WEEKLY SURVEY OF COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080007-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 4, 2009
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 27, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
NSA review completed
y33
Weekly Survey of Communist
Military Developments in Indochina
DIA review(s)
completed.
Secret
22
Copy No.
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Fifty-Sixth Report
WEEKLY SURVEY
OF COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
IN INDOCHINA*
(This report covers the period
from 20 through 26 March 1974)
The Key Points
? Infiltration of new troops was heavy last week. Seven new
groups with some 3,500 troops were detected in the Vinh
area: four destined for VC MR 5 and three headed for
COSVN.
e The entire NVA 46th AAA Regiment has redeployed from
Pleiku Province to Darlac Province in MR 2.
? Logistic activity in southern North Vietnam was light again
last week, while photography over Laos continued to indicate
that the roads are receiving heavy use. In South Vietnam,
logistic activity was focused on food shipments.
In recent months, the Communists have opened new rice
supply lines from the Delta to South Vietnam's MR 3.
* This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Department of Defense.
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This report is the fifty-sixth in a series summarizing evidence received
during the reporting period of (I) Communist efforts to infiltrate new
manpower and military supplies toward and into South Vietnam,
(II) significant Communist combat activity, and (III) other developments
affecting Communist military capabilities in Indochina.
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1. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese
Personnel and Military Supplies
Personnel Infiltration
1. The North Vietnamese maintained a heavy flow of troop
infiltration last week, as seven new regular groups with some 3,500 troops
were detected transiting Binh Tram (BT) 8 near Vinh, North Vietnam. Four
of the groups with about 2,000 troops are destined for VC MR 5, while
the other three groups, totaling 1,500 troops, are traveling to the COSVN
area. The gap in group designators between two of the COSVN-bound groups
suggests that three presently unobserved groups with an estimated 1,500
troops are, or soon will be, moving to the area. Therefore, they are also
included in the table below. A high rate of special-purpose infiltration also
occurred last week. Eleven new groups composed of some 375 specialists
were detected at BT 8 - five destined for COSVN, three for southern
Laos/MR 559, two for MR Tri-Thien, and one for the B-3 Front.
Comparative Starts of Troops
from North Vietnam, by Destination
I September-126 March
Total
85,000
71,000
MR Tri-Thien
26,000
2,000
MR 5
9,000
8,000
B-3 Front
14,000
8,500
COSVN
25,000
30,000
Southern Laos/MR 559
11,000
22,500
2. Although overall troop infiltration is still considerably below last
year's pace, the gap is narrowing. The number of troops sent to COSVN
and southern Laos/MR 559 is higher than last year, while the number sent
to MR 5 is nearly as great. Infiltration to MR Tri-Thien and the B-3 Front
still lags behind, however.
Redeployments
3. COMINT of 23 March confirms the movement of the entire NVA
46th AAA Regiment from Pleiku to Darlac Province in MR 2, where one
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battalion has been operating since January. The regiment is now located
in the southwestern part of the province, providing Communist forces with
additional firepower to counter the government's recent attempts to
interdict Communist Route 14 (see the order of battle map).
Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies
4. For the second consecutive week, logistic activity in southern
North Vietnam was relatively light. On 18 March, logistic units stationed
at the Cho Si Railroad Station north of Vinh shipped 20 tons of cargo
to nearby storage areas, and two days later another 20 tons were dispatched.
This slow pace of activity was reversed later in the week, however, as at
least 260 tons of ammunition and petroleum were sent from this area to
northern Laos on 23 and 24 March.
5. In the area between Quang Khe and the DM7, logistic activity
was somewhat heavier, as several large cargo shipments were noted. Between
18 and 23 March, at least three motorized launches pulling 32 barges with
350 tons of cargo were detected in COMINT. Units involved in these
shipments also reported that about 670 tons of ammunition remained in
storage awaiting further shipment.
6. Limited aerial reconnaissance of the main supply corridor in Laos
again made it difficult to measure the level of activity from Tchepone to
the tri-border area this week. On most days. only 25-50 trucks were observed
moving south, and a generally smaller number heading north. Field analysis
of the photography, however, continues to indicate that the road is being
heavily used, suggesting that significant numbers of trucks may be moving
through the Laotian Panhandle undetected. Increased use of Communist
Route 14 in South Vietnam also may be partly responsible for the low
number of trucks actually observed moving.
7. In South Vietnam, food shipments in the northern Quang Tri
area highlighted logistic activity this week. On 18 March, logistic units in
southern North Vietnam shipped 170 tons of rice to Dong Ha. Several days
later, on 20 March. 40 trucks reportedly were scheduled to carry some
1t,5 tons of rice from northern Quang Tri Province to southern MR I along
the Communists' western supply corridor. Finally, on 24 March, logistic
units operating along Route 1) (see the transportation map) reported
receiving 25 tons of 130-mm ammunition.
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Communist and South Vietnamese Regular Combat Forces in South Vietnam
Regular Combat Forces MR I
VC%NVA RVNAF
R VNA F2 84,000 103,000
324B Airborne
304th l st
711th 2nd
2nd3 3rd
673rd AAA Regional
325th VNMC
1. Includes VC/NVA personnel in ground
combat, combat support, and air defense units and
local force companies and platoons.
