RECENT COMMUNIST LOGISTICAL AND MANPOWER DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080075-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2009
• Sequence Number: 75
• Publication Date: March 27, 1973
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
NSA review completed
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Recent Communist Logistical and Manpower
Developments in Indochina
Secret
ER IM 73-19-7
27 March 1973
Copy No. 39
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Recent Communist Logistical
and Manpower Developments in Indochina
During the past week the North Vietnamese continued to implement the third phase
of this dry season's logistic program. However, we have our first tenuous signs that the
infiltration of combat personnel may have come to an end for this dry season.
The heaviest supply activity is concentrated in southern Laos and northern South
Vietnam. Some significant supply activity directed toward both northern Laos and South
Vietnam also continues to be detected in southern North Vietnam.
In Quang Tri Province, rear services units reported on 21 and 22 March
that they had moved 1,100 tons of rice and ordnance, and heavy ordnance
deliveries have continued since then. A major supply effort in the A Shau
Valley area is under way.
In southern Laos, "large convoys" of vehicles are headed south, and one
logistics unit is handling 50 to 60 trucks daily.
The heavy pace of activity is continuing through the tri-border area into
the Central Highlands and south through eastern Cambodia to South
Vietnam.
On the manpower side, the dispatch of infiltrators from North Vietnam appears to
have decreased sharply. A major personnel infiltration support unit in the Laotian
Panhandle may have completed its dry season mission. Some 500 special-purpose personnel
started to move through the system. Highlighting other activity:
The 308th NVA Infantry Division probably had redeployed to North
Vietnam by late January 1973, representing the first known relocation
of a major NVA combat unit out of South Vietnam since the beginning
of the 30 March 1972 Offensive.
An antiaircraft regimental headquarters and its two battalions completed
a post-cease-fire deployment to South Vietnam.
Note: Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcomed. They may be
directed to
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Recent Communist Logistical Developments in Indochina
Logistical Activity in Southern North Vietnam
1. Detected logistic activity in the Vinh area increased somewhat
during the past week but remains at a relatively low level - characteristic
of the traditional pace for this time of year. Intercepted messages from
Binh Tram 18 revealed that supplies are moving both west (toward northern
Laos) and south (toward South Vietnam) from the Vinh area. On 24 March,
it was reported that 50 vehicles carrying more than 150 tons of supplies --
mostly food but also small quantities of ammunition and explosives -- had
been dispatched from Vinh to northern Laos. On 21 March, about 100 tons
of cargo were detected being sent from Vinh southward. An intercept the
day before had revealed that almost 200 tons of cargo, presumably
southbound, were being offloaded from barges in the Binh Tram 25 area
(south of Vinh).
2. A transportation mission involving at least two transshipment
points in the Binh Tram 25 area was discussed several times in enemy
communications during the week. Vehicles were shuttling cargo from the
two points, and it may be that the storage areas were being cleaned out
and supplies consolidated elsewhere. By 22 March, communications revealed
that the cargo at one of the storage areas "has been completely depleted."
3. In the southern North Vietnam Panhandle, elements of Binh
Tram 26 (near Dong Hoi) were engaged in relatively heavy resupply activity.
A series of 21 March intercepts revealed that barges had been dispatched
to a storage area to pick up about 100 tons of rice. The same day,
96 vehicles were noted transiting the Binh Tram's area of operations. Binh
Tram 26 was also noted distributing weapons and equipment to some units.
Adverse weather conditions have been causing some backup of cargo in
the Binh Tram 26 area. On 25 March the Binh Tram revealed that 600 tons
of cargo, including about 45 tons of ordnance and the remainder rice,
remained unloaded from a barge because of the heavy rains. In addition,
because of the rains and resultant slippery road conditions, vehicles were
encountering difficulties in moving cargo out of storage areas.
Logistical Activity in Laos and Cambodia
4. During the past week, substantial quantities of supplies continued
to move into Laos, and there were signs that North Vietnam is preparing
the trail for wet season activity. a 50% increase
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Hang
Bac
Kan
Hoa
Binh
1A
ai Du
Muang~
Khoua
Ng Kf2ai A IL Af N D
North Vietnam
Transportation System
POL pipeline
---~--- Railroad
Road
- - - Trail
0 25 50 75MI1es
0 25 50 75 Kilometers
jfeh yen
101
Vin' Linh
DEMARCATION LINE
VIETNAM
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in southbound movements through the input corridors -- principally the
Ban Karai Pass -- and on 24 March the highest level of
vehicle activity this dry season. Adding to the heavy concentration of
activity at Ban Karai Pass, a flow of supplies west of the DMZ continued
as did a trickle through Mu Gia Pass. (Mu Gia is traditionally the first
cross-border route to close down operations, and it appears to be doing
so now.)
