COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE 27 JANUARY VIETNAM AGREEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080091-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 91
• Publication Date: May 14, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS
OF THE 27 JANUARY VIETNAM AGREEMENT
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COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS
OF THE 27 JANUARY VIETNAM AGREEMENT
Listed below are the major Communist actions
which can be described as violations of the 27 Jan-
uary "Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring
Peace in Vietnam." Each of these Communist actions
is listed under the specific Article of the 27 Jan-
uary Agreement with whose provision it is in direct
or presumptive conflict. Each is listed and de-
scribed only once, under the lowest-numbered Article
of the Agreement where the violation fits. For
example, Communist infiltration and logistic move-
ments through Laos into South Vietnam are listed
under Article 7, which forbids the introduction of
new troops and military equipment -- except "piece-
for-piece" replacement of equipment -- into South
Vietnam. We could have listed the same violations
again under Article 20, which states that foreign
countries shall withdraw all their military forces
from Laos and Cambodia. The following account of
Communist violations, however, contains no such
double counting.
ARTICLES of the Agreement
ARTICLE 1
This article is not pertinent to Communist
violations.
ARTICLES 2 and 3
These articles, along with Articles 1-6 of
the Cease-Fire Protocol, established the cease-
fire in South Vietnam and called for a cessation
of attacks against all places under control of
the other side.
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Communist Violations
1. In South Vietnam, the total number of
Communist-initiated cease-fire violations re-
ported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces
from 27 January through 9 May are shown below.
Major Communist
Violations
Minor Communist
Violations
Total
1,924
11,080
MR 1
881
2,921
MR 2
207
1,482
MR 3
326
2,005
MR 4
510
4,672
2. Whatever the absolute numbers, the
Communists have clearly committed major viola-
tions of the cease-fire in South Vietnam. Just
before the cease-fire went into effect, Com-
munist forces launched widespread attacks in
order to interdict GVN lines of communication
and to enlarge areas under their control.
Many of these attacks continued beyond the
cease-fire -- notably at Sa Huynh on the
central coast, in the highlands between Kontum
and Pleiku, and in Chuong Thien Province in
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the Delta.* After GVN forces had regained
most of the territory lost in these attacks,
the overall level of fighting subsided.
Forces under North Vietnamese command, however,
have continued attacking GVN-held positions and
towns in order to expand the areas under Com-
munist control.
The ARVN base at Tonle Cham (Tay Ninh
Province) has been under continuous
attack for weeks.
Communist forces have initiated and are
continuing to carry out strong attacks
in Hong Ngu District of Kien Phong Province.
They have also carried out further attacks
in Chuong Thien, Chau Doc, Bac Lieu, and
Dinh Tuong Provinces of MR 4.
NVA forces have also launched numerous
moderate to fairly large attacks by fire
and ground probes against GVN positions
west of Hue in MR 1.
NVA forces have also fired rockets and
mortars indiscriminately into many cities,
refugee camps, and other population
centers -- for example in Tam Chau and
Phan Thiet -- causing numerous civilian
casualties. They have even mortared the
locations of ICCS teams at Tri Ton and
Hong Ngu.
In the past month the Communists have in-
creased their use of terrorism in South
Vietnam, including assassinations, tossing
grenades in public places, mining of
public thoroughfares, and widespread
abductions. There have been nearly twice
as many assassinations of local GVN offi-
cials and supporters, for example, in the
* There was also heavy combat in the area north
and west of Quang Tri City in the immediate post-
cease-fire period, but it is impossible to deter-
mine who started each individual action.
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period from 1 March to the present as
there were in the period of the same
length before 1 March.
3. Article 3 of the Agreement also states
that all military units of both sides in South
Vietnam shall remain "in place." In violation
of this provision, the 272nd Regiment of the
9th NVA Division is known to have moved in
April 1973 from MR 3 and is apparently destined
for MR 4, where some elements of the regiment
are already reported operating.
ARTICLES 4, 5, and 6
These articles are not pertinent to Communist
violations.
ARTICLE 7
This article, along with Article 7 of the
Cease-Fire Protocol, prohibits the introduction
into South Vietnam of "troops, military advisers,
and military personnel including technical military
personnel, armaments, munitions, and war material."
It limits equipment inputs to "periodic replacement
of armaments, munitions and war material which have
been destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after
the cease-fire, on the basis of piece-for--piece, of
the same characteristics and properties, under the
supervision of the Joint Military Commission of
the two South Vietnamese parties and of the Inter-
national Commission of Control and Supervision."
Communist Violations
1. Summary: Since the 27 January Vietnam
Agreement was signed, the North Vietnamese
have not used designated entry points for the
authorized "replacement" exchange of equipment
nor has there been any ICCS supervision of
equipment imports. Since 27 January, however,
the North Vietnamese have done the following:
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Infiltrated over 40,000 personnel into
South Vietnam and adjacent border areas
of Laos and Cambodia.
Moved more than 350 tanks and several
hundred field and antiaircraft artillery
(AAA) pieces into South Vietnam or adja-
cent border areas.
Probably moved into South Vietnam at least
four regiments (one engineer and three AAA
regiments), plus major elements of two
armor regiments. The personnel in these
units -- some 4,000 men -- are in addition
to the 40,000 men who came south in infil-
tration groups to flesh. out Communist units
already in South Vietnam.
Carried on a large-scale and still con-
tinuing logistic effort which has moved
thousands of tons of military supplies
from North Vietnam toward and into South
Vietnam.
The details of Communist violations of
Article 7 are presented below.
