COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080051-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 2, 2009
• Sequence Number: 51
• Publication Date: October 17, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
NSA review completed
~~res ~
,Thirty-Fourth Report
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS
(This report covers the period from
10 October through 16 October 1973)
This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.
Secret
`'3
17 October 1973
DIA review(s)
completed.
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Thirty-Fourth Report
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS*
(This report covers the week from
l0 October through 16 October 1973)
The Key Points
Over 4,000 additional North Vietnamese troops
have started their infiltration trek toward
southern Laos and the area of the Communist's
new supply corridor in western South Vietnam.
Recent evidence indicates that during the past
month more than 5,000 exfiltrating personnel
have been moving northward in North Vietnam.
The exact breakdown of these personnel is un-
known, but the flow includes sick and wounded,
POWs, and civilians going to North Vietnam for
training.
Communist logistic activity remained at low
levels in North and South Vietnam as heavy rains
and high winds from seasonal typhoons have caused
extensive disruptions. In Laos, road repair
and construction continues.
The large number of Communist storage areas in
MR l constructed since the January ceasefire
could serve both military and economic/political
functions.
Combat activs,ty rema~.ned at low levels in both
Sough V~.,etnam and Laos last week.
* This report has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department.
of Defense.
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The Details
NOTE: This is the thirty-fourth in a series of memo-
randa summarizing evidence received during the report-
ing period of (I) Communist efforts to infiltrate new
manpower and military materiel toward and into South
Vietnam, (II) Communist-initiated combat activity in
violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agree-
ments, and (ITT) other developments affecting Commu-
nist military capabilities in Indochina.
I. Infiltration and Rede~lo~ments of North Viet-
namese Personnel and Military Supp ies
A. Personnel Infiltration and Redeployments
1. Personnel infiltration during the past week
continued at a significant level, as six combat groups
(one of which was included in last week's estimate)
were observed in North Vietnam. The identification
of these groups- all of which are traveling toward
southern Laos, indicates that three currently un-
detected groups with about 1,500 additional troops
also have started or are preparing to start toward
that area. Ten smaller groups of specially-trained
personnel also were reported starting south during
the past week--about three-quarters of these per-
sonnel are traveling to northern GVN MR 1.
2. With the acceptance of these groups, the
number of infiltrators starting south fxom North
Vietnam after the 15 June "second" ceasefire is
estimated to be about 24,000, some 22,000 of whom
have been combat troops. Since the signing of the
original ceasefire agreement on 27 January, more than
74,000 North Vietnamese personnel, including over
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Communist and South Vietnamese Regular Combat Forces in South Vietnam
South Vietnam
Regdar Combat Forces
VC/NVA1 RVNAF~
180,000 320,000
86,000 89,000
325th VNMC
324B Airborne
320B 1st
304th 2nd
711th 3rd
2nd Regional
Forces
MR 2
1. Includes VC/NVA personnel in ground combat, combat VC NVA R VNAF
support, and air defense units and local force companies and
platoons.
2. RVNAF Ground Order of Battle. Includes assigned
personnel in ARVN/VNMC ground combat and combat
support units, and Regional Force battalions. Although
present for duty strength is no longer available, it is estimated
to be about 85% of assigned strength.
36,000 75,000
429th Sapper 25th
Command 18th
9th 5th
7th Regional
5th Forces
MR 4
.VC/NVA RVNAF
--~ Dao
_'~ Phu Ouoc
21 SI _ (Kien Giang)
9th
7th
44th Special
Tactical Zone
Regional Forces
VII
~ _~Pho 9~. ,fi
Kien ~_~ ?~Oinh ~~ Vinl
cnunng r -
Thien?f? Ba.
f Military region boundary
-?- Province boundary
~ ~ ICCS region hountlary
0 25 50 75 Miles
i i ~ J
i
0 25 50 75 Kilometers
25X1
LAX"I
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66,000 combat troops and 8,.000 specialists, have in-
filtrated southward. More than 49,000 of .these per-
sonnel have started south since 27 January,-while
25,000 were in the pipeline moving southward as of
that date. (ANNEX B, ontains a
more detailed discussion of the information pertain-
ing to infiltration which was received during the
past week . )
3. In mid-September, a sharp upswing in the
northward movement of personnel through the pipeline
occurred at about the same time Hanoi resumed the
southward flow of combat troops on a large scale.
