COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080058-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 58
• Publication Date: November 28, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Fortieth Report
Top Secret
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS
(This report covers the period from
21 November through 27 November 1973)
This report has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.
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Top Secret
51
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Fortieth Report
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS*
(This report covers the week
from 21 through 27 November 1973)
The Key Points
? For the first time this fall, infiltration groups of NVA troops
have been detected entering the pipeline on route to the
central highlands and southern South Vietnam.
? For the second straight week, intercepted North Vietnamese
messages show that large quantities of explosives and
ammunition are now stocked in southern North Vietnam.
In southern Laos and northern South Vietnam, poor weather
continued and Communist logistic movements were light.
? Preliminary analysis
does not provide any further evidence of military deliveries
from China or the USSR. This photography leads CIA to
believe that there has been no movement of armor out of
the major armor training center northwest of Hanoi since
photography of late September. DOD, however, continues
to believe that most of the tanks observed at this location
in late September have now left the area and may be headed
south.
Reviewed by
NGA
* This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Department of Defense.
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This is the thirty-eighth in a series of memoranda summarizing evidence
received during the reporting period of (I) Communist efforts to infiltrate
new manpower and military materiel toward and into South Vietnam,
(II) Communist-initiated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and
Laos settlement agreements, and (III) other developments affecting
Communist military capabilities in Indochina.
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1. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese
Personnel and Military Supplies
Personnel Infiltration and Redeployments
1. For the first time in the 1973-74 dry season infiltration cycle,
intercepted messages have revealed infiltration groups of NVA troops
preparing to travel to the B-3 Front and the COSVN area. These groups --
3006 and 2031 -- were detected with a strength of more than 1,000 troops
near Vinh, North Vietnam, on 21 and 28 November, respectively. They
were being held up for unspecified reasons until orders to move them farther
south were received.
2. These are the first regular infiltration groups detected since an
11 November message from MR 559 to rear services Group 472 stated that
the flow of combat troops to the B-3 Front and COSVN areas would be
resumed soon (see last week's report). Although Groups 3006 and 2031
are the only new regular combat groups to appear in the pipeline since
then, their appearance may mark the start of a renewed flow of troops
to the B-3 Front and COSVN, where Communist combat units would need
fillers and a pool of replacement personnel to sustain a major offensive.
In addition to these groups, one special-purpose group of three persons
was detected at Vinh on 21 November. Destined for northern South
Vietnam, this group reportedly is traveling with Group 3006.
3. With the detection of Groups 2031 and 3006, we now estimate
that some 28,000 North Vietnamese troops have started south thus far in
the 1973-74 infiltration cycle, which began on 1 September. This is about
7,000 fewer than during the comparable period in 1972, when 35,000 troops
started south. Since 1 September this year, about 80% of the troops have
gone to southern Laos and the areas of western South Vietnam through
which the new Communist logistic corridor runs. Last year during the
comparable period, only about 25% of the new infiltrators went to this
area.
4. Signal intelligence of '9 November places the 272nd Regiment.
9th NVA Division in north-central MR 3 on the Binh Long/Phuoc Long
Province border. It was formerly located in Binh Long Province. This
deployment, coupled with a more tenuous location on 19 November of
the E-1 (also known as the 275th) Regiment, 5th NVA Division to the
same area, would place two main force regiments within 19 miles of the
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Comparative Starts of Troops
from North Vietnam, by Destination
1 September- 28 November
Total
35,000
28,000
MR Tri-Thien-Hue
10,500
2,000
MR 5
5,000
2,000
&3 Front
3,000
500
COSVN
8,000
1,000
Southern Laos/MR 559
8,500
22,500
Phuoc Long provincial capital of Phuoc Binh and may presage an increase
in Communist military activity in the area of the capital. In addition, these
forces also give the Communists the option to reinforce the Bu Prang area
of Quang Duc Province. Map 515529 shows the current distribution of
Communist and South Vietnamese combat forces, by military region.
5. Farther south, in MR 4, recent SIGINT confirms the move of
the forward element of the headquarters of the NVA 1st Infantry Division
from the Chau Doc/Takeo Province border eastward to the Kien Tuong/Svay
Rieng Province border area. Such a move by a division's forward element
usually reflects a change in the status or area of operation of the division.
SIGINT, however, continues to locate the divisional headquarters and its
three subordinate regiments along the Chati Doc/Cambodian border. Thus,
additional information will be required to determine the significance of this
move.
Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies
6. For the second straight week, large quantities of explosives
(probably for road repair and construction) and ammunition were detected
in southern North Vietnam. Between 18 and 24 November, Binh Tram 8
near Vinh reported receiving more than 500 tons of cargo, most of which
were explosives. Farther south in Quang Binh Province, BT 26 reported
on 19 November that it had more than 900 tons of supplies on hand,
200 tons (roughly 4,500 rounds) of which were identified as 122-mm
artillery ammunition. BT 26 also reported on 22 November that it would
receive 15 railroad cars with some 110 tons of unidentified cargo each day
for an unspecified period.