2. Personnel Infiltration. In the months
following the signing of the Vietnam Agreement,
Hanoi continued to dispatch infiltrators from
North Vietnam to South Vietnam.
as of 6 May, post-cease-fire infil-
tration starts have totaled some 16,000 per-
sonnel -- about 11,000 regular combat troops
and almost 5,000 military and civilian spe-
cialists.
the rate of infiltration slowed signi-
ficantly, and by mid-April it was clear
that infiltration of regular combat groups
to South Vietnam in the 1972/73 dry sea-
son had ended. The infiltration of civil-
ian and military specialists has continued
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at relatively high rates, however, although
it too has slowed somewhat since mid-April.
virtually all
of the personnel w o started the journey
south after 27 January have now arrived in
South Vietnam.
3. In addition to the 16,000 personnel
discussed above, the Communists have also
buttressed their manpower position in South
Vietnam by allowing 25,000 men who were
already in the infiltration system as of
27 January to complete their journey south.
Most of these were combat troops. Conse-
quently, a total of over 40,000 North Viet-
namese regular combat and specially-skilled
personnel have arrived in South Vietnam or
adjacent border areas since 27 January.
4. Table 1 shows estimated starts of
infiltration groups, by week, since 1 Jan-
uary 1973.
5. Deployment of Armor and Artillery.
Hanoi has made a formidable commitment of
firepower to its military forces in South
Vietnam during the past dry season, moving
southward large quantities of tanks and
artillery. While the deployment started prior
to the cease-fire in South Vietnam, the
majority of these tanks and artillery reached
their final destinations after 27 January.
Characteristic of this year's commitment is the
fact that a greater proportion of this fire-
power was deployed farther south, as attested
by the large number of tanks and heavy artil-
lery noted moving to the southern three-fourths
of South Vietnam. This is in marked contrast
to a year ago, when the emphasis was on MR 1.
6. Some 600 tanks are conservatively esti-
mated to have been sent south by Hanoi since
late October 1972, surpassing the number com-
mitted to South Vietnam a year earlier for the
Communists' 1972 spring offensive. Of this
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Number of Personnel Entering the Pipeline
Since 1 January 1973
1-7 Jan 4,700
8-14 3,700
15-21 6,100
22-28 4,000
29-4 Feb 6,300
5-11 3,100
12-18 2,000
19-25 500
26-4 Mar 750
5-11 1,300
12-18 550
19-25 650
26-1 Apr 300
2-8 175
9-15 75
16-22 125
23-29 0
30-6 May 275
total, more than 350, or some 60%, are esti-
mated to have completed their journey after
the cease-fire date.
7. In addition to armor, Hanoi deployed
more than 50 field and antiaircraft artillery
groups south this dry season -- about one-
third of the total number of regular infiltra-
tion groups destined for South Vietnam and
Cambodia. The majority of these 50-plus groups
completed their southward journey after 27 Jan-
uary. In addition to the antiaircraft weapons
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noted in these infiltration groups, there were
several hundred guns belonging to the six inte-
gral antiaircraft regiments which have deployed
into South Vietnam since early January 1973,
three of which arrived after the cease-fire.
8. About 40% of the artillery infiltration
groups have been noted with specific types of
weapons, including the long-range 122-mm and
130-mm field guns, as well as light to medium
antiaircraft weapons. About half of the some
200 heavy field artillery pieces
were destined for the lower three-fourths of
South Vietnam, and this year for the first
time the Communists have deployed 122-mm and
130-mm guns to MR 3 and adjacent border areas
of Cambodia.
9. Deployment of Integral Communist Units
ommunis s ave pro a ly deployed at
least four new regiments -- three AAA and one
engineer -- and major elements of two armor regi-
ments to South Vietnam in violation of Article 7
of the Agreement. Moreover, other smaller units
and elements of COSVN (including elements of
the Headquarters of the South Vietnamese Lib-
eration Army) also may have been deployed into
South Vietnam after 27 January. The personnel
in these units are in addition to the more than
40,000 men in infiltration groups.
10. The following list of Communist combat
units has been subdivided into two categories,
reflecting the degree of confidence we have in
our judgment that the redeployment of the unit
was in violation of the cease-fire -- i.e.,
that it moved into South Vietnam after 27 Jan-
uary. In Category A we list those units which
we are fairly sure moved after 27 January. In
Category B, the dates of movement are more open
to dispute.
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Category A
The 254th NVA AAA Regiment with some
850 men deployed from North Vietnam to
Quang Tri Province, MR 1, in early February
1973.
In the period from mid-February to mid-
March, major elements of the 593rd NVA AAA
Regiment with a strength of 500 men arrived
in Kontum Province of MR 2 from southern
Laos.
In early March the 20th Radar Company
of the 290th NVA Reconnaissance Regiment
moved from southern Laos to Quang Tri Pro-
vince to provide radar acquisition data
for the 263rd SAM Regiment, which had de-
ployed there from North Vietnam in January
prior to the cease-fire.
The 3rd Battalion of the 203rd NVA Armor
Regiment arrived in Quang Tin Province of
southern MR 1 in February with a strength
of 200 men and subsequently is believed to
have deployed into Quang Ngai Province.
During the period 27 January to 17 March,
the headquarters of the 203rd NVA Armor Regi-
ment was en route to MR 3 and subsequently
arrived there in late April.
Between 27 January and 20 March the
headquarters of the 69th NVA Artillery
Command, with a strength of 250 men., moved
from a position in southern Kratie Province,
Cambodia, to a location in northern Tay
Ninh Province, South Vietnam.
During March, one battalion of the
239th NVA Engineer Regiment deployed from
Laos to MR 2. The remaining two battalions
and regimental headquarters deployed to
southern South Vietnam during April. The
strength of the regiment was about 1,000
men.
