ORR PROJECT S-1762 ,' THE IMPACT OF INTENSIFIED AIR ATTACKS AGAINST ECONOMIC TARGETS IN NORTH VIETNAM'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000800030007-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2002
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 28, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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? NO FOREIGN DISSEM
20
THE IMPACT OF INTENSIFIED AIR ATTACKS
AGAINST ECONOMIC TARGETS IN NORTH VIETNAM
28 January 1966
;(ORR Project No. S-1762)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
. Office of Research and Reports
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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CONTENTS
Page
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? ? . .
2. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ?
3. Direct Effects on Economic Activity . . . . . . . . .
4. Economic and Social Effects ? ? . . . . . . . . .
a. Economic Effects . . . . . . . . . . ? ? ? ? ? .
b. Social Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ec
.
6. Estimate of Civilian Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
t on the Waging of the War . . . . . . . . . . . .
Eff
5
Appendixes
Appendix A. Effect of Attacks on Electric Power 11
Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Appendix D. Alternative Target Systems . . . . . . . . . 23
n
Ppe 15
Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
dix C Effects of Interdiction of Rail and Sea
Appen ix 13
Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d B Effect of Attacks on Petroleum Storage
Table:;
Fixed Targets Attacked Under Assumed Intensified 20
US/GVN Air Offensive . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .
Map
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THE IMPACT OF INTENSIFIED AIR ATTACKS
AGAINST ECONOMIC TARGETS IN NORTH VIETNAM
Summary
This memorandum analyzes the economic and social effects of a
postulated escalation of the US/GVN air offensive against North Vietnam
which, if successfully executed, would deny essential supplies to almost
all modern industrial activity in North Vietnam. Under this assumption,
the country would also lose two-thirds of its power-generating capacity
and more than 95 percent of its bulk petroleum storage capacity. Both
rail transport and seaborne foreign trade would be greatly reduced. As
a consequence, industrial production would be practically ground to a halt.
In spite of these severe economic hardships, the regime would be
of economic losses alone to bring the regime into negotiations to end the
significantly increased scales of combat. It is unlikely that the level of
of Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam, both at present or at
and to.maintain the small flow of supplies needed to continue its support
able to feed and to control its population, to maintain essential imports,
North Vietnam is an essentially agrarian society with more than 85
percent of the population living in rural areas. Consumef demand is
extremely low and is focused almost exclusively on minimum require-
ments for food, shelter, and clothing. These wants could be largely
satisfied by the regime even if the thin veneer represented by North
Vietnam's modern economy were eliminated completely.
The intensified air attacks analyzed in this memorandum would
of urban populations, particularly those unei ,pyto~.ed in the industrial
primitive means of transport to distribute food and the further relocation
be able to cope with the postattack distribution problems involved in feed-
ing the population. Among the measures it would adopt are the use of
this determination would continue to be high under prolonged bombing and
mounting casualties in the South cannot be estimated. The regime should
and unify the people in their resistance to the United States. How long
there is reason to believe that at least initially the attacks would fortify
to be unwilling to support the regime and its conduct of the war. Indeed,
probably cause an overall but indeterminate decline in civilian morale,
but the damage inflicted by these attacks is not likely to cause the populace
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The estimated civilian casualties resulting from the attacks on fixed
targets would be at least 2, 000 to 3, 000. If armed reconnaissance is
carried on at the level authorized for each Rolling Thunder program in
late 1965, there would be at least an additional 300 civilian casualties
for each 1, 200 armed reconnaissance sorties. '
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The experience in 1965 indicates that air interdiction of lines of
communication has not halted the flow of men and supplies into North
Vietnam or into Laos and South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese have
shown a remarkable ability both to maintain and to increase the volume
of supplies moved into Laos and South Vietnam. They have, moreover,
increased the capacity of the major supply routes. Even after an
intensified air offensive of the same type as in 1965, North Vietnam
could continue to provide the Communist forces in South Vietnam with
an average of 12 short tons* of supplies per day. They would appear
also to have the capability to provide the 165 short tons of supplies per
day estimated to be required by an expanded PAVN/VC main force of
155 battalions fighting at intensified scales of combat at the .,d of 1966.
