THE NORTH VIETNAMESE LOGISTICAL SYSTEM- -CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000600290001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 5, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP78T02095R0O0600290001-1
Laos Air War
23 Jul 69 Typescript IM, Commando Hunt: The Air War in Laos
Since November 1968
26 Feb 70 OER contribution to SNIE update of Graham report re
The Sihanoukville Route, The Laotian Panhandle Route,
Sea Infiltration, and Conclusions
5 Aug 70 Blind Memo re The North Vietnamese Logistical System --
Capabilities and Vulnerabilities
Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600290001-1
 Approved For Release 2006A4 IA-R DP78TO2095R0006002 0001-1 25X1
Laotian Pan
-IlKiii &4 l
C unist forces in South Vietnar have been ma my
ported by two separate I
i.1 routes. (1) The
Trail from North Vietnam. through Laos
of i, a-an ukvil
The sea route _ the port
en overland tai4 or.,e mist sane--
5 Atjust 1970
e1iirer analysts
eawq~onontw at crcPr-c ant MACV ace on
field over the relative
early 1968 enema fore" in "arY I and TV
&stride the Cambodian- outs =ietnaz a re border.
nth Vietnar have received large ainounts
ivered arms and ammmition transshipped
There has been disagreement, however,
b+
tea routes. a field view ha
ats, since October 1966, have
va"d military supplies through the port of
nmkville ar4 that this route has to sup-
plied forces in southern 11 Corps and in 1111 and
elligen
Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600290001-1
 Approved For Release 20068TftT IA-RDP78TO2095R 00600290001-1
The CIA view, concurred in by DIA, has been that
the overland route through Laos has been the primary
logistics route for the Communist forces, including
those that operate in the southern half of South
Vietnam. CIA has believed that the Sihanoukviile
route did not become an important source of supply
for the Communists until sometime around mid-year
1968. CIA also estimated that probably no more than
one-half of the estimated Communist resupply require-
ments for arms and ammunition in Southern II,
and IV Corps were supplied by sea.
MACV has estimated that during the period October
1966 - September 1969 about 17,800 tons of communist
arms and ammunition were delivered to Sihanoukville.
The comparable CIA estimate included 7,100 tons of
confirmed ordnance (that is, arms and ammunition) and
4,100 tons of other military cargoes both ordnance
and non-ordnance. The differences in these estimates
differing analyses regarding the size and
composition of cargoes, not the sources available
to the analysts.
Other differences between CIA and the field have
involved the share of Communist arms destined for the
Cambodian Armed Forces (FARX) and the tonnage
2X1
Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000600290001-1
 Approved For Release 2006% f ~4
The fi
t farm
has been that tzntil. recently
dil
evidence with c"
the CIA sitior has been
dogte
moved t the C i t fa rc z.
been that the bulk of these
position as
has
relative it
rtanc rotates.
in t U
ar* providing up with.
now in `IA heed uartoris
ntaty
of these
for their aut -.erLtieity
coMteted we should be able
u than officials who were imavolve' in suer-
the
fro rihe oukviI
of ficials
army shi ents to (' o is
authoritative, coordinate apprecia
I4 please
lusio:
Siba,oukvi llie
he -i .aAouk-
Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000600290001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/1 t
played
total 2091
700 *ils o
to - the rizuhoo
fact,
sup,
in
d route that tret a fro Isnoi
d Parrot' a ak. .& a matter of
9, the land routes has
r the.
n:ville hag;
ax~a for
rant that t o~ s()m
nt lost this ve aunt back-door
vir forces in low* r cot.) % .atria ,
a burden must n.-L Q carried the
Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000600290001-1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600290001-1 25X1
Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000600290001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/11/07 :
Step-ET
a acri *ti0E of the awpty
.-cat -pan
3r
a whin, their way .row h the
a hi Iy ran
by structured org
,rgani aatian which su l
Viet t4', Laos o and kC
Directorate o r Rrvi
ational Dfee4 In the Isaotian
it ie a or?iita to the girth Viet
?aaha le, to nar a a ci
about 10% of
Transportation Group has been in bus i s niece 1159.
SS 9th
"Si
about 40 , 000 rsoneei ha dlin
cv liaia?n., an
,400 trucks in rr
551th
use. (This
art Vietaae
upply bases al the rle
a agate uses all available
Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000600290001-1
 Approved For Release 2006MUMT
modes of transport except air to move supplies south-
total boring halt on 31 October 1968,
Vinh has become the major storage and distribution
center in the panhandle of North Vietnaar. Supply
shipments destined for South Vietnam are transported
over a not of roads, waterways, and a meter-gauge
away. These feed into the cross-border corridors
linking up with the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos.