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By April the 245th NVA AAA Regiment --
which had deployed into southern Laos from
North Vietnam in mid-January with about 850
men -- had relocated from the Laotian Pan-
handle into South Vietnam's Quang Tri Pro-
vince.
elements of the 201st
Armor Regiment had recently arrived in
Quang Tri Province and were operating there.
The entire regiment has an estimated strength
of 1,000 men and some 100 tanks.
Category B
Beginning in early December 1972 and
possibly continuing through mid-February,
elements of COSVN (including elements of
SVNLA Headquarters) relocated to MR 3 from
Cambodia with an unknown number of personnel.
Immediately following the cease-fire,
elements of the 174th Regiment of the 5th
NVA Division and the 207th Regiment possibly
reinfiltrated into northern Kien Phong Pro-
vince from adjacent areas in Cambodia.
11. The Communist Logistic Effort. North
Vietnamese logistic movements across the DMZ
and MR 1, and through the Laotian Panhandle
toward and into the lower three-quarters of
South Vietnam, have continued at a high pace
since January -- almost as if there has been
no Vietnam Agreement. The major change from
previous years is that Hanoi has been able
to move its supplies more easily, and in day-
light hours, because of the absence of US
bombing.
12. The pace of logistic activity observed
since the Agreement was signed has fit almost
perfectly the pattern of a normal dry season
campaign. Activity in the Vinh area, the
major transshipment point in North Vietnam for
supplies moving south, continued at high levels
into early February, and has dropped sharply
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since that time as most supplies have been
moved farther south. Activity in the Laotian
Panhandle has continued to be heavy right up
to the present. Recently, the North Vietnamese
have also put a high priority on the movement
of supplies from Laos into South Vietnam. NVA
vehicle activity has continued within South
Vietnam -- at very high levels in Quang Tri
Province and at sustained but generally lower
levels elsewhere.
13. The movement of military equipment and
ammunition has continued throughout the cease-
fire period, although in recent weeks there
has been an increase in the proportion of total
NVA supplies moving which has been identified
as foodstuffs and quartermaster supplies. Reli-
evidence received since mid-April, however, has
indicated that by that time Hanoi already had
in storage very large quantities of weapons and
ammunition in Quang Tri Province and the Laos/
South Vietnam border area of MR 1. The extremely
heavy movement of ammunition south from Vinh
which was observed from October 1972 until
shortly after the cease-fire would account for
the existence of these stocks of military supplies.
14. The Communists have as yet shown no
sign of intentions to reduce the level of sup-
plies moving southward or the size of their
resupply network in southern Laos and South
Vietnam. The supply system has been reorganized
since the cease-fire to facilitate transporta-
tion in an environment free from aerial attacks.
Reports received within the last two weeks indi-
cate that transportation "offensives" have been
initiated by a unit in the southern North
Vietnam Panhandle, and by two of the three
major logistic groups in southern Laos. These
offensives are scheduled to last through May
and could be sustained beyond that date
depending on the weather. There has also
been extensive Communist road construction
activity within South Vietnam since the signing
of the cease-fire agreement. Although it
appears that the North Vietnamese may be develop-
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ing a north-south road network with South
Vietnam and extending from the DMZ into MR 3,
there has been no evidence that they intend to
abandon the Ho Chi Minh trail system in south-
ern Laos.
a high pace of logistic
activity in the North Vietnam Panhandle
into southern Laos, and
15. In the following paragraphs we detail
the major Communist logistic movements which
have taken place since 27 January. For con-
venience, we have divided the period since then
into three parts: (a) 27 January-28 February,
(b) 1-31 March, and (c) 1 April to the present.
16. From 27 January through 28 February,
very heavy levels of traffic were observed
moving over the passes from North Vietnam
south of Dong Hoi.
moving on the major routes between NVA
logistic entities in the Laotian Panhandle.
(See Tables 2 and 3 for a weekly record
of NVA truck movements into Laos from
North Vietnam and through the Laotian
Panhandle.) Similar levels of activity
were observed within northern South
Vietnam at this time. Hanoi also moved a sub-
stantial volume of military supplies into
northern Laos during the month of February.
there was also heavy traffic
A. NVA Logistic Movements Within
South Vietnam, 27 January- 8 Feb-
ruary
a. On Route 9 in Quang Tri Province:
1. During the period 7-22 Feb-
ruary a steady flow of North Viet-
namese truck traffic, averaging six
trucks per day, was noted moving
east from southern Laos into Quang
Tri Province on this route.
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Table 2
Southbound Movements of Communist Trucks into Laos'
2-8 Feb
298
...2
9-15 Feb
352
....2
16-22 Feb
170
27
23 Feb-1 Mar
74
120
2-8 Mar
131
44
9-15 Mar
84
97
16.22 Mar
137
72
23-29 Mar
174
87
30 Mar-5 Apr
211
98
6-12 Apr
182
130
13-19 Apr
158
112
20-26 Apr
803
753
27 Apr-1 May
383
593
1. Excluding light traffic moving through the Mu Gia or Nape Passes.
2. No reliable information available.
3. Reduced numbers reflect a decrease in the volume of reliable evidence, not a
decrease in the volume of traffic.
