
weeks--longer, if the rainy season should be late--
to carry out these programs. If there are no fur-
ther ground incursions into south Laos, the North
Vietnamese will undoubtedly use the remaining pe-
riod of the dry season to carry out an intensive
logistic offensive. The past history of their
logistic capabilities would indicate that they
should be able to make some progress in raising
the level of throughput into South Vietnam and Cam-
bodia. We cannot at this time give a quantitative
assessment of what this future throughput would be.
On balance it would seem, however, that it would
fall short of that needed to carry on sustained
and widespread offensives throughout South Vietnam
between now'and the start of the next dry season:
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16. Manpower Losses: Manpower rather than
supply losses will probably prove to be the most
grievous penalties paid by Hanoi during operation
Lam Son 719.
17. Reported enemy manpower losses through 0600
on 21 March total more than 11,800 killed-in-action;
(including some 3,700 killed-by-air). In addition
to these losses, untold thousands of enemy troops
have undoubtedly died of wounds or have been so
seriously wounded that they are no longer combat
effective. Statistics on enemy KIA are probably
among the most unreliable of the war, but whatever
the level of inflation might be in the above figures,
it seems clear that enemy manpower losses during Lam
Son 719 were extremely high and cannot be viewed
lightly in Hanoi.
18. Put in perspective with losses reported
by ARVN--989 KIA, 169 MIA--(figures which probably
are understated), Hanoi appears to have lost some-
thing on the order of 10 troops for each ARVN loss.
This enemy-to-friendly KIA ratio is one of the high-
est ever observed during the Vietnam war. Even if one
effects some upward adjustment in the ARVN figure
and downward adjustment in the Communist figure, the
resultant ratio is still significantly high.
IV. The Impact on Hanoi
19. The evidence currently available suggests
that Hanoi's confidence in its ability to stay the
course in Indochina has probably been enhanced by
the results of the fighting in southern Laos during
the past six weeks. As indicated above, the North
Vietnamese have paid a heavy price in terms of man-
power, diversion of military effort, and disruption
of supply activities. But when Lam Son 719 began it
quickly became apparent that Hanoi was prepared to
sacrifice heavily in this situation in the hope of
inflicting a significant setback on the South Viet-
namese. Early termination of South Vietnamese oper-
ations in Laos will probably lead Hanoi to believe
that its forces have accomplished this objective. In
these circumstances, the North Vietnamese will cer-
tainly claim a "victory".and Communist forces will
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probably receive the kind of psychological boost they
have not had in South Vietnam for nearly two years.
20. Hanoi recognizes, however, that regardless
of the psychological mileage it may be able to extract
from Lam Son 719, Communist forces are still a long
.way from reversing the tide that has been running
against them, particularly in South Vietnam. The North
Vietnamese will probably try--or at least want--to
shift more units to the northern provinces of South
Vietnam in an.attempt to keep the South Vietnamese un-
der pressure. But because Communist units seem to
have taken such heavy losses in Laos, we are inclined
to think the North Vietnamese will be more inclined
to concentrate on making the best possible use of the
time they have left this dry season to move supplies
southward.
21. If Hanoi wishes to make a bravura gesture
elsewhere to reinforce propaganda claims that Lam Son
719 did more damage to ARVN than to Communist forces,
Hanoi could sharply step up the level of Communist
activity in north Laos. The harassment of Luang
Prabang could conceivably be the opening shot in
a north Laos campaign. If so, the long-anticipated
assault on Vang Pao's positions at Ban Na, Tha Tam
Bleung, and Long Tieng may be timed to coincide with
the extraction of ARVN forces from the Laos panhandle.
22. In any event, we are inclined to think
that the Communists will make some strenuous attempts
during the next six to eight months to flex their mil-
itary muscles in both Cambodia and South Vietnam, if
only to demonstrate that Lam Son 719 did not undercut
their capacity to fight. They might also believe that
several sharp surges of military action in South Viet-
nam and Cambodia would tend to discredit President
Thieu and to diminish his chances for re-election
next autumn .
