COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080021-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 2009
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: March 23, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080021-5
Secret
NSA review completed
Fifth Report
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
(This report covers the week from
16 March through 22 March 1973)
This memorandum has been preparedjointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense
Secret
23 March 1971
DIA Review Completed.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080021-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080021-5
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080021-5
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080021-5
Fifth Report
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS*
(This report covers the week from
16 March through 22 March 1973)
The Key Points
Only a small number of additional North Vietnam-
ese personnel started the infiltration trip south
during the week, and all were civil or military
specialists. The much larger number of infil-
trators already in the pipeline continued moving
south.
An additional North Vietnamese AAA regiment has
begun to move into South Vietnam, and a newly
occupied and operational SA-2 SAM site has been
observed near Khe Sanh.
An NVA infantry division apparently moved north-
ward earlier this year from Quang Tri Province
of South Vietnam to Ha Tinh Province of North
Vietnam.
The flow of North Vietnamese military supplies
into southern Laos increased somewhat over last
week's level, but was below the level of sev-
eral weeks ago. There was heavy NVA resupply
activity inside South Vietnam in MR 1, and in
the tri-border area.
The number of combat incidents initiated by the
Communists was at a moderate level in both South
Vietnam and Laos.
* This report has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department
of Defense.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080021-5
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080021-5
The Details
NOTE: This is the fifth in a series of reports de-
tailing recently received evidence of (a) Communist
efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military ma-
teriel toward and into South Vietnam, and (b) Commu-
nist-instigated combat activity in viola,-inn of +hp
Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements.
A. Infiltration and Redeployment of North Vietnam-
ese Personnel
1. Evidence received during the reporting pe-
riod indicates that Hanoi is continuing to dispatch
some North Vietnamese personnel southward toward and
into South Vietnam. The apparently emerging trend
of an overall reduction in infiltration starts which
was noted last week, however, has continued. Only a
small number of new infiltrators started the trek
south during the week, and all of them were civil
or military specialists. The last combat troops
known to have enter the infiltration system started
their journey south ? Neverthe- 25X1
less, there are currently about 20,000 North Viet-
namese personnel still in the infiltration system
moving south, and an additional 15,000 infiltrators
who were in the system after 28 January have already
arrived at their destinations. About half of the
20,000 still in the pipeline left their starting
point in North Vietnam after the ceasefire date.
There has been positive evidence that at least some
of these infiltrators continued moving south after
the President's statement of 15 March, and no evi-
dence that any of them have turned back to the north.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080021-5
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080021-5
another North Vietnamese AAA regiment has begun
to deploy into South Vietnam in violation of the set-
tlement agreement. the headquarters
and two battalions of this regiment, with at least
40 AAA weapons, had moved from the Laos panhandle
to a location inside South Vietnam in southwestern
Kontum Province. As late as the first week of March,
good evidence indicated that the regiment was still
in Laos. We cannot determine definitively that the
regiment moved across the South Vietnamese border
after the President's statement of 15 March. It
must have moved, however
~ Earlier informa-
tion had shown that another NVA AAA regiment had
moved from North Vietnam into Quang Tri Province,
probably after 28 January.
This brings
the number of AAA regiments now located in South Viet-
nam to at least 15, with an estimated 900 guns.
3. In a major development during the week, a
newly occupied and operational SA-2 SAM site was ob-
served in the Khe Sanh area of Quang Tri Province
the North Vietnamese had set up
three other SA-2 sites in the Khe Sanh area, but by
-after strong complaints had been issued by
the GVN and the U.S.--they had removed the equipment
from these three sites.
no more SA-2 missiles or missile-related equipment
were observed inside South Vietnam, although there
is no evidence that the North Vietnamese removed the
missiles from the country. The three sites which
were unoccupied are still unoccupied.
The new site, however, is less than a kilometer away
from one of the earlier three (now unoccupied) sites,
and the missiles and equipment deployed at it could
be the same missiles and equipment seen earlier at
one or another of the other sites.
and that the missiles were emplaced on it
the new site had not been set up as o
25X11
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080021-5
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080021-5
the missiles were still there and the site was still
operational. (See paragraph 6 (i) for list of specific
equipment observed at this new site.)
4. I linformation provides evi-
dence of a northward deployment which may have oc-
curred earlier this year. This evidence indicates
that one of the five North Vietnamese infantry divi-
sions which we have been carrying in Quang Tri Prov-
ince probably had begun to move back to North Viet-
nam by January 1973, and most elements of the divi-
sion may have completed the move by late February.
