COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080062-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2009
• Sequence Number: 62
• Publication Date: January 9, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
NSA review completed
Communist Violations of the Vietnam
and Laos Settlement Agreements
and Related Developments
Secret
Copy No. ~' ~
~~ ~:~.:
DIA review(s)
completed.
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9 January 1974
Forty-Fifth Report
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS*
(This report covers the period
from 3 January through 8 January 1974)
The Key Points
~ North Vietnamese infiltration was brisk last week as eight
new regular groups and eight special-purpose groups were
detected.
~ North Vietnamese supply shipments in southern North
Vietnam decreased last week, but remained heavy in Laos.
In Cambodia, the North Vietnamese have significantly
increased their logistic support to the Khmer Communists.
~ Major elements of the NVA 316th Division have withdrawn
from northern Laos. In South Vietnam the deployment of
another Communist regiment to Quang Duc Province has
increased Communist forces in the area to some 4,000-5,000
men.
~ The latest photography over North Vietnam shows a
significant increase in the number of armored vehicles in the
North Vietnamese Panhandle.
* This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Department of Defense.
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This report is the forty-fifth in a series summarizing evidence received
during the reporting period of (1) Communist efforts to infiltrate new
manpower and military supplies toward and into South Vietnam,
(li} Communist-initiated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and
Laos settlement agreements, and fIII) other developments affecting
Communist mititary capabilities in Indochina.
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I. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese
Personnel and Military Supplies
Personnel In faltra lion
1. The rate of combat infiltration increased again last week. with
the detection of three new regular infiltration groups at the top of the
pipeline in North Vietnam and five additional regular groups farther south.
in the system. This is the highest number of regular groups detected during
a one-week period thus far in the current dry season. Six of these groups,
with almost 3,000 troops, are traveling to the B-3 Front while the other
two, with more than 1,000 troops, are bound for the COSVN area of South
Vietnam. The detection of one of the CO5VN-bound groups suggests that
three other battalion-size combat groups with an estimated strength of 1,500
troops already have started, or soon will start, to that area.
2. Eight small special-purpose groups were observed moving toward
South Vietnam during the past week. Six of these groups comprising about
225 personnel are en route to COSVN, while the other two with 25
specialists are being sent to the B-3 Front. All but one of these groups
were detected in the southern part of the infiltration system.
3. Since mid-December, 61 special-purpose groups with more than
2,000 personnel -virtually all of them en route to South Vietnam -- have
been detected moving southward in the infiltration pipeline. This is the
largest number of specialists observed infiltrating since March 1973 when
some 2,000 personnel were sent south. About one-fourth of the recent
special-purpose infiltration has been high-ranking civilian and military cadre,
and most of the remainder are civilian administrative and other types of
skilled personnel. The commitment of this many specialists since
mid-December indicates that one of Hanoi's primary goals continues to be
the rebuilding of the Communist political apparatus in South Vietnam.
4. The level of combat infiltration thus far in the present dry season
is 19,000 fewer than during the 1972-73 cycle. Moreover, despite recent
increases in the movement of troops to South Vietnam, almost 60% of
the troops who have left North Vietnam since 1 September have been sent
to southern Laos and contiguous border areas. The shift of infiltration away
from those areas in recent weeks, however, suggests that the North
Vietnamese now are focusing on their mid-November plan to increase
infiltration through southern Laos to COSVN and the B-3 Front. Of the
12,500 troops who have started toward these areas since then, at least $,000
already have passed through or are now transiting the Laotian Panhandle.
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Comparative Starts of Troops
from l4orth Vletnaen, by L3estination
t September - 8 Jaauary
t
Total
972-73 1
58,000
973-7~
39,000
MR Tri-Thien-Hue
i 8,500
?,000
13R S
7,000
x,000
B-3 Front
g,Opp
5,000
COSVh
13,500
7,500
Southern Laos/MR 559
1-0,000
"'2,500
Redeptcrynrents
5. The first significant withdrawal of North Vietnamese combat
troops from northern Laos since the cease-fire occurred during December
1973. According to CQMINT, the Headquarters of the NVA 316th Infantry
Division and two of its subordinate regiments -the 88th and 148t1i --
moved from the Plaine des Jarres area. of Laos into adjacent Nghe An
Province of North Vietnam. The redeployment of these combat units marks
the first time since late 1967 that there has not been an integral NVA
division in northern Laos. Currently, the 174th Regiment of the 316th
Division and two other independent infantry regiments -- 335th and
866th -are still operating in the Plaine des Jarres area. The 316th Division
withdrawals probably reflect, in part, some satisfaction by the North
Vietnamese with the Laos cease-fire accords and a North Vietnamese belief
that their position in northern Laos can be maintained with fewer troops.
