COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080066-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 12, 2009
• Sequence Number: 66
• Publication Date: February 6, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
NSA review completed
Communist Violations of the Vietnam
and Laos Settlement Agreements
and Related Developments
Secret
Copy No. ~~
DIA Review
Completed.
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6 February 1974
Forty-Ninth Report
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS
(This report covers the week from
30 January through S February 1974)
The Key Points
? The recent hzll in troop infiltration appears over as four new
regular groups were detected starting south during the week
and Hanoi apparently intends to send some 11,000 troops
during February.
? The NVA 9th Infantry Regiment is relocating from southern
Laos to Pleiku Province in South Vietnam's MR 2. I,n,
addition, a North Vietnamese infantry regiment has
withdrawn from Quarfg Tri Province to southern Quang Binh
Province.
? After a slowdown during the Tet holiday, North Vietnamese
1o~,istic activity in Indochina returned to its normal dry
season level last week.
? Increased construction activity has been observed in noz?thern
Laos. The North Vietnamese are building more permanent
structures and improving the road fretwork in the Plaine des
Jarres area.
~' This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Department of Defense.
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This report is the forty-ninth in a series summarizing evidence received
dr.rring the reporting period of (I) Communist efforts to infiltrate new
manpower and military supplies toward and into South Vietnam,
(II) Comnnruist-initiated combat activity in violatipn of the Vietnam and.
Laos settlement agreements, and (III) other developments affecting
Comrnunisl military capabilities in Indochina.
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1,,
1
I. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese
.Personnel and Military Supplies
Personnel In filtrextian
1. The recent lull in Communist troop infiltration is apparently over;
four new regular groups were detected. last week moving southward in the
system. Three of these groups, which have an estimated total strength of
carne 1,500 troops, are traveling to the COSVN area while the fourth, with
about 600 troops, is en route to the B-3 Front. All the groups were
detected at Binh Tram (BT) 8 near Vinh, North Vietnam. In addition, eight
special-purpose groups totaling more than 450 personnel were reported in
a BT 8 message on 2 February. All of the groups bore "C" prefixes --
a designator seen for the first time several weeks ago. Personnel in these
groups appear to be high-ranking and were identified as belonging to the
"Unification Section," suggesting they may be associated with. North
Vietnam's reunification effort.
2. In addition to the infiltration groups detected last -week, a
~0 January message from BT $ to its subordinate elements instructed them
to prepare to process at least one regular group every other day during
February. If this schedule is followed, some 11,000 troops would transit
the BT $ area this month, substantiating tho mid-November projgetiQn by
the North Vietnamese for monthly infiltration to the 13-3 Front and
COSVN.
3. In other infiltration activity, five regular groups (3091 through
3095), first detected in southern Laos in early January en route to the
B-3 Front, have been identified as the 9th Regiment of the
NVA 968th Division. At least some of these groups, which bear unique
designators probably assigned by NVA, Military Region 559, already have
grossed into Pleiku Province (see section on unit deployments). Because
the 9th Regiment moved from southern Laos into South Vietnam and
therefore does not represent infiltration from North Vietnam, our estimate
of infiltration starts to the B-3 Front -- shown in the table below -- was
reduced by 2,000 troops. As a result of the detection of one new regular
group destined for this area as noted in paragraph 1, however, the net
reduction from last week's figure is 1,500 troops.
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Comparative Starts of Troops
from I-tartll Vietnam, by Destination
t September - 5 February
Total 7 3 ,5tH1 47,5(}0
MR Tri-T11ien-Hue 18,500 2,00(?
