CONSEQUENCES OF MINING THE SEAPORTS AND WATER APPROACHES TO NORTH VIETNAM AND BOMBING THE NORTHERN RAILROADS AND ROADS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000800030019-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 17, 2002
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: May 23, 1967
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release 2002/11/08 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000800030019-ter
Secret
25X1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
JCS review(s)
completed.
Consequences of Mining the Seaports and Water
Approaches to North Vietnam and Bombing the
Northern Railroads and Roads
Secret
28
23 May 1967
No. 0649/67
Approved For Release 2002/11/08 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000800030019-9
 Approved For Release 2002/11/08 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800030019-9
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION
Approved For Release 2002/11/08 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800030019-9
 Approved For Release 2002/ 00030019-9
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
23 May 1967
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Consequences of Mining the Seaports and
Water Approaches to North-Vie! 57E and
Bombing t --e Northern Railroads an oads
Summary
A mining program coupled with intensified armed
reconnaissance against the railroads and roads in the
northern part of North Vietnam would have serious
economic consequences, but it would not be likely to
weaken the military establishment seriously or to
prevent Hanoi from continuing its aggression in the
south.
The disruption caused by mining would depend
upon the type and extent of the program. A substantial
portion of imports could be maintained by sea and
coastal water movements despite a conventional mining
program designed to prevent the discharge of deep-
draft oceangoing ships in harbors. However, almost
complete denial of water access to North Vietnam
could resul
An optimum program against all means of land and
water transportation probably could interdict at most
70 percent of North Vietnam's transport capacity to
import, reducing it from about 14,000 tons a a day at
present to about 3,900 a day. Interdiction to this
extent would reduce the present level of goods actually
imported by about 25 percent. North Vietnam could, however, reduce the flow
of supplies from outside the country to manageable
25X1
25X4
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/11/0 RjP 78T02095R000800030019-9
 Approved For Release 200 111108 0800030019-9
levels by eliminating nonessential imports. The
military supplies and essential economic goods needed
by Hanoi to continue with the war would not exceed
an estimated 3,000 tons a day. This amount of traf-
fic could be handled even if the capacity of North
Vietnam's transport system were reduced by 70 percent.
Imports at this level would not be sufficient
to continue operations of modern industrial plants or
to restore operation of those which have received
extensive bomb damage. The economy would be reduced
to its essential subsistence character, but those
modern sectors such as transportation, construction,
communications and other elements essential to support
the military establishment in North Vietnam and in
the South could be sustained.
Approved For Release
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 20 000800030019-9
Introduction
1. Two alternative target programs are examined
in this memorandum. The first is a conventional min-
ing designed to prevent the use of deep-draft ocean-
going ships,
I The second alter-
native is a program which includes the first and_
these programs include intensified armed reconnais-
sance operations against the northern railroads and
roads leading from Communist China to North Vietnam.
I.. Traffic and Capacity of Major Import Routes
2. North Vietnam's foreign trade traffic moves
almost exclusively by sea and rail transport. The
bulk of North Vietnam's imports have usually moved
by sea. Since the bombing of the petroleum storage.
facilities at Haiphong, however, petroleum imports--
amounting to about 700 tons a day--are no longer
handled at the Haiphong port facilities. Haiphong
still handles about three-fourths of North Vietnam's
dry cargo imports. During the first four months of
1967 an estimated 3,300 tons per day moved through
the port and transports by rail probably averaged
1,300 tons per day for a total of 4,600 tons daily
during this period.
3. The current transport capacity of the North
Vietnamese for the importation of goods totals al
most 14,000 tons per day on the average throughout
the year. The capacity of the major ports--Haiphong,
Approved For Release
25X1
25X4
25X4
25X4
25X1
 Approved For Release 2002/11/08 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000800030019-9
SFC RFT
Hon Gai, and Cam Pha--to receive imports totals 5,500
tons, and the railroad, road and river connections
from China can deliver an average of at least 8,400
tons per day.* Table I presents these estimates in
detail.