Communist Truck Traffic in the Laos Central Corridor
(Routes 92C, 99, 9211, and 958)
23 Feb-1 Mar
314
212
39
63
2-8 Mar
479
121
146
212
9-15 Mar
498
269
63
166
16-22 Mar
498
129
110
259
23-29 Mar
608
143
112
353
30 Mar-5
Apr
450
194
114
142
6-12 Apr
582
217
154
211
13-19 Apr
940
311
352
277
20-26 Apr
1,401
440
540
421
27 Apr-3 May
1,231
450
421
360
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2. On 18 and 24 February, 33
and 30 North Vietnamese cargo trucks,
respectively, were traveling this
route west of Khe Sanh. The direc-
tion of the trucks was not deter-
mined.
b. A North Vietnamese SA-2 SAM
regiment with at least four firing bat-
talions moved into the Khe Sanh area
of northern South Vietnam in mid-Jan-
uary and may have occupied firing posi-
tions prior to the cease-fire. The
presence of SAMs in this area was first
confirmed on 6 February, when two
operational sites were detected.
Since that date the North Vietnamese
have built additional sites. There now
are about a dozen sites, and the Com-
munists rotate their firing units among
these positions to make them less vul-
nerable to bombing. At any time, as
many as four or five sites may be
operational.
c. On Route 608 north of Khe Sanh,
32 North Vietnamese cargo trucks were
detected on 24 February, and 20 cargo
trucks and six unidentified vehicles
were seen on 27 February.
d.
Province from Laos and that base areas
for the supplies were being established
in the mountains about 25 miles south-
west of Hue.
as of mid-February, military supplies
were continuing to enter Thua Thien
e. The North Vietnamese began
deploying 130-mm artillery field guns
into MR 3 during late February. On
27 February twelve 130-mm field guns
reportedly were being towed from
Snuol, Cambodia, to Loc Ninh, South
Vietnam.
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f. On 6 February, in the western
DMZ area, there were 105 North Vietnamese
cargo trucks observed on Route 1033A,
and 230 cargo vehicles were seen on
Route 102B near its intersection with
Route 1032A in the same area.
g. On Route 102B in the western
DMZ, 62 cargo vehicles were detected on
17 February and 59 trucks were observed
on 18 February.
h. On 1 February there were 23 NVA
cargo trucks observed on Route 561A
northwest of Quang Tri City.
i. On 22 February, 30 trucks were
observed entering a North Vietnamese
truck park in the western DMZ during a
one-hour period.
j. A convoy of 18 NVA cargo trucks
was moving on Route 102B in the western
DMZ on 24 February.
B. NVA Logistic Movements in Laos and
Cambodia, 27 January-28 February
a. During the period 1-10 February,
1,252 North Vietnamese cargo vehicles
were active in the tri-border area. At
least 255 of these vehicles were observed
moving toward the central highlands of
South Vietnam, and at least 281 moving
toward the southern half of South Viet-
nam.
b. On 12 February an NVA logistic
unit in southern Laos just west of the
DMZ was observed preparing large vehicle
convoys to move cargo to coastal central
South Vietnam.
c. On 17 February there were six
vehicles towing 85-mm artillery pieces
detected heading toward the southern
half of South Vietnam from a major North
Vietnamese logistic unit in the tri-
border area.
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d. Reliable evidence indicated that
the North Vietnamese moved about 400
tanks through southern Laos and north-
eastern Cambodia from 27 January to the
end of February. The tanks were all
clearly to be assigned to Communist
units in southern South Vietnam or Cam-
bodia.
e. During the period 25 February -
25X1 1 March, over
5,160 NVA cargo trucks active between
logistic entities in the southern
Laotian Panhandle. Of this total, at
least 330 were specifically headed
toward South Vietnam, most toward the
southern half of the country.
f. Between 25 February and
1 March, over 60 cargo trucks were
noted on the feeder routes from
Laos into northern South Vietnam.
A 50-truck convoy was also
traveling on Route 922 into South
Vietnam on 26 February.
g. A large number of vehicles
(exact number unknown, but less than 50)
were detected returning from northeast-
ern Cambodia to the tri--border area of
Laos to participate in logistic activity
there. It can be stated categorically
that all activity in this area is
directed toward the central highlands
of South Vietnam.
about 1,100 trucks were moving through the
Ban Karai Pass from North Vietnam into
southern Laos between 1 and 23 February.
It is known that the cargo on these
trucks included more than 2,000 tons of
food and over 1,000 tons of ordnance.
h.
i. On 3 February, a 70-truck convoy
was detected transporting ammunition in
the area of eastern Laos between the
DMZ and the A Shau Valley. In the same
area, 194 NVA cargo vehicles were
active on 3 February and 233 active
on 5 February.
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j. Between 13 and 16 February,
there were 66 North Vietnamese vehicles
observed moving ordnance to a storage
area near Tchepone in southern Laos.
C. NVA Logistic Movements Within North
Vietnam, 27 January-28 February
a. On 8 February, two rail cars of
military goods were unloaded in the
central Panhandle of North Vietnam. In-
cluded in the manifest were 26 tons of
munitions specifically earmarked for
South Vietnam.
b. On 14 February, eight tons of
grenades were moving from
the central Panhandle of North
Vietnam to South Vietnam.
c. An NVA logistic unit operating
on the Song Ca River south of Vinh was
shipping over 100
tons of supplies daily through its area
during the period immediately preceding
23 February. This entity serves as a
major transshipment point for supplies
moving from Vinh southward toward
southern Laos and South Vietnam.
d. On 27 February, 65 cargo trucks
were revealed on Route 137 north of
the Ban Karai Pass. The direction of
the trucks could not be determined.
during the last three days of February
there were about 2,500 tons of supplies
moving between logistic units in the
southern North Vietnam Panhandle. The
types and specific destination of the
cargoes were not obtained.
17. From 1 March through 31 March, traffic
moving over the passes from North Vietnam into
southern Laos continued to be heavy, and in
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the Laotian Panhandle, large numbers of
vehicles were observed each day on the north-
south routes of the central corridor and also
along the feeder routes into South Vietnam.