6. COMINT of 6 January has located the NVA. 174th Infantry
Regiment: of the NVA 5th Division in western Quang Duc Province of
Military Region 2. Located in eastern Tay Ninh Province of MR 3 as
recently as 10 December 1973, the regiment - with 1,000 troops -
complements the movement of the 205th and 271st Regiments and other
supporting sapper and armor elements to Quang Duc Province during the
last quarter of 1973. With this deployment, there is now a Communist
divisional equivalent of combat forces, totaling same 4,000 to 5,000 men,
in the province. The Communists` decision to deploy another combat
regiment into hiR 2 appears to have been: far the purpose of providing
additional protection for the new western supply corridor which will transit
Quang Duc Province into northern MR 3. Map 515529 shows the current
distribution of Communist and South Vietnamese combat forces by military
region.
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Communist and South Vietnamese:: Regular Combat Forces in South; Vietnam
YC/NVA
- MR1
VC/NVA RVNAF
32Sth
324B
304th
7:1.,1 th
2nd "
89,000.:-
VNM~
Airborne
lst
2nd
3rd
Regional
Forces
MR 2
1. Lricluc~es VC'Jl~1VA personnel in ground combat;
combat support, and air defense units and local force
companies and platoons:
~, _R~r[yAF' Cramnd -Order pf Battle':- Includes
assigned persorineT in ARVN/VNMC ground combat
and combat support units, and Regional Foxee
battalions Alt7ough present for duty atr~ngth is n
fox~ge~ available it is estimated to be about i35% of
assigneti~stxcngth. ,
rMR 3
MR4
VC/N1tA R VNAF
1'st 21St
9th
7th.:
Vc/NVA
35;000
320th..
10th
3rd _
R VNAF
.`68,000: -
23rd
22nd
Regional
Forces
Quang
Nam '~
~.-..
~.~
Quang
(?
r?1 r-
VC/NVA R VNAI`
egiona
7th ' R 1
429th Sapper 25th
Cornmarid .18th
9th 5th
~ 1
Long
Lam Dong '~ `
Tay Ninh Binh'
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Binh
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hon9 _ is ff
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yAn Giang Spe~~ ~~?~.~ong~ (( ~.
~ ?~?~\''~'~;-"`h Long Kien Ho,a`, CAPITAL, SPECIAk. ~f1N~
'~ ?~Phon9~ `~ r
Klen Dinh Vinh
Giang SZf \?y~\ Bir~
Chuong ~._
Thien,/ Ba \.
M7i~ary regiQ
\.~ ~ .,.. y X u e n .-.
Y _ ~It ~f A
y Bac ~.f/ MR ?! ~..
Province 6oaa
Lieu ._~' ~ _ `~~
ICG~ region 6
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Pleiku ~ ~. ~
1 ~~..~
~~
.\
~?-?-?-~,? Binh Dinh
~ 1
Phu Bon ~ Yen
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a = International Commission
of Control and Supervision
region boundary
Road
.,__,_~. Railroad
POL pipeline
0 25 50 75 Miles
~1 I~
0 25 50 75 Kilometers
Names end boundary represents Lion
era no! necessarily authoritative
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l0. Recent reconnaissance over the Communist highlands supply
corridor extending along the western border of South Vietnam showed light
vehicle movement, with construction and repair activity also noted. These
repairs and. improvements will prepare: the corridor for the heary use
expected after the current rainy season ends next month. In the same area,
COMINT also reflected a light level of logistic activity which appeared to
be related to road repair or local supply distribution..
11. The North Vietnamese have significantly escalated their logistic
support to the Khmer Communists fKC). A series of intercepted
KC messages since late December indicates that the North Vietnamese have
initiated tl~e delivery of 904 tons of material and ?9b trucks to the KC --
by far the largest transfer ever noted. - in exchange for the KC sale of
5,000 tons of rice to the North 'Vietnamese. To date, three shipments -
received by the KC between 23 and 29 December -- have been observed,
comprising 9? trucks and 156 tons of ammunition, small arms and
e;rcw-served weapons, explosives, and communications equipment. The
KC messages also indicate that the North Vietnamese have agreed to help
with the countrywide distribution of t}iese supplies in return for certain
transit rights through southwestern Cambodia.
