LAOS, THE DIVIDED NATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000800070033-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2007
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: June 1, 1967
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Laos, the Divided Nation
DIA review(s)
USAID review
State Dept. review
Secret
Copy No. j ,
RR IR 67-14
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WARNING
I hie document contaios information affecting the matonal
,fefei,se of the Cnited States, within the meaning of Fitle
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Cock, as amet ded.
Its transmission or rev elation of its contents to o- re-
J eipt I) an ui aphorized person is prohibited by Loo
OFOCP I I
[t Ek{(J 1 AI~TONATIC
htiti'I('ATlt l.v
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Since gaining independence in 1953, Laos has been fighting a seesaw
war against the Communists that has kept the country weak and divided.
This report discusses the basic economic, political, and military factors
that have led to the present uneasy stalemate. The report also relates
the fighting in Laos to the war in Vietnam, and considers the principal
forces at work in Laos.
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CONTENTS
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. The Land and the People . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. The Land . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. The People . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
H. From Nothing to Nationhood
A. The French Heritage . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. The Military Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. The Emergence of Communist Power,
1949-54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. The Failure to Integrate, 1954-59 . . . .
3. Major Communist Gains, 1960 - Mid-1961
4. An Ineffective Ceasefire, Mid-1961 -
Mid-1962 . . . . . . . . I . . . . .
5. The Failure of Geneva, Mid-1962 - 1963
6. The Conflict in 1964-66 . . . . . . . . .
III. How Laos Is Governed . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A, The Structure of Government . . . . . . . .
B. The People Who Rule Laos . . . . . . . . .
C. The Present Government . . . . . . . . . .
D. Foreign Representation in Vientiane . . . . .
IV. Economics, Opium, and Gold . . . . . . . . . .
A. Agriculture . ... . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Food Crops . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Nonfood Crops . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Livestock, Poultry, and Fish . . . . . .
4. Foreign Aid to Agriculture . . . . . . .
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-B. Resources and Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1. Minerals and Metals . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2. Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3. Manufacturing and Construction . . . . . . . 23
C. Foreign Economic Relations . . . . . . . . . . 23
1. Foreign Trade ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21)
2. Foreign Economic Aid . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3. Balance of Payments . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
I). Government Economic Policy . . . . . . . . . . 30
1. The Government Budget . . . . . . . . . . 32
Economic Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
V. War and Truce in Laos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A. Capabilities of the Opposing. Forces . . . . . . .
11. Non-Communist Forces . . . . . . . . . .
2. Enemy Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Comparative Logistics . . . . . . . . . . .
35
42,
46
B. The Air War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
1. US Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Lao Air Operations . . . . . . . , , , ,
3. The US Air Attache's Office . . . . . . . . .
4. Enemy Antiaircraft Defenses . . . . . . . .
5. The Effectiveness of Air Interdiction . ,
Tables
48
50
51
51
52
Laos: =Balance of Payments, 1964-65 . . . . . . . . 31
q,u C. P Ulu
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Page
2. Laos: Government Receipts and Expenditures,
FY 1961-66
3. Laos: Estimated Order of Battle of Non-Communist
Forces, 1949-66 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4. Laos: Total Commitments and Deliveries Under
US Military Assistance Programs, FY 1950-66 . . . 41
5. Laos: Estimated Order of Battle of Enemy
Forces, 1949-66. . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Illustrations
Figure 1. Laos (map) following page . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 2. Laos: Representative Terrain in Xiangkhoang
Province (photograph) . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 3. Laos: Ethnic Groups (map) following page . . . 8
Figure 4. Laos: Communist Territorial Gains,
November 1954-January 1967 (maps)
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Figure 5. Laos Panhandle Area: Communist Roadnet 14
Development (maps) following page . . . .
Figure 6. Laos: Areas Covered by Operations BARREL
ROLL and STEEL TIGER (map)
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Figure 7. Laos: US Air Operations, 1965-66 (chart)
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Figure 8. Laos: Sorties Flown by the Royal Laotian Air
Force, 1964-66 (chart) following page . . .
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Laos, The Divided Nation*
Summary
The Kingdom of Laos, disrupted by Communist insurgency since
before independence, is struggling to maintain the facade of neutrality
that was imposed on it by the big powers at Geneva in 1962. The Com-
munists now hold about half the country with the direct support of North
Vietnamese troops, but the main population and agricultural centers are
in the areas controlled by the government in Vientiane. The Communists
are reluctant to attempt large-scale military actions because of North
Vietnam's preoccupation with its own war, the threat of US intervention,
and the strength of US/Lao air and guerrilla forces. Their strategy for
the present is to hold the eastern corridor of Laos that gives Hanoi an
infiltration route to South Vietnam. Neutralist Premier Souvanna Phouma
and the Lao Army cannot drive the insurgents out of Laos as long as they
are supported by North Vietnam. The country will probably remain in
this uneasy stalemate at least until the war in Vietnam has been settled.
Political power in Laos is held largely by a small French-educated
elite who are descendants of the royal families. Administration is often
weak and corrupt. The three main political factions correspond to the
three categories of the coalition government established in 1962 -- the
neutralists, the rightists, and the Communists. The Communist leader,
Prince Souphanouvong, who is half-brother to the Premier, sat in the
Cabinet at Vientiane until 1963, when he declared that the capital was
unsafe and left for Communist-controlled territory. Four Cabinet posts
are still held vacant for the return of the Communists, but the govern-
ment is now in effect a neutralist-rightist coalition. The Communists,
since 1950, have had little success in establishing a national base in their
areas through intensive grass-roots organizational efforts.
,< This report was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office
of Research and Reports and coordinated with the Offices of National
Estimates, Current Intelligence, and Basic Intelligence; the estimates
and conclusions represent the best judgment of the Directorate of Intelli-
gence as of May 1967.
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1 he Lao economy is a mixture of primitive agriculture, a bustling
war effort, and lucrative foreign trade in two commodities, gold and
ooiun-:m. The economy is too weak to support either the Communist insur-
gency or the defense against it, and both sides must be propped up by
substantial foreign aid. The standard of living in Laos is about the lowest
n Asia. The literacy rate is 15 percent; life expectancy, 30 years; per
capita consumption of electric power, less than 10 kilowatt-hours; road
density, about 0. 1 mile per square mile; and per capita GNP, under $100
(although a few people make fortunes on corruption, opium, a:.-Id gold).
Less than. 5 percent of the country is under cultivation, yet agriculture
supports 90 percent of the people. There is no manufacturing enterprise
bigger than a cigarette factory. Imports are 32 times larger than ex-
ports. Seven percent of the population is under arms, whereas in most
countries this proportion is less than 2 percent. But Laos has plentiful
natural resources in relation to its population, and in the long run, with
modern development methods, the country can be made economically
viable.
The military objectives of the contestants in Laos are basically
simple. The Communists must hold the route that goes fro:n Mu Gia
Pass in North Vietnam, meanders about 300 miles through the Laotian
Panhandle, and emerges at various points in South Vietnam. It is esti-
mated that up to 20, 000 short tons of supplies will move to South Vietnam
down this route during the 1966-67 dry season that ends in May. US
bombing of the route has increased the cost of moving supplies but has
not reduced their flow. Air attacks are relatively ineffective because
the level of traffic moving along the roads uses on the average only a
small proportion of the route's capacity and be cause the Communists now
travel at night, use extensive camouflage, and make rapid repairs. Else-
where in Laos the Communists would like to consolidate their control
over the Plaine des Jarres and the mountainous northern provinces. The
government in Vientiane wants to keep the Communists out of t".'Ie Mekong
valley, where most of the people live. In addition, the government would
like to retake all of the territory lost to the Communists since 1950 and
to prevent the Communists from using the southern Panhandle as a supply
route from North to South Vietnam, but it cannot achieve these objectives
as long as North Vietnamese troops remain in Laos.
The two opposing Laotian armies are not impressive military forces.
The troops on both sides are mostly uneducated and untrained and ].nave
li~;t.le will to fight. Loyalties depend on family and region, and. important
ethnic differences complicate the problems of both armies. The military
commanders in Vientiane are often at odds with one another. In cont:rast,
the North Vietnamese in Laos are professionals. They are better trained
and equipped and are more highly motivated than the Laotians. They are
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used as independent units to spearhead attacks and as the hard core of
many Laotian Communist units.
Total non-Communist forces in 1966 were about 99, 600 men, includ-
ing 1, 150 in the Air Force, which has available about 40 small combat
planes. The Communists in 1966 had about 40, 000 Laotian troops, plus
16, 000 regular North Vietnamese Army troops, but no aircraft. The
capabilities of the two forces are determined more by the external sup-
port available to them than by their own indigenous strength. Since 1950
the United States has supplied a half billion dollars of nonmilitary aid
and $300 million of military assistance, including most of the Army's
equipment, its logistics system, and even some of its food. China and
North Vietnam have furnished military equipment and supplies of unknown
value to the Communist forces in Laos.
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I. THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE
Laos is a weak, landlocked kingdom divided by region, by family,
and by tribal loyalties. The land is predominantly mountainous jungle
with a few plateaus and river plains. The people, of many tribes and
cultures, lack the sense of basic identity to make them a true nation.
Laos throughout its history has been subject to the conflicting ambitions
of its neighbors, and today the Communists control half the real estate
and a fourth of the people.
Laos, extending 700 miles on a northwest-southeast axis and vary-
ing in width from 60 to 300 miles, has the general shape of Italy and is
slightly larger than Kansas (see Figure 1). A long border to the north
and east with China and North Vietnam makes it an avenue for Com-
munist infiltration into South Vietnam and Thailand, its principal southern
neighbors.
Laos is rugged and forbidding in most of the north and in the
eastern part of the southern Panhandle. Steep-sided mountains rise
from 3, 000 to 8,000 feet. The intervening valleys are often narrow,
almost impassable gorges (see Figure 2). The border with North
Figure 2. Laos: Representative Terrain
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Vietnam generally follows the crest of the mountain range known as
the Chaine Annamitique, and most troops and supplies crossing into
Laos must go through narrow passes such as Deo Mu Gia -- 1,370
feet in elevation and traversed by important motor routes. The only
areas in this region suitable for conventional warfare are the o,?en
and grassy Plateau du Tranninh in the north, whose largest portion,
the Plaine des Jarres, is considered to be the strategic: key to :northern
Laos, and the Plateau des Bolovens in the south near the Cambodian
border.
The Mekong plain sustains most life in Laos and holds two-thirds
of its people and most of its major towns. Part of this plain is centered
on the capital city of Vientiane in the north, where flat swamps and
marshes extend 70 miles north-south and 20 to 40 miles east-west.
In the southern Panhandle the Savannakhet plain forms a gently rolling
area about 100 miles long and up to 80 miles wide between the Chaine
Annamitique on the east and the Mekong on the west. The Mekong
plain is moderately well drained and is covered with dense to open
.forest or is cultivated, permitting relatively easy movement by con-
ventional military forces.
.:wife moves with the weather in Laos. From mid-May to mid-
September the wet southwest monsoon brings flooded streams and mud
that make surface travel. almost impossible and air operations uncertain.
The rain stops with the coming of the dry northeast monsoon, which
extends from mid-October, when much of the rice harvest begins, to
mid-March. Total annual rainfall varies from about 50 inches in some
parts of the country to more than 150 inches in others. High tempera-
tures and humidity throughout the year reduce efficiency and contribute
to a heavy incidence of such tropical diseases as malaria and cholera.