Some supplies move directly south across the D to
support NVA forces in that area.
In July 1968 the North Vietnamese began to build
a petroleum pipeline capable of moving up to 1,006
tons of fuel per day. This line now extends south
from Vinh through the tuu Gin Pass and some 22 miles
into Wis. ore recently, the Communists have built
another pipeline farther to the south, crossing the
border near the western DMZ and terminating near
Tcheppon e--the major logistical transfer point in
southern Laos for supplies destined for South Vietnam.
The addition of the two pipelines to the enemy's
logistic system provides him with the year-round mans
of transporting large amounts of petroleum across the
rugged Laotian border.
Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-R?P78T02095R000600290001-1
 Approved For Release 200IT'
a, the
Qr s- r
r
b5R000600290001-1
:4t, a roll established
lout-, pipeline:
th rouc
rte*r t active corridor
'ass,
corridor crosses t h+s tan
Pass 40 tr soutt>
crass-borer route in the, ciui
:pier
with a fourth
the heavily-us,
earlier, t h* newly co t c1
into T e
psss,s
built to
ual road A is
River crosses t ho north-south, mute at
th 14! miles to the Ce odi
extrene northern and
Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000600290001-1
 Approved For Release 20091
= T62095RM T 00290001-1
reaches of the river have
indications that the for h Vietnas se in
the river more full;
border area
h Vietuaa; (Base area 609) s p
Vi
a network
or read (route 9 into the A Shan Valley).
and 11 Corps
e ete =y in I
0 the I-3 front in
airly high vol
609) and from Base
a on,
Viet-
uanq Due Proviz ce . co ai se an re-
sport in used an only
40-50 .#.s of this corridor, i jr+ le ,
arts, and porters ,ve it the rest
the 3-1 rrant, enery forces are sup lie
s concentrated in 12 a Areas
d Caodia.
qptration of th
Under Air
ould like now to describe how the arys to
has stood
nder U tin , ca)a . ns with
srenoa to the period between
march avd Move r 1969,
Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-R?P78T02095R000600290001-1
 Approved For Release 20Qfkw_ :
1. In North Vietnam--During the four years
of the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign
against North Vietnam from March 1965
to November 1968 the supply system proved
surprisingly durable. North Vietnamese
success in offsetting the effects of the
bombing was achieved in large part through
inventive countez asures . Hanoi put some
600,000 people to work, full and part-time,
repairing bombed roads and railroads and
building new roads and railroads as well
as hundreds of bypass bridges and fords,
pontoon bridges, underwater bridges, and
ferries. Supplies and transport equip-
ment were moved under cover of darkness
and through sanctuaries provided by air
strike restraints. During this period--
assisted by large amounts of supplies
from their Com i unist allies--the North
Vietnamese were able to maintain and
even expand their logistical flows.
The Communist supply system got its most severe
test during the last seven months of the Rolling
Thunder program--the period of the partial bombing
Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-R?P78T02095R000600290001-1
 Approved For Release 200Ggj
3) .
Dbal-,Iy
V1ta,
Oft4 i it had
of 3ez fro
a inflicted to t=uck
Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000600290001-1
 Approved For Release 2006Rf : CI
V. In addition the bo b bavb
;iY
rii: at it LIh
vity. zog.ns
the VOAJ aayst*m Ieftdtn 4 ti
S i A / i a
ugh out 1
auk Leuis*a r ,C - ;;a xets :
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000600290001-1
 Approved For Release 20060
et
sou
n h
Slaptolt
11_jhti more than 4
the final
.*u 1h Gia
and
1a1iats
Vietrutaw
tod in L south
iately
pate =iy .I
Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-R?P78T02095R000600290001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/11/07: C
0600290001-1
enemy cc me ieasures were usually effective in re-
storing servi ability in a matter of days, or in sore
antes, a tter of hours. One notable exception
Ban oy/Hotel area on Route 912 south of
Ban Karai pass, ich was closed to truck traffic front
late Deco er to l .te January.
To sum up this portion of my briefing, the last
seven months of the Rolling Thunder program was prob-
ably the most effective period of the entire air war
against North Vietnam in terms of complicating the
flow of supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam.
e same tine, it was clear that the Cor unists were
continuing to w*mw large numbers of men and more tons
of supplies than ever before into the northern end
of the supply route to South Vietnam. The bombing;
program was forcing the north Vietnamese to pay a
heavy "tax" to support the war in the South, but much
as being paid by the USSR and C --"-A
plied the t Vietnamese with about $3.0 billion
litary and economic aid between 1965-68.
Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600290001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000600290001-1
Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600290001-1