MRS 9,000 '',0(10
B-3 Front 14,000 5,500
cosv~t zz,?o? [ s,s0o
Southern Laos/MR 559 10,000 22,500
Red~plo}~nr~rtts
yt11 1V VA Regirrrent Moritlg to Central fligltlartds
4. COMINT has confirmed previous indications that the North
Vietnamese 9th Infantry Regiment, 868th Division, is relocating from
sou thorn Laos to the central Highlands area of South Vietnam (see the
22 January report}. In addition to the equation of five 3xxx infiltration
groups with the movement of the 9tH Regiment, the Headquarters of the
regiment's 1st Battalion was located on 1 Fcbnaary in western Pleiku
Province. The deployment of tllc 9tH Regiment - which should be
completed shortly -- increases Communist regular combat strength in
MR ? by some '',000 men. The. relatively high strength of the regiment
suggests that it had 6cen reinforced from Sxxx series infiltrators sent to
southern Laos earlier this dry season. With the 9tH Regiment's move, the
Communists will have an increased capahility to oppose any South
Vietnamese incursions along tlteir strategic supply route in western South
Vietnam (see map nn Communist and South 'Vietnamese Combat Forces
in South Vietnam).
Withdrawal of Another NVA Irlfaratry R~egirraetlt
fro~rl Narthertt Sotrtlt Vic~t~Iarrt
5. The 270B NVA Independent Infantry Regiment has relocated
from northern M R 1 to southernl Quang Binh Province in North Vietnam
aild is now subordinate to the newly reconstituted 341st Disivion (see the
l9 December 1973 report). Analysis of recent COMINT indicates that tile.
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Communist and South Vietnamese Regular Combat Forces in South Vietnam
Regular Combat Forces
VC'/N V.4
VC/NVA 1
R VNAF'-
86,000
186,000
372,000
325th
324B
304th
711th
2nd3
1.
Includes
VC/NVA
personnel in
673rd AAA
ground
combat, combat support, and air defense units and
local force companies and platoons.
2. RVNAF Ground Order of Battle. Includes
assigned personnel in ARVN/VNMC ground
combat and combat support units, and Regional
Force battalions. Although present for duty
strength is no longer available, it is estimated to
be about 85% of assigned strength.
3. Only one infantry regiment subordinate to
MR4
VC/NVA R VNA F
24,000 97,000
21St
9th
7th
MR3
Y'C'/N ~ r1 R V.N,4 F
9th 25th
7th 18th
5th 5th
77th AAA Regional
429th Sap Cmd Forces
69th Arty Cmd
VNMC
Airborne
1st
2nd
3rd
Regional
Forces
~~Demercetion Line
J
r.?~ 'Dinh Tuon
~~
'yAn l7lanQt? sp'Z' "'~ ~~'?L.~ono
CAPITAL SPECIAL
'~( ?~Vlnh lony~ Klan. Hoe
. .~
(ilany S1?~ ~., j `?,~ Binh
Chuonp
~~~. Thtenf./~ ge
+~ ...-.,J Xuyen ,
I (..f/
eac 1VIR 4
'
Llsu_
~
l
'~
an
Xuya
V~~
Milkary region boundary
_, Province boundary
~ . ICCS region boundary
0 25 50 75 Milee
ITZT"-J
0 25 50 75 Kilometers
25X1
25X1
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regiment withdrew from Quang Tn Province during the latter part of 1973
and was subordinated to the 341st Division in late December -permitting
identification of the division as an infantry unit. With the 270B Regiment
now located near the division headquarters in Quang Binh Province,
Communist regular combat strength in MR 1 has been reduced by
2,000 rnen. The 341st Infantry Division now consists of three regiments --
the 31st, 32nd, and 270B -with some 6,000 troops. Although the unit
is not currently targeted against northern South Vietnam, it could, if needed,
move south quickly to reinforce Communist forces there.
Movement of lylilitary Cquipmejrt arld Sripplies February 1974
6. Following last weeks slowdown caused by the Tet Holiday,
Communist logistic activity gradually returned to its previous level during
this reporting period. On 30 January, BT 8 at Vinh ordered subordinate
elements at the Cho Si Railroad Station to assemble more than 800 tons
of cargo for shipment farther south, including at least seven tons of I30-mm
artillery ammunition and 70 tons of construction materials. Three days
later, on Z February, logistic units at Vinh reported receiving 50 tons of
ordnance, including some 20 tons of small arms and 30 tons of antiaircraft
weapons. On 5 February, a storage facility north of Vinh reported it had
received 11 railcars from a logistic unit at Thanh Hoa on 4 February
carrying 145 tons of ammunition, including 108 tons of 57-rnm antiaircraft
ammunition and 12 37-mm artillery pieces.
