COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080039-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2009
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: July 24, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080039-6
Secret
NSA review completed
) .
(
0JJ
Twenty-Second Report
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS
(This report covers the period from
17 July through 23 July 1973)
This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.
Secret
cl2d 3
24 July 1973
DIA review(s)
completed.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080039-6
 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080039-6
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080039-6
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080039-6
24 July 1973
Twenty-Second Report
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS*
(This report covers the period from
17 July through 23 July 1973)
The Key Points
A small number of civilian and military special-
ists were the only new North Vietnamese person-
nel detected beginning the infiltration trip to
the south during the week.
North Vietnamese logistic activity continued at
a high pace in northern South Vietnam, but was
at low or moderate rainy season levels else-
where.
Combat activity was at low levels in both South
Vietnam and Laos.
A comprehensive assessment of our evidence shows
that Communist military personnel in South Viet-
nam--both combat and administrative services per-
sonnel--have increased from 221,000 on 27 Jan-
uary to 268,000 at present. The size of North
Vietnamese forces in southern Laos and Cambodia
has diminished in the same period as substantial
numbers have crossed over into South Vietnam.
* This report has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department
of Defense.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080039-6
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080039-6
The Details
NOTE: This is the twenty-second in a series of re-
ports detailing recently received evidence of (I) Com-
munist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military
materiel toward and into SouthVietnam, (II) Commu-
nist-initiated combat activity in violation of the
Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements, and (III) other
developments affecting Communist military capabilities
in Indochina.
I. Infiltration and Rede to ments of North Viet-
namese Personnel and Military Supplies
A. Personnel Infiltration and Redeployments
1. No new combat infiltration groups were de-
tected starting the trip south from North Vietnam
during the past week. A re-evaluation of earlier
evidence, however, indicates that four combat infil-
tration groups rather than the three originally re-
ported left North Vie, nam during the previous week
(11-17 July). This4g`roup may have the normal com-
plement of 500 men, but we have as yet actually ob-
served only 55 men in the group. In the current
week (17-23 July), only three smaller groups of civil
and military specialists, totalling about 75 people,
were actually detected entering the infiltration
pipeline.
2. The new detections, plus the acceptance of
the additional combat group for the previous week,
raises the total number of North Vietnamese person-
nel who have begun the infiltration trip to the south
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080039-6
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080039-6
since the 15 June "second" ceasefire to about 3,500.
Some 3,000 of these have been combat troops, and the
remainder have been specialists. Since the original
27 January ceasefire, more than 54,000 North Viet-
namese personnel have infiltrated into South Vietnam,
Cambodia, and southern Laos. More than 29,000 of
these began the infiltration trip after 27 January,
while the other 25,000 were already in the pipeline
as of that date. (ANNEX B, con-
tains a more detailed discussion of the information
pertaining to infiltration received during the week.)
3. Newly received evidence indicates that the
headquarters of the 58th Artillery Regiment of the
NVA 308th Division is now located in the Hanoi area.
The unit, along with the rest of the division, fought
in Quang Tri Province of South Vietnam during the
1972 Communist offensive. Since the headquarters
of the division and its three infantry regiments re-
turned to North Vietnam during January and February
of this year, as previously reported, the artillery
regiment probably also returned to the North during
the. same period. The departure of this unit has not
appreciably reduced North Vietnamese firepower in
the two northernmost provinces of South Vietnam,
where Hanoi still maintains 6 artillery regiments.
4. Elements of COSVN Headquarters continue to
move into South Vietnam from Cambodia. On 10 July,
an additional subordinate element of COSVN was ob-
served in South Vietnam's Tay Ninh Province, having
moved from its early May position in Kompong Cham
Province, Cambodia. This redeployment, following a
similar move by another element in early June (see
the 12 June 1973 weekly violations report), suggests
that still another command unit of COSVN probably
will relocate from Cambodia to South Vietnam, as all
three units normally operate in the same geographic
area.
B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies
North Vietnam
5. NVA resupply movements in southern North
Vietnam continued at a moderate level during the
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080039-6
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080039-6
reporting period. Logistic activity was again cen-
tered on Vinh and in the area from Quang Khe south
to the DMZ. On 12 July, 17 cargo vehicles were
detected moving between'two storage facilities west
of Vinh. On the same day, another NVA logistic unit
received 66 tons of ordnance (much of which was re-
portedly damaged), and was scheduled to receive 250
tons of cargo during 17-31 July. According to one
reliable report received during the week, the major
POL shipping agency in Thanh Hoa Province of North
Vietnam was to ship some 325 tons of POL products to
unspecified NVA units in the near future.