Communist
road construction was also revealed at a
number of points within South Vietnam.
A. NVA Logistic Movements Within
South Vietnam, l-31' March
a. On Route 9 in Quang Tri Province:
1. There were 36 cargo trucks
detected between Khe Sanh and the
Laos border on 6 March. Direction
of movement could not be determined.
2. Evidence of 6 March indicated
that the North Vietnamese were up-
grading a second runway at the Khe
Sanh airfield.
b. During early March, the Com-
munists were observed constructing a
road from the Route 165/966 intersection
in southern Laos into Quang Tin and
Quang Ngai Provinces of South Vietnam.
The road was not close to any of the
three "legal" border entry points which
the Communists had requested as of that
time.
C. I I
during zf~io 8-14 March, a major
unit operating in northeastern Quang
Tri Province accepted or dispatched
about 2,500 cargo vehicles.
d. Road improvement was observed
during late February/early March on
Route 6089 north of its junction with
Route 616 south of Khe Sanh, A new
dual lane highway bridge was also con-
structed during this period on Route 9,
4 miles east of Khe Sanh.
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e. On 6 March, nine NVA trucks
were observed towing AAA guns and two
130-mm field guns south on Route 13
toward Loc Ninh in northern Binh Long
Province.
55 NVA cargo trucks had delivered
over 100 tons of cargo to several loca-
tions in northern MR 1. On 19 March,
an NVA unit in the A Shau Valley was
observed receiving over 170 tons of
cargo, most of it ammunition. It could
not be determined whether these instances
represented the transfer of cargo within
South Vietnam or the introduction of new
supplies into the country.
f. On 17 March,
g. As of 19 March, there had been
a total of seven NVA storage facilities
constructed in the A Shau Valley. The
facilities had been built since 24 Feb-
ruary and contained as many as seven
storage buildings plus areas for open
storage.
h. On 19 March, at least 130 tons
of ammunition were observed moving
between NVA units operating in Quang Tri
Province.
i. On 20 March, 46 NVA trucks were
noted moving ammunition in one area of
Quang Tri Province.
k. On 21 and 22 March, 1,100 tons
of rice and unspecified ordnance were
shipped between two units operating in
Quang Tri Province. On 23 and 25 March,
another unit received over 400 tons of
assorted munitions. In both cases, it
could not be determined if the cargo
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had been transferred within South Viet-
nam or was newly received from out of
the country.
1. On 30 March, 26 vehicles report-
edly transported 93 tons of TNT and
rocket and mortar ammunition to a unit
in northern Quang Tri Province. The
unit reported that after the receipt of
this cargo, it had over 900 tons of
ammunition and construction-related
explosives in storage.
m. On 31 March, 137 cargo vehicles
were detected on Route 9 in western
Quang Tri Province heading both east
and west.
B. NVA Logistic Movements Within Laos
and Cambodia, 1-31 March
as On 8 March a convoy of 50-60
NVA cargo trucks carrying food and ord-
nance was detected moving supplies south
along Route 16 through Attopeu and into
Cambodia.
b. From 23 February to 9 March,
over 1,000 trucks were detected
moving southward through Ban Karai
Pass.
c. On 1 March, 285 vehicles
reportedly were being moved from
the southern Laotian Panhandle to
southern South Vietnam to support
logistic activity there.
d. On 1 March, one unit in the
tri-'border area of Laos and three units
in northeastern Cambodia reported 205
vehicles available to support logistic
activity in the area.
e. There were 380 cargo trucks
detected moving southward on Route 912
through Ban Karai into southern Laos
between 28 February and 6 March.
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f. Two NVA units in the tri-border
area of Laos were observed dispatching
over 300 vehicles toward South Vietnam
and Cambodia during the first 10 days of
March.
g. On 16 March an NVA entity operat-
ing in northeastern Cambodia reportedly
dispatched at least 88 vehicles carrying
unspecified types of cargo.
h. On 16-17 March an NVA unit
operating in the tri-border area was
observed receiving 70 cargo vehicles
and on 17 March dispatching 30 vehicles
destined for South Vietnam.
i. On 22 March, about 200 vehicles
were moving between NVA entities
in the northwest Bolovens region and the
area west of Chavane in the Laotian
Panhandle.
j. On 23 March, an NVA unit in the
tri-border area had 77 vehicles trans-
porting cargo. Another unit near Ban
Bac had 70 vehicles operating on 24 March,
and another south of Saravane received
46 vehicles and dispatched 42 on 25 March.
k. On 28 March, 25X1
70 trucks on Route 966 east of
Chavane -- a three-fold increase in the
traffic observed on this route since the
cease-fire in Laos on 22 February.
1. From 29 March through 1 April,
at least 370 vehicles were detected
moving between NVA units in the southern
Laotian Panhandle. About 200 of these
were headed for a destination in north-
eastern Cambodia adjacent to Pleiku
Province, South Vietnam.
m. An NVA unit in the area northwest
of Ban Bac moved 690 loaded vehicles into
the A Shau Valley during March.
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n. On 29 March, a unit near Tche -
pone received 42 cargo vehicles and
dispatched 71.