Although an escalation of the bombing undoubtedly would increase the
difficulty of logistical support and would force North Vietnam to under-
take emergency measures to maintain the flow of supplies, there would
seem to be no way, -short of physical occupation, to attain a complete
halt in the flow of supplies to South Vietnam by using conventional
weapons.
The logistic funnel through Laos is needed to provide only a small
volun`' of supplies since the Communist forces in South Vietnam are
almost completely independent of the economy of North Vietnam. There-
fore, economic loss alone will neither affect the ability of the regime to
support the war nor necessarily induce it to negotiate to end the war.
.Although the heavy losses to modern industrial facilities might possibly
induce the Hanoi regime to abandon its objectives in South Vietnam,
under present conditions this response to the bombing seems unlikely.
The more important factors shaping the attitude of the regime would
appear to be the certain anticipation or actual experience of unacceptably
high losses and defeats to the VC and PAVN in the South or the discontinu-
ance.,ofaid from other. Communist countries, particularly the USSR.
Continuing destruction in the North would very likely reduce the leader-
ship's willingness to maintain the war effort, if and when the tide turns
against them in the South.
* Unless specifically identified as short tons, tonnages are given in
metric tons.
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1. Assumptions
This memorandum presents an analysis of a postulated escalation
of the US/GVN air offensive against North Vietnam. The analysis assumes
a completely successful intensification of aerial attacks against targets of
economic and military significance within the general Hanoi-Haiphong
area. * The attack specifically analyzed represents an expansion of the
air offensive to a level deemed appropriate 'to attain an effective halt of
most of the modern economic activity in North Vietnam. 44* The major
target groupings included in this analysis are: (a) four of the principal
electric power facilities; (lb;) the nine remaining major petroleum storage
facilities; (c) thirty-four bridge and transport targets, ;.;including the rail
connections to China and the port facilities at Haiphong; and (d) aerial
mining of the major ports. The analysis also includes an evaluation of
the impact of these strikes on (a) economic activity within North Vietnam,
(b) the secondary economic and social effects within the country, and
(c) the probable level of civilian casualties resulting from these attacks
and from strikes against other significant military targets.
2. Background
The North Vietnamese economy, which is basically one of sub-
sistence agriculture, has only a small modern industrial sector con-
centrated in a few urban centers, including Hanoi, Haiphong, Nam Dinh,
Viet Tri, and Thai Nguyen. The country imports little food even in poor
agricultural years and depends largely on domestic production to feed
its population of about 18 million persons. More than 80 percent of the
population is engaged in agriculture, which in 1964 accounted for almost
one-half of the gross national product (GNP). North Vietnam produces
only minor items of military equipment -- grenades, mines, mortars,
and ammunition for small arms -- and must import all of its heavy
military equipment and most of its small arms, ammunition, and medical
supplies from Communist countries.
The industrialization program of North Vietnam has concentrated on
the development of a machine building industry, a chemical industry, a
food processing industry, and several other light industries which con-
stitute the core of the new modern industrial structure of the country.
The country also is building with Chinese aid a 100, 000-ton steel mill
?,* For the location of these targets,see the accompanying map; for an
annotated listing, see the table in Appendix C.
For a discussion of alternative target systems, see Appendix D.
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at Thai Nguyen which is already producing pig iron and which was
expected to be producing crude steel and some rolled products by the
end of 1965.
This small industrial sector is heavily dependent on imports of
machinery and raw materials, principally from Communist China and
the USSR. The foreign trade of North Vietnam, which has been such
an important factor in the, economic development of the country, was
equal to about 15 percent of GNP in 1964.
Through the end of 1965, this small industrial sector has been
relatively untouched by the US/GVN air offensive. In spite of the
interdiction of rail transport connections to Communist China, rail
imports in 1965 exceeded the level of 1964. Seaborne imports and
exports in 1965 also exceeded 1964 levels. The infiltration of men
and supplies into South Vietnam also increased.