1'_. The first deliveries probably will start to find their way into the
hands of KC line units within a few weeks. Together with existing stocks
in forward positions and rear area warehouses, this new materiel should
allow the KC to sustain anticipated offensive activity through the dry season
with few shortages. In fact, commanders in several key regions have been
authorized to form a total of about ''_0 new battalions as a result of these
deliveries. Moreover, the influx of the trucks should greatly enhance the
KC's ability to resupply their units in the field.., a prominent shortcoming
during their offensive against Phnom Penh last summer.
The 1973-74 Dry Season Supply Effort
13. The Communists' 1973-74 dry season supply effort is now in full
swing and in many ways it is similar in scope and intensity to that of
previous years. As in past dry seasons, the supply push is a major effort
which will go far beyond merely replt~cing the supplies consumed by
Communist forces within South Vietnarh during the past several months.
Stockpiles of all categories of supplies will be augmented. Since early
November, for example, Communist units in tl~-e Vinh area have handled
~ibout 5,000 tons of ordnance -based on planned delivery schedules --
including ammunition for virtually every weapon in the Communists'
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arsenal. The Communist supply movements into Laos from southern North
Vietnam probably will peak in the next month or so as January and
February have been the traditional period for maximum input into Laos.
Beyond February the emphasis will shift to the delivery of supplies to South
Vietnam and Cambodia.
14. The 1973/74 effort, however, probably will fall somewhat short
of last year's campaign. Once it became evident that acease-fire was near
during October 1972, Hanoi's logisticians began an unprecedented drive to
move goods south before the actual signing of the agreement. During
November and December 1972 alone, the North Vietnamese moved at least
20,000 tons of ordnance southward through Vinh, a figure that was not
matched this fall.
15. Some other trends probably will emerge in the months ahead.
Although no final destination has been revealed for most of the cargo
moving in Laos, a substantial part of it will probably go to the COSVN
area. These forces have not been supplied through Laos since late last spring;
consequently, stockpiles in MRs 3 and 4 are much smaller than in other
areas of the country. Communist forces in MRs 1 and 2 received large
quantities of supplies over the western supply corridor during the summer
and fall and are in a much stronger position logistically than the Communist
forces in the southern half of the country.
II. Communist-Initiated Combat Activity
in South Vietnam and Laos
16. In South Vietnam the total number of Communist-initiated
cease-fire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since
27 January 1973, since 15 June 1973, and for
(2-8 January 1974) are shown below:
the past week
Military
Region
Total Since
27 January
Cease-fire
Total Since
15 June
Cease-fire
Last Week
(2-8 Jan 74)
Major
Minor
Major
Minor
Major
Minor
Total
4,418
29,355
2,049
15,400
50
(57)1
456 (606)1
MR 1
1,552
5,679
527
2,320
12
46
MR 2
732
4,852
468
2,998
6
108
MR 3
679
5,141
277
2,565
13
71
MR 4
1,455
13,683
777
7,517
19
231
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17. Some of these violations may have been initiated by South
Vietnamese forces rather than Communist farces, and it is impossible in
all cases to determine the actual instigator. The tabulation above and the
charts following the Annex, however, show fairly accurately the trend in
the amount of combat that has occurred in Soutlt Vietnam since the
cease?firc. The fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular time
and place is generally reported accurately by the South Vietnamese, even
though the question of who started it may not always be treated objectively.
Operational reports since 19 December, however, have attempted to
distinguish between Communist and friendly-initiated violations. Only those
violations designated as Communist-initiated are reported in the above
tabulation.
18. There was no significant military activity in Laas during the past
week.
III. Other Developments Affecting Communist Military
Capabilities in Indochina
Results of Rccerrt PfrotogroPhy of North Vietnarrr
19.
photo mission over North Vietnam shows a substantial increase since
in tanks parked in several cleared areas located some 20 miles
south of Thanlt Hoa. This latest photography showed a total of 103 armored
vehicles - 85 light and medium tanks, 12 armored. personnel carriers (APC),
and 6 unidentified vehicles - in three cleared areas, tom ared with 47 tanks
and 17 APCs in two areas DIA interpretation
of the same area confirms a siza c increase in total armored vehicles
observed but only a slight increase in tltc: tank taunt over
photography. The DIA count of 95 armored vehicles inclu es tan cs,
14 APCs, anal. 22 unidentified. and ~ possible armored vehicles. The nearby
Coflg Phu rail spur, the probable offloading point for these vehicles, showed
no activity Coverage of both the Thanlt Iiaa and Vinh
rail yards, north and south of Cong Phu, revealed no evidence of armored
vehicles, precluding any identification of the possible origin of tltc additional
tanks now parked near Cong Phu. Initial signs of construction of several
permanent structures and possible water wells in the tank storage areas
suggest that these areas may develop into a permanent armor training
facility.
