COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080022-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2009
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: March 30, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
Sixth Report
1t, w
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
(This report covers the week from
23 March through 29 March 1973)
This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense
NSA review completed
DIA Review Completed.
Secret
30 March 1973
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Sixth Report
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS*
(This report covers the week from
23 March through 29 March 1973)
The Key Points
Only a small number of additional civilian and
military specialists started the infiltration
trip south during the week. There have been
no observed infiltration starts of combat troops
since 11 March. Infiltrators in the pipeline
continued moving south.
The flow of North Vietnamese military supplies
into southern Laos was considerably above the
mid-March level, but somewhat below that of
late February.
North Vietnamese logistics units in Quang Tri
Province moved very large quantities of sup-
plies during the week.
The number of combat incidents initiated by the
Communists continued at the moderate level of
the last several weeks in both South Vietnam
and Laos.
* This report has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department
of Defense.
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The Details
NOTE: This is the sixth in a series of reports de-
tailing recently received evidence of (a) Communist,
efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military ma-
teriel toward and into South Vietnam, and (b) Commu-
nist-instigated combat activity in violation of the
Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements.
Infiltration and Redeployments of North Viet-
namese Personnel
1. Continuing the trend of the past several
weeks, only a small number of new North Vietnamese
infiltrators started the trip south during the week,
and all of them were civilian and military specialists.
2. In a Special Note attached to our memoran-
dum of last week, we discussed some very tenuous
evidence concerning 6,500 possible NVA infiltrators
whom we had not included in our infiltration esti-
mate. We have received no additional evidence of
the existence of these infiltrators since last week.
After careful study, both the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Department of Defense have agreed
that we should continue to leave these possible
infiltrators out-of our estimate at the present time.
If and when new evidence is obtained, this judgment
will be reviewed. Therefore, our total estimate of
35,000 infiltrators (25,000 in the pipeline as of
28 January plus 10,000 who started their journey
south since that date) remains unchanged.
25X1
25X1
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3. Recent evidence on the movement of infil-
trators through the pipeline indicates that a sig-
nificant proportion of the groups which started south
since early this year have traveled by vehicle.
Previously, when many sections of the Ho Chi Minh
trail system were under aerial bombardment, most in-
filtrators moved on foot.) As a result, many of the
personnel in the pipeline have arrived at their
destinations appreciably earlier than they would
have in former years. Thus, it is estimated that
most of the 35,000 North Vietnamese personnel who
have been in the infiltration system since 28 Jan-
uary have now arrived at their destination.
4. Recently available evidence indicates
that the headquarters and support elements of an
NVA Air Defense Division have been located in the
Khe Sanh area of northern South Vietnam since just
prior,to the ceasefire date. This divisional entity
is probably the senior authority for North Vietnamese
air defense forces in the "southern area" (i.e.,
Quang Tri Province of South Vietnam, the contiguous
areas just north of the DMZ, and the Panhandle of
Laos.) At present, approximately 60 percent of North
Vietnam's total antiaircraft forces plus two SAM
regiments are known to be located in this southern
area.
operational as of that date.
on the SA-2 site near Khe? Sanh which was occupied and
5. As of 27 March, hard evidence has confirmed
the presence of all elements (four firing battalions
and one support battalion) of the previously reported
NVA SAM regiment in the Khe Sanh area. Since 21
March, however, we have received no further information
6. Within southern Laos, the North Vietnamese
apparently are effecting a major restructuring of
their logistical system. According to a North Viet-
namese soldier who recently rallied, all NVA infil-
tration and logistic stations (Binh Trams) in
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Saravane and Attopeu Provinces of Laos are to be re-
formed into regiments, each with a specific function.
According to the rallier, at least two Binh Trams in
these areas completed their transformation in late
1972 and early 1973. Similar changes have also oc-
curred elsewhere within the NVA logistic and infiltra-
tion system. A Binh Tram in Quang Tri Province of
South Vietnam, for example, was redesignated as an AAA
regiment in early March. In two other cases, infil-
tration-support regiments appear to have been estab-
lished from existing Binh Trams or elements of Binh
Trams in the Laos Panhandle. The impact of these
organizational changes is not yet clear. Significant
supply activity continues in the area, however, and
it is apparent that with U.S. bombing halted over
southern Laos, North Vietnam's manpower requirements
to carry out logistic operations are greatly reduced.