3. Direct Effects on Economic Activity
The successful execution of the air offensive postulated in this
memorandum would bring activity in the modern industrial sector to
a quick halt. The losses resulting from these attacks would be serious
and would create severe hardships. They would not, however, preclude
continued support for the Communist forces in South Vietnam, nor would
these economic losses alone compel the leadership of North Vietnam to
enter into negotiations to end the war in Vietnam. A decision to negotiate
would probably be dependent on some indeterminate combination of eco-
nomic and human losses in North Vietnam, unacceptable military defeats
in South Vietnam, and external pressures o3: the denial of assistance
from other Communist powers.
The speed and extent of the breakdown of North Vietnam's modern
industrial sector would depend on the way in which the attack was carried
out. The fullest and most immediate impact on the economy would be
achieved by the simultaneous and swift execution of all of the assumed
attacks on electric power installations, petroleum storage facilities,
internal lines of communications, major port facilities, and the aerial
mining of major ports. On the other hand a slower schedule could
possibly have a greater harmful impact on public morale through the
combined effects of exposure to air attacks over a longer period of time
and the frustrations of trying to cope with reconstruction and repair
problems under conditions of repeated strikes and restrikes on targeted
areas.
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The escalated air offensive analyzed in this memorandum would
stop almost all modern industrial activity for a number of reasons. The
attack on electric power installations would raise total losses in generat-
ing capacity to 118, 000 kilowatts, or 67 percent of total generating
capacity* that existed before the onset of the Rolling Thunder program.
Almost all of modern industry -- the exceptions being some industry at
Haiphong and Viet Tri -- would cease operations. Activity at the port
of Cam Pha would also be severely disrupted. From 30 to 40 percent
of the electric power supplied to agriculture would be cut off. The
effect here would not be felt until the spring harvest. The degree to
which agriculture would be affected cannot be estimated without specific
knowledge of the areas affected and the measures which might be adopted
to offset the loss of power supply. The attack on electric power facilities
would be sufficient to prevent a complete restoration of North Vietnam's
main power grid for a period of at least one to two years.
The attack on petroleum storage facilities would elitinate more than
95 percent of national storage capacity, but the effect of this loss on
economic and military activity would be only temporary. **'The immediate
economic effects would be felt only slightly in industry, which does not
use petroleum as an energy source. The major impact would be on
transport. The distribution of food, raw materials, and finished products
would be rather thoroughly disrupted. Stockpiles of petroleum available
after the attack would amount to less than a month's normal requirements.
Within a short time, however, the regime could probably cope successfully
with the loss of petroleum storage. Essential civilian transport in the
postattack situation could be handled by other than motorized vehicles.
Military transport could be satisfied by emergency measures to bring in
essential petroleum requirements. ***
The initial destruction and continued interdiction of transport targets
would cause rail transportation to cease almost completely. *** Seaborne
foreign trade would be greatly reduced by the mining of the major ports
and attacks on port facilities. Many of the transport problems in the
civilian sector would be ameliorated by the reduced requirements for
transport that would result from the cessation of most industrial produc-
tion and the inability to maintain most export trade. The immediate
problems associated with distribution of food are lessened by the fact
that the harvest is already in and distributed. Moreover, the highly
decentralized system of food storage lessens the requirement:-for trans-
portatio.n:i:r
See Appendix A
See Appendix B.
See Appendix C.
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4. Economic and Social Effects
a. Economic Effects
Modern industry, accounting for about one-half of-gross
industrial output,; and industrial construction would come to an almost
complete halt under the assumed attack. There would be a sharp set-
back to North Vietnam's economic development program. The re-
percussions of the breakdown of modern industry, would, however, be
limited by the primarily self-sufficient nature of the subsistence sector,
which supports about 85 percent of North Vietnam's 18 million people.