7. Farther south, between Quang Klle and the DNIZ, BT 26 was
involved in fairly heavy post-Holiday logistic activity. On 28 January an
element of BT 2G reported that it Hard sonic 2l0 tons of cargo in storage,
most of which was weapons, and that 100 tons were to be sent out shortly.
During the next three days, BT 2b reportedly received at Ieast 150 tons
of cargo from train and barge shipments and dispatched an equal amount
of goods. Finally, on 3 February, COMINT indicated that BT ?6 sent
another 1 SO tans of unidentified cargo.
8. In Laos, COMINT and photography reflected heavy truck traffic
along tl~e length of the Communists' now ,dual-lane supply corridor. During
the period 28-31 January, COMINT indicated that logistic units along the
southern part of the corridor had Handled at least 650 vehicles. In most
cases, no information was provided on what was being carried in the trucks,
although one message did specify that 78 vehicles were carrying fuel.
9. Aerial reconnaissance over the Panhandle
generally confirmed what was seen in COMIPdT. During most of the
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reporting period, photography showed 100-200 trucks moving daily
between Moung Nong and the tri-border area. Traffic was fairly equally
divided between northward and southward movements, lppar4ntly
indicating that the vehicles are delivering their cargo and then returning
for more goods. Coverage during the week also showed that Route 9 from
Tchepone to the Khe 5anh area in South Vietnam is in good condition
and sustaining heavy traffic.
10. In other activity, logistic units may have begun- cargo shipments.
through the Mu Gia Pass on the North Vietnam/~,aos border to storage
areas located along Route 12 for future shipment through the Laotian
Panhandle. A 29 January intercept disclosed that 23 vehicles would move
through the Mu Gia Pass, including 10 trucks carrying weapons. Plans for
supply shipments through this area were noted in early December, when
MR 559 instructed the 14th Engineering Regiment to open the road
throu the Pass. The road through Mu Gia Pass is motorable, although
photographic coverage of it does not show any recent upgrading
(see the. map on transportation).
11. For the first time in several weeks, photography .over the
Communists' western supply corridor in northern South Vietnam, provided
information on the level of logistic activity in this area
photography showed 24 trucks south of I~he 5anh on Communist
.Route 14. According to the field read-out, the road is in good condition
and shows signs of considerable traffic. Farther south on this road,
11 trucks were seen near the A Shau Valley. This section
of the road was also reported in good condition and supporting moderate
traffic, according to field analysis.
1 ~. In the months ahead the Communists will probably make greater
use of this s~.tpply corridor. Since October, heavy rains have -made movement
along the northern part of the corridor difficult, and oply during the past
few weeks- has the weather along this route improved.- wring the past
6 months, however, North Vietnamese engineering units have expended
considerable energy on maintaining the road and lessening the damage from
the rains, suggesting that the North Vietnamese Intend to make heavy use
of this corridor as soon as they are able.
13. (photography indicates that the Communists are
conducting extensive logistic activity between southern Laos and
northeastern Cambodia. Coverage showed 74 large and
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medium-sited boats on the Tonle Kong River between Attopeu, Laos, and
Stung Treng, Cambodia. Thirty-two of these were moving supplies
southward. into Cambodia, while the other 42, which were empty, were
either moored or traveling northward. An additional 10 large boats were
noted on the Mekong River between Stung Treng and Kratie -three moving
southward. with supplies and seven moving northward empty.
14. The only road in northeastern Cambodia that was noted in
photography as being active was Route. 19, which runs eastward from Stung
Treng to the central highlands of Vietnam. The road was supporting
moderate traffic, and four loaded trucks were observed moving eastward.
Another 10 empty trucks were traveling west.