This would be the first NVA division known to have
returned to North Vietnam since the start of the
Communist spring offensive on 30 March 1972. If
the division has moved with all of its personnel,
it would reduce NVA combat forces in MR 1 by some
7,500 personnel. Other NVA combat forces still in
the area--not including AAA units--total between
55,000 and 65,000 personnel. (This development and
the evidence relevant to ito are discussed in more
detail in ANNEX III.)
B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies by
The North Vietnamese Toward and Into South Viet-
nam and Laos
5. Heavy NVA resupply activity was observed
during the week within northern South Vietnam, and
the North Vietnamese in this area appear to be im-
plementing the new transportation effort scheduled
to run from 15 March through 31 May. (Under normal
weather conditions, 31 May would be in the early
stages of the rainy season.) Indications of logistic
activity in the Laos Panhandle were less substantial
than those received from South Vietnam, but did re-
flect a continuing drive to move supplies into the
forward areas. Heavy activity was observed in the
tri-border area and in northeastern Cambodia where
NVA logistic units continued to move large quantities
of supplies into central and southern South Vietnam.
Within southern North Vietnam, some supplies con-
tinued to move southward, and moderately heavy cargo
shipments are still moving to northern Laos. South-
bound truck traffic through the entry corridors into
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080021-5
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080021-5
southern Laos from North Vietnam increased somewhat
above the level observed in the previous week, but
was below the level noted in late February and early
March immediately after the Laos settlement agree-
ment was signed.
6. The following instances of Communist lo-
gistic activity were observed within South Vietnam
during the period under review. Activity observed
within South Vietnam probably reflects supplies
which have recently entered the country. (The map
on the following page shows the roads and route num-
bers which appear below.)
(a)
(b)
(C)
(d)
delivered over 100 tons of cargo to
several locations in northern GVN MR-l.
It could not be determined whether these
trucks had moved supplies from stock-
piles outside the country or were merely
transferring cargo from storage facili-
ties within South Vietnam.
that 55 North Vietnamese cargo trucks
evidence indicates
halted on Route 922, north of the A
Shau Valley within South Vietnam.
0 trucks were observed
observed receiving over 170 tons of
cargo, primarily ammunition. Whether
or not the cargo had just been moved
into South Vietnam could not be deter-
mined.
the A Shau Valley in South Vietnam was
an NVA logistics unit in
storage areas were observed in the
A Shau Valley. These facilities,
all constructed since 24 February,
contain as many as seven storage
buildings each plus additional areas
for open storage.
a total of 7 new NVA
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080021-5
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080021-5
Udan
tchat h ani
huoc
Tuy
on I'a'u
?..~ vung
g \',CAPITAL SPECIAL ZO
Vinh
Vinh
Binh
R
bg
Ran Lieu
NAMES AND BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION
ARE NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
i tnam
le Demarcation Line
South Vietnam
.- Province boundary
Military region
International Commission
of Control and Supervision
region boundary
Railroad
Road
-- POL pipeline
25 50
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080021-5
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080021-5
(e) I lat least 130 tons of am-
munition were observed moving between
NVA logistic units operating in Quang
Tri Province. Again, it could not be
determined whether these supplies had
just come from North Vietnam or were
being transferred within South Vietnam.
(f) In western Quang Tri Province, 35 trucks
were observed traveling south and 35
north through the opera-
tional area o. one NVA logistic unit.
(g)
(h)
46 trucks were observed
moving ammunition in one area of Quang
Tri Province of South Vietnam. Again,
it could not be determined whether or
not these supplies had just come from
North Vietnam.
a ten-mile segment of a
new road which must have recently been
constructed by the Communists was ob-
served in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai
Provinces of South Vietnam, heading
south from Route 534.
(i) A newly occupied SA-2 SAM site located
in the Khe Sanh area has been confirmed.
At the site are 2 SA-2 guideline mis-
siles on launchers, 2 radar instruments,
and 2 support vans. Firm evidence indi-
cates that these missiles were emplaced
sometime between
(j)
the Communists had
constructed a new section Off road from
the Mimot area of Cambodia into Tay
Ninh Province of South Vietnam.
(k) On Route 1033 in the western DMZ, there
were 72 cargo trucks observed movi
south
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080021-5
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080021-5
7. There were the following indications dur-
ing the reporting period of North Vietnamese logistic
activity in the Laos Panhandle and northeastern Cam-
bodia.. Historical precedent would suggest that much
of this activity probably involves supplies destined
for South Vietnam.