The impact of even a complete loss of its modern industrial base would
be a matter of direct concern to only a small element of the North
Vietnam society. Most of the population leads a fairly primitive life
with simple wants and needs. North Vietnam's small modern economy
is not consumer-oriented. Only a small segment of the society would
find its daily routine or standard of living measurably impaired if the
industrial base ceased to operate. More than one-half million non-
agricultural workers would be released from their jobs, but most of
these workers would undoubtedly be reemployed in reconstruction and
transportation. The morale and productivity of the nonagricultural
labor force probably would decline because of the transfer from normal
work, the regime's probable demand for further amounts of uncom-
pensated labor, and the separation from families as a result of new job
assignments or the probable further evacuation of dependents from urban
areas. But these effects would be felt directly by such a small segment
of the population that they would neither control the reactions of the rest
of the country nor be compelling enough to shape the attitude of the
policy-makers.
The further decrease in the normally tight supplies of food and
other essential consumer goods as a result of the disruption of the
transportation system and denial of imports might also have a harmful
impact. North Vietnam is basically self-sufficient in food, however,
and the distribution problems resulting from the disruption of transport
could lead at the most to only minimal food shortages in some smaller
urban areas and in the already food-deficit regions in the southern,
northwestern, and northeastern parts of the country. Evacuation of
urban residents, which is currently under w.ay, would undoubtedly be
stepped up to relieve food shortages.. The recent replenishing of food
stocks from the fall harvest plus the proximity of North Vietnam's major
urban areas -- Hanoi, Haiphong, and Nam Dinh -- to surplus rice-
growing regions would permit adequate supplies of food to these areas.
The likely influx of evacuees from urban centers and other food-deficit
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areas into normally self-sufficient rural areas would reduce per capita
availabilities of food there, and possibly wouldprovolce the hostility of
local residents toward the newcomers.
Severe problems probably would not arise in the supply of
essential civilian goods. Other than food the major requirement is for
clotbi=ng;,, but shortages of clothing would be felt only in the long run and
would be ameliorated by North Vietnam's moderate climate. With the
exception of combat-related pharmaceuticals, medicines are in short
supply and could become a critical item, but resupply could be a rela-
tively simple logistic problem.
b. Social Effects
The execution of the intensified program of air attacks could
probably cause an overall decline in civilian morale. The experience of
the World War II air offensives in both Germany and J? :'.n would indicate
that aerial bombing, even in these economically advanced countries, does
not produce a politically significant decline in public morale until the
damage inflicted is so pervasive and irreparable that the will and ability
of the populace to support the war are thoroughly shattered. In view of
the limited impact of the intensified air attack analyzed in this memo-
randum, it is unlikely that civilian morale in North Vietnam would decline
to the point that it would become a significant factor in influencing the
regime's policy decisions on continuing to support the war in South Vietnam.
There is no evidence that the ten months of continuous bombings in the
southern part of the country have as yet created serious morale problems
in that part of North Vietnam. 25X1 C
25X1C the almost daily bombings have generated fear and appre-
ension u have at the same time produced a strong patriotic and angry
response to the attacks, thus contributing to the regime's ability to mobilize
the population.
The people, apparently with a minimum of coercion, have
evacuated populated areas, restricted private travel, and accepted con-
siderable adjustment in their normal economic and social activity. The
influx of people into rural areas has actually helped to relieve the man-
power shortage created by the draft of personnel for military service
and reconstruction. The population of .the Hanoi-Haiphong area would
probably react similarly when subjected to aerial attack. 25X1 C
25X1 C25X1 C these areas continue to reflect a large
degree of public support for the regime's war effort. ?
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Both the public and private statements of the North Vietnamese
leaders indicate that Hanoi fully expects an escalation of the air attacks
to indlude all worthwhile military and economic targets within the Hanoi-
Haiphong heartland. Their statements and actions suggest that they are
prepared to accept this destruction as part of the cost of successfully
achieving Communist objectives in South Vietnam and that they will
endure the bombings at least until the fighting in South Vietnam turns
decisively against them.
5. Effect on the Waging of the War
The type of war currently being waged by the Communist forces in
South Vietnam remains essentially guerrilla warfare. It is characterized
by hit-and-run tactics and a general unwillingness' of Communist forces
to engage in frontal combat with the opposing forces.