6. In the area just to the north of the DMZ,
200 southbound and 32 northbound cargo vehicles were
observed crossing the Troc River southwest of Quang
Khe on 12 July. On 16 July, 23 northbound and 27
southbound vehicles were observed at the same location.
On 18 and 19 July, a major logistic unit south of
Quang Khe received over 110 tons of rocket and
mortar ammunition from another NVA supply unit west
of Vinh.
Southern Laos/Cambodia
7. With the rainy season continuing, there is
still little evidence of supply activity in southern
Laos. The Communists are, however, continuing their
construction work aimed at upgrading the supply cor-
ridor in the Panhandle. construction
activity was observed on Routes 91 and 911 in the
Tchepone area, (The map on the following page shows
the roads and route numbers mentioned in this report.)
Farther south, in the tri.-border area of Laos and
northeastern Cambodia, there have been persistent
reports of supplies being moved by boat, a mode of
transport traditionally used by NVA units in that
area during the rainy season. On 13 July, three
watercraft were observed transporting nearly 20 tons
of rice northward through the tri-border area. The
shipment was destined for an NVA unit operating on
the Communists' western supply corridor in GVN MR 10
Another NVA unit operating in northeastern Cambodia
was observed transporting some 10 tons of rice by
boat on 15 July to an undesignated location.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080039-6
 Eyng
Ream
Phum Sdofn
Ach Romeas
Z-War
Charn rap
Kien
Clan/
rig 1
K ha n li
i Xu n Hung
Hon Nieu
lS::.r. (anchorage)
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R0007000806
'-0'-3-9--
1 _ (. i`-lK \cresa crr v rccirasen I (
Mu Cia
Pass
Udon
R al cha than i
Khong
{ddode
1033
6666
?Y e r. N
Tuy Hoa
Names and boundary representation
are not necessarily authoritative
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080039-6
Province boundary
Military region
Is International Commission
of Control and Supervision
region boundary
Road
Railroad
POL pipeline
25 50 75 mil-0 25 50 75 Kilometers
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080039-6
South Vietnam
8. The heaviest current levels of North Viet-
namese logistic activity in Indochina are still being
observed along the Communists' western supply cor-
ridor in northern and western South Vietnam. Re-
ports from units operating on the western corridor
showed the following activity. On 15 July, a storage
and transshipment facility along Route 548 received
62 cargo vehicles with 185 tons of rice and foodstuffs.
On 17 July, the same unit received 43 vehicles carry-
ing nearly 180 tons of rice and gasoline. On 14
July, another logistic unit operating along the
route reportedly had almost 6,000 tons of supplies
remaining on hand.
9. In addition to this activity on the west-
ern corridor, fairly heavy NVA traffic movements
were detected on other routes in northern South
Vietnam. 74 cargo vehicles were ob-
served on Route 6089 south of Khe Sanh, and on 19
July 116 cargo trucks were seen on Route 9 between
Dong Ha and the Laos/South Vietnam border. An NVA
supply unit operating in the Cua Viet River area of
eastern Quang Tri Province was observed processing
167 cargo vehicles through a river crossing point
in its area on 18 July, and on 20 July, 120 vehicles
were seen traveling through the unit's area of
responsibility.
10. Farther south, the Communists are continuing
to build up areas along their new western supply cor-
ridor. On Route 614 south of the A Shau Valley,
twelve newly constructed or enlarged areas containin
y sma 1 cultivated plats. In a possibly related
development, a reliable report received during the
week indicates that nearly 800 tons of nitrogen
fertilizer were being sent from Hanoi to Quang Tri
Province. Some 100 tons of the shipment had been
received at Dong Ha on 3 July, and the remainder was
to arrive over an unspecified period.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080039-6
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080039-6
II. Communist.-Initiated Combat Activity in South
Vie~tnam_an Laos
A. South Vietnam
11. In South Vietnam, the total number of Com-
munist-initiated ceasefire violations reported by
the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 27 January,
15 June, and for the last week (17-23 July) are
shown below:
Military Total Since 27 Total Since 15 Last Week
Region January "Ceasefire" June "Ceasefire" (17-23 Jul)
Major Minor Major Minor
Major Minor
MR 1 1,085 3,660 60 301
11 54
MR 2 339 2,397 75 543
10 97
MR 3 459 3,099 57 523
17 126
MR 4 779 7,265 101 1,099
16 175
Totals 2,662 16,421 293 2,466
54(47) 452
(400)1/
1/ Denotes,totals of previous week.