Most of the country has a dense cover of broadleaf evergreen
forest, with undergrowth ranging from a low carpet of ferns to a thick
tangled mass of vines, bamboo, and smaller trees. This jungle and the
rugged terrain make it difficult to defend against infiltrators. The
country has a sparse road network and no railroads. Foot trails are
a, principal means of communication and transportation. - Inland, water-
way traffic is extensive but largely local. Air transport is vital and
is often the only means of supplying remote areas.
B. The People
The 2 million people of Laos are as diverse in ethnic origins as
those of the United States. At least two-thirds of the population belong
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to the Tai ethnic group, including the Lao and the Tai tribal people.
Indigenous minority groups are the Lao Theung or mountain people,
about 350, 000; the Meo, about 100, 000; the Yao, from 25, 000 to 50, 000;
and various Tibeto-Burman peoples, 15, 000 to 25, 000. In addition,
there are about 35, 000 Vietnamese and up to 60, 000 Chinese (see Fig-
ure 3).
The Lao, who probably migrated from Yunnan in China between
the 11th and 13th centuries, are politically the dominant group. Lao
is the official language. The royalty and a cluster of prominent Lao
families are the elite of the country, and most of what constitutes
authority in Laos derives from this group. Virtually no one else is
competent to do the work of national government. There is a small
but emerging middle class of government clerks, traders, and junior
army officers -- followed by the mass of peasants and minorities, who
are 90 percent illiterate. Individually, the Lao is gentle and patient,
is rarely emotional, and is inclined to be passive in adversity. He
does not plan for the future, because his needs are simple and rather
easily obtained.
The tribal people live in the higher river valleys and plateaus.
They have a culture similar to that of the dominant Lao, but they have
not been assimilated. There is little national feeling among these
people, and they tend to dislike the central government.
The Lao Theung (mountain Lao), a primitive racial group, were
pushed back into the forests and mountains by the invading Lao, who
called them Kha, meaning slave or barbarian. The Kha extend through-
out Laos, usually living on the less fertile slopes above the river
valleys. They are more numerous in the south and form a majority
in Attopeu Province. A few are wet-rice farmers, but most practice
a primitive slash-and-burn agriculture. Communist influence among
the Kha is strong, and a significant percentage of Pathet Lao armed
strength in the south is believed to be Kha.
Farther up the mountains live the Meo, nicknamed the ''cat people.
They build their homes on the sides or tops of mountains, seldom less
than 3, 000 feet up. They also live by slash-and-burn agriculture, but
they are a cohesive group who often form effective fighting units to
resist the Communists.
The Yao (Man) occupy mountainous areas in the north and northwest
of Laos. The Tibeto-Burman tribes live on high mountain slopes near
the Chinese and Burmese borders, but they often wander back and forth
across the frontier and claim allegiance only to family or village.
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The Vietnamese held minor administrative posts under the French
but are now small businessmen and artisans. The Lao dislike them,
restrict their entry into the country, and occasionally harass them with
surveillance. The Chinese engage in trade and commerce in the major
towns but are concentrated in Vientiane.
;:status in Laos is determined at birth, and there is little inter-
change among the classes. Higher education, essential to moving up,
is beyond the reach of the peasants and has been a factor perpetuating
the elite. The national literacy rate is about 15 percent. Of 124, 000
children in the first three grades in 1965, only 6, 000 were expected to
graduate from the 6th grade and only 125 from high school. Religion
has no more unifying force than education: the Lao are nominally
Buddhists and the non-Lao animists. The Lao peasant believes that
his body is inhabited by 32 souls, and that if any of them depart and
cause sickness they can be brought back only by sorcery, a shot in
the arm at a dispensary, or a whiff of opium.
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Figure 3
Mountain Mon-Khmer
(Lao Theung)
LAOS
Ethnic Groups
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II. FROM NOTHING TO NATIONHOOD
Laos was pushed prematurely into nationhood in 1953 after several
hundred years of clan warfare and foreign domination. The French
administration of a half century was a classic example of failure of a
colonial power to prepare a people for self-government. Even with
massive economic and administrative assistance, the young nation has
been unable to solve in a few years the problems accumulated during
the preceding century.
A. The French Heritage
Before the French arrived in Laos a group of clans with separate
kingdoms had occupied the land for several hundred years, fighting
intermittently with the Burmese, Shan, and Siamese. The French
moved into Annam in 1858 and claimed territory as far west as the
Mekong River, which brought them into political conflict with the
Siamese, who claimed some of the same territory. During the 19th
century, Laos was repeatedly raided from Yunnan (China), partly
because of the Franco-Chinese hostilities on the Chinese coast. The
French marched into Laos more to oppose the Chinese and the Siamese
than because of an interest in Laos itself. By a treaty of 1893 the
Siamese withdrew from places east of the Mekong and later gave up
territory west of the river.
Laos as the name of a state dates from 1899, when the French
began to administer the region as a single unit with a chief resident
at Vientiane. The old kingdom of Luang Prabang provided local authority
in three provinces, and the other provinces were treated as separate
chieftaincies. The French gave Laos a form of political unity in 1923
by setting up a single consultative assembly.
When the Japanese occupation of Laos ended after World War II
the king of Luang Prabang reaffirmed his loyalty to France. At the
same time, growing nationalism was encouraged by the administrative
vacuum left by the Japanese. Many elite Lao joined the non-Communist
Lao Issara (Free Laotian Party) to resist the French and establish an
independent Laos. Paris granted internal autonomy to Laos in 1947 and
full independence within the French Union in 1953. Most of the Lao
Issara supported the new nation under a single king, and four of the
seven ministers in the first cabinet (1953) were former leaders of the
party. In the meantime the Pathet Lao (PL), a Communist-inspired
movement led by Prince Souphanouvong, had been organized and urged
revolution against the provincial chieftains that formed the core of the
new independent Laos.
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The French did nothing to prepare Laos for the modern world and
to encourage a sense of nationhood. The villages of Laos traditionally
have been self-contained units, and the concept of representation in a
national government has been foreign to most Laotians. The sprinkling
of elite and educated Lao considered themselves almost more French
than Laotian. The educational system was not designed to turn out the
large number of clerks, professional people, and businessmen that
every country needs nor to provide the broad educational background
necessary for a responsible citizenry. Some primary education was
provided in the Lao language only, but secondary education was in
French. Because French was not taught in the lower grades and was, not
widely spoken, few could pass the rigid French examination required.
to enter secondary school. The result was an almost complete cutoff
between the educated few and the mass of Laotians. Even today, after
nearly a decade of rather intensive foreign aid to education, only about
one-third of the elementary-age school children and only 2 percent of
those of secondary school age are enrolled in school.
The :Military Conflict
Developments in Laos since independence in 1953 are closely tied
to the civil war between the Pathet Lao and the Royal Lao Government.
The war has alternated between sporadic attacks and periods of relative
quiet but has absorbed many of the resources that would have gone into
economic and social development. At present the Communists control
about half the physical. area of the country, including their strategically
important corridor from North to South Vietnam. However, Trost of the
people, the main agricultural areas, and the important. cities are in the
western part of the country still held by the government (see Figure 4).
1. The Emergence of Communist Power, 1949-54
In 1949, after the autonomy of Laos within the French Union had
been confirmed, Prince Souphanouvong led several dozen dissatisfied
followers from Laos into Vietnam. There they received support and
training from the Vietminh, and in 1950 Vietminh propaganda broadcasts
made their first reference to a "Pathet Lao Resistance Movement"
dedicated to the fight against "French imperialism. " Pathet .Lao forces
fought against the French presence in Laos in isolated actions along
the Vietnamese border but controlled only small fractions of Laos until
1953. Laos remained essentially untouched by the French-Indochinese
war until April 1953.
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LAOS: COMMUNIST TERRITORIAL GAINS; NOVEMBER 1954-JANUARY 1967
Saysboury Xenp KFOUaq? L
PLAINE DES JARRES
xie ng K~, ouan q?
Snyebou ry
PLAINE DES JARRES
~-~.Paksa ne
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In the early 1950's the Laotian National Army, later named the
Forces Armes Royales (FAR), was developed under French leader-
ship. This was necessary because nearly all available French troops
were transferred to Vietnam. Between 1949 and the end of 1952 the
anti-Communist Lao army had grown from 1, 200 to 12, 300 men and
with French help had repulsed the limited attempts of the Communist
forces to gain a foothold in Laos.
In April 1953, Vietminh/PL forces launched their first thrust
into Laos, occupying Houa Phan Province and advancing to within a
few miles of the royal capital of Luang Prabang. Although the Viet-
minh radio announced that the army was made up of Pathet Lao with
Vietnamese "volunteers, " Vietminh forces were twice as numerous
as those of the PL, and the ranks of the latter were filled preponderantly
with Vietnamese personnel. The French repulsed the attack on Luang
Prabang, but the invaders were able to retain control of much of Houa
Phan Province. Souphanouvong immediately announced the establish-
ment of a "Resistance Government" in the town of Samneua, declaring
it to be the only legal representative government in Laos, and moved
his headquarters there from Vietnam. In late 1953 a Vietminh force
crossed from Vietnam into the Panhandle of Laos to take the town of
Thakhek. This force also was dispersed by the French, but the
Vietminh went into the surrounding hills, where they began propaganda
and subversive activities among the mountain tribes. Pockets of control
were thus established by the Pathet Lao.
As a result of the 1953 offensive the PL and Vietminh claimed to
have "liberated" 15, 400 square miles of territory, including all of Houa
Phan Province, a large part of Xiangkhoang Province, and parts of Luang
Prabang and Phong Saly Provinces. This success, coupled with skillful
propaganda which had been designed to build up an exaggerated picture
of PL strength, insured that the movement was given some recognition
by the Geneva Accords of July 1954.
The Geneva convention called for a single, independent government
for Laos. All "Vietnamese Peoples' Volunteers" were to be out of Laos
within 120 days. Pathet Lao forces were to regroup in the two northern
provinces of Houa Phan and Phong Saly and were to be integrated into a
national army, also within 120 days. Foreign countries were prohibited
from establishing or maintaining military bases in Laos, except that
France was allowed to keep 3, 500 troops in Laos and a training mission
of 1, 500.
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The Failure to Integrate, 1954-59
It became apparent soon after the signing of the Geneva agree-
merit that the political differences between the opposing), factions in
Laos would prevent a rapid integration of the PL forces into a national
army. Furthermore, PL military harassment of government-controlled
areas continued. Eventually a nominal integration of 1, 500 P'L troops
into the Royal Army took place on the Plaine des Jarres in February
1958, but the two PL battalions involved retained their own identities.
It was not until May 1959 that the Sananikone government decided to
force integration of the PL battalions. Faced with an ultimatum, the
battalion stationed south of Luang Prabang complied; but the second
battalion, on the Plaine des Jarres, escaped across the border to North
Vietnam.
1='athet Lao forces soon returned to their bases in Houa Phan and
Phong Saly. During July-September 1959, North Vietnamese Army
(NVA)/PL forces made strong attacks on government positions in these
provinces. Arrival of a UN fact-finding commission caused the enemy
to cease large-scale operations, and by October the PL had reverted
to guerrilla attacks on FAR outposts and villages.
