RECENT COMMUNIST LOGISTICAL AND MANPOWER DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080077-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2009
• Sequence Number: 77
• Publication Date: April 10, 1973
• Content Type: IM

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Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Recent Communist Logistical and Manpower
Developments in Indochina
NRO Review Completed.
NSA review completed
Top Secret
10 April 1973
Copy No.
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Recent Communist Logistical
and Manpower Developments
in Indochina
10 April 1973
The overall pace of detected logistical activity seems to have fallen somewhat during
the first week of April. With the approaching rainy season, the pace may slow even further,
but there are indications that Hanoi intends to keep some supplies moving through Laos
during the summer.
? Some Communist logistical forces in Laos are being granted leave to
return to North Vietnam for short visits, but significant supply deliveries
continue to be noted throughout the system.
? A major logistical entity in southern North Vietnam has reported that
"technical weapons" - possibly armor or artillery -- will be moving north
through its area. This equipment may have come out of Laos, implying
that the Communists, in closing down some of their facilities there, no
longer require the scale of firepower deployment that they have hitherto
maintained.
On the manpower side, no new infiltration groups were detected entering the pipeline
in North Vietnam during the past week, and one combat infiltration group originally
scheduled for northern South Vietnam has been redirected northward within North
Vietnam. It appears that this dry season's infiltration of regular combat troops may now
have ended and that the infiltration of civilian and military specialists also may be abating.
In other developments:
? Two antiaircraft regiments are preparing to move or are in the process
of moving from Quang Tri Province into southern Laos.
10 Two NVA SA-2 sites were established near Khe Sanh during the past
eight days.
? A headquarters element of an NVA armor regiment apparently deployed
from North Vietnam to the border area of Cambodia and South Vietnam's
Military Region 3 by mid-March and may be serving as a regional armor
controlling authority for southern South Vietnam.
? The buildup of Communist forces in the Ta Viang-Xieng Khouangville
area of northern Laos is continuing, suggesting the possibility of future
military activity.
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Recent Communist Logistical Developments
1. Substantial supply movements are still under way in North
Vietnam, although our information is very sketchy. Fairly large quantities
of supplies are still being directed toward Communist forces in Laos and
South Vietnam.
2. A major logistics-related entity slightly north of Vinh reported
on 2 April that it had pumped nearly 7,000 tons of petroleum during
March. A significant portion of the petroleum was probably to move farther
by pipeline southward to South Vietnam and Laos. High levels of activity
have been observed elsewhere in the southern North Vietnamese Panhandle.
has revealed extensive logistical activity
in several areas of the southern Panhandle.
There have been a number of COMINT reports of extensive
logistical activities in and around Dong Hoi (Binh Tram 26). Indications
of truck traffic through the area included reports from an element of Binh
Tram 26 that a total of more than 200 vehicles had transited a vehicle
checkpoint on 6 and 7 April. Another element of the binh tram reported
that it had received more than 45 tons of supplies on 2 April and had
shipped some 70 tons. According to enemy communications, part of the
referenced activity was via a "new tramway," possibly an extension of the
present one which parallels the Giang River. The following day the binh
tram revealed that it would continue delivering "weapons" during the month
of April.
3. In another development, Binh Tram 26 was advised on 3 April
to prepare for the movement of "heavy technical weapons" through its
area of responsibility some time during the period 4 to 16 April. The
weapons referred to, whatever their nature, reportedly were in the Binh
Tram 14 area - at the Ban Karai Pass - at the time and would require
assistance from Binh Tram 26 in Quang Binh Province. The term "technical
weapons" has generally been interpreted to represent armor or artillery,
and it appears that some such equipment may be moving northward. Such
a shifting of resources may be in connection with the current reorganization
of the North Vietnamese logistical network in the Laotian Panhandle
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Hang
Bac
,Kan
Phu Th0.
Hoa
Binh
Mu Gin
Pass
1A
ai'Du
Kbrai
ass
Muongi
Khouai
g M' A V IL
North Vietnam
Transportation System
POL pipeline
--~---- Railroad
Road
--- Trail
Thai ;
Binh
flan,Yen
IE TNAM
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currently under way. The reorganization is consolidating some of the field
entities, and presumably less firepower would be required to keep supply
channels adequately protected.