Since then, more than 5,000 personnel have been re-
ported moving northward through the North Vietnamese
Panhandle. Although the precise composition of these
personnel is unknown, the flow includes sick and wounded,
civilians being sent to North Vietnam for training,
and repatriated POWs. Currently, there is no evidence
to suggest that the Communists are withdrawing any
of their combat forces in South Vietnam, either as
integral units or through the infiltration system.
B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies
North Vietnam
4. Logistic activity was light last. week as
heavy rains and high winds from seasonal typhoons
swept into the North Vietnamese Panhandle. Despite
the poor weather, Rear Service units continued to move
some munitions--largely AAA and field artillery ammuni-
tion--in southern North Vietnam early in the week.
On 14 October, however, another typhoon was reported
close to the Panhandle, and Rear Service units were
instructed to prepare for rains and severe flooding.
This typhoon will probably further constrain logistic
activity.
5. Communist units in the Laos Panhandle are
still focusing primarily on road repair and construc-
tion. Only light vehicle activity was detected and
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 i
j x rlon rv eu r-~--
I _ mh (anchorage) I G GA'~Ir u~FfFT~dtt ,:.-. 1A
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.~, .
~H~Tinh
Nakhori
Phanofn
No,
F'a njarnry
?War
Chamrap
Mg Gia
Pass
Stang Tren
~,
165
hao ane
Names and boundary representation
ere not necessarily authoritative
New Communist Supply Corridors
O uang Tri i
~t~utl7 (~hrna
.1_ra
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?-~~?-??? Province boundary
Military region
y'~.. _.... ,-.....International Commission
of Control and Supervision
region boundary
Road
?-~-~ Railroad
POL pipeline
0 25 50 75.Miles
iT-~i~
0 25 50 75 Kilom el ers _
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was probably related to localized activity. Although
Rear Service units should be capable of moving a high
volume of supplies through this area within a few
weeks, there have been no indications that such an
upsurge is imminent..
South Vietnam
6. The impact of the typhoons apparently was
even more severe in northern South Vietnam than in
North Vietnam. In this area, truck traffic was at a
virtual standstill, communications were disrupted,
many roads and bridges were washed out, and cargo in
storage was damaged by water. In the near future Rear
Service units in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces
probably will be concentrating on repairing recent
flood damage and countering the effects of the ex-
pected new typhoon on the logistic system.
II. Communist-Initiated Combat Activit in South
Vietnam and Laos
A. South Vietnam
7. In South Vietnam, the total number of Com-
munist-initiated ceasefire violations reported by
the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 27 January,
15 June, and for the last week (10-16 Oct) are shown
below:
Military
Region
Total Since 27
January .Ceasefire
Total Since 15 Last Week
June Ceasefire (10-16 Oct)
Major
Minor
Major
Minor Major
Minor
MR 1
1,377
4,794
352
1,435
34
103
MR 2
548
3,720
284
1,866
15
117
MR 3
562
4,045
160
1,469
10
92
MR 4
1,105
9,903
427
3,737
24
245
Totals
3,592
22,462
1,223
8,507
83(80)
557(417)1/
1/ Denotes totals of previous week.
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8. Some of these violations may have been in-
itiated by GVN forces rather than Communist forces,
and it is impossible in all cases to determine the
actual instigator. The table above and the charts on
the following pages, however, do show fairly accurately
the trend in the amount of combat that has occurred in
South Vietnam since the ceasefires The fact that a
combat incident occurred at a particular time and
place is generally reported accurately by the South
Vietnamese, even though the question of who started
it may not always be treated in objective fashion.
9. The most significant combat incident of the
week occurred on 13 October when Communist forces
overran the South Vietnamese mountaintop outpost at
Dach Ma, southeast of Hue. ARVN forces may try to
retake the position, but resistance would be expected
since the Communists are now in an excellent position
to observe and report any government activities in
the coastal lowlands and along Route 1 that will
threaten their forces in the hills and mountains to
the west..
10. There was no significant military activity
in Laos last week.
III. Other Develo ments Affectin Communist Ca a-
bilities n In ochina
11. Since the January ceasefire, the North
Vietnamese have constructed over 3,000 buildings,
including 1,800 for general storage, along-the high-
lands supply corridor, on Route 9 between-bong Ha
and Khe Sanh, and in the Ba Long Valley? Some 240
buildings identified as suitable for ammunition and
explosives storage can accommodate an estimated 70,000
short tons. The 1,800 general cargo storage buildings
could house many times that amount. Obviously,
many of the buildings could be used for purposes
other than storage--such as vehicle and weapons
repair and light industrial production activities.