C. NVA Logistic Movements Within
North Vietnam, 1-31 March
a. It was reported in early March
that an NVA unit south of Vinh would
ship over 1,000 tons of cargo south-
ward during the month.
b. On 16 March, nearly 200 tons of
cargo were observed being offloaded from
barges by a logistic unit operating south
of Vinh on the Song Ca River. The same
unit reportedly received over 100 tons
of cargo on 21 March.
c. On 21 March a logistic entity
in the southern North Vietnam Panhandle
shipped 100 tons of rice southward from
Dong Hoi via barge. On 25 March the
same unit reportedly had 45 tons of
ammunition and 550 tons of rice awaiting
shipment at dockside.
d. On 21 March, another unit
operating south of Dong Hoi sent 49
vehicles south and 46 north.
e. The major NVA petroleum trans-
shipment facility located in Thanh Hoa
Province pumped nearly 7,000 tons of
petroleum during March. Nearly all of
the total probably was moving southward.
18. From 1 April to the present, activity
in the Vinh area of North Vietnam decreased
to very low levels, but large-scale logistic
movements continued throughout the rest of
the system. Heavy traffic was reported through
the pass areas and NVA vehicle activity
detected on the central corridor of the Laotian
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Panhandle was very heavy, sometimes approaching
300 vehicles in a single day (both directions)
on Route 99. Activity was also detected at
ver high h levels in northern South Vietnam,
and
very large quan-
storage at a number of NVA locations. There
was also continuing evidence of Communist
road building activity in South Vietnam.
tities of weapons and ammunition were in
A. NVA Logistic Movements Within South
Vietnam, 1 April to Present
a. During the period 1-5 April,
there were 64 southbound cargo vehicles
detected on Route 1033 in the western
DMZ.
b. On 3 April, 65 NVA cargo
vehicles were reported on Route 608
north of Khe Sanh.
c. Reliable evidence of 7 April
disclosed 21 cargo vehicles on Route
6089 southeast of Khe Sanh (11 north-
bound, 6 southbound, and 4 parked).
d, On Route 616 southeast of Khe
Sanh, there were 11 cargo trucks and
31 57-mm AAA pieces parked along the
road on 10 April.
e, On 9 April, a convoy of 21
vehicles was seen on Route 922 traveling
on the segment just inside the South
Vietnam/Laos border. Sixteen of the
vehicles were moving south, six of them
towing light artillery pieces.
f. On 9 April, 16 trucks, 5 tanks,
1 armored personnel carrier, and 6
field artillery pieces were seen parked
along Route 547 southwest of Hue.
g. During the period 10-12 April,
over 80 tons of cargo were shipped by
NVA units in northern Quang Tri Province.
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h. On 15 April, 63 vehicles assigned
to an NVA unit in Quang Tri Province
picked up cargo at Dong Hoi, North
Vietnam, and moved it into South Vietnam.
i. On 15 April a major NVA unit
operating in the border area of northern
MR 1 and Laos had over 8,000 tons of
supplies in storage, of which 7,700 tons
were weapons and ammunition.
j. On 16 April, there were 71 cargo
vehicles on Route 9 between Dong Ha and
Khe Sanh (29 eastbound, 10 westbound,
and 32 parked).
k. Since early March, the Communists
Province.
had been working on the reconstruction
of a road running southward from Mimot,
Cambodia, into South Vietnam's Tay Ninh
the road had been restored
and was supporting tanks and artillery
pieces. The rebuilt road provides a
connection between Route L13 in Tay Ninh
Province and Route 7 in southeastern
Cambodia, and by-passes the legal resupply
check point at Xa Mat.
1. a number of
instances of Communist road construction
activity inside South Vietnam
The Communists had been extend-
ing Route 614 in the A Shau Valley for most
of the period since the cease-fire, appar-
ently to connect the road with Route 14 to
the south. As of 7 April the distance
between these two roads had been reduced
to about 18 miles. As of 12 April,
there was an 8-mile segment of newly
constructed road extending from Route
514 to within 5 miles of the coastal
town of Sa Huynh in Quang Ngai Province.
Finally, there was a 52-mile segment of
cleared road observed on 16 April extend-
ing southward from the Route 19 inter-
section with the Laos border about midway
into Darlac Province.
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M. On 20 April, the major unit
operating in northern Quang Tri Province
shipped about 210 tons of munitions
southward on Route 608/616. The total
included nearly 150 tons of 160-mm mor-
tar ammunition.
n. On 29 April, nine trucks were
detected transporting about 30 tons of
cargo in the western MR 1/Laos border
area. On the next day that an NVA
storage facility in the area reportedly
had over 7,500 tons of cargo -- primarily
ordnance -- on hand.
B. NVA Logistic Movements in Laos and
Cambodia, 1 April to Present
a. From 29 March through 1 April,
at least 370 vehicles were detected
moving between two Communist units in
the southern Laotian Panhandle. About
200 of these vehicles were headed for a
destination in northeastern Cambodia
adjacent to Pleiku Province.
b. On 7 April, 43 cargo vehicles
were observed on Route 966 east of
Chavane near the South Vietnam border
(34 eastbound and 9 parked).
c. On 8 April, an NVA unit in
northeastern Cambodia was detected
shipping 77 tons of petroleum and
diesel fuel, 88 tons of rice, and over
50 tons of food supplies to an NVA
engineer regiment operating in the area.
d. On 12 April, 44 cargo vehicles
were detected on Route 912 northwest of
Tchepone (5 northbound, 2 southbound,
and 37 parked). On 15 April, there were
25 vehicles on this route (7 northbound,
2 southbound, and 16 parked).
e. During the period 20-22 April,
a number of NVA logistic units operating
in the Laotian Panhandle adjacent to or
in GVN MR 1 handled large shipments of
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supplies, consisting primarily of ord-
nance and ammunition. Three unlocated
storage facilities in the area were
observed receiving over 2,000 tons of
munitions over the three-day period.
f. On 20 April, an NVA unit operat-
ing in the Laotian Panhandle adjacent
to central MR 1 received a total of 95
vehicles, 40 of which moved on to an
unknown destination.