5. The recent surge in southbound detections follows a week to ten
days in which
-:1mnore northbound than southbound movements were counted). It now
appears that the northward bias reflected the return of some of the very
large number of vehicles which entered Laos during the preceding month.
When back, they could pick up more cargo to move south, and the current
return to a southward bias suggests that is what is occurring. Additional
inputs of supplies to Laos should normally dwindle in the next month or
so as the dry season draws toward its finish, but North Vietnam may be
preparing for wet season resupply procedures. Recent photography revealed
some road improvements and bridge building just south of Ban Karai and
pontoon bridges were spotted near Ban Phone.
6. Very heavy resupply activity continues within Laos and Cambodia
as the North Vietnamese implement the third phase of their "General
Transportation Offensive." The current phase - scheduled to last through
May -- is emphasizing supply movements south through Laos and into South
Vietnam.
7. Numerous examples of heavy vehicle activity through the central
Panhandle became available during the week. A 21 March intercept
indicated that a logistical unit in the central Laos Panhandle would handle
50 to 60 trucks "every day." Several intercepts during the past week also
referenced "the large convoys going south toward Group 471." On
24 March, one of the vehicle convoys headed to Group 471 included tanker
vehicles carrying petroleum supplies south. On 21 March, Group 471
reported that it had dispatched 90 vehicles. Two days later, Binh Tram 34
near Ban Bac reported that it was loading eight vehicles with cargo --
possibly including ordnance -- to move south.
8. Some recent intercepts indicate that logistic units in the
Group 472 area are preparing new petroleum storage facilities and providing
hidden storage for other supplies. On 24 March, communications revealed
that trenches were being dug along Routes 29 and 99, and storage tanks
are apparently to be emplaced there. In a bomb-free environment, petroleum
products can be stored in much greater bulk because the threat of explosions
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is greatly diminished. Also, the improvement ? of gasoline storage capabilities
along major routes will ease supply activity. In this connection, recent
communications from the 592nd Engineer Regiment (responsible for
maintaining the petroleum pipeline which enters Laos west of the DMZ)
revealed that preparations were under way to pump fuel to a storage facility,
probably within Group 472's area. Also along Route 99, a "work project"
is currently under way, which involves the dispersing and hiding of some
cargo. Several weeks ago the North Vietnamese were anticipating inspection
teams in the central Panhandle, and this campaign could reflect those
expectations.
9. Vehicle activity remains heavy in the southern Laos/Cambodia
border area. On 23 March, for example, a subordinate of Group 470
reported that 77 vehicles were "on the roads." Vehicles are transporting
cargo from both Binh Tram 37 near the tri-border area and Binh Tram 51
in eastern Cambodia to the B-3 Front, and the supplies on route continue
to include significant quantities of ammunition. Supply movements in the
Group 470 area are proceeding by boat as well as by truck. Transportation
has been hindered to some extent in the Group 470 area by the recent
very sharp increase in US bombing in Cambodia, but for the most part
widespread logistical activity from the southern Laos border to the widely
spaced border crossing points along the Cambodia/ southern South Vietnam
border continues to be noted by aerial observers. On 13 March, Group 470
reported that the "enemy" had carried out reconnaissance missions and
had concentrated strikes on its roads, bridges, and storage facilities. As a
result, units were exhorted to keep the roads open to ensure vehicle traffic.
10. The pattern of current vehicle traffic flows through eastern
Cambodia is normal for this time of year. Route 97/975 is supporting the
bulk of cross-border traffic entering Cambodia. A major share is moving
eastward onto Route 19 to the B-3 Front rear support area located astride
the border of South Vietnam's MR 2. South of Stung Treng, vehicles have
switched to a newly built road paralleling Route 13. The new road, which
is well canopied, provides better protection from aerial surveillance and a
more direct route to border base areas opposite MR 3.
11. Waterways are also being used to move supplies despite low water
levels and hazards. Some obstacles apparently have been cleared and channel
markers emplaced to guide vessels through some shallow sections. Some
supplies are moving on the Tonle San River near the Cambodia/South
Vietnam border, in addition to those moving on the Tonle Kong and
Mekong. On the Mekong the VC/NVA are said to be employing some
30 flat-bottom motorboats, each capable of carrying 2 to 3 tons, to move
ammunition and medical supplies from Kratie to offloading points below
Chhlong. From Kratie, Chhlong, and other staging areas near the river,
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Binh Tram Locations in Military Region 559
Ban Karai
?Pass
36 1~
nlocated
Group 471
46
Unlocat
em Pang
X1941
CAMBODIA
53
I i Stun Treoa~
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supply shipments proceed toward southern South Vietnam via roads into
Snuol, Mimot, and Krek, all of which are reportedly being used to funnel
supplies and equipment into South Vietnam.