The Communist forces in South Vietnam have only a minimal
dependence on the economy of North Vietnam. The guerrilla forces are
almost completely self-sufficient. The main force is dependent for
supplies from external sources for only the smaller part of its needs --
principally quartermaster goods such as medical supplies and signal
equipment and weapons and ammunition. These supplies are not produced
in North Vietnam and are supplied almost wholly by other Communist
countries. * Thus a collapse of the modern industrial sector would have
almost no impact on the military activity in South Vietnam.
The effort required to satisfy the logistic requirements of the Com-
munist main forces in South'Vietnam: is small. ' At the: level of combat prevail-
ing during most of 1965 the requirement for logistic support from abroad
is estimated at about 12 short tons per day. Even at the current projection
of the probable maximum buildup of PAVN and Viet Cong main forces dur-
ing 1966, the external logistic requirement would be only 165-ahbrt tons a
day. *
The North Vietnamese have developed an effective and relatively
invulnerable system to infiltrate men and supplies into South Vietnam.
The capacity of the recently improved primary infiltration route through
the Laotian panhandle has been reduced by US/GVN interdiction measures
* A.'fairly important exception is the procurement through normal trade
channels of medical supplies from some non-Communist countries.
** This requirement is calculated for a main force of 155 PAVN/VC
battalions engaged in combat once in. every three days.
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to an estimated 400 short tons per day. This capacity is more than
adequate to meet the current logistic requirement of the Communist
main forces in South Vietnam. The capacity of this route would also
meet the logistic requirements of an expanded main force engaging in
a scale of combat considerably more intensive than that waged to date.
If both the buildup of the PAVN/VC main forces and the scale of
combat should approach the point of exhausting the capacity of the
supply funnel through Laos, the North Vietnamese could then resort to
sea infiltration or the use of Cambodia to, augment the flow of supplies.
During 1965 the US/GVN air offensive included a determined effort
to cut off the flow of supplies moving through Laos. In spite of this
interdiction, the North Vietnamese have demonstrated a remarkable
ability not only to maintain and to increase the movement of men and
supplies but also to increase the basic capacity of this supply network.
Although the attack analyzed in this memorandum would make logistic
support more difficult and require more emergency measures, the ton-
nages involved are so small that there would seem, in effect, to be no
way, short of physical occupation, to attain a complete halt in the flow
of men and supplies through Laos into South Vietnam.
To maintain the logistic support of the Communist forces in South
Vietnam, the North Vietnamese also need an effective transport system
within North Vietnam. Although the air offensive to date has disrupted
and hindered the operation of the North Vietnamese transport system,
it has not reduced it to a level below that needed to maintain essential
traffic. During the last quarter of 1965 the volume of freight that was
moved into the southern provinces of North Vietnam approached and
may even have exceeded normal levels. The inventory of motor trucks,
despite the losses from air attack, actually increased during 1965. It
should be noted finally that the supply of the probably most essential
factor -- petroleum -- was not reduced to critical levels during 1965.
Moreover, even the intensified attack analyzed in this memorandum
would not prevent the North Vietnamese from maintaining at least its
essential imports of petroleum* -- and hence its ability to supply the
forces in South Vietnam.
See Appendix C.
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6. Estimate of Civilian Casualties
The air attack analyzed in this memorandum extends into areas of
North Vietnam that have been relatively untouched by previous US/GVN
air strikes. The specific target locations are for the most-part in
sparsely populated areas. Only one of the four electric power targets
is in a relatively heavily populated area. The petroleum storage targets
are all in lightly populated areas or on the outskirts of larger cities.
Several of the major transport targets are in close proximity to heavily
populated areas. It is estimated, however, that previously executed
evacuation programs, the extensive civil defense measures, and the
present form of US/GVN air attacks all make it unlikely that civilian
casualties will reach unacceptable levels. They would, however, be
proportionately higher and would be inflicted within a much shorter
time phase than the casualties experienced under the US/GVN air
campaign during 1965.
This estimate of civilian casualties is based on factors derived
from an analysis of the US/GVN attacks through October 1965. On this
basis, it is estimated; that the civilian casualties resulting from the
attack on preestablished and fixed targets will be at least 2, 000 to
3, 000. Additional civilian casualties resulting from armed reconnais-
sance missions may be computed at a minimum rate of 300 civilian casu-
alties for each 1, 200 armed reconnaissance sorties. In the past, no
more than 1, 200 armed reconnaissance sorties have been authorized for
a two-week period.