3. Major Communist Gains, 1960 - Mid-1961
In August 1960, Kong Le, an obscure army captain and commander
of a parachute battalion which had been trained by US Special Forces,
staged a successful coup d'etat in Vientiane. This act thrust an im-
portant third force, the Kong Le Neutralist Army, on the Lao political
and military stage. The PL saw Kong Le as a potential ally and an
additional disruptive force to plague the Royal Government. During
the next few months, while Kong Le was recruiting an expanded Neutralist
force, the PL managed to engage his sympathies and infiltrate his
movement with their own people.
.,.,after Kong Le's coup, General Phoumi Nosavan joined Prince
Boun Oum in forming a Revolutionary Committee based in Savannakhet.
`('hey soon acquired the allegiance of most of the FAR forces and
announced their intention of marching on Vientiane. Anticipating this
move, Kong Le airdropped small contingents of troops in the Saravane-
E'Attopeu and Houa Phan areas as a diversionary scheme and moved east
from Vientiane to capture Paksane from General Phourni's forces. The
planes used by Kong Le at this time had been supplied by the United States
to the FAR for use by Kong Le's parachute battalion. By late November,
however, Phoumi had rallied, recapturing Paksane and retaking
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Vientiane in spite of extensive Soviet airlifts of supplies to Kong Le.
By mid-December, Prince Boun Oum had established a new govern-
ment in Vientiane.
NVA and PL troops invaded Houa Phan and pushed westward along
Route 7 (see Figure 5) across the Plaine des Jarres about three weeks
after Phoumi had taken Vientiane. An estimated five battalions of
North Vietnamese border security troops were engaged in the drive,
which ended in early January 1961. The Communists and Neutralists
were essentially in control of the Plaine des Jarres and the nearby
town of Xieng Khouang.
It was evident that only a ceasefire or a major increase in US
military involvement could insure Phoumi's security. All sides agreed
that a new international conference, aimed at restoring Lao neutrality,
was a necessity. Negotiations for a ceasefire line began in early 1961
but were repeatedly stalled by the PL, who sought to improve their
strategic position and press their advantage over the FAR. To improve
their position in central and southern Laos, the PL, spearheaded by
North. Vietnamese units, launched three main drives in March and April
of 1961. The first thrust was aimed along Route 8. The second was
about 50 miles to the south along Route 12, where the town of Mahaxay was
taken. Further south, Tchepone and its airfield were captured only two
days before the ceasefire went into effect (3 May). In the north, Muong
Sai, an important town and military post that controlled access to Phong
Saly and Houa Khong Provinces, was captured from the FAR.
4. An Ineffective Ceasefire, Mid-1961 - Mid-1962
Military operations in Laos continued after the ceasefire agreement
in May and while talks to establish a coalition government continued in
Geneva. Disregarding the counsel of US military advisers, the FAR was
determined to assemble a very large force to recapture Muong Sai.
About 5, 000 men were assembled, probably the largest concentration
of troops used in a single operation in Laos up to that time. The cam-
paign was poorly conceived and badly executed. Two assaults by the
FAR against Muong Sai, in December 1961 and January 1962, were
routed, with some units retreating as much as 60 miles in confusion.
In the spring of 1962 the NVA/PL forces began a drive against
Nam Tha, first capturing Muong Sing near the border of China. On
Some reports indicated that Chinese troops were engaged in the cap-
ture of Muong Sing. Although it is probable that PL and NVA troops
were permitted to cross a salient of Chinese territory on their way south
from Phong Saly Province to Muong Sing, there is no evidence of the
actual involvement of Chinese forces.
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6 May 1962, Nam Tha was overrun, forcing the hectic retreat of a
force of approximately 4, 500 Lao troops -- including infantry? para-
claute battalions, and supporting artillery units. Most of these troops
fled as far as the Mekong River and into Thailand. Even the best FAR
units retreated wildly on first contact with the enemy, deserting their
US advisers. The FAR lost large amounts of materiel and even more
of its limited self-confidence. This defeat eliminated the authority of
the Royal Lao Government in northwestern Laos and opened western
Luang Prabang Province and all of Houa Khong Province to Communist
domination. Moreover, Thailand was now vulnerable to possible attack
from northern Laos. At the invitation of the Thai government, US
ground and air forces were dispatched to Thailand under SEATO
authority. The enemy forces made no further attempt, however, to
exploit their successes in the area.
5. The Failure of Geneva, Mid-1962 - 1963
(.)n 23 July 1962 the Declaration of Protocol on the Neutrality of
Laos was signed in Geneva. Continued guerrilla warfare, however,
made it clear that the PL had no intention of keeping the peace in Laos
except on their own terms. By the spring of 1963, serious fighting
was again in progress. By that time, however, most of Kong Le's
forces had switched their support to the conservatives as a result of
disaffection between Kong Le and the PL. Some of Kong Le's troops,
on the other hand, had defected to the PL in early 1963. These de-
fectors --? Colonel Deuane and the 1, 500 troops under his command --
are still referred to as Dissident Neutralists.
In April 1963, following the assassination (instigated by the PL)
of two principal Kong Le followers and the retaliatory slaying of the
pro--Communist Foreign Minister, the PL attacked Kong Le in the
vicinity of the Plaine des Jarres. Kong Le requested help from the
FAR, and the Royal Lao Air Force airlifted six battalions into the
western Plaine area, where the FAR had not been since 1961. In spite
of the reinforcements, the military situation of the Kong Le-FAR forces
continued to become worse. By the end of May they had been pushed,to
the western end of the Plaine and the Communists controlled strategic
portions of Route 7. Non-Communist forces retained only a foothold on
the western edge of the Plaine.
,also in the spring of 1963 the NVA/PL forces increased military
operations in central and southern Laos. These actions were designed
to consolidate the Communists' hold on lines of communication vital to
their operations in South Vietnam, but they also prevented reinforcements
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 ,Saavannakhet
I JANUARY 1964
Ban Phone
Mouang
sipone 1
Mhepone)
L A O S
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DEMARCATION
UNE
Chavane
Attopeu
I SEPTEMBER 1965
THAILAND'
Ubon
Ratchathani
J
NA
LAOS PANHANDLE AREA
COMMUNIST ROADNET DEVELOPMENT
-)
a Attopeu 1
I AUGUST 1966
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from being sent to the Plaine des Jarres. By early June the Com-
munists had secured what is now designated as Route 23.
The importance of the Panhandle to the Communists was illus-
trated by their reaction to a FAR offensive in November 1963. By
December 8, FAR forces had moved to within 15 miles of the North
Vietnamese border on Route 8 but were assaulted by enemy forces,
augmented by North Vietnamese battalions which probably were shifted
across the border for the assignment. Other enemy forces moved
north toward the Na Kay Plateau from Nhommarath. By the end of
January 1964 the enemy had captured the entire plateau and had advanced
to within 16 miles of Thakhek. In the process the Communist forces
strengthened their control of an important mountain pass, gained control
of most of Route 8, and, in general, occupied in strength an area which
looked south down the Panhandle and west toward Route 13. It is esti-
mated that 5 North Vietnamese and 3 PL battalions had been engaged
against 1 Neutralist and 10 FAR battalions.
6. The Conflict in 1964-66
In April 1964 the enemy began a new offensive on the Plaine des
Jarres. First, an intensive campaign was launched against the Meo
guerrilla units which had been engaged in cratering operations along
Route 7. Then, apparently inspired by Phoumi's abortive coup of
19 April, the NVA/PL forces opened a widespread assault which even-
tually resulted in complete Communist control of the Plaine. By May
1964 the Communists controlled more Lao territory than ever before.
In July 1964, FAR, Neutralist, and Meo troops launched a joint
campaign, Operation Triangle, which was designed to clear the ground
within the area defined by the triangle connecting Vang Vieng, Muong
Soui, and Luang Prabang. US military attaches aided the FAR General
Staff in planning the operation. T-28 aircraft armed with bombs and
.50-caliber machineguns were used to support ground operations, and
they gave the FAR troops a combat advantage over the Communists as
well as an important boost to morale. Planes controlled by USAID
delivered 3, 000 troops to the battle area and more than 5, 100 tons of
supplies, including artillery, ammunition, food, medical supplies,
jeeps, trucks, trailers, and POL. The triangle was successfully cleared,
an example of the effective use of air power and of cooperation between
FAR and Neutralist forces.
For air operations, see V, B, below.
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~7L' Al\L` 1
The focus of friendly military action in Laos since mid-1964 has
shifted to the air interdiction campaign against Communist supply
routes to South Vietnam, Fighting on the ground has consisted of
limited probing attacks against Communist strongholds or strategic
positions and consolidation of control over territory already won.
The only notable military campaign in the north was Operation Prasane,
undertaken in July-August 1966 in part to ease enemy pressure on
Luang Prabang. The action, which resulted in the withdrawal of most
enemy forces from the area, involved Meo units, FAR forces, and
Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF) and US aircraft.
Only two notable military actions have taken place in southern
Laos in the past two years. In March 1965 an enemy attack led by
North Vietnamese troops on the FAR Reserve Officers Academy at
Dong Hene was decisively repulsed. About 50 enemy troops were
killed and 9 North Vietnamese were captured in the action. Later the
International Control Commission (ICC) conducted an investigation
of the attack on Dong Hene and :is-sued a report which provides the
major documentary evidence of North Vietnamese military interven-
tion in l aos. The second operation was an enemy drive toward Thakhek
in November 1965. During this action, which also included sizable
numbers of North Vietnamese troops, the enemy drove to the outskirts
of Thakhek. The drive was repulsed by airlifted F %R reinforcements
and by combat support from the RLAF. The enemy operation was more
of a spoiling attack and a harassment of Thakhek than a determined
effort to capture the town.
On 16 October 1966, Neutralist General Kong Le was ousted from
his command. The probable result of this action will be an eventual
integration of the Neutralist forces into the Royal Laotian Army,
although progress has been slow. On 18 November, Kong Le formally
resigned as Commander-in-Chief of the Neutralist Army and or.
2.3 November departed from Laos for a stay in Indonesia. He has since
asked for asylum in the Philippines.
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III. HOW LAOS IS GOVERNED
Political disunity and widespread corruption have prevented effec-
tive government in Laos. Although in theory the structure of the govern-
ment is highly centralized, with Vientiane controlling administration
down to the subdistrict level, in practice family arrangements determine
relations at most levels of government. Both prestige and the opportunity
for profit go with government service, and most Lao who have a secondary
or higher education are in administrative posts.
The Kingdom of Laos has a parliamentary system of government.
Article III of the constitution, approved in 1956, declares that
"sovereignty emanates from the people and is exercised by the King. "
He selects the Premier, presides over formal sessions of the Council
of Ministers, names 6 of the 12 members of the upper legislative
chamber (the King's Council), and exercises considerable power when
the legislature is not in session. When the nation's vital interests are
at stake the King may -- at the initiative of the government and with
the approval of both legislative chambers -- take upon himself the
duties of the government or appoint a government of his own choice
which is not subject to assembly approval. The King has power to
postpone elections to the National Assembly in times of grave national
crisis. The King also has substantial political influence because of
his personal prestige.
The National Assembly, composed of 59 deputies elected at intervals
no greater than five years, exercises the principal legislative power. By
a vote of censure the assembly can force the resignation of the govern-
ment. The King's Council, or upper house, whose members are appointed
half by the King and half by the assembly, can revise and remand legisla-
tion originating in the assembly, but it has no veto power and its decisions
can be overruled by a majority vote in the assembly.