B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies by
the North Vietnamese toward and into South
Vietnam and Laos
7. North Vietnamese logistical activity con-
tinued at a high level during the week in both
southern Laos and northern South Vietnam. Large
numbers of cargo vehicles were observed moving
through the entry corridors from,North Vietnam into
the Laos Panhandle, in the central Panhandle, and
in the tri-border area to the south. The number
of vehicles moving southward through the entry cor-
ridors from North Vietnam increased by about one
quarter over the previous week. The present flow
of traffic is still somewhat less than it was during
the peak period in the last half of February, but
is considerably higher than it was in mid-March.
Heavy vehicle activity was also detected in Quang
Tri Province during the week as large quantities
of supplies were being moved by NVA logistics units
in that area. In the southern part of North Vietnam--
where our evidence is more limited--the total traffic
volume appeared to be less, but a significant amount
of cargo was still being shipped. The movement of
supplies to northern Laos from North Vietnam remained
at roughly the levels of the past several weeks.
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In northern Laos, the North Vietnamese have begun
work on road improvements in the northern region
of the Plaine des Jarres.
8. The following instances of Communist lo-
gistic activity were observed within South Vietnam
.during the week. Activity observed within South
Vietnam probably reflects supplies which have re-
cently entered the country. (The map on the fol-
lowing page shows the roads and route numbers
which appear below.)
(a) Reports from Quang Tri Province in-
dicate that on 20 March one NVA lo-
gistic unit received or dispatched
200 vehicles, while another unit re-
ceived or dispatched 300 vehicles on
the same date. No information was
available as to the cargo being carried
by these vehicles.
(b) On 21 and 22 March, 1,100 tons of
rice and unspecified ordnance were
shipped between two logistic units
operating in Quang Tri Province.
(c) On 23 and 25 March, an NVA logistic
unit in Quang Tri Province received
over 400 tons of assorted types of
munitions. It could not be deter-
mined whether this materiel had just
been shipped from North Vietnam or
had been transferred from another
location within South Vietnam. On
25 March, the same unit had, in
addition, nearly 400 tons of muni-
tions in storage.
(d) From 23 through 29 March, 89 cargo
vehicles were observed moving south
on Route 1033 in the western DMZ.
9. The following indications were received
during the reporting period of North Vietnamese lo-
gistic activity in north and south Laos. Historical
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a sane ap
.. ~..., - Pass ~THa Tinh I ('
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are not essarily authoritative
International Commission
of Control andSupervision
region boundary
-^-+- Railroad
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POL pipeline
25 50 75 Miles
25 50 75 Kilometers
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Vtrng Tau
Yen
Q Hoa
CAPITAL SPECIAL ZONE
South Vietnam
and
North Vietnam Panhandle
--- Province boundary
ON 00 Military region
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precedent would suggest that much of the activity
in the Laos Panhandle probably involved supplies
destined for South Vietnam.
(a) Hard evidence recently received in
Washington indicates that as of 20
March the North Vietnamese were
making a substantial effort to up-
grade the route system in the north-
ern Plaine des Jarres. Bridge and
drainage ditch construction and road
grading were observed on Route 7,
the primary route into the Plaine
from North Vietnam, and also on
Routes 4 and 4/7 which transit the
northern Plaine in an east-west di-
rection.
(b) On 22 March, about 200 vehicles were
observed moving between NVA logistic
entities in the northwest Bolovens
region and the area west of Chavane
in the Laos Panhandle.
(c) On 23 March, an NVA logistic unit
in the tri-border area had 77 ve-
hicles in operation. In addition,
the unit received another 6 cargo
vehicles, reportedly carrying car-
bine ammunition, on the same date.
(d) During the period 23-29 March, 235
cargo vehicles were detected traveling
south on Route 912 through the Ban
Karai Pass. There were also 245
northbound vehicles observed moving
through the Pass during this period.
(e) On 24 March, an NVA logistic unit
operating near Ban Bac in the Laos
Panhandle was observed to have al-
most 70 cargo vehicles operating in
its area, including 23 northbound,
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31 southbound and 14 parked vehicles,
all of which were on Route 99.