Medical services in North Vietnam are inadequate to meet the
nationbs';normal public health needs. These services, therefore, can
provide only minimum emergency care and treatment of additional
civilian casualties. The small numbers of civilian medical and para-
medical personnel (estimated to include 1, 400 physicians, 2, 300 doctors'
assistants, and 8, 000 nurses in 1965), most of whom are poorly trained,
are unable to cope with the high incidence of nutritional, infectious, and
parasitic diseases. They presumably have been hard-pressed to serv-
ice the relatively few war casualties sustained thus far. The civilian
and military hospitals (only 25, 000 beds), convalescent homes, and
village, medical stations are, with few exceptions, poorly equipped and
chronically overcrowded. Moreover, with the exception of several
important combat-related items, medicines are in short supply. The
exceptions are mainly penicillin, blood plasma, and sulfa drugs, large
stocks of which have-been accumulated as a result of greatly increased
imports during the past year. The stockpile of penicillin is estimated
to be sufficient, according to US experience, to meet the needs of more
than 800, 000 troops in active combat for one year.
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APPENDIX A
EFFECT OF ATTACKS ON ELECTRIC POWER FACILITIES
The proposed escalation of air attacks against electric power facilities
would put out of operation the important thermal power stations at Hanoi,
Thai Nguyen, and Hon Ga'i as well as the vital Dong Anh substation, which
feeds power from three sources to the city of Hanoi. Destruction of these
facilities would raise the total loss of power-generating capacity to 118, 000
kilowatts, or 67 percent of national capacity. These strikes would bring
modern industry in the affected areas to a complete halt and would severely
disrupt the highly electrified operations at the port of Cam Pha. Some of
the major industrial installations that would be forced to shut down are
the Hanoi machine building plant, the Nam Dinh textile plant, the Thai
Nguyen iron and steel plant, the iron ore mines at Thai Nguyen, and the
coal mines at Hon Gai. In each case the enterprise is the major if not
exclusive producer of its kind in the country. Many of the enterprises
are also highly regarded show projects. The attacks postulated in this
memorandum leave some 33 percent of national electric power capacity
intact. Some of this capacity is accounted for by small plants not connected
with the main grid. However, three important plants not included among
those targeted in the proposed escalation -- one at Viet Tri and two at
Haiphong -- account for 19 percent of national generating capacity. * The
industries they support could therefore continue to function. The most
important of these are the cement plant at Haiphong and the paper mill,
the chemical combine, and the sugar refinery at Viet Tri. It is unlikely
that the powerplants situated at Haiphong would have excess capacity for
transmission to Hanoi. In any case the distance and limited carrying
capacity of the 35-kilowatt line between Haiphong and Hanoi will restrict
the maximum load that could be transmitted to perhaps 3 to 5 megawatts,
or only a small fraction of Hanoi's requirements. Although the power-
plant at Viet Tri would have surplus capacity to supply power to the main
grid, the loss of the Dong Anh substation would forestall effective use
of this excess capacity at least temporarily. The substation probably
* The exclusion of these plants is arbitrary. The selection of targets
in this sector included only those installations necessary to effectively
cripple the operations of the main grid system and to cause the most
important industrial activity to cease operations.
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could be put back into partial operation in as little as two months,
provided technical assistance is available, by transferring equipment
from substations elsewhere in the country. Thus it would be necessary
to maintain some surveillance on this target to determine the necessity
of a restrike.
If the attacks on the electric power facilities are effectively executed,
the North Vietnamese would be hard-pressed to restore power to the
degree necessary to resume industrial production. Destruction of the
targeted power facilities would also deny to agriculture an estimated 30 to
40 percent of the power supply presently used in agriculture. The country
lacks both the capability to manufacture the required equipment and the
technical skills necessary to reconstruct the powerplants. Even with
outside assistance, their reconstruction would require from one to two
years. For this reason the attacks against electric power facilities,
once successful, would not require sustained strike operations by
US/GVN forces.