The Premier is the principal executive, and the Council of Ministers
is his Cabinet; together they exercise executive power in foreign and
domestic affairs. The Premier is appointed by the King. The Council
of Ministers is selected by the Premier, approved by the National
Assembly, and invested by the King. The Council now includes the
Ministries of Defense; Foreign Affairs; Veterans Affairs; Rural Affairs,
National Economy, and Plan; Education; Finance; Health; Information,
Propaganda, and Tourism; Interior; Social Welfare; Public Works; Post,
Telephone, and Telegraph; and Justice.
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Laos is divided into 16 provinces and the prefecture of Vientiane,
each headed by a governor appointed by the central government. The
provinces are divided into 115 districts, which are made up of 910
subd istricts or cantons comprising 11, 893 villages. All provincial
officals down to the canton level are appointed by the central govern-
ment, but the diverse nature of the village people and the disruptions
Of civil war have greatly eroded Vientiane's authority at the local
levels of administration.
The courts in Laos are based on a mixture of modern judicial
principles and native practices adapted to French legal codes. There
are Justices of the peace at village levels, a criminal and civil court
in each provincial capital, and appeals courts at the national level.
The legal process is slow and inefficient because of a shortage of
trained personnel and because the legal code is not fully compatible
with the unsophisticated needs of Laos.
`:I'he career civil service in Laos is not comparable in training
and traditions with that of developed Western countries. Modern work
methods are almost unknown outside Vientiane. The government can
scarcely fill even the few key positions with qualified Lao and must
turn to Western. nations for extensive help in the fields of administra-
tion, education, military training, transportation, and economic
development. France provides advisers in key government ministries,
about 250 teachers scattered throughout Laos, and a military training
mission of about 200 men. The United States has a. large assistance
program, including several hundred experts in administration and
economic development.
B. The People Who Rule Laos
- ol.it_ical power in Laos is still held largely by a small French-
educa.ted elite who are descendants of the royal families. Political factions,
whose interests usually are both political and commercial, are organized
around these families. Each family group has a power base in a specific
region, although its political following may be more widely scattered.
The existence of family and regional loyalties is a carryover from the
18th and 19th centuries, when Laos was divided into several petty states.
Even though some of these have long been defunct, families have sur-
vived with their titles and retain considerable influence.
Powerful families still dominate the provinces that formerly were
the principalities of Luang Prabang, Xiangkhoang, Vientiane, and
C:;hampassak. The present royal family, including King SavarLg Vatthana,
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and its closely related cadet branch (of which Souvanna Phouma is the
leading member) are extremely influential in Luang Prabang and the
northwestern provinces. The Sananikones, headed by former Premier
Phoui Sananikone, share leadership in Vientiane with the equally impor-
tant Souvannavong family. The Sananikone position has been strengthened
by an alliance with General Kouprasith Abhay, the capable and ambitious
chief of the 5th Military Region and a nephew of Phoui. In Xiangkhoang
Province the Say family, led by Prince Say Kham, commands considerable
respect and has the military backing of General Vang Pao, commander
of the 2d Military Region. In the south, Prince Boun Oum is the dominant
figure, holding the allegiance of such disparate figures as General
Phasouk, powerful commander of the 4th Military Region, and Leuam
Insixiengmay, a leader of the rightist faction. The struggle for power
among these groups, including some of the ambitious generals, has
often been a source of instability in Laos. In the three-year period
from August 1958 to June 1961, Laos had six separate governments.
Prince Souvanna Phouma, Premier of Laos, was born in 1901 into
the cadet branch of the royal family of Luang Prabang. He received
degrees in architecture and electrical engineering from the Universities
of Paris and Grenoble and served as a government engineer until the
end of World War II. He has been active in politics since the war,
serving four times as Premier, as Ambassador to France and several
other European nations, and as a member of the National Assembly.
In the early 1960's Souvanna appeared hopeful for an agreement with
the Communists, but he is now taking a firmer approach to them and
is actively cooperating with the conservative faction in the government.
Prince Boun Oum na Champas sak is the head of the royal family
of the former Kingdom of Champassak in southern Laos and is the
permanent Inspector-General of Laos. He served as Premier in 1950
and again from 1960 to 1962 but does not now play a public role in Lao
politics. He is occupied primarily with the affairs of the southerners,
his family, and his business interests. There is a certain amount of
antagonism between Boun Oum and Souvanna Phouma, although Boun
Oum reportedly stated in late 1965 that he fully supported the present
government. He is strongly anti-Communist.
General Kouprasith Abhay, one of the two Deputy Commanders in
Chief of the FAR and Commanding Officer of the 5th Military Region,
ranks among the most important figures in Laos. He is a young,
intelligent, and articulate opportunist who has enhanced his position
by the political support he receives from the influential Sananikone
family (his mother and wife are members of that family). Since 1965
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he has been a major source of strength behind Premier Souvanna
Phouma, whose post he covets. Kouprasith, born in 1925, is a member
of the conservative element in Laos and is a talented military officer.
General Phoumi Nosavan represented the rightist faction in the
tripartite government as Deputy Premier and Minister of Finance
from June 1962 until he was forced into exile in Thailand after his
unsuccessful bid for power in 1965. In late 1966 he was making tenta-
tive moves to regain a role in future Laotian political developments.
Phcumi, born in 1920, was a leading military figure by 1958 and was
given increasingly important cabinet positions as the rightist element
in Laos gained political strength.
Prince Souphanouvong, half-brother of Premier Souvanna Phouma,
is Chairman of the Neo Lao Hak Sat (Lao Patriotic Front -- NLHS)
and the nominal leader of the Communist-led "people's struggle" in
Laos. He also holds in absentia the posts of Deputy Premier, Minister
of the National Economy, and Minister of Planning in the Vientiane tri-
partite government. He made a brilliant record in school, received a
degree in civil engineering, and traveled extensively in France and
North Africa. Souphanouvong joined the Lao Issara after World War II
but was frequently at odds with other leaders because lie wanted to
merge the Lao Issara with the Vietminh (the Vietnamese Communist
movement). When the Pathet Lao Resistance Government was formed
under. Vietminh auspices in August 1950, Souphanouvong was named
Premier and Foreign Minister. Articulate, capable, and forceful,
Souphanouvong has won widespread respect and even affectiorL - rom
the people of Laos. Despite his unquestioned leadership ability,
Souphanouvong probably is not fully trusted by the Vietnamese Communists.
Nouhak Phoum-savan, one of the most powerful men in the Lao
Communist movement, is a standing member of the NLHS Central Com-
mittee and is probably the Chairman of the Phak Pasason Lao (Lao
People's Party -- PPL). Nouhak is apparently a major policyYnaker
for the NLHS and the Pathet Lao. He has frequently assumed acting
leadership of the movement during the absence of Prince Souphanouvong.
Phe influence of the traditionally powerful families may be challenged
as more Lao obtain the benefits of education. The loss by several name
candidates to relative unknowns in the 1965 "consultative elections" is
evidence of a rising middle class that is politically significant though.
numerically small. The expanding role of the armed forces also acts
as a counter to the power of the great families.
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Corruption is prevalent among Lao leaders. Some rakeoff by
officials is to be expected, but not of the flagrant kind that over the
past decade has helped to tarnish the government's image. Much of
the corruption involves diversion of foreign aid into private channels,
which is difficult to control in countries receiving large-scale assist-
ance with limited supervision.
Political parties in Laos have been little more than the personal
vehicles of their various leaders or of short-lived coalitions of
leaders. Party lines are loose and discipline almost nonexistent.
Of the four political parties represented in the first general elections
of 1955, for example, none exist today; they have all dropped from
sight in the splits and mergers that characterize the Lao political
scene.
The three main political factions correspond to the three categories
of the coalition government -- the neutralists, the rightists, and the
Communist NLHS. When the two NLHS members of the Council of
Ministers, Prince Souphanouvong and Phoumi Vongvichit, declared
Vientiane unsafe and left for Communist-controlled territory in 1963,
Communist participation in the government came to an end. Four
cabinet posts are still held vacant for the Communists' return, but the
government is now in effect a neutralist-rightist coalition.
The majority of the members of the National Assembly probably
are opposed to a three-way coalition and would favor the elimination
of the NLHS from the government. There has been pressure to re-
distribute the vacant NLHS cabinet posts, with their highly coveted
privileges, among the present deputies. However, international
pressures and the influence of King Savang and other leaders have
been able to retain the form if not the substance of a tripartite coali-
tion. The assembly itself is entirely non-Communist, because the
Pathet Lao boycotted the elections of assembly members.
Moves by the military have been difficult to control, and attempted
coups in 1964 and 1965 narrowly missed toppling neutralist Premier
Souvanna Phouma. The Kouprasith-Siho coup attempt in April 1964
produced a dramatic example of international interest in maintaining
the coalition government in Laos. The ambassadors of the United
Stages, the USSR, France, and the United Kingdom jointly applied
pressure on the main political groupings in Laos to retain Souvanna
and salvage the coalition. There have been other, less publicized
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occasions when international support has enabled Souvanna to resist
military and political pressures.
The rightists and neutralists in the past have disagreed sharply
over national policies. Premier Souvanna, however, has become
increasingly disillusioned with the Communist-controlled left wing
and has steadily integrated the right and center under his leadership.
The flight of Phoumi Nosavan to Thailand in February 1965 eliminated
an important source of political instability and strengthened Souvanna's
position. More recently, rightist leader Leuam Insixiengmay, who
inherited the bulk of Phoumi Nosavan's defunct Social Democrat Party,
has pressured Premier Souvanna for more authority in. government
decisions. However, the voting for a new assembly on. 1 January 1967
substantially cut down Leuam's influence by reducing his control from
32 out of 59 seats in the previous assembly to scarcely more than a
half dozen in the new assembly.
Souvanna is in a relatively strong position in 1967; most of the
deputies have agreed to support him, and the president of the assembly
has agreed to push his program through. Souvanna has strong inter-
national support, including that of the USSR and the Communist coun-
tries of Eastern Europe. As Premier and Minister of both Foreign
Affairs and Defense, he makes nearly all the important decisions.
The departure of the 66-year-old Souvanna would probably result in
a major political crisis and further weaken the fragile government
structure. Souvanna has implied that he favors Sisouk na Champassa.k
as successor to the premiership, but the relatively young Sisouk has
stated that he does not yet have the necessary prestige for the ;job.
The Hanoi-backed Communists have achieved little success in
establishing a national base in the areas they control through intensive
grass-roots organizational efforts. The NLHS, which is a legal political
party serving as a front for the clandestine Lao Communist Party, has
established numerous mass organizations of women, students, Buddhist
clergy, and other groups. The Communists use the traditional Lao
administrative organizations in their areas but in addition have a Party
committee at each administrative level. The Party chief, who repre-
sents the Central Committee of the NLHS, has authority over the local
administrative chief.
JD. Foreign Representation in Vientiane
T.,ao foreign policy since conclusion of the Geneva agreements of
1962 has been based on the principle of strict neutrality. By the terms
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of the agreements, the government undertook to establish friendly
relations "with all countries, " to refrain from interference in other
nations' affairs, to refuse the use of Laotian territory for foreign mili-
tary or subversive purposes, and to require the withdrawal of all troops
from Laos, except for a small French training mission. Accordingly,
Laos established diplomatic relations with Communist countries.
Today, in addition to the non-Communist representation, ambassadors
are resident from Communist China, North Vietnam, and the USSR.
Other Communist representatives resident in Hanoi, Phnom Penh, or
Rangoon are also accredited in Vientiane. Several aid agreements
that had been signed with Communist countries in 1962 were quietly
dropped following the outbreak of fighting on the Plaine des Jarres in
April 1963.