I5. The logistic activity in Caslibodia apparently is connected with
the North Vietnamese agreement to deliver 900 tons of materiel and
296 vehicles to the Khmer Communists (KC) in exchange for 5,000 tons
of rice. The level of southward movement on the Tonle Fong and Mekong
Rivers is consonant with the magni#udc of North Vietnamese aid deliveries,
and the waterborne logistic system in the a~a reportedly has supplemented
the movement of vehicles in the past. The eastward. movement on Route 19
coincides with previous KC messages which indicated that the KC rice
shipments would be going to the North Vietnamese B-3 Front located in
the central highlands.
16. The ultimate disposition of the North Vietnamese aid deliveries
remains unclear. KC messages have detailed. the planned allocation of
materiel to regional authorities, but intercepted KC timetables and the lack
of observed activity on logistic corridors leading toward the "front lines"
from Kratie and Stung 'Treng suggest that internal KC deliveries probably
started subsequent to the photographic coverage.
II. Communist-Initiated Combat Activity
in South. Vietnam and Laos
17. In South Vietnam tl~e total number of Communist-initiated
cease-fire violations reported. by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since
27 January 1.973, since 15 June 1973, and for the past week
(30 January-5 Nebruary 1974) are shown below:
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~:. Paksa~ Pass ~orfh VIIE'fnr'7/1] I rasa tp ~ ita3
Fla Tinh
Nakho
Phaniu
New Communist Supply Corridors
(The Communists have designated
the route wiThin South Vietnam as
~'! a'',j
~'Warin
Cham rap
Sa Huynh
1fliE^$f7r~117
i Me
~huot
South Vietnam
and
North Vietnam Panhandle
,..m.,,.....,?_. Province boundary
Military region
~, :.~:. International Commission
of Control and Supervision
region boundary
Road
,~ Railroad
POL pipeline
0 25 50 75 Miles
-~ r I
0 25 ' 50 75 Kilometers
Nam send boundary representation
are nor necessarily authorirafi ve
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Total Since Total Since Last Wcek
Military 27 !an 1973 1 S dun 1973 (30 !an
Region Cease-fire Cease-Ore 5 Feb 1974)
Major Minor Major Minor Major Minor
Total 4,65$ 31,232 2,287 17,277 59 (33)1 437 {402)1
MR 1 1,569 5,783 544 2,424 3 19
MR 2 804 5,160 540 3,30$ t 5 88
NIR 3 730 5,30~J 328 2,733 22 47
MR 4 1,553 14,980 875 8,814 19 283
1 Figures in parertthescs denote totals or the previous week.
18. Some of these violations may have been initiated by South
Vietnamese forces rather than Communist forces, and it is impossible in
all cases 'to determine the. actual. instigator. The tabulation above, however,
shows fairly accurately the tn;nd in the amount of combat that has occurred
in South Vietnam since the cease-fire, The fact 'that a combat incident
occurred at a particular time and place is genecally reported accurately by
the South Vietnam~:se, even though the question of who started it may
not always be treated objectively. Operational n=ports since 19 Dt:cember,
however, have attempted to distinguish between violations initiated by
Communist and friendly forces. Only those violations designated as
Communist-initiated are reported in the above tabulation.
19. There was no signi[icant military activity in Laos during the past
week.
II[. Other Ueveloptnents Affecting Communist MiBitary
Capabilities in Indochina
Commtsttist Constrttrtion ~Jc~.l~tty In 1d/ort~tern Lctos
20. Aerial reconnaissance during 9anuary shows that Communist
construction crews have been active in northern Laos as well as in the
southern Panhandle. In the Plainc des Jarres area, North Vietnamese and
Pathet Lao forces have almost completed. an extensive program to construct
permanent barracks and storage and support buildings alol~g the primary
route stntcture leading between the North Vietnam border and major towns
on the Plainc. "['ht; majority of the new stnlctures observed under
construction appeared complete on photography of
_ t_. __s., Lt:..t~..,.~
i ,ice. v"........~ '"
bivouac and storage areas and are generally arranged. in clusters of 8 to
20 units.