23. But we do not expect the Communists to
pull out all the stops anywhere during the next few
months; indeed, they are not in a position to alter
the situation on the ground significantly in South
Vietnam, and probably not in Cambodia. Moreover,
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D
the Communists are likely very soon to be planning
for the next major round of military activity in late
1971 and early 1972. Hanoi must be confident that
many more US troops are going to be withdrawn from
South Vietnam between now and then, and it clearly
hopes that the results of Lam Son 719 can be por-
trayed to cast further doubt on the ability of the
South Vietnamese to persist as this happens. In ad-
dition, Hanoi is probably now more confident that it
will be able to cope with whatever allied operations
are mounted against Communist supply activities in
Laos.
V. The Impact on ARVN and the Military Balance
24. We are far too close to a still continuing
operation and the available evidence is too confusedly
conflicting to attempt any net judgment on the ulti-
mate impact of Lam Son 719 on the GVN's armed forces
or the balance of the military equation, even in MR-1.
This operation was the largest and most complex en-
deavor in which the GVN's armed forces have played a
leading role. Even though they were palpably, and
critically, dependent on US air support of all kinds,
the ground fighting was managed and executed almost
entirely by the South Vietnamese. Some senior Viet-
namese military officers have criticized the staff
work, planning, and command arrangements or decisions
of their colleagues and the latters' alleged errors
in handling liaison with essential US air support.
Carping at the professional skill of one's colleagues,
however, is not, unique to the South Vietnamese Army,
and all armies engaging in new types of operations
have to learn certain lessons from experience.
Furthermore, the GVN was on the strategic offensive
in an environment where the terrain and other circum-
stances gave the Communist defenders obvious advantages.
The Communists knew the area well, having controlled
it for over a decade, and had a heavy concentration
of AAA and other ordnance plus well prepared techniques
designed to facilitate defense against just this kind
of attack. GVN casualties were heavy but, as noted
above, the enemy's were far heavier.
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25. The actual net impact of or lessons to be
derived from Lam Son 719 with respect to the GVN's
military capabilities thus involve complex judgments
that will have to be sifted as more data become
available. At another level, however, the psycho-
logical impact of the operation on ARVN morale,
hence performance, will be heavily influenced by at-
titudes or quasi-emotional judgments that jell within
the next few days or weeks. Much will depend on
whether the ARVN officers conducting the extraction
from Laos and the units involved therein view it as
an operation running to plan or an enforced retreat.
More will depend on the pattern of ARVN activity in
the immediate aftermath of Lam Son 719's termination,
GVN troops directly involved and their comrades w o
were not participants come to think of it as a
victory--as they came to regard the battles of 1968,
especially Tet, where fighting was also intense and
GVN casualites even heavier. The leadership role
and behavior of the GVN's military establishment
and government in the days immediately ahead will
have a significant impact on this largely emotional
and attitudinal issue.
VI. The Impact on South Vietnamese Popular Attitudes
26. Despite inevitable sniping from some of
Thieu's critics and political opponents, most polit-
ically concerned South Vietnamese seem to regard
Lam Son as having been costly but, so far, success-
ful, despite a somewhat slow start. Such popular
attitudes could be most adversely affected if the
extraction of GVN forces should look like a precipi-
tate retreat enforced by enemy pressure. Assuming
the extraction is reasonably orderly, however, its
timing (i.e. now as opposed to two or three weeks
hence) is unlikely to make much immediate impact in
this arena. What will make an impact is the course
of future events, especially the nature and level of
Communist military activity within South Vietnam it-
self and the manner in which the ARVN reacts, plus
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the GVN's adroitness or lack thereof in coping with
Hanoi's "great victory" propaganda offensive, which
VC cadre throughout South Vietnam will certainly
attempt to further.
VII. The Impact on Thieu's Position and Prospects
27. Again, the way the extraction of Lam Son
forces from Laos is handled and presented to the
public will be important here. Assuming reasonable
success and good management in that area, the timing
adjustment of Lam Son's termination will be of min-
imal intrinsic importance. If subsequent events--
again, especially the level of Communist activity
within South Vietnam--enable Thieu to claim plausibly
that Lam Son facilitated a favorable evolution of the
situation in South Vietnam, then Thieu can turn the
operation very much to his political advantage. If
the situation in South Vietnam deteriorates over the
next several months, Thieu's opponents will be quick
to allege that his mismanagement of Lam Son was an
operative factor. The jury on that issue will render
its verdict in October.
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