Relations with Communist China and North Vietnam have remained
correct but extremely cool. Relations with the USSR and Eastern Euro-
pean countries have been more cordial. In June 1966, King Savang and
Premier Souvanna made a state visit to the USSR. In February 1967,
Laos granted the USSR overflight privileges for at least one flight from
Moscow via Rangoon to Hanoi. The Soviet authorities probably have
asked informally for overflights on a regular basis, but there is no
evidence that they are seeking a scheduled air route over Laos.
In spite of the international commitment to neutrality, Premier
Souvanna has turned to the West for assistance in countering the
Communist insurgent movement in Laos. Shortly after the Communist
offensive of April 1963, Souvanna formally called on the United States
to increase its military assistance, a request justified under the article
of the Geneva agreements which permits the introduction of such
quantities of conventional armaments as the Royal Government of Laos
may consider necessary for the national defense of Laos. " US assist-
ance has been a key factor in preventing further Communist gains, but
it has also aroused Communist suspicions about US support for a
neutral policy in Laos. The Western allies -- the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France -- have made it clear that they do not
want to shatter the facade of the Geneva agreements. Similarly, the
USSR desires to maintain the status quo. No change in these positions
is likely until the conflict in Vietnam is settled.
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IV. ECONOMICS, OPIUM, AND GOLD
The Lao economy is a jumbled mixture of primitive agriculture, a
bustling war effort, and lucrative foreign trade in two commodities --
in the case of gold, legal, and in the case of opium, illegal. Seldom
in modern times has a nation faced the future with so little of the world's
goods. The standard of living in Laos is about the lowest in Asia. The
literacy rate is 15 percent; life expectancy, 30 years; per capita con-
sumption of electric power, less than 10 kilowatt-hours; road density,
about 0. 1 mile per square mile; and per capita GNP, under $100
(although a few people make fortunes on corruption, opium, and gold).
Less than 5 percent of the country is under cultivation, yet agriculture
supports 90 percent of the people. There is no manufacturing enterprise
bigger than a cigarette factory. Imports are 32 times larger than
exports. Seven percent of the population is under arms, whereas in
most countries this proportion is less than 2 percent.
A. Agriculture
Laos has the potential to become, with modern agricultural
techniques, self-sufficient in food and an exporter of agricultural
products. The cultivated area could be greatly extended and yields for
both crops and livestock substantially increased. But at present, Laos
is a net importer of food. Agriculture is almost completely subsistence
and is largely outside the monetary economy. Farmers and their
families, living in villages, work small fields by age-old methods to
provide their own food and a small surplus to barter for other essentials.
They have rarely seen even the simplest form of mechanization, know
little about modern fertilizers and improved seeds, and have hardly
scratched the surface in contemporary animal husbandry.
1. Food Crops
Most of the cultivated land is planted to rice, the great staple food
of Laos. Wetland rice, produced along the rivers, accounts for about
80 percent of the crop, but the mountain people grow dryland rice under
a system of shifting cultivation that keeps them moving on as the soil is
depleted. Official figures, which are often no better than rough guesses,
show that rice production declined during the crop years 1962 and 1963,
then increased through the 1966 crop year to about 570, 000 tons. * Rice
imports increased from 16, 000 tons in 1961 to about 60, 000 tons in 1965
and are used to help feed the military forces, the growing urban popu-
lation, and the increasing number of refugees from Communist-controlled
areas.
Tonnages are given in metric tons throughout this section.
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Corn ranks second to rice as a food grain but occupies only
3 percent as much cultivated area as rice and is primarily a supple-
mentary food. A wide variety of vegetables -- potatoes, peppers,
beans, and soybeans -- are grown and consumed in the villages. The
urban centers import many vegetables from abroad.
2. Nonfood Crops
Tribal people cultivate opium poppies and produce opium, partly
:tor local smoking but primarily for sale at nominal prices to middlemen.
Although the government regulates the domestic sale of opium and
prohibits its export, it continues to be used as a medium of exchange
an remote parts of Laos. Smuggling of opium is a million-dollar
foreign exchange earner, receipts from which are larger than those
from legal exports. Most opium probably goes to Saigon or Bangkok
for transshipment to Hong Kong and other ports.
Laotians produce silk and cotton locally and weave them into their
own textiles, although imported textiles are growing in importance.
Tobacco, cultivated in small patches by most village families, is a
valued article of trade in local markets and is also shipped across the
Mekong to Thailand without going through commercial channels.
Livestock, Poultry, and Fish
The farmers of Laos keep both edible livestock and work animals,
but the quality is low, the incidence of disease is high, and livestock
yields are poor. A half million buffalo and a third of a. million cattle
pull. field plows and other heavy loads. Some 14, 000 horses are used
for transport. Once known as "the land of the million elephants, " Laos
now has only a few (2, 000) for transport and ceremonial use. Goats
and sheep (8, 000) do not thrive well in the Laotian climate. Hogs
(735, 000) and poultry (8 million) are raised for human consumption.
Fish provide a large share of the protein in the Laotian diet.
Families fish in the Mekong and its tributaries for their own needs,
sometimes selling part of their catch in the markets. Laos imports
fish from Thailand, both to satisfy urban requirements and to stock
the many local ponds.
4. Foreign Aid to Agriculture
.A sm.all but encouraging start has been made in the development
of agriculture. The United States began an extensive vegetable
production program near Vientiane in 1963, emphasizing improved
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seed, fertilizer, and insecticides. The result has been a rapid expansion
of output that enabled Lao growers to capture about half the Vientiane
market, which had been supplied primarily by imports from Thailand.
The United States sponsors jointly with the Laotian government a program
(a) to provide higher yielding rice seed to villagers, (b) to distribute
information on improved farming methods, (c) to extend credit to farmers,
and (d) to buy surplus rice at prices that will encourage domestic pro-
duction. The objective is to make Laos self-sufficient in rice in two or
three years and then enable it to begin exporting rice. In addition, the
United States has constructed small self-help dams that brought over
25, 000 acres under irrigation by the end of 1965. It is planned to have
60, 000 acres under irrigation by 1967, but this is less than 5 percent of
the total cultivated area, which often lies fallow for lack of water during
the dry season.
Laos has not been carefully surveyed for resources of commercial
value. The extent of the country's mineral wealth, with only a few
exceptions, is unknown, and little has been done to exploit known resources
for export. Some minerals prospecting is now under way, especially by
the Japanese.
1. Minerals and Metals
Salt for home use and tin for export are the only minerals now
produced in Laos. Production of tin concentrates is about 900 tons a
year. Proven reserves of tin are estimated at 70, 000 tons, and the
government is planning to increase output to 2, 000 or 3, 000 tons
annually. All tin is exported, accounting for nearly two-thirds of the
value of legal exports.
Reserves of iron ore, of excellent quality and near the surface, have
been estimated at 1 billion tons, far in excess of requirements for
Southeast Asia. The deposits, located on the Xiangkhoang Plateau in
central Laos, could become important suppliers of iron ore for Japan
and other major steel producers. Access is difficult under present
hostile conditions in that area, and there are no immediate plans for
development.
2. Energy
Wood and animal wastes are the sources of much of the energy
traditionally consumed throughout Laos. Electric power production has
been expanded rapidly in recent years but is entirely thermal and is
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confined to the larger towns. Construction of the country's first
hydroelectric facility, on the Nam Ngum River, will be started late
in 1'967. There are surface indications that Laos may have big
petroleum resources,, but nothing has been done to find them beyond
granting exploration concessions to one French company. Coal is
found in relatively small deposits in several areas. Imported petro-
leum products provide the largest source of commercial energy and
are used for aviation, motor transport, and power generation.
Manufacturing and Construction
The largest operating industry in Laos is a cigarette factory
which employs 200 people. Manufacturing is concentrated in Vientiane,
wwhe:re there are several hundred small factories, primarily of the
faam:ily type employing three or four persons each. The scarcest input
is capital, for which the normal interest charge to a good credit risk
;is about 60 percent a year. The government has tried to encourage
small industries through favorable foreign exchange rates for machinery
:imports, protective tariffs, tax advantages for new, industries, and
some credit facilities. Most private capital, however, flows into
nonproductive uses such as luxury housing, while many light industrial
products that might be produced locally are imported with foreign aid
:Ellinds.
New construction, aside from a few small industrial facilities,
is mostly housing. Clay bricks of poor quality are produced in about
100 local kilns, but Laos must still import bricks l; illegally) from
I ha:iland. In a country that is 67 percent forested, production of
lumber does not meet the demands of the small construction industry.
Cement needs of 30, 000 to 40, 000 tons annually are all imported,
although raw materials for cement production are plentiful. Attempts
over the past seven years to build a cement plant, in part with equipment
from an abandoned tin plant, have not yet material".zed.
C. Foreign Economic Relations
Ilaos is a member of the United Nations, the International Monetary
1, und, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, and the Asian Develop-
n-ient Bank. In normal times, intercourse with the outside world would
stimulate slow but steady progress in economic development, but foreign
economic transactions are now distorted by the war with the Communists.
Programs necessitated by the war have opened an enormous trade gap,
have, required large doses of military aid, and have interrupted three
or four economic plans before they got a decent start.
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1. Foreign Trade
Receipts from foreign transactions arise from a mixture of illegal
gold sales, receipts from smuggling opium, and legal exports. The
primary legal exports, amounting to about $1 million annually, are
tin concentrate, benzoin, wood, and coffee, shipped mainly to Malaysia,
Singapore, and Thailand. There is little chance of expanding legal
exports at present because Laos is surrounded by neighbors who produce
the same products cheaper.
Gold and opium are very profitable for the few, with no
particular benefit to the country generally. Gold may be imported legally
into Vientiane by anyone, and the traffic increased from $30 million in
1961 to $60 million in 1966. The gold is promptly exported (which is
also legal) and becomes contraband only when entering another country.
It usually is sold at a profit in the black markets of other Southeast
Asian countries. The government levies a 7-percent tariff on the
metal as it comes in, and this provides a third of the total government
revenue. The export of opium is strictly illegal, but it is smuggled
across the long borders of Laos or dropped by air in convenient spots
in neighboring countries or at sea. Transactions in opium and gold
do not enter official trade statistics, but their net return in foreign
exchange is probably less than $5 million.
Merchandise imports into Laos, exclusive of gold, were
$32. 9 million in 1965, an increase of 180 percent compared with 1960.
This increase resulted from swollen military and civilian government
payrolls rather than from productive development of the economy.
Imports of food into Laos, an overwhelmingly agricultural country,
amounted to about one-third of total imports in 1965. Other major
imports were machinery and transport equipment (19 percent of the
total), petroleum products (13 percent), metals and chemicals
(12 percent), and textiles and clothing (10 percent).
2. Foreign Economic Aid
The United States has given Laos 87 percent of the $545 million in
foreign economic aid that it has received since 1964. France has
given 6 percent, the United Kingdom 4 percent, and the USSR 1 percent.
Nearly all assistance is in the form of grants, primarily to finance
imports of commodities and technical assistance. Because the United
States gives priority to achieving political stability in Laos, only
about one-third of the 1966 aid commitments of $55.6 million were for
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economic development projects, and the remainder were about equally
divided between security activities and nonproject aid. The USSR
obligated $7. 6 million in economic assistance to Laos in 1962, and
Vientiane used $1. 5 million of this for purchase of civilian aircraft
shortly thereafter. The remainder of the aid has not been used, and no
projects have been suggested during the last few years.