Logistical Activity in South Vietnam
12. High levels of resupply activity continue in northern South
Vietnam. Rear services elements report that 1,100 tons of rice and ordnance
were being shipped between unidentified points in Quang Tri Province on
21 and 22 March. A number of intercepted messages from Binh Tram 12,
in northern Quang Tri Province, showed that it is heavily involved in the
effort. On 20 March, for example, an element of Binh Tram 12 revealed
that it had delivered at least 130 tons of ammunition the previous day.
Two days later, 46 trucks of one transportation battalion moved supplies --
including at least 60 tons of ammunition -- through the Binh Tram's area.
The largest effort detected came on 25 March when elements of the Binh
Tram handled 200 tons of ordnance. In addition, a large quantity of supplies
is moving south from the Quang Tri area. On 23 March a logistic entity
reported receiving 78 vehicles from Binh Tram 12 and other units -- most
of the 250 tons of supplies they carried were weapons and ammunition.
13. Heavy activity was also apparent in the western sector of MR 1.
On 20 March, Binh Tram 41, whose area of responsibility extends roughly
from Khe Sanh to the A Shau Valley and spills over into Laos, reported
that 70 vehicles had transited its area, half moving north and half south.
Aerial photography during the week showed continued heavy use of roads
all around Khe Sanh and south toward the A Shau Valley. At Khe Sanh,
a newly occupied SAM site -- two SA-2
missiles on launchers, radar, and other support equipment were observed
at the new site. Three previously installed sites remained unoccupied. A
major Communist supply push into and in the A Shau Valley is also
apparent from both photography and COMINT. On Route 922, the main
feeder road into the A Shau from Laos, 50 trucks were seen in
photography. The same day, COMINT revealed that Binh Tram 42, which
operates in the Laotian border/A Shau area and on Route 922, received
vehicles carrying more than 190 tons of weapons, ammunition, and
explosives. In the northern A Shau, seven storage areas, newly constructed
since the end of February and containing 32 buildings, were observed along
Route 616. Signs of recent activity were evident, and stocks of supplies
are stored openly.
14. Further significant improvements to roads into the coastal
lowlands of southern MR I were detected during the past week. In eastern
Quang Tin Province, a new segment of road leading south from Route 534
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 Udon
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region boundary
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Binh
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has been sighted by air observers. Route 534 has been used extensively
to move supplies from Laotian border base areas to the NVA 711th
Division -- including recently, 30 armed vehicles. Farther south, new
construction activity is continuing along the new Communist road through
western Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces, and visual reconnaissance
recently revealed a 17-truck convoy on the eastern part of the road.
15. In the Central Highlands of MR 2, the Communists have, since
early March, constructed numerous ammunition caches along Route 19 in
Pleiku Province.
16. The pace of Communist logistic activity remains brisk in South
Vietnam's MR 3, particularly in northeastern Tay Ninh Province, where
new road construction links the Route 246/244 system in Tay Ninh with
Route 7 near Mimot, Cambodia. The new road is reportedly now being
used to move rice stockpiled around Mimot into South Vietnam. West of
Saigon, Communist units reportedly are preparing to receive additional
supplies of modern weapons from Cambodia.
Recent Manpower Developments in Indochina
Personnel Infiltration
17. There are tentative signs that Hanoi may be bringing its dry season
infiltration program to a close. There have been no reports of regular
infiltration groups leaving from North Vietnam since 4 March -- when
intercepted messages indicated that two combat groups were to transit Vinh
on 10 and 11 March. There are now some preliminary reports that at least
one battalion of a major infiltration support unit in the Laotian Panhandle --
the 574th NVA Communications-Liaison Regiment -- has completed its dry
season mission. Recent intercepts indicate that the unit will receive no more
southbound "individual troops or groups." If the same is true of the
regiment's other subordinates, it would probably signal the end of Hanoi's
1972/73 dry season effort through the Laotian Panhandle. At the same
time, however, other regimental elements have been detected streamlining
the infiltration route possibly for continued infiltration exclusively by
vehicle -- which would require fewer communications-liaison personnel. The
latter possibility is considered somewhat less likely with the approaching
rainy season in the Panhandle -- traditionally a period of very low
infiltration.
18. During the reporting period, a total of 17 special-purpose
infiltration groups - with an aggregate strength of 500 -- were noted moving
south through the Vinh area. In addition to these firm detections of
southbound special-purpose groups, a message of 20 March revealed the
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existence of 345 "civilian administrators" traveling within Binh Tram
18's area of responsibility. Although no groups were specifically referenced,
it appears likely that they were moving southward, primarily because
references to "civilian administrators" have always denoted southbound
personnel. Currently there are some 20,000 personnel in the infiltration
pipeline, and an additional 15,000 have arrived at their destinations in South
Vietnam, Cambodia, and southern Laos since 28 January.