TABLE I
North Vietnam: Transport Capacity of Major
Import Routes as of April 1967 a/
25X1
Tons Per Day
Dry
Season
Rainy Annual
Season Average b/
14,400
12 , 900
13,900
Major ports c/
5,500
5,500
5,500
Haiphong
4,500
4,500
4
500
Hon Gai and Cam Pha
1,000
1,000
,
1,000
Routes from Kwangsi and Kwangtung
5,700
3,650
5,000
Dong Dang - Hanoi Railroad
3,000
3,000
3,000
Roads
2,700
650
2,000
t f
ou es rom Yunnan
3,200
3,700
3,400
Lao Cai - Hanoi Railroad
700
700
700
Roads
1,600
300
1,200
Red River
900
2,700.
1$500-
a. These estimates do not include amounts that could be offloaded
fron ocean-going ships into shallow-draft craft and moved to inland
ports or coastal ports other than Haiphong or moved over the beaches.
Also no estimate is included of the amount that could be moved from
South China ports to minor ports and beaches in North Vietnam by
shallow-draft craft.
b. The dry season during which road conditions are at their best
extends from about October through May. Heavy rains, beginning about
May in the northern part of North Vietnam, reduce road capacity un-
til late September. The annual average has been computed using a
four-month (June-September) rainy season and an eight-month dry
season.
c. Theoretical dry-cargo handling capacity at the docks and assum-
ing that no exports would be handled.
here a strong possibility that the principal
railroad connection with China has now been con-
verted to dual-gauge. If this is the case, rail ca-
pacity will have been increased by at least 1,500
tons.
-d-
I 25X1
Approved For Release 2002/11/08 : T02095R000800030019-9
 Approved For Release 20 0800030019-9
4. A mining program directed solely against
oceangoing shipping could not be expected to halt
the receipt by North Vietnam of imports by sea.
These ships could be off-loaded, beyond the areas
of the mine fields, into small shallow-draft craft
which would then proceed to normal areas of discharge.
There would be disruptive effects on the transport
system, almost all export trade would cease and for-
eign exchange earnings would become negligible. But
at least half of the normal seaborne imports would
continue to be received by sea. There is sufficient
excess capacity on the Dong Dang-Hanoi railroad lead-
ing from China to absorb the traffic that could not
be transshipped from oceangoing ships into small
craft.
5. In the event that a program against ocean-
going ships were coupled with a program using mines
capable of blocking channels and rivers used by small
craft, the mining would be much more effective. Al-
though it is not possible, to judge the effectiveness
the program is effective enough to
stop a seaborne imports. Thus Hanoi would be com-
pelled to give up 3,300 tons of seaborne dry cargo
imports daily or find alternative means of transport
to handle them. If imports of 3,300 tons a day were
added to the volume now moving by rail--1,300 tons--
the total would be about 4,600 tons a day. In ad-
dition North Vietnam would have to maintain petroleum
imports by rail shipment. The total traffic in these
circumstances would be about 5,300 tons and would
Approved For Release
25X1
25X4
25X1
 Approved For Release 20 00800030019-9
exceed the current capacity of the railroads con-
necting with China by almost 1,600 tons. If the
North Vietnamese wished to maintain this tonnage of
imports they would have to resort to the use of
motor truck transport from China, or increase the
capacity of the railroad lines. Either or both al-
ternatives would be costly and time consuming.
6. Maintaining this flow of traffic would be
even more difficult, depending on the extent to
which the interdiction campaign against the Hanoi -
Dong line reduced its capacity below its present
level of 3,000 tons a day.
7. Interdiction of the railroad bridge at
Viet Tri on the Lao Cai - Hanoi railroad has effec-
tively reduced the capacity of this line to 25 per-
cent of its pre-attack capacity. There is no rail-
road bridge on the bong Dang - Hanoi railroad, with
the possible exception of the Doumer Bridge in Hanoi,
which could be interdicted to the same degree as the
Viet Tri Bridge. The Doumer Bridge is located in
downtown Hanoi in a heavily populated area. If it
were attacked and ferrying operations were harassed,
the capacity of the Hanoi - Dong Dang line then could
possibly be reduced by about 75 percent. In this
case, which probably represents the maximum attain-
able interdiction of the railroads, the combined ca-
pacity of the two lines to China would be only 1,500
tons a day or about 3,800 short of the capacity to
move normal imports.