(f) On 25 March, another NVA logistic
unit south of Saravane received 46
cargo vehicles and dispatched an-
other 42.
(g) On 26 March, 99 cargo vehicles were
observed moving southward in the Ban
Bac area.
(h) On 28 March, 70 trucks were observed
on Route 966 east of Chavane. This
is more than three times the number
seen along this route on any one day
since the 22 February Laotian cease-
fire.
10. The following evidence was received during
the week of movement within North Vietnam of mili-
tary and other supplies which are probably destined
for South Vietnam and northern Laos.
(a) On 21 March, 100 tons of unspecified
cargo were detected moving southward
from Vinh to an NVA logistic unit on
the Song Ca River. This NVA unit is
located at a major transshipment point
for supplies moving southward through
the North Vietnam Panhandle.
(b) in the southern North Vietnam Pan-
handle, large amounts of cargo were
being transported southward by barge.
On 21 March, an NVA logistic unit op-
erating from Dong Hoi to the south
shipped 100 tons of rice on a num-
ber of barges. On 25 March, the
same unit had 45 tons of ammunition
and 550 tons of rice awaiting ship-
ment at dockside.
(c) On 21 March, another logistic unit
operating south of Dong'Hoi was ob-
served sending 49 vehicles south and
46 north.
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(d) On 23 and 24 March, 127 tons of food-
stuffs, 25 tons of gasoline, and 16
tons of ammunition were shipped from
a storage area near Vinh to northern
Laos via Route 7.
(e) On 24 March, another 88 tons of cargo
were dispatched from the Vinh area
to an NVA logistic unit on the border
of northern Laos. The cargo included
17 tons of ammunition and 25 tons of
foodstuffs, the remainder being un-
specified cargo.
(f) On 27 March, 116 trucks were observed
operating along Route 7 near the
Plaine des Jarres. This is more than
double the number observed on any one
day since the Laotian ceasefire of 22
February.
C. Combat Activity Instigated by Communist Forces
In South Vietnam Since the Ceasefire
11. In South Vietnam, the total number of Com-
munist-initiated ceasefire violations reported by
the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 28 January
and for the last week (23 March - 29 March) are shown
below:
Military
Total Since Ceasefire Last
Week (2
3-29 Mar)
Region
Level of Action Le
vel of A
ction
Major Minor Maj
or
Minor
MR 1
652 2,348 3
4
131
MR 2
159 922 1
9
100
MR 3
192 1,396 2
1
89
MR 4
300 2,842 2
9
207
Totals
1,303 7,508 10
3(125)1/
527(642)1/
1/ Denotes totals of previous week.
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12. Some of these violations may have been in-
itiated by GVN.forces rather than Communist forces,
and it is impossible in all cases to determine the
actual instigator. The table above and the chart
on the following page, however, do show fairly ac-
curately the trend in the amount of combat that has
occurred in South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The
fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular
time and place is generally reported accurately by
the South Vietnamese, even though the question of
who started it may not always be treated in objective
fashion. In some cases, the Joint.Military Commission
(GVN/PRG) also reports violations of the ceasefire.
13. The following is a chronological listing
of only the most significant "major" Communist vi-
olations of the ceasefire in South Vietnam that
were reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces
during the past week.
MILITARY REGION 1
(a) On 23 March, 15 miles south-southwest
of Da Nang, a bridge secured by an
RF company received a ground attack
by an enemy force. One span of the
bridge was dropped and the bridge
was closed to traffic.
(b) On 23 and 24 March, enemy forces
fired 160 rounds of 60- and 82-mm
mortar fire at elements of three
ARVN infantry battalions during four
separate attacks-by-fire (ABF) 14
miles west of Hue.
(c) On 24 March, enemy forces fired over
300 rounds of mixed ordnance during
six separate ABFs at elements of
two ARVN infantry battalions 10 miles
west of Hue.
(d) On 25 March, two VNAF CH-47 helicopters
transporting 50 released ARVN PWs
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CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF
(28 JANUARY 1973 TO THE PRESENT)
FEB
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
I AJ R V I LA I O 5
FEB MAR
28 1 2 3
MAR
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
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were fired on by enemy elements 13
miles south-southeast of Quang Ngai.