g. On 21 April, 47 cargo vehicles
were seen traveling on Route 966 east
of Chavane (31 eastbound, 6 westbound,
and 10 parked). There were also 47
vehicles observed on this route on
24 April (34 eastbound, 7 westbound,
and 6 parked),
h. On 23 April there were 75 cargo
trucks on Route 9211 southeast of.Saravane
(13 northbound, 29 southbound, and 33
parked). On 24 April, 82 cargo vehicles
were observed on this route (10 north-
bound, 70 southbound, and 2 parked).
i. On 24 April, 70 eastbound cargo
trucks were seen moving on Route 9 east
of Tchepone.
j. On 25-26 April, nearly 300 NVA
vehicles were active in the tri-border
area of the southern Laotian Panhandle
and northeastern Cambodia. Although no
information was available on the type of
cargo being carried, most of the vehicles
were shuttling cargo eastward into South
Vietnam.
k. On 26 April, there were 24 cargo
trucks on Route 9211 south of Saravane
(18 southbound and 6 northbound). There
were 46 cargo vehicles on this route on
30 April (9 northbound, 33 southbound,
and 4 parked).
1. On 30 April, there were 28 cargo
trucks detected on Route 9 from the
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Route 92 intersection east to the Laos/
South Vietnam border (8 eastbound, 20
parked).
C. NVA Logistic Movements in North
Vietnam, 1 April to Present
a. On 6^7 April, nearly 200 cargo
vehicles passed through the operational
area of an NVA logistic unit south of
Dong Hoi, The total included at least
85 southbound vehicles, but the type
and amount of supplies being carried
could not be determined. The same unit
reportedly had 146 vehicles (74 north-
bound and 72 southbound) pass through
its area on 10 April.
b. In the southern North Vietnamese
Panhandle, 85 cargo vehicles passed
through the area of a major NVA logistic
unit on 15 April (43 southbound and 42
northbound).
c. On 19 April, an NVA unit in the
southern Panhandle offloaded over 300
tons of foodstuffs and medical supplies
from barges on the Giang River and
shipped out over 100 tons of rice.
d. During the period 21-23 April,
over 240 vehicles were noted transiting
the area of an NVA logistic unit south
of Dong Hoi.
e. During the period 1-26 April,
nearly 2,000 vehicles were
0 moving through the area or a mayor
NVA logistic unit south of Dong Hoi,
over half of them traveling south.
f. On 25 April, over 100 vehicles
moving in both directions passed a
vehicle checkpoint south of Dong Hoi.
g. On 28-29 April, over 140 NVA
cargo vehicles were observed crossing
the Giang River in the southern Panhandle.
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ARTICLE 8
This article, along with the Protocol on Cap-
tured Personnel, calls for the return of all mili-
tary prisoners of war within 60 days, and urges the
two South Vietnamese sides to resolve the question
on civilian detainees within 90 days.
Communist Violations
1. The GVN Joint General Staff (JGS) states
that there was on 27 January 1973 a total of
31,810 RVNAF personnel held as POWs by the
Communists. Of these the JGS states that 1,069
were captured in Laos and 531 in Cambodia.
2. As of 28 March, 5,018 of these prisoners
of war had been released. Also, since the
cease-fire, approximately 1,200 RVNAF personnel
have been reported missing. This would bring
the total RVNAF personnel possibly still held
as POWs by the Communists to approximately
28,000.
3. The above GVN figures of POWs held by
the Communists include missing RVNAF personnel
as well as captured. The GVN has no way of
telling how many of these men were captured
and how many may have deserted, died, been
induced to go over to the Communist side,
or impressed into the Communist forces.
4. In the absence of firm data, it is
impossible to give a true figure of the number
of RVNAF personnel now held as prisoners by the
Communists. The number is less than 28,000,
but how much less it is impossible to say.
5. The GVN has compiled a list of actual
names of 67,501 of its civilians detained by the
other side since 1954. Of these, 16,754 were
GVN local officials and government cadre. The
Communists, however, initially claimed to hold
only 140. They later raised this number to 428,
and finally, on 20 April, agreed to release 637.
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ARTICLES 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14
These articles are not pertinent to Communist
violations.
ARTICLE 15
This article states that the reunification of
Vietnam must be accomplished through peaceful means
and that, pending reunification, North and South
Vietnam shall respect the DMZ.
Communist Violations
1. North Vietnam has, since the cease-fire,
moved sizable numbers of troops back and forth
across the DMZ, and has (as stated earlier)
moved thousands of tons of military supplies
across the DMZ into South Vietnam.
2. North Vietnam has virtually annexed
sizable areas of Quang Tri Province below the
DMZ. It has not even engaged in the pretext.
of a "PRG" administration in that part of Quang
Tri Province under its control, but openly ad-
ministers it directly through ministries and
agencies of North Vietnam. In other words, for
North Vietnam, the DMZ does not exist. Indeed,
if challenged on this point, Hanoi's negotiators
will probably cite the text of Article 15's
subsection (a) as ample justification.
This article is not pertinent to current Com-
munist violations. (The article concerns the Four-
Party Joint Military Commission, which has already
been dissolved.)
ARTICLE 17
This article, along with articles 11-18 of the
Cease-Fire Protocol, sets forth the proper func-
tioning of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission
(TP JMC) .
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Communist Violations
1. The negative attitude of the Communist
side has prevented the TPJMC from functioning
as it was intended to function.
The "PRG's" Chief Delegate (Tran Van Tra,
an NVA General and alternate member of the
Party Central Committee) has absented him-
self from TPJMC meetings since 30 March.