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Communist and South Vietnamese Regular Combat Forces in South Vietnam
Regular Combat Forces
VC/NVA1
190,000
92,000 89,000
325th VNMC
324B Airborne
320B 1st
304th 2nd
711th 3rd
2nd Regional
Forces
support, and air defense units and local force companies and VCINVA R VNAF
platoons.
2. RVNAF Ground Order of Battle. includes assigned
personnel in ARVN/VNMC ground combat and combat
support units, and Regional Force battalions. Although
present for duty strength is no longer available, it is estimated
to be about 85% of assigned strength.
429th Sapper 25th
Command 18th
9th 5th
7th Regional
5th Forces
MR 4
'i C/N VA R VNAF
25,000
,
88,000
21st
9th
7th
Deo
Phu Quoc
(Kien Giang)
44th Special
Tactical Zone
Regional Forces
>,Phon9\
Kieh- ? f, ?,,Dinh
ng% Kie
Vinh
Binh
Bac...r~
Lieu,
VII
Phuo
guy
Tuyen
Duc-Minh
Military region boundary
Province boundary
ICCS region boundary
0 25 50 75 Kilometers
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7. In southern Laos and northern South Vietnam, most rear service
units were engaged in road repair and construction activity (see
map 501958). COMINT revealed little cargo moving, as poor weather along
the main supply corridors continued to.limit traffic and delay the expected
start of a major resupply campaign from North Vietnam. All the major
NVA logistic units in southern North Vietnam, northern South Vietnam,
southern Laos, and northeastern Cambodia were directed, however, to
attend a 25 November conference to receive "orders," according to a
21 November intercept. Although no details were given, the "orders"
probably relate to the start of the 1973-74 dry season logistic campaign.
II. Communist-Initiated Combat Activity
in South Vietnam and Laos
8. In South Vietnam the total number of Communist-initiated
cease-fire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since
27 January, since 15 June, and for the last week (21-27 November) are
shown below:
Military
Region
Total Since
27 January
Cease-Fire
Total Since
IS June
Cease-Fire
Last Week
(21-27 November)
Major
Minor
Major
Minor
Major
Minor
Total
4,020
25,857
1,651
11,902
65(73)1
633(463)1
MRI
1,472
5,316
447
1,957
19
89
MR 2
9
4,303
385
2,449
10
97
MR 3
606
4,568
204
1,992
8
90
MR4
1,293
11,670
615
5,504
28
357
9. Some of these violations may have been initiated by South
Vietnamese forces rather than Communist forces, and it is impossible in
all cases to determine the actual instigator. The tabulation above and the
charts following the Annex, however, show fairly accurately the trend in
the amount of combat that has occurred in South Vietnam since the
cease-fire. The fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular time
and place is generally reported accurately by the South Vietnamese, even
though the question of who started it may not always be treated objectively.
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 25X1 (anchorage) GP# a#Mi liri to
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Mu Gia
Passs
rin
~Warin
Ch a m rap
K hong
iedone
a, -6
0211
922 9
' A FY
Names and boundary representation
are not necessarily authoritative
New Communist Supply Corridors
(The Communists have designated
V,inh Linh the route within South Vietnam as
South Vietnam
and
North Vietnam Panhandle
-1 - Province boundary
99 ON Military region
.. -? International Commission
of Control and Supervision
region boundary
Road
-r----+ Railroad
POL pipeline
0 25 50 75 Miles
0 25 50 75 Kilorneters
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Laos
10. There was no significant military activity in Laos last week.
III. Other Developments Affecting Communist Military
Capabilities in Indochina
Trends in Hamlet Evaluation System Results Since June
11. Since the 15 June "second" cease-fire in South Vietnam, Hamlet
Evaluation System (HES) reporting has shown virtually no change in the
relative shares of the population controlled by the government and the
Communists. Inaccuracies in reporting from all regions continue to impair
the usefulness of the HES results (data for which are wholly gathered and
tabulated by the South Vietnamese). The inaccuracies appear to be no
greater than they have been in the past, however, and the general trends
reflected are probably valid.
12. As of the end of September* -- the most recent month for which
data are available - 83.4% of South Vietnam's total population of more
than 19.5 million people lived in hamlets or urban areas rated "A" (secure)
or "B" (relatively secure) - almost identical with the 30 June figure of
82.8%. Moreover, in the period June-September, there was little
month-to-month fluctuation in the countrywide combined A-B figure,
although significant changes occurred in some provinces.
13. The stable control situation countrywide was also evident at the
regional level between June and September, the greatest change being less
than two percentage points (MR 1). As of 30 September, about 58% of
MR I's total population (3.3 million) lived in areas rated A or B - by
far the lowest of any region in South Vietnam. In MR 2, nearly 86% of
its 3.5 million population lived in areas rated A or B as of 30 September.
MR 3, w:tere more than 95% of the population (5.8 million) lived in areas
rated A or B at the end of September, remains the most highly pacified
area of South Vietnam. In MR 4, virtually no change occurred in the areas
rated A or B, which on 30 September covered about 84% of the region's
7.1 million people.