ILz 1964 .the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and
Australia, recognizing that the neutralist government of Laos needed
support for its currency, created the Foreign Exchange Operations
=Fund (FE(DF), which in effect gives unlimited support to the Laotian
currency and leaves foreign exchange transactions perfectly free.
Through the FEOF, anyone in Laos who wants to buy dollars may do
so on the free market at the rate of 500 kips (K) to the dollar (the
official exchange rate, which is K240 to the dollar, applies only to
imports of aid goods and a few other minor transactions). Sales of
dollars through the FEOF increased from $7. 8 million in 1964 to
$20. 6 million in 1966. Most of the kips acquired through FEOF have
been frozen in Laos and have thus offset the increasing budget deficit
of the Laotian government. As a result, domestic prices in Laos
have peen held down and confidence in the currency has been encouraged.
The United States provided $25 million to the FEOF during 1964-66,
the United Kingdom $5. 1 million, France $4. 7 million, Japan $2. 2 mil-
lion, and Australia $1. 6 million.
I.,aos has also received large amounts of military assistance. *
I-B~alanc e of Payments
The large payments deficit that Laos accumulated during 1965,
estimated at $36. 9 million, was almost entirely offset by foreign aid.
Total export earnings, including receipts from smuggling, were only
aoot;:t 10 percent of payments for imports. Gross official holdings
of foreign exchange declined by $0. 4 million during 1965 to $6. S mil-
lion (see Table 1).
1D+. Government Economic Policy
Military forces in Laos are far larger than the country can support,
and as a result, few resources have been applied to economic develop-
nient. The infrastructure essential to growth -- roads, schools, and
public: utilities -- is still hardly visible in Laos.
See V, A, 1, c, below.
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Laos: Balance of Payments
1964-65
1964 1965 a/
Exports b/
3.1
3.6
Imports b/
-31.3
-31.8
Trade balance
-28.9
-28.2
Net invisibles
-3.9
-2.9
Total
-32.1
-31.1
2.
Miscellaneous transfer payments,
capital movements, and net
errors and omissions
-4.1
-5.8
Total 1 and 2
-36.2
-36.9
3.
Foreign aid
AID reimbursement for invisibles
3.7
2.8
US import program, including POL
10.6
10.1
US project aid and defense support
12.0
11.0
UK and other aid import programs
1.2
1.7
Sale of foreign exchange by FEOF
7.8
10.9
Total
35.3
36.5
4.
Monetary movements
0.9
0.4
Total 3 and 4 36.2 36.9
a. Preliminary figures.
b. Excluding imports and exports of gold, which are approximately
offsetting. Exports include earnings from clandestine trade,
primarily opium.
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UL' V L\li 1
1. The Government Budget
The large annual deficits in the government budget are apparent
from Table 2. Government expenditures increased from K3, 719
million in fiscal year (FY)* 1962 to K14, 936 million in FY 1966.
About 75 percent of the increase in expenditures in FY 1965 and
FY 1966 was the result of a government pay increase. Military and
police forces took 66 percent of government expenditures in FY 1966,
an increase of 313 percent over FY 1962, and most of the money was
spent for personnel expenditures. Supplies and equipment for the
military were provided through foreign aid. Civilian expenditures,
34 percent of the budget, were allocated primarily to education, with
small amounts to public works and foreign affairs.
Laos: Government Receipts and Expenditures
Fy 1961-66
Million rips a/
F i s c al
Year
Receipts
Expenditures
Deficit
1961
489
3,369
2,880
1962
583
3,719
3,136
1963
848
4,282
3,434
1964
1,602
6,080
4,478
1965
4,734
10,313 C/
5,579
1966
4,536
14,936 c/
10,400
a. Kips may be converted to US dollars at the
official rate of exchange of K240 to US f1 .
This rate, however, does not necessarily reflect the
dollar purchasing power of the kip.
b. About half the increase over 1964 arose from the
purchase of K1.4 billion from the FEOF, financed by
$2.8 million which the United. States made available
to the Laotian government under a special arrangement
c. About 75 percent of the increase in expenditures
.in 1965 and 1966 was accounted for by a government
pay increase.
The Laotian fiscal year is from 1 July through 30 June.
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Government receipts increased about seven times from FY 1962 to
FY 1966. Most of the expansion has occurred since FY 1964 and is
attributed to the increase in the exchange rate used for customs
valuation (from K240:US $1 to K500:US $1) and to the rapidly rising imports
of gold (which is taxed at 7 percent). Revenue from gold provided
about a third of total revenue in FY 1965.
2. Economic Policy
Economic development in Laos is hampered by a severe shortage
of trained personnel and the difficulty of maintaining law and order.
A five-year plan of $100 million, begun in June 1959, would have gone
half to education and transportation, with the remainder divided among
agriculture, public utilities, urban and village improvement, and
mineral development. Actual expenditures during the first year were
less than a third of the planned amount, and thereafter the plan was
suspended because of military and political uncertainties. Other
development plans, started in 1962 and 1964, met a similar fate. A
two-year plan for 1966-67 aims for self-sufficiency in rice and sugar
and proposes some industrial development, but its prospects are not
clear.
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V. WAR AND TRUCE IN LAOS
Laos is disrupted by Communist-inspired insurgency that began
before independence. During most of the period since 1949 it has taken
the form of open armed insurrection, actively supported by North Viet-
nam. Not only does Hanoi nurture the Lao Communist movement and
support its military arm, the Pathet Lao, but for years it has main-
tained regular North Vietnamese military forces in Laos. In the past
few years the military situation has become relatively stabilized. The
Communists retain nominal control of about half the country, but the
main population and agricultural centers are in the areas held by the
government in Vientiane. The Communist forces are reluctant to
attempt large-scale actions because of the preoccupation of North
Vietnam with its own war, the threat of US/Thai intervention, and
the success of the US/Lao air and guerrilla actions. Their principal
objective for the present is to hold the eastern corridor of Laos that
gives Hanoi an infiltration route to South Vietnam. On the other hand,
the non-Communist forces do not have the capability to dislodge the
North Vietnamese from Laos. The country probably will remain in
this uneasy stalemate until the war in Vietnam has been settled.
A.. Capabilities of the Opposing Forces
The two Laotian ground armies are not imposing military forces.
The troops are mostly uneducated and untrained and have little will
to fight. Important ethnic differences complicate the problems of
both sides. The military commanders, especially in Vientiane, are
often at odds with one another. The capabilities of the two forces are
determined more by the external support available to them than by
their indigenous strength. However, if all foreign troops should with-
draw and the Lao fight it out themselves, the non-Communists probably
would win because of their superior logistics position and because they
have the only aircraft in Laos.
1. Non-Communist Forces
a. Order of Battle
Non-Communist forces in Laos include the Forces Armes
Royales (FAR), the Forces Armes Neutralists (FAN), and paramilitary
forces made up of Lao tribesmen who are engaged mainly in guerrilla
operations. The estimated strength of these forces during 1949-66 is
shown in Table 3.
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Laos: Estimated Order of Battle of Non-Communist Forces
1949-66
Forces Armees Royales (FAR) J/
Date of b/
Estimate
Army
Royal Lao
H ~ ~ ' r ( R,LP.'~~ r `
Forc e
=i~.r er F lo, ti - I a
-
To ta l
Forces Armees
-r; eutra1
i.stes (rA1,~6Guerrilla Forces
Total
1949 (end of year)
1,200
1,200
N.A.
1,200
1950 (end of year)
3,000
3,000
N.A.
3,000
1951 (end of year)
9,500
9,500
N.A.
9,500
1952 (end of year)
12,300
12,300
N.A.
12,300
1953 (end of year)
17,000
17,000
N.A.
17
000
1954 (July)
27,000
27,000
N.A.
,
27
000
1955
(December)
24,000
24,000
N.A.
,
24,000
1956
(December)
25,600
400
26,000
N.A.
26,000
1957
(October)
21,500
500
22,000
N.A.
22
000
1958
(January)
21,500
500
22,000
N.A.
,
22
000
1959 (May)
24,500
500
N.A.
25, 000
N.A.
,
25
000
1960
(midyear)
28,000
550
300
28,850
N.A.
,
28,850
1961
(midyear)
35,000
200
350
35,550
N.A.
35,500
1962
(midyear)
51,000
550
400
5l 950
13,500
65,450
1963
(midyear.)
49 000
4vv
4oc
4^9,800
8,000
19,500
71,300
1960
(midyear)
~6 000
rn n5n -
p, r.~~.
1965
(midyear)
53,000
l,coo
4oo
54,400
8,500
31,000
93,900
1966
(November)
51,500
1,150
45o
53,100
11,500
35,000
99,600
a. Present designations of all forces are used. The absence of any entry indicates that the organization is not
known to have existed. An N.A. entry indicates that the organization existed but in unknown numbers.
b. The choice of dates of estimates is determined by the avsilability of data.
C. Between 1Q6n anti 1963 +.H. Neutralists r.rnre assoc ate r;+1, +Y,e r(, of foroco
d. The increase over 1963 is more a reflection 0P improved FAR statisticsvthan of an increase in order of battle.
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(1) Forces Armes Royales (FAR)
The FAR ground force, the principal non-Communist ground force
in Laos, has a present strength of about 51, 500 men, organized into 66 bat-
talions (55 infantry battalions, 6 parachute battalions, 1 Honor Guard
battalion, and 1 artillery regiment made up of 4 battalions) and 4 armored
companies as well as support and service elements. Battalions range
in size from about 400 to 600 men. The FAR is deployed throughout the
western part of the country. It has about 45 percent of its combat troops
located in the northern and central provinces and about 55 percent in the
southern Panhandle. Principal field artillery consists of 75mm pack
howitzers and 105mm and 155mm howitzers. Armored cars and scout
cars are being replaced by new US-built M-113 armored personnel
vehicles.
The Royal Lao Air Force (RLAF) has a personnel strength of
about 1, 150, including 85 pilots. It has 54 aircraft, including 20 T-28D
trainers used as fighter-bombers, 18 C-47 transport planes, 13 miscel-
laneous planes -- some of which are used for forward air control -- and
The River Flotilla consists of about 450 personnel and a small
fleet of river craft which transport military personnel and equipment on
the Mekong River. Most craft usually are stationed at Vientiane. The
boat strength includes 7 small landing craft (LCM), 25 small patrol craft,
16 river cargo craft, and 1 floating yard dock.
(2) Forces Armes Neutralists (FAN)
This force, until recently commanded by General Kong Le,
numbers about 11, 500 officers and men organized into six infantry bat-
talions, five parachute battalions, two "special" battalions, one artillery
regiment made up of two battalions with light artillery, and one armored
battalion. The FAN combat troops are located about 30 percent in the
area of FAN headquarters at Vang Vieng and about 60 percent at Muong
Soui, just west of the Plaine des Jarres on Route 7. One battalion is
stationed at Pakse on the Mekong River in southern Laos.
For a discussion of the air war, see V, B, 2, below.
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Guerrilla Forces
The guerrilla forces at the end of 1966 nurnbered about. 35, 000,
organized in companies of about 100 men each and in some areas in bat-
talions of about 500. The guerrilla forces are primarily local. tribesmen --
zYao, Meo, and Kha. Their effectiveness varies from one area to
:another.
b. Strengths and Weaknesses
(I) The Ground Forces
The economic backwardness of Laos and the lack of employment
opportunities make military service attractive to th,a average Lao. The
soldier's lot is not a difficult one. His income is higher and more
regular than it would be in most civilian jobs. Craning schedules are
'Lgh., Pak time (a siesta-like interlude) is frequent, discipline is lax,
and direct confrontation with the enemy is infrequent. It is these
personal advantages, however, and poor military It adership that make
::tie Lao army a questionable military force. The tribal guerrillas
obably have been the most effective units within their assigned role
disrupting enemy forces and gathering intelligence.