The "PRG" has not responded to the GVN offer
to extend the FPJMC "privileges and im-
munities" to the TPJMC.
The "PRG" has failed to deploy personnel
to points of entry designated under Article
7.
The "PRG" has refused to discuss GVN pro-
posals for prompt agreement on organization
and deployment (based on ICCS deployments).
The "PRG" delegation has not seriously re-
sponded to GVN proposals to freeze major
combat units and to begin delineation of
zones of control.
The "PRG" delegates have refused to discuss
GVN-proposed procedures for establishing
cease-fires in areas under Communist attack
(e.g., Tonle Cham and Hong Ngu). (For one
thing, the "PRG" insists on lower level
contacts between opposing commanders. The
GVN quite correctly suspects that this is
more aimed at subversion. than at peace-
keeping and insists that only those ARVN
commanders who control all of the forces
in an area [e.g., including artillery]
should deal with the other side.)
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ARTICLE 18
This article establishes the International
Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS).
Both this article and the Protocol to the Agree-
ment on the ICCS state that the two South Viet-
namese parties shall facilitate the operation of
the ICCS teams and give them full cooperation,
assistance, and protection.
Communist Violations
1. The Communists have seriously hindered
the operation of the ICCS and have frequently
endangered the lives of the Commission's dele-
gates. These forces have on a number of occa-
sions fired on clearly marked ICCS helicopters
and on 7 April shot down an ICCS helicopter
in Quang Tri Province killing all nine pas-
sengers aboard. The other side's explanation
that this helicopter was off course ignores
the fact that ICCS helicopters are not to be
fired on under any circumstance -- neither,
for that matter, are any other aircraft
operating legitimately in GVN airspace and
not engaged in acts of force.
2. The Communists have seriously threatened
the safety of ICCS personnel by conducting
numerous artillery and rocket attacks upon Tri
Ton and Hong Ngu district towns where Com-
mission members have been stationed.
3. The unwillingness of the Communist
side to ensure the safety of ICCS inspections
or travel in areas under their control has
seriously impaired ICCS operations.
This article is not pertinent to Communist
violations.
ARTICLE 20
This article concerns Laos and Cambodia and
states, among other things, that all parties to
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the Agreement shall end their military activities
in these two countries and withdraw their military
forces therefrom.
Communist Violations
1. North Vietnam still maintains military
forces in Laos and Cambodia, and shows no
intention of removing them.
2. North Vietnamese Forces in Laos.
Table 4 shows our current estimate o A
forces in Laos.
3. The 38,000 NVA combat troops in Laos
are organized into two infantry divisions and
13 regiments, as well as a number of inde-
pendent battalions. The 47,000 administrative
forces are principally engaged in operating
and maintaining the Ho Chi Trail system in
southern Laos.
4. From late 1972 until February 1973 the
North Vietnamese steadily augmented their
combat forces in Laos, both by deploying units
from North Vietnam and creating units from
personnel already in Laos. During the same
period, the North Vietnamese also began an
extensive reorganization of their rear services
apparatus in southern Laos which involved the
transformation of binh trams, which had per-
formed a variety of functions, into regiments,
each of which is engaged in one specific task,
such as engineering or transportation. It is
apparent, however, that the reorganization is
not yet complete and that evidence of further
changes probably will be forthcoming in the
near future.
5. In addition to their own forces, the
North Vietnamese continue to maintain an ex-
tensive advisory presence in both northern
and southern Laos. Although the number of
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Order of Battle of North Vietnamese
Military Forces in Laos
1 May 1973
Total
Northern
Laos
Southern
Laos
Total
85,000
22,000
63,000
Regular combat
forces
38,000
16,000
22,000
Administrative
services
47,000
6,000
41,000
North Vietnamese advisers to Pathet Lao (PL)
and neutralist forces is unknown, there is
little doubt that there are advisers at all
major command levels. Moreover, in order to
instruct the PL, NVA troops occasionally have
been attached to PL units on a temporary basis.
Over the years, the NVA advisory effort has
proven extremely valuable -- if not essential --
to the PL, both in terms of planning overall
strategy and conducting daily tactical operations.
6. North Vietnamese Forces in Cambodia.
Table 5 shows our current estimate of NVA and
VC forces in Cambodia.
Order of Battle of VC/NVA
Military Forces in Cambodia
1 May 1973
Total
33,400
NVA
25,400
VC
8,000
Regular combat forces
5,000
NVA
3,500
VC
1,500
Administrative services
28,400
NVA
21,900
VC
6,500
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7. The 5,000 VC/NVA combat troops in
Cambodia are organized into five regiments
and several independent battalions. Almost
all of the 28,400 administrative services
troops and about 20% of the combat troops are
located in the eastern part of the country.
The disproportionately large administrative
structure has a dual role, supporting both
VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam's MRs 3 and 4
and VC/NVA and Khmer units in Cambodia.
8. In addition to providing support for
VC and Khmer Communist (KC) units in Cambodia,
the North Vietnamese have furnished an unknown
but significant number of advisers to the KC
military and political apparatus. The North
Vietnamese commitment of combat troops?has de-
clined markedly since the withdrawal of major
units prior to the offensive in South Vietnam
in 1972, and the KC have become increasingly
autonomous in conducting combat activity.
Nonetheless, the North Vietnamese continue to
provide a significant level of logistical and
some fire support in addition to their rela-
tively small manpower commitment. The North
Vietnamese also, of course, have an influential
and possibly decisive voice in determining what
military policies the Khmer Communists shall
pursue.
ARTICLES 21, 22, and 23
These articles are not pertinent to Communist
violations.
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