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21. Communist road crews have also restored and improved much
of the main road network on the Plaine. The amount of truck traffic rising
east-west Route 7 increased from a light volume in November to a moderate
level during December and late January, with the direction of travel
primarily westward- from North Vietnam. For example, 27 of the 34 trucks
observed moving on Route 7 on 27 December were headed west with
cargoes of oil drums, sacks, and other materials. Recent COMINT has
reflected the movement of considerable numbers of weapons and
ammunition as well as large amounts of petroleum to BT 11 in central
North Vietnam. BT 11 is the controlling authority for logistic movements
to nothern Laos via Route 7.
2?. The photography also showed recent large shipments of petroleum
and other supplies into the Plaine. Several reactivated and improved storage
areas along Routes 7/71 contained numerous stacks of crated supplies as
More significantly, a large part of
the new construction activity apparently is for developing petroleum storage
capacity. To this end, more than 40 buildings have been erected along newly
constructed spur roads -- apparently for storage of oil drums. Two such
areas are located several miles from the newly built airstrip at Phong Savari
and about 20 miles from the recently restored airfield at Xiangkhoang.
23. As in other North Vietnamese controlled areas of Laos and South
Vietnam, great efforts have been made since the cease-fire to improve logistic
routes from North Vietnam. In each case, new petroleum pipelines acid
petroleum storage facilities have; been constructed to support an irlcrcasingly
mechanized North Vietnamese military structure. In the case of northern
Laos, some of the efforts associated with petroleum apparently are to
support cargo and VIP aircraft flights.
24. Photography of North Vietnam (showed a record
number of occupied surface-to-air missile (SAMj sites, including thirty-two
SA-2 sites. Moreover, CIA analysis indicates 11 SA-3 sites also were,
occupied; DOD analysis indicates only six occupied SA-3 sites plus SA-3
ccluipmcnt -- not considered to ~be in a firing configuration -- at five o1.h~~r
locations. Unlike those for the SA-Zs, all of the SA-3 sites and locations
were concentrated within 30 miles of Hanoi. The caustering of these sites
in the large Xuan Mai and Phuc Yen training areas most likaly means that
the SA-3 system is still undergoing crew training and testing., p~?ior to
deployment as an integrated part of the country's air defense system. On
the basis of analysis of ilanoi's SAM communications, it is esti.niatcd that
there are currently between 44 and 48 firing battalions in the countr
each battalion capable of occu in one site.
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INFILTRATION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE
PERSONNEL TO THE SOUTH
Since the signing of the cease-fire settlement for South Vietnam, more
than 109,000 North Vietnamese troops and specialists have infiltrated
southward. More than 84,000 of this total have started south since
27 January 1.973, while the other 25,000 were moving in the pipeline on
that date. Since l S .Tune l 973, when the original accord was reaffirmed,
more than 58,000 troops and specialists have, been sent south. The following
table shows the number of North Vietnamese troops starting south, by
month and destination, since l January 1973.
Number of Troops Entering the Pipeline Destined
for South Vietnam, Southern Laos, and Cambodia
Since I January 19731
COSVN
B-3 Front
MR 5
MR Tri-
Thien-Hue
Southern Laos/
MR 559
Total
Total
2$,500
11,000
9,000
14,000
26,500
89,000
1973
Jan
7,000
5,000
4,000
2,500
....
18,500
Feb
5,000
500
....
1,500
1,000
8,000
Mar
....
....
....
1,000
....
1,000
Apr
1,000
....
....
....
....
1,000
May
....
....
....
7,000
....
7,000
Jun
....
....
....
....
1,500
1,500
Jul
....
....
3 ,000
....
....
3,000
Aug.
....
...,
....
....
1,500
l ,500
Sep
....
....
2,000
2,000
3,000
7,000
Oci
....
....
....
....
14,000
1.4,000
Nov
1,000
1,000
....
....
5,500
7,500
Dec
3,500
1,000
....
....
....
4,`>00
1.974
Jan
10,000
3,000
....
....
....
1.3,000
Feb 1-5
1,000
500
....
....
....
1,500
1. Excludes special-purpose personnel. The totals are rounded to the nearest 500.
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Secret
Secret
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