The helicopters were not damaged.
(e) On 25 and 26 March, enemy forces
fired a total of 190 60- and 82-mm
mortar rounds during three separate
ABFs on elements of two ARVN infantry
battalions 10 miles west of Hue.
One ABF was followed by a ground
attack.
MILITARY REGION 2
(a) On 27 March, enemy forces fired forty-
four 122-mm rocket rounds at elements
of an ARVN ranger group 8 miles south-
west of Pleiku City.
MILITARY REGION 3
(a) On 22 and 23 March, RVNAF elements
in the vicinity of Tonle Cham re-
ceived four enemy ABFs consisting of
386 rounds of mixed ordnance.
(b) On. 26 March, enemy forces fired a
total of 172 rounds of mixed ordnance
during two separate ABFs on the
Tonle Cham base camp 9 miles south-
west of An Loc ABFs.
(c) On 27 and 28 March, the Tonle Cham
base camp received 175 rounds of
mixed ordnance during two ABFs.
(d) On 29 March, the Tonle Cham base
camp received 720 rounds of mixed
ordnance.
MILITARY REGION 4
(a) On 24 March, enemy forces attacked
elements of an ARVN infantry bat-
talion 10 miles northeast of Chau
Duc.
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(b) On 25 March, a US Army UH-1H heli-
copter with standard US markings
was hit with. ground fire while
flying from Saigon to Can Tho.
(c) On 26 March, enemy forces attacked
elements of an ARVN infantry bat-
talion while on a security operation
26 miles northeast of Chau Duc.
(d) On 27 March, 7 miles northwest of
Tri Ton, enemy forces fired fifty-
five 82-mm mortar rounds at elements
of an ARVN ranger battalion.
(e) On 29 March, enemy forces fired thirty-
five 82-mm mortar rounds at elements of
an RF battalion 4 miles south-south-
west of Ca Mau.
D. Combat Activity Instigated by Communist Forces
in Laos During the Week from 23 through 29
March
14. During the week, combat activity continued
in the area southeast of Thakhek in Khammouane Prov-
ince, some of it initiated by friendly forces but
some of it initiated by the North Vietnamese and
Pathet Lao. Other incidents were reported in areas
northeast of Seno; also in areas east and southeast
of Kengkok. In the vicinity of Paksong on the
Bolovens Plateau and in the area between Khong Sedone
and Saravane north of the Plateau, activity decreased
as only three clashes were reported. South of Pakse,
FAR units in the Muong Khong area reported several
attacks by enemy units. Only isolated incidents
were reported throughout the rest of Laos.
15. Following is a brief account of significant
combat incidents which occurred between 23 and 29
March and which were clearly initiated by Communist
forces in violation of the Laos ceasefire agreement:
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(a) On 23 March, NVA units clashed with
a Royal Lao Army (FAR) company south-
east of Thakhek. On the same date,
another FAR position in the same area
was attacked by an enemy company.
Northwest of Khong Sedone, the NVA
initiated a company-sized attack
against a Lao Neutralist Army (FAN)
position on the north side of Route
13 forcing the FAN units to withdraw
to the southwest.
(b) On 24 March, an NVA company supported
by 140 rounds of mixed 60- and 82-mm
mortar fire attacked a FAR company-
sized position, southeast of Thakhek.
(c) On 25 March, enemy forces attacked
and forced FAR units to abandon an
outpost position north of the Nam Ou
River in an area northeast of Luang
Prabang. (This was the only friendly-
held position on the north side of
the Nam Ou River.) On the same date,
enemy units attacked a FAR battalion
position southeast of Kengkok. In
another incident a FAR position north-
east of Seno was attacked by an enemy
company.
(d) On 26 March, south of Pakse, a FAR
company-sized unit was attacked by
an enemy force of unknown size north
of Muong Khong.
(e) On 27 March, one friendly position
southeast of Thakhek was attacked
by enemy company-sized units. In
other areas, enemy units attacked
FAR positions southeast of Kengkok
and northeast of Seno. South of
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Pakse, on the same date, a FAR com-
pany position was attacked by a com-
pany-sized unit just north of Muong
Khong.
(f) On 28 March, enemy units initiated a
company-sized attack against a FAR
position southeast of Thakhek.
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