;a) The FAR
In the experience of US advisers , tationed in Laos
cap to October 1962, all echelons of the FA.R had proved militarily
deficient. The leadership and motivation of the FAR officers and
noncommissioned officers, with rare exceptions, has been very poor.
They have not appreciated the importance of intel.l.i:;enr_e and night
operations. They have remained aloof from their ? roops (many
hold their positions because of social or political s'.atus), and they
have lacked initiative and decisiveness in tactical situations. There-
fore, they have not been able to inspire their troops by example. The
leaders of small units, deficient in military experience, have made few
decisions on their own. The Lao soldier, although often enthusiastic in
noncombat situations and proficient in patrolling and raiding, has lacked
:;el::-.confidence and aggressiveness and has been reluctant to close with
the enemy in combat. He is passive by nature, anri he has received
nadequate basic training and psychological indoctrination. Moreover,
loyalty is dependent on regional, family, and personal associations
rather than on allegiance to the nation. All of these factors have
contributed to the many military defeats suffered by FAR troo-cos.
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There are some indications that the FAR has improved
slightly as a military force since 1962. It has continued to receive steady
doses of US material assistance and training, and with a small number of
US advisers has been able to mount a few successful campaigns. For
example, since August 1966 seven FAR battalions have been committed
to Operation Prasane in northern Luang Prabang Province. Using air
support for all supply and transportation and coordinating with guerrilla
companies, the FAR seized and held the rice bowl of Nam Bac Valley.
The enemy responded sharply in an area which he has controlled for
several years, but FAR forces maintained their positions and pushed
the offensive. Although the NVA battalions in the area have not yet been
defeated, Operation Prasane is a turning point for the FAR because it
represents a significant action initiated by them and carried through
successfully. Military attaches now believe the FAR is capable of
meeting the Pathet Lao on more than equal terms but that it would
continue to have difficulty if opposed by typically aggressive North
Vietnamese troops.
(b) Guerrilla Forces
Guerrilla forces are not able to oppose a major NVA
regimental-size attack, but they have forced the NVA to commit thousands
of troops to Laos in order to prop up the Pathet Lao and the NLHS. They
have withstood a moderate increase in North Vietnamese pressure by a
combination of classic guerrilla and conventional tactics. They hold
territory and inflict heavy casualties, then fall back and allow the NVA.
troops to occupy the terrain. They harass supply lines from the ground
and direct airstrikes against supply lines and enemy positions. The
guerrillas continually expand their control and influence over areas and
people that are removed from centers controlled by the NVA and Pathet
Lao. By establishing bases in these new areas, they can launch further
intelligence operations and harassment.
Guerrilla units provide most of the information on North
Vietnamese troop and supply movements through the Laos Panhandle to
South Vietnam. They also report valuable targeting data and sometimes
are used as ground and air forward controllers to direct airstrikes
against important targets.
Meo guerrillas under General Vang Pao, the FAR
commander in the 2d Militarv Region, operate effectively against Pathet Lao
and NVA units and supply lines. The Meo occupy important high ground
in enemy-held territory. In some areas, such as Nam Tha and
northern Luang Prabang, guerrilla units and volunteer battalions are
the only friendly forces holding territory. Since 1965, Vang Pao's
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guerrillas, with increased material support from the FA.R and effective
Close air support, have mounted several sustained offensives and have
held important military/political centers against strong enemy attacks.
Pathet Lao and NVA losses have been heavy in several major battles
with guerrillas in northeast Laos.
Beginning in the fall of 1961, a Kha guerrilla force
was established on the Plateau des Bolovens in the southern end of the
Lao Panhandle. By October 1962 the Khas had been organized into a
force of about 1, 100 men. By mid-1963 the combat effectiveness of
the Khas had diminished considerably, although a small number of
tribesmen had been organized for intelligence gathering and reporting.
1;2) The Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF)
The RLAF is a valuable addition to friendly Lao military
:strength. * However, a conflict between the air leadership and the FA.R
General Staff culminated in the removal of General Ma, head of the Air
1, orce, in October 1966. The Air Force, although directly responsive
to the control of the General Staff, had operated on the basis of regional
c::onsrciderations and, above all, on the basis of the Air Force commander's
personal interpretation of the ground situation. The Ma incident lowered
morale and caused divided allegiance within the armed forces, at least
temporarily.
c. Foreign Military Assistance
Deliveries under the US Military Assistance Program (MAP),
valued at some $300 million in FY 1950-66, comprise nearly all of the
:supplies and many of the services required by the friendly forces in Laos
(see Table 4). Almost 60 percent of Laotian defense expenditures in the
calendar years 1961-66 was represented by MAP deliveries, and almost
half of the remaining expenditure was financed directly or indirectly by
foreign aid, preponderantly US. Even the food consumed by most of the
FAR and FA.N forces is nearly all supplied by US AID. Although the
Geneva Accords of July 1962 gave France exclusive responsibility for
training all Lao military forces, the French military role and expen-
ditures in Laos have declined in recent years and are insignificant
conznared with those of the United States. The United Kingdom and
Australia have made small contributions in budget support and material
to friendly forces. The Neutralist forces received Soviet equipment and
training before shifting allegiance to Vientiane in 1963. They have
since received US and French assistance and small amounts of
Fora discussion of the air war, see V, B, 2, below.
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Indonesian aid, mainly in the form of uniforms and training. An
Indonesian training program for Kong Le's Neutralist troops apparently
proved mutually unsatisfactory; most of the Lao trainees showed little
aptitude or interest and had various complaints about the way of life
in Indonesia.
Laos: Total Commitments and Deliveries
Under US Military Assistance Programs
FY 1950-66
Expenditures/Deliveries
,Commitments
FY 1966
FY 1950-66
FY 1950-65
(Estimated)
345,078
248,366
46,099
Total excluding excess
stocks
299,731
207,142 J
42,390 J
Ammunition
65,803
48,979
9,945
Aircraft
39,152
18,628
4,694
Vehicles and weapons
32,190
26,939
2,074
Supply operations
23,632
17,587
5,200
Training
19,178
16,816
1,459
Communications
equipment
13,504
9,526
1,320
Excess stocks (valued at
acquisition costs) J
45,347
41,224
3,709
Aircraft, cargo C-47
27
25
Aircraft, trainer
55
32
21
Helicopters
60
31
1
Aircraft, observation
13
10
2
Aircraft, utility
15
12
2
Trucks
3,685
2,875
498
Carbines
68,468
50,974
11,021
Rifles
27,093
25,883
917
Submachineguns and
machineguns
14,484
13,279
1,086
Mortars
1,440
1,263
122
Rocket launchers
1,876
1,60
276
a. Including cost of repair and rehabilitation of excess stocks
and cost of transportation of equipment and supplies.
b. Surplus US military stocks not included in the official
accounting of military aid programs.
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2. Enemy Forces
a. Order of Battle
Enemy forces in Laos consist of the Pathet Lao (PL), North
Vietnamese Army units (NVA), and the Dissident Neutralists. The
estimated strength of these forces, 1949-66, is shown in Table 5.
(1.) Pathet Lao (PL)
PL forces numbered about 37, 600 men in November 1966,
organized into about 100 infantry battalions and a number of field
artillery,, armored, and antiaircraft artillery elements. Most infantry
ibattalions vary between 200 and 400 men, but some are smaller. Almost
all PL battalions include NVA personnel, and about 40 battalions contain
one or more companies of NVA troops. The command structure of the
PL forces includes NVA advisers at all levels, and operational control
of PL forces probably rests very largely in NVA hands. About 55 per-
cent of the PL are deployed in northern and central provinces and 45 per-
cent in the southern Panhandle.
!;2) North Vietnamese Armor (NVA)
NVA forces in Laos vary in number in accordance with devel-
oping combat needs. Forces have been sent into Laos or withdrawn on
fairly short notice. The strength of the NVA forces in Laos in November
:1.966 is estimated to have been 16, 000 men, of which 3, 000 we:re cadres
or advisers attached to PL units. Most NVA forces are organized in
regular units and serve either with PL companies in mixed battalions
or as NVA battalions, which range in size from 350 to 450 men. It is
believed that in November 1966 there were 20 NVA infantry battalions
in Laos, deployed throughout Communist-held territory but concentrated
in the Panhandle area.
f. 3) Dissident Neutralists
Col. Deuane and some of his troops defected from Kong Le's
forces in early 1963 and were proclaimed by the Communists as the
"true neutralists. " The Deuane Dissidents, about 1, 500 men, are made
up of seven infantry battalions and artillery and armored elements, and
they include PL officers and men. The forces are deployed in defense
of K.h.ang Khay, the PL headquarters east of the Plaine des Jarres.
4 For a discussion of antiaircraft capabilities, see B, 4, below.
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Laos: Estimated Order of Battle of Enemy Forces a/
1949-66
Date of
Khamouane
/
/
/
L
Estimate Pathet Lao (PL)
North Vietnamese Army (NVA)
Kong Le Neutralists
Deuane Forces
Forces
Total
1949-53 N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1954 (July) 1,800
N.A.
1,800
1955 (December) 6,300
N.A.
6,300
1956 (December) 6,300
N.A.
6,300
1957 (October) 6,300
N.A.
6,300
1958 (February) N.A. /
N.A.
N.A.
1959 (May) N.A. J
N.A.
N.A.
1960 (August) 9,000
N.A.
600
9,600
1961 (February) 9,500
N.A.
5, 000 e/
N.A.
14,500
(May) 15,000
N.A.
5,000
N.A.
20,000
(September) 15,900
3,200
5,500
N.A.
24,600
1962 (January) 19,000
9,000
6,000
4,000
38,000
(November) 19,000
6,000
8,000
3,000
36,000
1963 (February) 19,000
6,000
8,000
2,500
35,500
(May) 19,000
6,500
J
500
2,500
28,500
(November) 19,500
7,000
500
2,000
29,000
1964 (October) 20,000
10,000
2,000
1,000
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Laos: Estimated Order of Battle of Enemy Forces a/
1949-66
b /
Estimate J Pathet Lao (PL) North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Kong Le Neutralists Deuane Forces Forces Total J
1965 (July) 23,500 9,000 1,750 1,900 36,200
(0ctober) 25,000 7,000 1,750 1,900 35,700
1966 (November) 37,600 g,/
16,000
1,500 1,400 56,500 g/
a. Data for 1949-53 are not available. Totals are the rounded sums of the available estimates of all forces.
Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown. The absence of an entry indicates that the
organization is not known to have existed at that time. An N.A. entry indicates that the organization existed but in
unknown numbers.
b. The choice of dates of estimates is determined by the availability of data.
c. In addition, an undetermined but probably small number of Chinese Communist troops (possibly 600 to 1,200 during
recent years) is estimated to have been in northwest Laos since 1954. A few Chinese advisers have also been reported
elsewhere in Laos from time to time.
.
d. T- Pict-tea '~~ .~.iS ~~lt L~I'ai.cu ,Luc i -,. ..