8. The North Vietnamese would then be compelled
to rely on the major road connections to Communist
China. There are a total of 5 major roads crossing
into China with a combined capacity of 3,200 tons a
day. This capacity would ostensibly be unable to
assume the full requirement of 3,800 tons that the
railroads cannot carry. Moreover, if the roads were
used to capacity the movement of goods would be costly
and would require the employment of about 5,000
trucks. These trucks, however, could undoubtedly be
made available by North Vietnam's allies within a
short period of time.
9. It is difficult to predict the extent to
which bombing of roads and the trucks moving on
them can reduce the capacity of motor transport. A
Approved For Relea
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 8000800030019-9
case study of our bombing in North Vietnam indicated
that the maximum reduction achieved in bombing roads
was about 25 percent. If this interdiction could be
attained, the theoretical maximum capacity of both
road and rail connections to China would be 3,900
tons. Thus the maximum shortfall in terms of main-
taining imports at their current levels would be
1,400 tons or 25 percent of current import levels.
II. Essential Import Requirements
10. North Vietnam could attempt to solve its
transport problems discussed above by eliminating
all, but essential military and economic imports. It
is estimated that North Vietnam requires about one
million tons of imports annually or 3,000 tons a
day to maintain its war effort and carry on essential
economic activities. This level of imports is about
45 percent less than the import rate for the first
four months of 1967.
The major categories of required imports would
probably consist of the following (in metric tons
annually):
Military goods
Cement
Petroleum
Food or fertilizer
Miscellaneous economic goods
Total
200,000
90,000
150,000
330,000
330,000
1,100,000
The individual estimates are the results of numerous
assumptions and are subject to considerable change,
but the basic assumptions used to derive these es-
timates are the following: (a) military goods will
continue to be imported at least at the rate estimated
during the first part of 1967; (b) assuming our at-
tacks against the cement plant and electric power
supply continue, cement will no longer be produced
domestically, and will have to be imported to meet
military requirements for construction and repair;
(c) petroleum import requirements can be reduced by
one-third by cutting out nonessential civilain and
military consumption; (d) food will continue to be
imported at the rate of identified food imports during
January-April 1967; (e) imports of miscellaneous eco-
nomic goods (including transport and communications
25X1
Approved For Rel - 95R000800030019-9
 Approved For Releas 20-0-294 fik-C, A-4 y R000800030019-9
equipment, construction supplies, rubber products,
etc.) can be reduced to about one-half of the import
rate of recent months. It is believed that greater
reductions in imports of any of these commodities,
except possibly food, would reduce the present mili-
tary capability.
11. Domestic production, particularly in agri-
culture, and stockpiles of other goods could reduce
the North Vietnamese short-term dependence on im-
ports to an even lower level for a few months while
alternative import procedures were being worked out.
Petroleum stockpiles, for example, are estimated to
have amounted to about 60,000 tons at the end of
April 1967. Petroleum is probably being consumed at
the rate of about 18,000 tons per month. By cutting
out all nonessential civilian and military consump-
tion, this rate could probably be reduced to about
12,000 tons per month. Thus the stockpiles would be
sufficient for about 5 months without further imports.
Cement stocks now available in the country could prob-
ably satisfy domestic requirements for a month or
two. Additional imports of food may not be required
for a number of months because the new crop will be
harvested this month (May).
III. Transport Capacity for Essential Imports
12. Based on the discussion above it is con-
cluded that the North Vietnamese capability to im-
port can be reduced from 14,000 tons to 3,900 tons
per day. Essential requirement for imports, how-
ever, constitute only 3,000 tons of the 5,300 tons
currently being imported daily. Essential require-
ment could be reduced to an even lower level in the
short-run depending on the extent of stockpiles in
existence. Thus the remaining transport capacity
would exceed the level of essential imports in both
the short and long run.
13. The program, however, would present the North
Vietnamese-with great difficulties and force them to
make hard decisions regarding the allocation of scarce
transport capacity, conservation of supplies, and es-
tablishment of priorities. They have proven that
they are capable of overcoming managerial problems of
this nature. There is no reason to doubt that the
North Vietnamese could cope with this situation. They
would be able to maintain essential economic activity
and continue the war at the current level.
-8-
25X1
Approved For Release - R000800030019-9 25X1
 , ooroevad For Release 2002/11/08 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800030019-9
Secret
Approved For Release 2002/11/08 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800030019-9