12. Some of these violations may have been
initiated by GVN forces rather than Communist forces,
and it is impossible in all cases to determine the
actual instigator. The table above and the chart
on the following page, however, do show fairly ac-
curately the trend in the amount of combat that has
occurred in South Vietnam since the ceasefires The
fact that a combat incident occurred at, a particular
time and place is generally reported accurately by
the South Vietnamese, even though the question of
who started it may not always be treated in objective
fashion.
13, Combat activity in Laos was at a low level
during the week with no significant Communist cease-
fire violations reported.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080039-6
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080039-6
[NAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF
(28 JANUARY 1913 TO THE PRESENT)
Ann 29 30 31.1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14, 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
]AN-FEB 200
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
0
200
Of 1. V 0 I S
1 0 I S
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 1b It 16 19 2V 41 G[ G3 44 4 40 1140
41111110
0
200
"NEW"
CEASE-FIRE
JUL
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910-
200 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080039-6
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080039-6
III. Other Developments Affectin Communist Militar
Capabil ties in Indochina
A. Changes Between 27 January and the Present
in the Communist Force Structure in South
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia
14. Since the 27 January settlement agreement
went into effect, the total number of VC/NVA combat
and administrative services troops in South Vietnam
has increased by some 47,000 men (see the table below).
CIA/DIA Order of Battle of Communist
Military Forces in South Vietnam, 1973
(in thousands)
"First"
Ceasefire
27 Jan
"Second"
Ceasefire
15 Juna/
The
Present
10 Jul
lar Combat Forces
R
149
167
172
egu
NVA
124
140
145
VC
25
27
27
istrative Services
Ad
i
72
80
96
n
m
NVA 35
37
53
VC 37.
43
43
Total
221
247
268
NVA 159
177
198
VC 62
70
70
a/ The agreed CIA/DIA listing for May 1973 was used
for 15 June. By late May, however, it became clear
that large numbers of NVA administrative services
units were in the process of relocating from southern
Laos and northwestern Cambodia to western South Vietnam.
Until the full extent of this major shift could be de-
termined, CIA/DIA decided not to publish any new in-
terim order of battle. By 10 July, the Intelligence
Community was able to estimate that some 16,000 North
Vietnamese administrative services personnel, plus an-
other 5,000 combat troops, had relocated into South
Vietnam from Laos and Cambodia since the spring of 1973.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080039-6
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080039-6
15. The total increase of Communist personnel
in South Vietnam from 221,000 to 268,000 between 27
January and the present includes VC andNVA combat
and administrative services units which deployed
into the country after 27 January, and those North
Vietnamese replacement personnel who arrived since
that date in infiltration groups to augment the
strength of existing in.-country units. Nearly 85
percent of the incease--or 39,000 men--were North
Vietnamese troops, and the remaining 8,000 were Viet
Cong. (These figures do not correlate with our in-
filtration estimates because of casualties, attrition,
and other factors.) Most of the 39,000 new North
Vietnamese troops entered South Vietnam since March,
and their arrival reflects the shift of NVA forces
from southern Laos and Cambodia into western South
Vietnam. As a result of all the changes of the past
half year, we estimate that North Vietnamese troops
provide nearly 75 percent of the total Communist
regular forces now in South Vietnam. The map on the
next page shows the distribution of Communist, as
well as South Vietnamese, combat personnel by Mili-
tary Region. Administrative service forces are not
included on the map.
16. The unprecedented movement of North Viet-
namese administrative service units into South Viet-
nam (over half of the total increase since 27 Jan-
uary) is in support of the new western supply cor-
ridor. When completed, this will be a primary, all-
season route running from the DMZ south at least
into the western highlands of GVN MR 2. Some
evidence indicates that it eventually will be ex-
tended as far south as the city of Loc Ninh in MR 3.
The completion of the new corridor will link up Com-
munist-controlled areas in the western part of the
country and, more importantly, will allow the North
Vietnamese for the first time to support many of their
military units and much of the civilian population
under their control via an in-country supply route.
Their reliance on the Ho Chi Minh Trail system in
Laos and Cambodia will be correspondingly reduced.