4. The overall pace of detected logistical activity in Laos declined
during the past week. It was clear, however, that significant resupply was
continuing. On the input corridors to Laos, vehicle activity
was down somewhat compared with the average level detected in March.
Significantly, however, a southbound emphasis on detected movers
prevailed, an indication that large quantities of supplies are still being moved
into Laos. Although the heaviest activity continues to be detected near
Ban Karai Pass, where the level of detected southbound activity increased
from last week, ground observers have noted sustained, albeit light, truck
traffic through Mu Gia Pass, and recent aerial photography has revealed
that the Communists have completed some new road construction just south
of Mu Gia. Photography also confirmed continuing high levels of activity
west of the DMZ, as 27 southbound cargo trucks were noted on Route 1033
5. In the central Panhandle, COMINT on 7 April revealed heavy
vehicle activity. According to an intercept, about 121 vehicles had been
received by an element of Group 472, and additional large numbers of
vehicles were sent out, probably to the south. Neither the time frame over
which this activity took place nor the types or quantities of cargo moved
were revealed; however, it was obvious that a high percentage of the available
vehicles in the element's area were being used. Again, photography durin
the week confirmed heavy vehicle activity, especially on Route 99.
more than 170 vehicles were spotted along that route, rou y
between Muong Nong and Ban Bac. Well over half were southbound and
were confirmed as carrying cargo, probably including some sections of
petroleum pipeline. Some 130-mm field guns also were observed being towed
south. The remaining vehicles noted were either headed north or parked
along the road.
6. COMINT revealed on 4 April that major logistical elements in
the central Panhandle are now preparing storage areas to facilitate the
movement and storage of cargo during the forthcoming rainy season. No
details on the type of activity were provided; however, the following day
a Group 472 element referenced "the plan to construct storage areas at
each position to stockpile foodstuffs, weapons, and tools for the unit which
is calculated to arrive in December of 1973."
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TCS-3240/73
7. Farther south in Laos, detections of activity were highlighted by
photography showing nearly 70 vehicles carrying cargo southward
through the Chavane area. It is likely that most of these vehicles were
transporting military supplies toward South Vietnam's Central Highlands
or the COSVN area.
8. In spite of this heavy activity, some of the personnel now
operating the logistical network are being scheduled for leave. A new leave
policy has been established and probably is already being implemented in
the Group 472 area. The first indications of this came on 1 April, when
the 592nd Engineer Regiment reported that those personnel who had been
assigned to the battlefront for three or more years or who had family or
personal problems would be given first priority. Subsequent information
revealed that leave is to be granted for 20-day periods, except in special
circumstances where longer leaves are warranted. Thirty men are to be
granted leave in each phase. By 6 April a similar leave policy had been
announced by the 34th NVA Engineer Regiment (formerly Binh Tram 34),
and although no specific references have yet been made, it is likely that
the policy extends to Groups 470 and 471. It is clear from these
developments that the North Vietnamese now believe they can sustain the
flow of supplies they deem necessary with somewhat fewer people.
Moreover, implementation of the leave policy at this time could be a signal
that the pace of logistical activity will now decline in southern Laos, a
decline that is to be expected anyway as the rainy season approaches.
9. Inside Cambodia, major roads and water supply routes displayed
heavy use again this week, including heavy truck traffic from the southern
Laotian border into the border base areas around Snuol and Mimot.
Continued heavy US air attacks against Communist transport equipment
and traffic control points appear to be causing some traffic slowdowns,
particularly along Route 19 leading to the B-3 Front. Numerous stacks of
supplies have piled up there in spite of road crews working hard to keep
interdiction points open and trucks moving.
10. Reconnaissance of late March over the Route 19 border crossing
reveals extensive new road building activity which appears aimed not only
at improving motorable access on the South Vietnamese side of the border,
but also probably at attempting to bypass the ICCS monitoring site on
Route 19 at Duc Co.