19. The first tabulation below shows the pattern of infiltration starts
of regular groups since 1 September, for both the 1972/73 and 1971/72
dry seasons. The recent lack of any detected regular groups beginning the
trek south has widened the gap in starts between the two dry seasons from
the 5,000 difference reported last week to some 7,500 personnel. The
second tabulation depicts estimated starts of regular and special-purpose
infiltration groups, by week, since 1 January. The estimates should be
viewed as "soft" because precise data on the date of departure of many
of the groups are not available.
1 Sep 72 -
25 Mar 73
1 Sep 71 -
25 Mar 72
Total
86,500 -''
94,000
MR Tri-Thien-Hue
26,000
14,500
MR 5
9,000
17,000
B-3 Front
14,000
22,500
COSVN
26,500
31,500
Southern Laos/MR 559
11,000
8,500
Number of Personnel
Entering the Pipeline
Since 1 Jan 1973
Total 1
Special Purpose
1-7 Jan
4,500
200
8-14
3.500
150
15-21
6,000
400
22-28
4,000
150
29-4 Feb
6,000
100
5-11
3,000
150
12-18
2,000
850
19-25
200
200
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(Continued)
Total
Number of Personnel
Entering the Pipeline
Since 1 Jan 1973
Special Purpose
26-4 Mar
700
700
5-11'
1,300
300
12-18
50
50
19-25
500
500
1. Including gap-filled groups, except Groups 7001 through
7009, for which the 1973 dates of departure are uncertain,
although they probably left prior to 11 March. If it is
assumed that these groups departed between 15 February
and 10 March, some 4,500 combat troops would be spread
over the departures estimated for those weeks.
VC/NVA Redeployments in South Vietnam
20. Very recent evidence has revealed that the 308th NVA Infantry
Division apparently had moved from Quang Tri Province to Ha Tinh
Province in North Vietnam by late January 1973. This would be the first
North Vietnamese division known to have returned to North Vietnam since
the start of the Communist Spring Offensive on 30 March 1972.
21. The 308th Division -- and its three subordinate regiments -- were
last firmly identified as all being in Quang Tri Province of South Vietnam
in November 1972, and some elements of the division continued to be
identified in Quang Tri as late as mid-February 1973. However, since at
least late January the division's headquarters has been located in Ha Tinh
Province, some 150 miles north of the DMZ. Other evidence
indicates that at least elements of all three of the
division's regiments also were in Ha Tinh Province by late January.
Subsequently, on 24 March the headquarters of the Division's 36th
Regiment was located by direction finding in the Hanoi area.
22. As no units of the 308th have been heard from inside South
Vietnam since mid-February, they too probably have left the country. The
redeployment of the 308th Division to North Vietnam reduces the number
of NVA divisions in MR 1 from eight to seven and the Communist combat
order of battle there from 82,000 to 76,000.
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Co mun st youth Vietnamese Regular Cambat Forces in South V etnar
Regaalar Combat Forces
ViC`-JNVA1
1 n Litles `/ iVt p rsonncl in ground combat, combat
support, d air dr fence units acid 41--forge- companies and
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un}t , :an d I o rsnal 1 o rcc battalions r ice assigned strengths
fjl V Tf NIA combat and .combat support units and' all
*f tit Regigna1 F~orcr
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Forces
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26,000 67,000
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VC/NVA
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76,000
85,000
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23. In another major deployment, the headquarters of the 593rd
Antiaircraft Artillery (AAA) Regiment -- a GDRS unit which has operated
in the northern part of the Laotian Panhandle since October 1972 -- and
two of its at least four subordinate battalions -- the 10th and the 120th --
probably have deployed to South Vietnam. The other two battalions are
probably still in southern Laos, one of which -- the 92nd -- was ordered
to stop its deployment on 20 March. Because the 92nd Battalion was not
identified as being destined for South Vietnam originally -- as were the
10th and 120th Battalions -- it cannot be determined if the 92nd's halting
was in response to the President's warning. Currently, the battalion is
believed to be operating in extreme southern Laos near the tri-border area.
24. COMINT of 21 March located the headquarters of the regiment
in southwestern Kontum Province, 5 kilometers inside the South
Vietnam/Cambodia border. Since at least mid-February, intercepted
messages had indicated that the regimental headquarters and the 10th and
120th Battalions were moving south through the Laotian corridor en route
to the B-3 Front. This is the first time that Hanoi has deployed a AAA
regiment this far south in South Vietnam. Its arrival raises the in-country
number of regiments to 17 -- 16 AAA and one SAM. The 593rd's mission
may be to protect the logistical corridors into Kontum Province or to
provide AAA coverage for the airfield near Dak To, which recently was
improved by the Communists and now appears serviceable.
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Secret
Secret
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