17. The augmentation of forces in South Vietnam
has been accompanied by a concomitant drawdown in
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080039-6
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080039-6
Communist and South Vietnamese Regular Combat Forces in South Vietnam
VC/NVAI
172,000
325th
324B
320B
312th3
304th
711th
2nd
1. Includes VC/NVA personnel in ground combat, combat
support, and air defense units and local force companies and
platoons.
2. Revised RVNAF Ground Order of Battle. Includes
present for duty personnel in ARVN/VNMC ground combat
and combat support units, and Regional Force battalions.
3. The headquarters and divisional support units are
currently located deep within North Vietnam.
MR 4
VC/NVA R VNAF
28,000 78,000
Dao
429th Sapper 25th
Command 18th
9th 5th
7th Regional
5th Forces
1st 21st Phu Quoc
9th (Kien Giang)
7th
44th Special
Tactical Zone
Regional Forces
Long -7
/Long
!' Khanh
Bien
Hoe
Birth
Tuy
1Kharih
.rif:-Haa :--
Military region boundary
-?- Province boundary
ICCS region boundary
0 25 50 75 Miles
0 25 50 75 Kilometers
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080039-6
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080039-6
Communist strength in southern Laos and Cambodia.
The estimated total strength of North Vietnamese
and Pathet Lao forces in all Laos has been reduced
by some 21,000 men since the 22 February Laos cease-
fire. The current total strength is 97,000 troops,
of which 59,000 are combat personnel and 38,000 are
administrative services personnel. North Vietnamese
troops account for some 65 percent of the total, or
63,000 men. In southern Laos alone, despite the
major reduction in NVA administrative service troops,
the North Vietnamese still have some 20,000 support
personnel. With the current upgrading of the road
system in this area, the North Vietnamese will retain
a substantial capability--particularly in a ceasefire
environment--to infiltrate supplies and personnel
through Laos this coming dry season, even if none
of the units which went to South Vietnam return.
18. In Cambodia, there has been a total 15,000-
man reduction in VC and NVA forces since 27 January,
resulting from units shifting back into South Vietnam.
Currently, we estimate that VC and NVA forces in
Cambodia total 21,000 men, of which 3,000 are combat
and 18,000 are administrative services. North Viet-
namese troops number about 17,000 men, or 80 per-
cent of the total.
B. Communists Rebuild Dong Ha Area of South
Vietnam
19. aerial photography
indicate that the Communists have made a major effort
to rebuild and repopulate the town of Dong Ha in
northeastern'Quang Tri Province. Natives of the
area are reportedly being joined both by refugees
from other parts of Quang Tri and by North Vietnamese
civilian and military personnel "arriving regularly"
by buses traveling down Route 1. There are indica-
tions that a fairly large market place has been
established in the center of town, where goods are
being exchanged for both. North and South Vietnamese
currencies. Numerous new structures housing Commu-
nist administrative and party cadre have apparently
been erected in the town, and there are several large
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080039-6
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080039-6
food and POL storage areas on the outskirts. Some
of the supplies are probably being shipped from
North Vietnam by watercraft, which have been pho-
tographed offloading cargo at a recently established
port facility on the nearby Cua Viet River. Finally,
at the Dong Ha airfield the Communists are reportedly
dismantling the pierced steel plating laid down in
earlier years by U.S. and GVN forces and using it in
the construction of buildings and walkways in the
surrounding area.
C. Logistic Developments and Air Operations
in Cambodia
20. Last week the Communists continued to move
supplies between widely scattered storage areas in
Cambodia despite strikes by US aircraft. Unlike on
the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos, overland
transport in most parts of enemy-controlled Cambodia
during the summer monsoon is possible--although at
reduced levels--because of better road conditions.
In the north, C-130 gunships destroyed three trucks
moving along Route 19 east of Stung Treng on 19 July.
U.S. Pilots also reported sighting vehicle traffic
last week on Routes 6 and 21 north of Kompong Cham
City, and along routes leading between the Chup area
and the South Vietnam border. Gunships strafed a
group of suspected enemy watercraft on the Mekong
River some 15 miles north of Phnom Penh on 13 July,
destroying four of the craft and damaging seven.
.to transport supplies purchased in FANK-controlled
areas to depots of the insurgents up river at Chhlong
and Kratie.