11. Major Communist logistical elements in northern South Vietnam
have continued to report the movement of supplies, including ordnance;
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Binh Tram Locations in Military Region 559
Ban Karai
?Pass
t STUnV Tre,
KherrI
a
Sr,
25 50 Miles,
25 50 75 Kilometers
Group 470
enlocated.-.54
Note: As indicated in the memorandum the North Vietnamese logistical network in MR 559 is
currently undergoing a major reorganization. This neap does not reflect such changes, and is intended
only as a reference to the various binh trams' areas of operation prior to the recent changes. New
maps will be prepared when our information on the new organization warrants.
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001
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however, totals are down somewhat from reports of recent weeks. The
heaviest recent activity has been detected in aerial photography. On
or example, 137 trucks were spotted along Route 9 in
nort eastern Quang Tri Province. Another 53 vehicles were spotted along
Routes 608 and 616 around Khe Sanh on the same day. Some storage
facilities in Quang Tri Province have been instructed not to accept any
more cargo, probably to avoid concentrating too much in any one area.
Some of the detected activity in eastern Military Region (MR) 1 appears
to be associated with Binh Tram 41's relocation to a new position (reported
last week). Recently, the binh tram reported it had a "great deal" of
equipment, food, and ordnance that had to be moved.
12. The Communists are also continuing to funnel supplies through
the A Shau Valley in western Thua Thien Province. Heavy truck traffic
is apparent on Route 548 in the A Shau, and signs of vehicle use and
recent repair work are evident along a major supply corridor leading from
25X1 the valley. as of late March the
Communists were building a new base area in the southern part of the
A Shau that they plan to fortify with newly infiltrated antiaircraft weapons.
According to the report, forces protecting the southern A Shau are already
equipped with at least 50 armored vehicles. A subsequent report indicated
that the Communists intend to have four divisions in the province before
launching an attack and that, in anticipation of those attacks, they have
continued to move in foodstuffs and ordnance from Laos as well as from
25X1 Quang Tri Province. two tank regiments --
with 40 tanks each - had arrived in Thua Thien (from Quang Tri) in late
March.
13. In southern MR 1, road construction and truck traffic continue
to be observed along Route 614, which the Communists reportedly plan
to connect with Route 14. Twenty tanks were spotted in this area on
24 March. Meanwhile, Communist forces in the Quang Nam lowlands, south
of Da Nang, are reported to have recently received a large quantity of
ammunition, including 122-mm rockets and 82-mm and 37-mm rounds, and
Viet Cong units in the region have stepped up efforts to purchase locally
grown rice.
14. In northern Quang Ngai Province, a new munitions factory,
complete with electric generators, engines, furnaces, and forges, recently
has been completed by the Communists. The factory consists of five
structures, which are accessible to the new road being built into Quang
Ngai from the Laotian border. The 32 factory workers, including two
engineers and ten "munitions experts," reportedly use broken weapons, dud
ammunition, and aircraft and vehicle parts to assemble new equipment. In
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South Vietnam
-?? Province boundary
A_: Military region
International Commission
of Control andSupervision
region boundary
Railroad
Road
POL pipeline
0 25 50 75 Mil-
0 25 50 75 Kilometers
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the southern half of the province, logistical activity probably related to
resupplying the NVA 2nd and 3rd Divisions has been detected.
15. In southern South Vietnam, supplies recently infiltrated from
Cambodia are being redistributed from northern Binh Long Province into
adjacent Phuoc Long Province, where reports indicate that the Communists
plan to expand their territorial control. Similarly, Communist forces in Binh
Duong and Hau Nghia Provinces are now being resupplied from recently
emplaced supply caches along the Saigon River. Supplies are continuing
to move to units in Dinh Tuong Province, MR 4.
16. In the lower Delta, Communist munitions shops in Kien Giang
Province have received orders to double their production of weapons,
particularly of mines, explosive charges, and hand grenades. To increase
production, rear services officials are planning to train more munitions
workers and distribute additional materiel recently received from COSVN.
This increased emphasis on the local production of ammunition - both
in the Delta and in MR 1 as noted above - will reduce the requirement
for delivering ordnance from North Vietnam.