Such activities serve the North Vietnamese within
the context of both their military and economic/
political options.
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(See Reverse Side of Page)
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VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF
(28 JANUARY THROUGH 31 JULY 19131
~~~ 29 30 31.1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14, 15 16. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
JAN?FEB 20a
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
T I INS
1 O i S
0
0
zoo
0
200
lUl
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
200 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 LO 11 12 13 14 15 16 X17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
I:t Alt-tiltt. YIULA I IUnJ 111 ~uu i n
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AUG '??
SEP ~??
OCT ,0?
NOV '??
~~~~
~ii~
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 I1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
200 r'T~TI~'I ~ i i ~ '-e i
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 2% 28 29 30 31
2001~I~T~r~r?,r-r-,i i-, ,
DEC ioo
200 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 1G 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 2% 28 29 30 31
I
lAN ~??
CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH
VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF
(1 AUGUST 1913 TO THE PRESENT)
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Post-Ceases"ire Infiltration of North Vietnamese
Personnel to the South
1. The southward flow of infiltrators from
North Vietnam continued during the past week with
the detection of six new regular combat groups and
ten small, special-purpose groups in the Vinh area.
Although all six combat groups were reported for the
first time, one of them (5073) was previously in-
cluded in our estimate as a "gap-fill" based on the
observation of other gooups in the 5xxx series (see
last week's report). The detection this week of
regular combat groups 5066, 5068, 5070, and 5071--all
of which are traveling toward southern Laos--enables
us to fill three more "gaps" in the series. The
estimated 1,500 personnel in the three groups prob-
ably either have already infiltrated south or will do
so soon. The inclusion of these groups and those
detected during the week eliminates the block of
seven missing groups reported last week.
2. The ten small groups observed for the first
time during the past week at Binh Tram 8 in the Vinh
area had an aggregate reported strength of some 200
personnel, about 150 of whom are moving towards Com-
munist Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue in northern South
Vietnam. Although most of the specialists reported
moving during the past week were civilian administra-
tors, three groups bore generic designators not pre-
viously observed. As a result, their composition and
function are currently unclear. The appearance of
ten new small groups in the Vinh area constitutes
the largest number observed in the pipeline during a
one-week period since last August and may indicate
an upturn in special-purpose infiltration.
3. With the addition of more than 4,000 troops
traveling to sauthern Laos/MR 559 during the past
week, the total number of NVA troops who have started
infiltrating toward this area since l September now
stands at about 12,500--a level surpassing that (12,000)
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sent to southern Laos/MR 559 during the entire 1972/73
d~?y season (September 1972, through June 1973). In
past years, hcwever, infiltration to this area often
has occurred during a relatively short period in the
first half of the dry season. Thus, while the level
of combat infiltration observed thus far in the cur-
rent dry season is larger than normal, it does not
necessarily presage a continuing flow of infiltrators
at the recent high rate. Although the assignment of
these personnel at their destinations still is unknown,
a recently intercepted message from southern Laos
suggests that at least part of them may be used to
strengthen administrative services units. Tab 1e 1
below shows the pattern of total infiltration starts,
including specialists, since 1 January 1973. Table 2
compares the southward movement of combat troops since
1 September 1973 by destination with the same period
in 1972.
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Number off' Personnel Entering the Pi aline
Dest~.ne for South Vietnam, Southern
Laos, and Cambodia Since 1 January 1973
Total Special-Purpose
January
20,000
1,600
February
10,200
2,100
March
3,250
2,250
April
1,925
1,200
May
7,175
300
June
2,200
700
July
3,650
600
August
2,200
700
September
7,000
0
October 1-16
9,800
300
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Comparat.a.ve Starts by Combat Troops From
North Vietnam, by Destination
~1 September - 16 October
1972
1973
Total
9,500
16,500
MR Tri-Thien-Hue
8,000
2,000
MR 5
1,500
2,000
B-3 Front
0
0
COSVN
0
0
Southern Laos/MR 559
0
12,500
* This table covers the infiltration of North Viet-
namese troops to South Vietnam, Cambodia, and
southern Laos. Infiltrators moving to northern
Laos are not included.
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Secret
Secret
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