D. Khmer Communist Offensive Has Provided
Large Stocks of Captured FANK Military
Equipment
21. The recent Khmer Communist offensive along
Routes 3 and 4 near Phnom Penh has provided some KC
units with substantial stocks of weapons and other
war materiel obtained by capture. Communications
intercepted from KC units within the last ten days
r %t* use this stretch of the Mekong each night
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080039-6
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080039-6
have indicated that the amount of materiel captured
in the last six months has included a wide variety
of ordnance and other military hardware. The KC
Southwest Region Committee reported in a message of
20 July that it had captured 5,034 weapons of various
types (including eight 105-mm howitzers), 1,400 tons
of ammunition, and 6 vehicles. Other COMINT reports
from units operating near the capital indicate that
the Communists have also captured large amounts of
equipment in that area. A 17 July message from the
Eastern Region Standing Committee outlined the re-
sults of a 6 July battle on Route 3 near Kompong
Kantout. Two 105-mm weapons, 1,000 various smaller
weapons, 15 military vehicles and at least several
thousand tons of military equipment and ammunition
were recovered, according to the source. Other
intercepted messages from the same area have provided
similar evidence of the capture of FANK military
equipment by Khmer Communist units. Nonetheless,
Khmer Communist effectiveness in some areas con-
tinues to be hampered by localized shortages of
ammunition.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080039-6
 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080039-6
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080039-6
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080039-6
Post-Ceasefire Infiltration
of North
South
1. An additional regular infiltration Group--
1061--which was detected in an 11 July intercepted
message, has now been accepted as a new group. The
message, which originated from Binh Tram 18 in Vinh,
North Vietnam, made reference to a Group 1061 with
55 people, but at the time of its detection, the
group was believed to consist of stragglers from
an earlier Group 1061, which was observed in North
Vietnam on 25 February. As a result of the appear-
ance last week Groups 1042, 1060, and 1085, however,
Group 1061 now is believed to be a new combat in-
filtration group which is destined for VC MR 5. Be-
cause messages describing regular combat groups in-
itially detected at BT 18 have sometimes referred to
only a portion of the group, CIA is adding Group 1061
to its infiltration totals at an estimated strength
of 500 troops--the average for regular combat groups.
DIA is carrying the group in its estimates at the
detected strength of 55 men.
2. In addition to the acceptance of this com-
bat group, three special-purpose groups were added
to our estimate during the reporting period. These
groups, which have a total estimated strength of
about 75 civilian and military specialists, were
detected in southern Laos and South Vietnam. Table
1, below, shows overall infiltration starts from
North Vietnam for the past two infiltration seasons,
while Table 2 summarizes the pattern of starts since
1 January 1973?
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080039-6
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080039-6
INFILTRATION STARTS: COMBAT TROOPS LEAVING
NORTH VIETNAM FOR THE SOUTH*
1972-1973
Infiltration Year**
Total Infiltration 94,000
Starts 1 September
1972 through 30
June 1973
(broken down by area
of destination)
MR Tri-Thien-Hue 33,000(CIA), 36,000(DOD)
MR 5 9,000
B-3 Front 14,000 (CIA) , 11,000 (DOD)
COSVN 26,000
Southern Laos
and MR 559 12,000
Total Infiltration 2, 200 (CIA) , 1,800(DOD)
Starts From 1
Through 23 July
(broken down by area
of destination)
MR Tri-Thien-Hue
MR 5
B-3 Front
COSVN
Southern Laos
and MR 559
0
2,200 (CIA) , 1,800 (DOD)
0
0
This Table includes only combat infiltration
groups, and omits special purpose groups. There
are minor differences between the DOD and the
CIA on the number of personnel destined for
specific areas listed on this table. Where such
differences exist, both. the CIA and the DOD
estimates are given.
** For accounting purposes, we arbitrarily define
the "infiltration year" as beginning on 1 Sep-
tember, which roughly coincides with the start
of the dry season along the Ho Chi Minh Trail
in the Laos Panhandle each year.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080039-6
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080039-6
Number of Personnel Entering the Pipeline
Since 1 January 1973
Total!/
Special-Purposed/
January
20,000
1,600
February
10,200
2,100
March
3,250
2,250
April
1,925
1,200
May
7,175
1-15 June
825
125
16-22 June
425
23-27 June
450
30- 6 July
600
7-13 July
800(DIA)
1,225(CIA)
14-17 July
1,050
18-23 July
75
1/
2/
Including gap-filled groups, except Groups 7001-
7009 and 5057. Assuming that these groups de-
parted after 1 January, about 5,000 combat troops
would be added to the infiltration starts shown
above.
Including those groups which were initially de-
tected without a specific strength but which
have been assigned an average strength of 350
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080039-6
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080039-6
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080039-6