Recent Manpower Developments in Indochina
Personnel Infiltration
17. No new infiltration groups -- either special-purpose or combat
replacements -- were reported starting the trip south from North Vietnam
during the past week. Furthermore, COMINT has initially identified the
diversion of one regular infiltration group away from its original destination
in South Vietnam. The 120-man group, now in the Dong Hoi area of North
Vietnam, is according to an intercepted message of 5 April being rerouted
and sent northward. There is no direct evidence as to when this group
started its journey southward, but we believe it could have been sometime
in February or early March. The identifying number of the group indicates
that it was originally scheduled to go to the northern part of South Vietnam.
18. Farther down in the infiltration pipeline in southern Laos,
COMINT also detected for the first time six additional small groups of
civilian and military specialists with a total of less than 60 men. These
specialists are believed to have departed from North Vietnam some time
in February or March.
19. A month has elapsed since the last regular infiltration group was
noted entering the pipeline in North Vietnam, and it appears that this dry
season's infiltration of regular combat troops may have ended. In addition,
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Communist and South Vietnamese Regular Combat Forces in South Vietnam
South Vietnam
Regular Combat Forces
VC/NVA' R VNAF 2
153,000 287,000
?i"Demarcation Line
VC/NVA
325th
324B
320B
312th
304th
711th
2nd
1. Includes VC/NVA personnel in ground combat, combat
support, and air defense units and local force companies and
platoons.
2. Revised RVNAF Ground Order of Battle. Includes present
for duty personnel in ARVN/VNMC and combat support
units and Regional Force battalions vice assigned strengths
of ARVN/VNMC combat and combat support units and all
of the Regional Forces.
429th Sapper
Command
9th
7th
VC/NVA
.26,000
5th
1st
44th Special
Tactical Zone
Regional Forces
21st
9th
7th
VNMC
Airborne
1st
2nd
3rd
Regional
Forces
IV
a..a ` Dec 3 -'\ong y
SPECIAL TONNE
Gib .` Binh
Chuong ,
= Thienr/ Ba
Lieu
VII
VI
Military region boundary
Province boundary
ICCS region boundary
0 25
0 25 50
50 75 Miles
ZL~
75 Kilometers
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fewer special-purpose groups have been detected entering the system during
the past several weeks, indicating that the infiltration of civilian and military
specialists also may be abating. As shown in the first table below, the
number of starts from 1 September 1972 to 8 April 1973 is significantly
less than during the same period in the 1971/72 dry season. The second
table gives estimated starts of regular and special-purpose infiltration groups,
by week, since 1 January for the current dry season. The latter estimate
should be regarded as "soft" because precise data concerning the date of
departure of many of the groups are not available.
1 Sep 71 -
1 Sep 72 -
8 Apr 72
8 Apr 73
Total
112,500
86,500
MR Tri-Thien-Hue
16,500
26,000
MR 5
16,000
9,000
B-3 Front
30,000
14,000
COSVN
36,000
26,500
Southern Laos/MR 559
14,000
11,000
Number of Personnel Entering the Pipeline
Since 1 January 1973
Total1
Special-
Purpose2
1-7 Jan
4,700
400
8-14
3,700
350
15-21
6,100
500
22-28
4,000
150
29-4 Feb
6,300
400
5-11
3,100
250
12-18
2,000
850
19-25
500
500
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Number of Personnel Entering the Pipeline
Since 1 January 1973
(Continued)
Totall
Special-
Purpose2
26-4 Mar
750
750
5-11
1,300
300
12-18
50
50
19-25
600
600
26-1 Apr
200
200
2-8
0
0
1. Including gap-filled groups, except Groups 7001 through 7009.
Assuming that these groups departed between 1 January and
10 March, some 4,500 combat troops would be spread over the
departures estimated for those weeks.
2. Including those groups which were initially detected without a
specific strength, but which have been assigned an average strength
of 35.
20. Since the cease-fire, approximately 15,000 personnel are estimated
to have started south, but most of these probably now have arrived at
their destinations in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Those infiltrators
that remain in the system are primarily stragglers from regular groups and
personnel in special-purpose groups.