It should be expected that power requirements for essential services
such as command posts, communication centers, and hospitals can be
maintained through the use of mobile diesel generators. Restricted
power supply in Haiphong probably will result in drastic reduction, if
not elimination, of street lighting and consumption of electricity by private
households. It is also likely that industrial requirements for power in
Haiphong will not be fully met without alteration of work schedules to
reduce demands during peak load hours. With the exception of the
32-megawatt Hanoi thermal powerplant, which can supply an estimated
70 percent of Hanoi's power, all facilities proposed as targets for.
es-.calation of air attacks are located in relatively sparsely populated
areas. The Hanoi plant, although situated in the northwestern outskirts
of the city, is bordered on two sides by dense residential housing.
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EFFECT OF ATTACKS ON PETROLEUM STORAGE FACILITIES
Previous air strikes against bulk petroleum facilities destroyed or
rendered useless four storage facilities which represented about 37, 000
tons of bulk storage capacity. The proposed. expansion of air strikes
against nine major storage terminals would deprive the regime of an
additional 168, 000 tons of capacity, There would remain only some
7: 000 tons of storage dispersed in a variety of untargeted locations and
some 2, 200 tons in small buried tanks at seven newly identified dis-
persed storage facilities. Thus the planned attacks would eliminate the
principal bulk petroleum terminals in North Vietnam and would preclude
the delivery of petroleum supplies in bulk by tankers. About 90 percent
of North Vietnam's imports of petroleum currently are delivered by
tanker.
In 1965 the total supply of petroleum, all imported, was about 175, 000
tons. Although coal is the principal source of primary energy, this amount
of petroleum probably represents North Vietnam's minimum essential
needs. The distinction between military and civil consumers is not always
clear, but it is estimated that about 60 percent of the total supply is con-
sumed by the military. The remainder is consumed chiefly by civilian
motor and water transport.
The loss of petroleum storage facilities -- and their contents -- would
have an immediate effect on the economy. The effect on normal industrial
production activities would be slight because most of the industrial enter-
prises in North Vietnam rely on coal or electricity for energy. Consump-
tion of petroleum by individual civil consumers is negligible. The major
effect in the civilian economy would be in transportation. Civilian motor-
ized transportation would come to a quick halt if imports of petroleum were
interdicted continuously. The transport of food, raw materials, and
finished goods would be curtailed drastically. Relief would be found only
to the extent that priority transport and distribution problems could be
handled by primitive means of transport or through use of existing stock-
piles.
Data on stockpiles of petroleum in North Vietnam, including that in
drums and small buried tanks, are not available. The inventory repre-
sented by these expedients and by untargeted facilities is small, totaling
only about 10, 000 tons -- less than a month's supply at current supply
rates.
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A sustained loss of petroleum storage facilities coupled with an
inability to import even minimum operating requirements would have its
greatest effect on military operations. North Vietnamese military forces
account for about 60 percent of total petroleum consumption, or a monthly
average of about 8, 500 tons. North Vietnam with Chinese cooperation
would probably be able to maintain petroleum imports at almost normal
levels even after the intensified attacks discussed in this memorandum.
Therefore, the supply of essential imports of petroleum for military
requirements would appear to be almost certain. The methods by which
this could be done are discussed in Appendix C.
* For a discussion of the effect on transportation of a denial of petroleum
and the ability of transport to handle minimum essential imports of pe-
troleum, see Appendix C.
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EFFECTS OF INTERDICTION OF RAIL AND SEA TRANSPORT
For the purposes of this memorandum, it was assumed that an
escalated air attack on the Hanoi-Haiphong area would continue the inter-
diction of 22 major rail, highway, or combination rail/highway bridges
These targets are on transport routes that connect
the major industrial centers with each other and with Ping-hsiang, China,
and the port of Haiphong. also includes seven other transport
targets on the same routes, three port facilities, the minable area at
Haiphong, and the major railroad repair shop near Hanoi. If all of these
targets were effectively and repeatedly attacked in an escalated bombing
schedule, it could be assumed that rail transport would almost cease. a