2. RVNAF Ground Order of Battle. Includes
assigned personnel in ARVN/VNMC ground
combat and combat support units, and Regional
Force battalions. Although present for duty
strength is no longer available, it is estimated to
Forces
..,,'Demarcation Line
VC%NVA RVNAF
37,000 78,000
be about 85% of assigned strength. 320th
3. Only one infantry regiment subordinate to 10th
the division. 3rd
9th 25th
7th 18th
5th Sth
377th AAA Regional
429th Sap Cmd Forces
69th Arty Cmd
MR4
VC/NVA R VVA F
22,000 97,000
_4n G114t so, ong
Vinh Long% Kien Hoa
XPho 9\ .r
Kien inh Vinh V I
Glans j1? \ Binh
Chuong
Thian_,- Be
~.~., .,lam... ..4 ,X u y e n
sec
Lieu
An V
Xuyen
Nam
trping Tin
Quang
r" __ __N?gat
Darlac
Rinb
Try
Military region boundary
-?- Province boundary
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H. Significant Communist Combat Activity
8. Communist cease-fire violations rose from an average of 75 per
dav last week to 93 this week, a level slightly below the 1973 daily average
of 100. Communist casualties decreased significantly from 148 to 107 per
dav, but ARVN casualties rose from 28 to 32 daily. MR 1, scene of major
clashes last week, was relatively quiet except for a Regional Force operation
against the VC MR 6 Headquarters in Binh Thuan Province. MR 4
continued to register the majority of violations, which consisted primarily
of minor harassing actions, attacks-by-tire, and limited ground probes.
III. Other Developments Affecting Communist Military
Capabilities in Indochina
Communists Open New Rice Suppii Line
from Delta to South Vietnam's MR 3
9. Recent reporting indicates that over the past several months the
Communists have been shipping rice regularly from the northern Delta to
"liberated areas" in Tav Ninh and Binh Long Provinces in South Vietnam's
MR 3. Most of the rice is purchased from South Vietnamese civilians in
the northern border provinces of South Vietnam's MR 4 and channeled
northward into southern Cambodia through Communist-controlled exit
points along the border. At the end of 1973, the Communists were estimated
to be moving about 600 tons of rice a month through [long Ngu -- the
most active of these exit points. The estimate was based in part on an
aerial reconnaissance mission which sighted at least 500
large sampans moving freely from Hong Ngu across the border. In early
March the commanding general of the ARVN 9th Division indicated that
this activity was continuing. According to him, a great deal of rice is still
being collected in Chau Doc and Kien Phong Provinces and moved along
canals to northern Kien Tuong Province and thence across the border into
Svay Rieng Province, Cambodia.
10. The ultimate destination of the rice being collected in the Delta
apparently is the Communist-controlled territory stretching across South
Vietnam's northern MR 3. Although this is a rice-deficit area, the
Communists in the past have avoided drawing large amounts from the Delta
b~ supplying the area with Cambodian-grown rice. Apparently the reduced
availability of rice from Cambodian sources over the past year has forced
the Communists to open a regular supply line from the Delta. Other factors
prompting this move may be the increased rice requirements of the
Communists in northern MR 3 to feed a substantial number of civilians
as well as their own military forces, and the South Vietnamese rice control
program, which in some parts of southern South Vietnam has put a squeeze
on Communist procurement activities.
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 "on ivien
h (anchorage)
~?."^JQdl/
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Nape Ha nh
Ti Pass
75 073
Mu Gia
Pass I
Jwarin
i----~ C h a m r a p
6081
Khe
65
h avane
Ke
P
Ha Tim n vung Tau
tinh
Demarcaiion
CuaOViet
Gio River
Linh
Deng He
the route within South Vietnam as
'Route 14".)
South Vietnam
and
North Vietnam Panhandle
Province boundary
':. Military region
International Commission
of Control and Supervision
region boundary
Road
....._.....,,. Railroad 25X1
POL pipeline
0 25 50 75 Miles
Tr rL
0 25 50 75 Kilometers
Names and boundary representation
are not necessarily authoritative
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INFILTRATION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE PERSONNEL
TO THE SOUTH
Since the implementation of the cease-fire settlement for South
Vietnam on 27 January 1973, almost 136,000 North Vietnamese troops
and specialists have infiltrated southward. Nearly 111,000 of this total have
started south since that time. Since 15 June 1973, when the original accord
was reaffirmed, almost 85,000 troops and specialists have been sent south.
The following table shows the number of North Vietnamese troops starting
south, by destination, since 1 January 1973.
Number of Troops Entering the Pipeline Destined
for South Vietnam, Southern Laos, and Cambodia
Since 1 January 19731
COSVN
B-3 Front
MR 5
MR Tri-
Thien
Southern Laos/
MR 559
Total
Total
43,000
14,000
15
000
14
000
26
500
500
112
1973
,
,
,
,
Jan-Mar
12,000
5,500
4,000
5,000
1,000
27,500
Apr-Jun
1,000
....
....
7,000
1,500
9,500
Jul-Aug
....
....
3,000
....
1,500
4,500
Sep
....
2,000
2,000
3,000
7,000
Oct
....
14,000
14,000
Nov
1,000
1,000
....
....
5,500
7,500
Dec
3,500
1,000
....
4
500'
1974
,
Jan
10,000
3,000
...
13,000
Feb
M
5,500
1,500
1,500
8,500
ar 1-26
10,000
2,000
4,500
....
....
16,500
1. Excluding special-purpose personnel. The totals are rounded to the nearest 500.
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Secret
Secret
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