Results of Recent Photography over North Vietnam
14. I over North Vietnam covered
several important military and industrial sites in the northern part of the
country. Preliminary analysis of cloud-free imagery over Haiphong Port and
parts of the northeast rail system leading from China provides no additional
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evidence of military aid deliveries. The level of merchant shipping activity
at Haiphong was somewhat below that observed in recent months. Rail
and highway traffic on routes leading north and south of Hanoi appeared
normal.
15. I photography also provided coverage of the Vinh
Yen Armor Training Center northwest of Hanoi. Previous coverage of
over this area caused a divergence of opinion on the armored
vehicle inventory at Vinh Yen The Central
Intelligence Agency believes that the film quality
was of sufficient quality to indicate that there has been no reduction
From the latest photography, CIA has identified more than
180 armored vehicles in the area consisting of the following: 121 tanks,
20 probable tanks, 34 armored personnel carriers, and 13 probable armored
personnel carriers for a total of 188 vehicles. Although there has been some
movement of tanks in the main storage area, most of the tanks were parked
there on the latest photography in the same relative positions
suggesting that little, if any, inventory turnover has occurred
in the past two months.
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16. I the Department
of Defense (DOD) continues to believe that there has been a significant
reduction in the number of tanks at the Vinh Yen Armor Training Center
since late September. While both agencies agree 132 tanks were present
the DOD believes there were only 43 tanks present on
as opposed to the CIA count of 141 tanks. In the main
storage area alone, the DOD believes there has been a substantial reduction
of armor. Of the 76 tanks observed less than 10
remained
17. photography
revealed 25 tanks at the Xuan Mai Military Training Area 20 miles west
of Hanoi, about the same number as noted in this area last July. Other
military equipment parked in the Xuan Mai area included seven SA-3
launchers, four probable SA-3 launchers, large quantities of SA-2 missiles
and support equipment, 15 field artillery pieces, and 60 antiaircraft pieces
and fire-directing support equipment.
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19. Only two of the several large vehicle storage parks located between
the China border and Hanoi were photographed . The two,
located 15 miles northwest of Kep, held an estimated 1,850 trucks,
compared with a total of 2,700 trucks seen there in mid-July.
20. Photography revealed a new SA-2 site six miles
southwest of the Khe Sanh airstrip. There are now a total of 10 SA-2
sites in the Khe Sanh area which have been constructed in South Vietnam
since the January cease-fire. Only four sites, however, have ever been
occupied at any one time.
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INFILTRATION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE PERSONNEL
TO THE SOUTH SINCE THE CEASE-FIRE
The detection of regular infiltration Groups 2031 and 3006 and
special-purpose Group M417 at BT 8 in North Vietnam, and the
"gap-filling" of Group 2030, increases our estimate of infiltration starts
since 1 September by some 1,500 personnel. Since the 15 June- second
cease-fire, almost 36,000 North Vietnamese have infiltrated south, including
nearly 34,000 combat troops and 2,000 specialists. Since the 27 January
agreement, about 86,000 personnel have infiltrated southward, including
about 78,000 combat troops and 8,000 specialists. Some 61,000 of these
personnel have started south since 27 January, while 25,000 were in the
pipeline moving southward as of that date. The following table shows the
number of North Vietnamese infiltrators starting south, by month and
destination, since 1 January 1973.
Number of Troops Entering the Pipeline Destined
for South Vietnam, Southern Laos, and Cambodia
Since 1 January 19731
COSVN
B-3 Front
MR 5
MR Tri-Thien-Hue
Southern Laos/
MR 559
Total
Total
14,000
6,000
9,000
14,000
26,500
500
69
Jan
7,000
5,000
4,000
2,500
....
,
18
500
Feb
5,000
500
....
1,500
1,000
,
8
000
Mar
....
....
....
1,000
,
1
000
Apr
1
000
,
May
,
....
....
1,000
Jun
....
....
....
7,000
....
7,000
Jul
Aug
....
3,000
...
1,500
....
1,500
3,000
Sep
Oct
....
....
2,000
2,000
1,500
3,000
1,500
7,000
14,000
14
000
Nov 1-28
1
1,000
500
5,500
,
7,000
. Excludes special-purpose personnel. The totals are rounded to the nearest 500.
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GtRat-rIflt 1IULM 1 HUna In duu 1 n
VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF
(28 JANUARY THROUGH 31 JULY 1913)
JAN-FEB 200
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
Lt 0
~l~ I~q'P~1?ERL r
0
200
NEW"
CEASE-FIRE
JUL
A so NO -I 0%ws, Irk
- 1 10% Ll Ij i ,
&
111h. I-
~ Qjorwo 000
I I--T- 1 1-1 -w"P-r I I =
2 3 4 5 6 7
L TE- I
i--]- - - I 17001~01
N'MTIInI (~i~f'
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AUG 100
0
200
CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH
VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF
(1 AUGUST 1913 TO THE PRESENT)
I ff-
17-
1 tlf
I = - A. 000
= T-T I I
OCT 100
0
200
NOV 100
DEC 100
200 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
JAN 100
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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