(a)
(b)
tic entity operating in northeastern
Cambodia reportedly dispatched at least
88 vehicles carrying unspecified types
of cargo.
a North Vietnamese logis-
operating in the tri-border area was
observed receiving 70 cargo vehicles
and ispatching 30 vehicles
destined tor south Vietnam. The unit
reportedly had a large amount of cargo,
including some fuel, which was to be
sent to forward areas in southern South
Vietnam.
an NVA logistic unit
(c) In eastern Laos, a convoy of 19 cargo
trucks loaded with supplies was ob-
served on Route 922, 9 miles
west o the Laos ouch Vietnam border.
(d) 188 cargo trucks were observed moving
southward on Route 912 through the Ban
,__Karai Pass during the period
of foodstuffs and other sup
8. There is additional evidence of the con-
tinuing movement within North Vietnam of military
and other supplies which are probably moving to
South Vietnam and northern Laos.
(a)
observed transporting over 100 tons
in the Vinh area of North Vietnam was
a logistic unit operating 25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080021-5
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080021-5
(b) In possibly related activity in the
Vinh area, 35 vehicles were observed
picking up carcro at the Cho Si Rail-
road Station and trans-
porting it towar uong en, on Route
7 at the border with North Laos.
(c
nearly 200 tons of cargo
were observed being offloaded from
barges by an NVA logistic unit south
of Vinh.
C. Combat Activity Instigated by Communist Forces
In South Vietnam Since the Ceasefire
9. In South Vietnam, the total numbers of Com-
munist initiated ceasefire violations reported by the
South Vietnamese Armed Forces and the Joint Military
Commission since 28 January and for the last week
(16 March - 22 March) are shown below:
Military Total Since Ceasefire Last Week (16-22 Mar)
Region Level of Action Level of Action
Major 1/ Minor 1/ Major Minor
MR 1 615 2,217 48
155
MR 2 138 822 8
61
MR 3 167 1,307 26
140
MR 4 269 2,635 32
286
Totals 1,189 6,981 114(173)2/ 642(749)2/
1/ DOD definitions of major and minor violations
are contained in ANNEX IV.
2/ Denotes totals of previous week.
10. Some of these violations may have been
initiated by GVN forces rather than Communist forces,
and it is impossible in all cases to determine the
actual instigator. The table above and the chart
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080021-5
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080021-5
on the following page, however,?do show fairly ac-
curately the trend in the amount of combat that has
occurred in South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The
fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular
time and place is accurately reported by the South
Vietnamese in most instances, even though the ques-
tion of who started it may not always be treated in
objective fashion.
11. The following is a chronological listing
of only the most significant "major" Communist vio-
lations of the ceasefire in South Vietnam that were
reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces during
the past week.
(a) On 15 and 16 March, four miles south-
west of Quang Tri City, elements of
four airborne battalions received 10
enemy attacks-by-fire (ABF) totaling
489 rounds of mixed ordnance.
(b) On 15 and 16 March, 10 miles west of
Hue, elements of two ARVN infantry
battalions received three enemy ABFs
consisting of 682 rounds of mixed mor-
tar fire. Two of these indirect fire
attacks were followed by enemy ground
assaults.
(c) On 20 March, 4 miles south of Hue,
elements of an ARVN infantry battalion
received an enemy attack-by-fire (ABF)
of 80 rounds of mixed 60-mm and 82-mm
mortar fire followed by a ground as-
sault.
(d) During the period 20 and 21 March,
elements of the lst Division, west-
southwest of Hue, received seven enemy
attacks-by-fire (ABF) consisting of
348 rounds of ordnance. Two ABFs were
followed by ground attacks.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080021-5
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080021-5
CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF
(28 JANUARY 1973 TO THE PRESENT)
N
FEB MAR.
28 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
FEB
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
MAR
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080021-5
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080021-5
MILITARY REGION TWO
(a) On 15 March, enemy forces attacked an
element of an ARVN infantry battalion
three miles southwest of Bong Son.
(b) On 21 March, eight miles northwest of
Kontum City, an ARVN battalion received
an ABF of 100 rounds of mortar and
recoilless rifle fire.
MILITARY REGION THREE
(a) On 15 March, 11 miles east-southeast
of Dau Tieng, elements of an RF com-
pany received an enemy ground attack.
(b) On 20 and 21 March, RVNAF elements in
the vicinity of Tonle Cham received
three enemy ABFs consisting of 226
rounds of mixed ordnance.
(c) On 22 March, RVNAF elements in the
vicinity of Tonle Cham received two
enemy attacks by fire consisting of
200 rounds of mixed ordnance.
MILITARY REGION FOUR
(a) On 17 March, 10 miles southeast of
Rach Gia, an RF battalion received an
ABF of 12 rounds of mixed 60-mm mor-
tar and B-40 rocket fire followed by
a ground assault.