?(}. (photographs revealed
some 20 Soviet ZSU-2311 self-propelled antiaircraft artillery (AAA) guns
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in a training area 9 miles west of Ninh &inh. This is the largest number
ever photographed in the country and the farthest south the weapon has
ever been noted. The quadmourited 23-mm ZSU-23-4 with on-carriage fire
control has been nated in North Vietnam since mid-1972. It is the country's
most sophisticated AAA weapon. The ZSU-23-4 may be assigned to a few
AAA regiments in the North Vietnamese Panhandle in the near future, but
thus far there is no indication that it will be deployed elsewhere in
Indochina.
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INFILTRATION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE PERSONNEL
TO THE SOUTH
1. Between 4 and 8 January, Groups 2043, 2054, and 3010 were
noted in the Binh Tram (BT) 8 area near Vinh, starting toward COSVN
and the B-3 Front. Each of these groups had a strength of more than 500
troops. The detection of Group 2043 indicates that some 1,500 additional
troops in Groups 2040, 2041, and 2042 have already been dispatched or
will soon start the journey south. On 7 January, Groups 3091, 3092, 3093,
3094, and 3095 were detected in the Group 472 area of the Laotian
Panhandle. These designators are far out of numerical sequence with other
recently observed 3xxx-series groups, and, although they may have been
reported incorrectly, the groups are considered to be valid. In addition,
one special-purpose group -- M356 with some 22 personnel -was detected
at BT 8, while seven other small groups with a total strength of 228 were
observed in the Group 472 area - M234, M239, M254, M259, M354, Y240,
and Y256.
2. Since the 15 June "second cease-fire," some 49,000 North
Vietnamese have infiltrated southward, including some 44,000 combat
troops and nearly 5,000 specialists. Since the 27 January Paris Agreement,
more than 99,000 personnel have infiltrated southward, including more than
88,000 combat troops and nearly 11,000 specialists. Over 74,000 have
started south since 27 January, while 25,000 were in the pipeline moving
southward as of that date. The following table shows the number of North
Vietnamese infiltrators starting south, by month and destination, since
1 January 1973. Number of Troops Entering the 1'ipellne Destined
for South Vietnam, Southern Leos, and Cambodia
S'incc (January 19731
COSVN
B-3 Front
MRS
MR Tri-
Thien-Hue
Southern Laos/
MR 559
Total
Total
20,500
10,500
9,000
!4,000
26,500
80,SOU
1973
Jan
7,000
5,000
4,000
2,500
...
18,500
Feb
5,000
500
....
1,500
1,000
8,000
Mar
....
...
....
1,000
....
1,000
Apr
I ,000
....
....
....
...
1,0On
May
...
....
....
7,000
...
7,000
Jun
....
....
....
..,.
1,500
1,500
Jul
...
....
3,000
....
....
3,000
Aug
....
....
....
...,
1,500
1,500
Sep
....
....
2,000
2,000
3,000
7,000
Oct
....
....
....
....
14,000
14,000
Nov
1,000
1,000
....
....
5,500
7,500
Dec
3,500
1,000
....
....
....
4,500
1974
Jan 1.8
3,000
3,000
...
....
...
6,000
1. Excludes special-purposo personnel. The totals are rounded to the nearest 500.
11
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4LHJL'~1~tL ~IULF1 I Iu11J In ~uu 1 n
~fIETt~AM A~ R~P'0#TED BY RYNAF
f 28 IANUARY TI{ROOGN 31 IDLY 19131
lAN?FEB zoo
MAR
APR
MAY
lUN
zoa
a
zoo
lUl
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AUG '??
SEP ~??
OCT ~??
NOV '??
CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH
VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF
(1 AUGUST 1913 TO THE PRESENT)
200 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2~1 30 31
lAH ~??
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Secret
Secret
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