Manpower Developments in South Vietnam
21. Tenuous evidence from COMINT suggests that a headquarters
element of the NVA 203rd Armor Regiment may have deployed from its
base of operations in North Vietnam and may now be located in the
Cambodia-South Vietnam border area. A radio terminal serving the
headquarters element was located by direction finding on 17 March in the
border area north of Loc Ninh City. This entity was last located north
of Hanoi in the vicniity of Thai Nguyen City on 27 January 1973. The
headquarters element probably will serve as the controlling authority for
the large number of tanks detected moving to the COSVN area during this
dry season. Both this entity and another headquarters element of the
203rd Armor Regiment believed to be currently located in Quang Tri
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Province are probably the regional controlling authorities for the North
Vietnamese armor in their respective areas of operation.
22. Recent COMINT indicates that two NVA antiaircraft regiments --
the 232nd and 591st -- are preparing to move or are in the process of
moving from Quang Tri Province into the Laotian Panhandle. (Although
we reported last week that the 232nd Regiment probably had moved out
of Quang Tri as early as the first week in March, subsequent communications
revealed that because of the lack of fuel for its vehicles, it had not left
the province as of 29 March.) Although the destination of the two regiments
is unclear, there have been continuing indications of a Communist buildup
of antiaircraft defense in southern Laos and extending into northeastern
Cambodia.
23. In other air defense developments, preliminary readouts of
photography reveal that two North Vietnamese SA-2 sites have been
established near Khe Sanh during the past eight days. There are now
ten SA-2 sites in the Khe Sanh area which have been constructed since
In addition to the SA-2 sites, a cluster of four antiaircraft artillery sites,
two of which are radar-controlled 57-mm batteries, has been identified some
10 miles east of Khe Sanh. Identification of radar-controlled antiaircraft
batteries in South Vietnam is rare and suggests a qualitative increase in
Communist antiaircraft defense capabilities in this area.
the beginning of this year. Four of these were occupied
24. further details on Viet Cong
recruiting in Binh Duong Province, MR 3. In late February, leaders of Viet
Cong district units were instructed to initiate recruiting efforts in their
respective areas, and by early March the campaign was under way. Cadre
were told to recruit 13-15 year-olds by persuading their parents first to
consent and second to report to the South Vietnamese authorities that their
children were either "missing" or "arrested" by the Viet Cong, reportedly
to alleviate any potential government pressure on the families if the youths
were discovered in Viet Cong units. In addition, the cadre were told that
by recruiting South Vietnamese the Viet Cong hope to reduce the North
Vietnamese presence at the local level, consequently enhancing the Viet
Cong image. Over the past few years a sizable number of Viet Cong units
in MR 3 have become de facto NVA units by the large influx of North
Vietnamese replacements. Any attempt to reverse this trend would require
a high level of sustained recruiting. It is more likely that the recruiting
effort is simply aimed at raising the strength of depleted units in MR 3.
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Manpower Developments in Cambodia
25. The NVA 367th Sapper Regiment has recently been located by
some 11 miles east of Phnom Penh. This is the first
indication that the 367th has relocated nearer to the capital and that it
may be involved in the current Communist military activity along the
Mekong River. If true, this would be the first known instance of an NVA
unit directly participating in the current offensive in Cambodia. We believe,
however, that the Khmer Communists continue to be responsible for
maintaining virtually all the pressure points around Phnom Penh.
Manpower Developments in Northern Laos
26. During the past week, more evidence was received concerning the
continued enemy buildup in the Ta Viang-Xieng Khouangville area,
southeast of the Plaine des Jarres. In addition to three battalions of the
335th NVA Regiment that have completed their movement to the Ta
Viang/Route 4 area, an NVA sapper battalion and two artillery companies
were added to Communist forces in the sector. Moreover, intercepted enemy
communications suggest that additional deployments may be forthcoming.
Enemy messages also indicated that the North Vietnamese intend to regain
control of Route 4 south of Xieng Khouangville, which was lost to Laotian
government forces prior to the cease-fire in Laos.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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