(b) On 17 March, seven miles south-south-
west of Soc Trang, an ABF of an un-
known number of 82-mm mortar rounds
impacted on an RF outpost near a pagoda.
(c) On 18 March, 16 miles northeast of Vinh
Long, an RF company received an enemy
ground attack.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080021-5
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080021-5
(d) On 19 March, 21 miles northwest of
Vinh Long, elements of an RF battalion
received an ABF (unknown type and num-
ber of rounds) followed by. a ground
assault.
(e) On 20 March, ARVN elements 10 miles
northeast of Chau Doc received a
ground attack resulting in over 100
enemy killed.
D. Combat Activity instigated by Communist Forces
In Laos During the Week from 16 Through 22 March
12. The week began with heavy North Vietnamese
Army attacks in several areas in south Laos, most
significantly in the vicinity of Paksong on the Bolo-
vens Plateau and in the area between Khong Sedone and
Saravane north of the Plateau. Activity in the cen-
tral panhandle was heaviest in an area south of Thak-
hek, capital of Khammouane Province, where Communist
forces are continuing to contest the Royal Lao Govern-
ment presence near several heavily populated villages.
The rest of Laos remained generally quiet with only
light isolated incidents reported.
13. Following is a brief account of significant
combat incidents which occurred between 16 and 21
March and which were clearly initiated by Communist
forces in violation of the Laos ceasefire agreement:
(a) On 16 March, North Vietnamese Army
(NVA) units launched four ground at-
tacks against Royal Lao Army forces
west of Paksong on the Bolovens Plateau.
In the heaviest of these attacks, an
estimated NVA battalion penetrated a
Government position 5 kilometers south-
west of Paksong and forced the defend-
ers to withdraw an additional 5 kilo-
meters. On the same date, four smaller
Communist-initiated attacks took place
south of Thakhek in Laos MR III.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080021-5
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080021-5
(b) On 17 March, an NVA battalion attacked
a Government battalion east of Khong
Sedone in MR IV, forcing the friendly
unit to withdraw several kilometers to
the west. Three company-sized ground
attacks and one attack-by-fire were
initiated by Communist forces south
of Thakhek in MR III.
(c) On 18 March, two company-sized ground
attacks and one 200 round mortar at-
tack were launched against friendly
units south of Thakhek. A Government
position north of Dong Hene in MR III
was also attacked by two Communist com-
panies.
(d) On 19 March, two Communist companies
launched another ground attack and
attack-by-fire south of Thakhek, forcing
a Government battalion to relocate sev-
eral kilometers to the west. A sharp
engagement occurred in MR IV when two
NVA companies forced a Government unit
out of a village northeast of Khong
Sedone. This village was in Govern-
ment hands at the time of the cease-
fire, but has changed hands three times
since then.
(e) On 20 March, the Communists launched
another two-company ground attack sup-
ported by over 100 rounds of mortar
fire south of Thakhek in MR III. The
attack was repulsed.
(f) On 21 March, there was no significant
activity throughout Laos.
(g) On 22 March, early reports indicate no
significant activity throughout Laos.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080021-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080021-5
Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080021-5
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080021-5
Definition of "Major" and "Minor" Ceasefire
Violations:
Paragraph 9 of this memorandum contains a table
listing the total number of Communist-inspired cease-
fire violations reported by the GVN, both for the past
week and for the whole period since the ceasefire be-
came effective on 28 January. The determination of
whether a violation is "major" or "minor" is based on
the following criteria, which have been established by
the U.S. Department of Defense.
Major Violation: One in which US/friendly
forces, fac1Iii i or population centers:
-Receive numerous rounds of enemy mortar,
artillery, or rocket fire within a
short period of time or sporadically
over a period of hours.
-Receive a multi-company (150-400 men) ground
attack with or without supporting fire.
-Are subjected to one or more acts of ter-
rorism involving extensive use of mines
and demolitions.
Minor Violation: One in which US/friendly
forces, facilities or population centers:
-Receive one or a very few rounds of enemy
mortar, artillery, rocket, or small
arms fire following an extended period
during which no stand-off attacks-by-
fire were received.
-Receive a small ground probe, unsupported
by significant mortar, artillery, or
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080021-5
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080021-5
rocket fire, following an extended pe-
riod during which no attacks of this
type were received.
25X1
-Are subjected to one or a very few small
terrorist attacks involving use of
mines and demolitions following an
extended period during which no at-
tacks of this type were received.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080021-5
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080021-5
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080021-5