.~ ,.c..~ o ,~~~~i ii rc~;iuai'y i7~u, an] Luc ie.;i3iiider ~au~~ut, CO-)
/were to have been demobilized. The demobilization probably was not carried out. Integration of the two battalions
proved to bo only nominal, a and +:he aue in i?:a,y iM y 1959 to force integration, one v of the
.... .nominal, and w....,. an u ~ ..~.u.y "tte p+ ~ was made l ~ilc ~wv ua ~ uai.r.viiS
escaped to Communist territory.
e. A very large proportion of Kong Le's recruits were in fact infiltrators from the Pathet Lao forces.
f. Transferred to the friendly side.
g including 7 1+50 troops '?t ly ideas . f a a 5
'p iaE-j or
omits iiv prc V iV tAA 1J' ---'ed and included. ,he 1ncr ease from m July 19"
V f 1~ therefore
ri`ouauiy uversus.Led by some 0,000 Lo 7,000.
Date of
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General Khamouane has a dissident force of about 1, 400 men
located in Phong Saly Province. Consisting of seven infantry battalions,
supported in part by the Chinese Communists, -these forces defend a part
of the Communist base area.
b. Communist Military Capabilities
There is little firm intelligence on PL capabilities, but probably
many of the unsoldierly characteristics of the FAR are also found in the
PL. Deficiencies include a generally low level of education, inadequate
training, ethnic dissension (40 percent of the PL troops are drawn from
ethnic minority groups), and a lack of will to fight in some instances.
Because of a primitive logistics system and dependence upon outside
support, their capacity for sustained, large-scale operations is low.
The increased number of non-Communist airstrikes probably produces
some morale problems. The Pathet Lao by themselves are estimated to
have a continuing capability to mount effective guerrilla operations, and
with direct North Vietnamese support in men and materials they can
launch conventional attacks of battalion size.
The NVA. forces are far better trained and equipped and more
highly motivated than the PL. When faced by either FAR or Neutralist
forces they have always fought well and are considered vastly superior
to either force on a unit-by-unit basis. Because of their superiority,
they have been used to spearhead attacks.
The Deuane Dissidents, heavily staffed with PL officers and
men, are comparable to the PL in combat effectiveness. The Khamouane
Dissidents hardly ever engage in combat and are not considered a useful
offensive force at present.
c. External Aid to the Communist Forces
Little is known about the external aid supplied to the Communist
forces in Laos, but it is not nearly as extensive as US aid to the non-
Communist forces. Communist China is the main source of supply, and
North Vietnam probably acts as the intermediary for most deliveries.
Aid has consisted of financial contributions and deliveries of arms,
ammunition, and equipment. Among the larger weapons made available
to the Communist forces in Laos are antiaircraft weapons*; 60mm, 82mm,
and 120mm mortars; 75mm pack howitzers; 85mm division guns; 105mm
howitzers; and 57mm, 75mm, and 82mm recoilless rifles.
See B, 4, below.
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Gom parative Lo istics
'elon-Communist forces in Laos appear to have an advantage in
logistics and transportation over Communist forces. Better truck and
`eater routes are available in the areas held by the FAR and FAN than in
the areas held by the Communists. Surface routes in friendly territory
have relatively easy access to 'Thailand, where main logistics bases are
located, and they are supplemented by an airlift. A major portion of the
Communist road network is oriented toward the supply of Communist
forces in South Vietnam rather than offensive or defensive forces in Laos.
The Communist logistics system depends on trucks supplemented by
~,varlous forms of primitive land and water transport, which must cross
a, formidable mountain range between Laos and North Vietnam. The
maintenance and expansion of the logistics and transportation systems of
both Communist and friendly forces in Laos are dependent on foreign. aid,
and the relative capabilities of these systems could be changed quickly
if either side received substantially greater or lesser amounts of
material and administrative assistance.
Non-Communist Forces
The logistics system of the non-Communist forces is inadequate
to support sustained military operations, although it has been improved
in recent years by US aid and training. Many of the simplest logistics
techniques are beyond the organizational and technical capabilities of the
friendly forces. These forces have relied on the US AID Mission, which
implements the MAP in Laos, to carry out the most important logistics
operations. The United States almost entirely controls the FAN logistics
system and provides extensive assistance for FAR-controlled logistics
operations. The road network in non-Communist territory totals some
1, 200 to 1, 500 miles.
The present logistics resupply requirement of the friendly forces
is about 275 tons- per day, of which food represents about 75 tons and
petr_oleuxn about 120 tons. The ground forces require about 210 tons and
the FAR Air Force 65 tons. Food is furnished by US AID, except for a
small amount that the FA.R obtains in Laos. Most supplies are trans-
ported through Thailand to central FAR depots at Vientiane or Savanrcakhet.
The FAR is usually able to move supplies within Laos to regional depots
and field units, using truck transport companies, air force cargo planes,
or hired civilian transport (truck, boat, or aircraft). However, US control
over movements within Laos is necessary when speed is essential or
when large pieces of equipment must be shipped.
Tonnages are given in short tons throughout this section.
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b. Communist Forces
The volume of supplies moved from North Vietnam into Laos in
support of forces in Communist-held areas of Laos is not known. Since
the time of the Geneva agreements in 1962, most of the supplies have
been delivered by truck. The road network has been extended from
450 miles in 1962 to about 1, 000 miles in mid-1966, and the number of
truckable roads crossing the border has increased from 4 to 10 in the
same period (see Figure 5). Information from road-watch teams is
sufficient on only three of the cross-border routes to derive estimates
of the volume of traffic, but even these estimates are tentative because
of problems involved in the reporting.
The level of truck traffic entering the Plaine des Jarres area of
Laos on Route 7 and the volume of supplies delivered each year on this
route appear to have declined during 1964-66. The estimated volume
of supplies delivered in 1966 was about 60 percent of the amount esti-
mated for 1963, or about 27, 400 tons. The volume of traffic on Route 7
during the first few months of 1967 suggests that the volume of deliv-
eries for the entire year 1967 will be higher than in 1966. Some supplies
may have been moved into the area in 1966 on the newly completed
Route 61. Truck traffic on Route 8 into northern Khammouane Province,
which has declined since 1963, was practically nonexistant in 1966.
By contrast, the volume of supplies moved by truck into the
southern Panhandle of Laos is estimated to have increased substantially
since 1963. The road network in this area has been greatly expanded and
improved. Truck traffic moving south from North Vietnam is estimated
to have delivered about 7, 000 tons in the dry season of 1964-65 and about
17, 000 tons in the dry season of 1965-66, but airstrikes destroyed about
20 percent of the total in 1965-66. In the current dry season, 1966-67,
the North Vietnamese are moving supplies over this route that may total
20, 000 tons, of which some will be destroyed by airstrikes. In addition,
primitive transport from North Vietnam delivered an estimated 2 tons
per day, or 730 tons a year, into the same area, and food supplies
arriving from Cambodia in 1966 may have amounted to 15 tons per day,
or 4, 000 tons during the dry season. Very little information is available
regarding the division of these supplies between Communist forces in
Laos and those in South Vietnam, but it is estimated that in 1965 the
quantity reserved for use in the southern Panhandle was no more than
5, 700 tons and possibly less than 4, 600 tons. Of the supplies delivered
in the first half of 1966, about half were probably consumed in Laos.
The logistics organization supporting Communist forces in Laos
appears to be under the control of the North Vietnamese Ministry of
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::National Defense and its subordinate directorates. General storage areas
for supplies have been identified in many places in the Communist-held
portion of Laos. At least four of these areas are believed to he major
storage areas. Supplies are generally moved from North Vietnam to
these areas by truck convoys and further distributed by truck or by
primitive transport. The logistics system appears to be flexible and has
been modified as a result of aerial attacks. It is relatively invulnerable
to air interdiction because the level of traffic moving on the roads is
equivalent to only a small percent of the road capacity.. The Communists
in Laos will probably continue to receive adequate supplies from
external sources.
Roads are the only transport routes with significant capability
to support a substantial increase in Communist forces in Laos. It is
estimated that the truckable roads that cross the border into Laos from
China and North Vietnam theoretically have the capability to resupply
throughout the year some 22 light infantry divisions and supporting
units --- about 423, 000 men -- under average combat conditions. Some
of the roads extend only 30 to 50 miles into Laos, however, and the
capability to resupply troops beyond the road terminals would be greatly
reduced. Larger numbers could be supplied during the dry season, when
the routes can support a larger volume of truck traffic; but in. the rainy
season, as route capacities are reduced, the number that could be
supported would be reduced to less than a fourth of the dry season
maximum. These estimates would change if the level of combat or
composition of units were different or if changes were made in the
roads involved.
B. The Air War
1., US Participation
[he principal US air programs, flown from bases outside Df Laos,
are known as BARREL ROLL (BR) and STEEL TIGER (SL). Under these
programs, armed reconnaissance has been conducted against lines of
communication, transportation equipment, troop concentrations, bivouac
and storage areas, barracks, and antiaircraft sites. Targets, both fleeting
.and fixed, are validated by the US Ambassador at Vientiane. Sorties are
also flown in support of ground operations.
The 13R Program was initiated on 14 December 1964 when four
F'-105's based in South Vietnam carried out an armed reconnaissance
fission over Route 8 in the Panhandle. The program was at first
confined to the central Panhandle area, and in a 3-1/2-month period
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through March 1965 only 51 missions were flown. During this time the
list of targets was expanded and the program was reorganized. Since
1 April 1965 the program has been directed against the Communist-
controlled areas of the northern provinces of Xiangkhoang, Houa Phan,
Phong Saly, and Luang Prabang. The SL Program is similar to BR and
is directed against the Communist-controlled areas in the Laotian
Panhandle south of Nape Pass (see Figure 6).
The number of BR/SL sorties increased after 1 April 1965, although
the rainy season caused flight cancellations in July and August. With the
increased availability of aircraft and the advent of the dry season, the
number of attack sorties reached about 3, 000 in December and a peak of
over 8, 000 in January 1966. The number of monthly attack sorties varied
between about 1, 000 and 6, 000 during the remainder of 1966, and support
sorties averaged an additional 2, 300 per month throughout 1966 (see
Figure 7). Airstrikes were fairly evenly divided between BR and SL
areas during the first few months of the program, but, beginning in
November 1965, the airstrikes concentrated on the Panhandle in an
effort to interdict the flow of troops and materiel to South Vietnam.
About 20 percent of the sorties flown against Communist positions in
Southeast Asia in 1966 were in Laos. The United States lost 71 planes
over Laos in 1966 (59 in combat), about 14 percent of the total number
of planes lost in US/South Vietnamese actions in Southeast Asia.
TIGER HOUND is a special program initiated in December 1965 to
increase the effectiveness of the SL Program. It employs forward air
control planes flown by US pilots from bases in South Vietnam to locate
both vehicular and fixed targets for strikes in the southern part of the
SL areas. Twenty O- lE aircraft were originally assigned to the program,
and these have since been supplemented by other types. An airborne
command post (C-130), manned by US personnel and two RLAF observers,
provides continuous radio contact between observers, strike pilots, and
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headquarters during operations. Beginning in January 1966,
the TIGER HOUND program began using observation aircraft
c~u.i;.,ped with Side-Looking Air Borne radar.
The CRICKET Program, initiated in February 1966, uses ground
ro:,.,ci-watch teams in radio contact with spotter aircraft, which consist
of a gout 20 small econnaissance aircraft (O-1E's) flown by US pilots
(:i .iei improvements in air operations have been a more extensive
of rada.i and the introduction of flares for night operations (includ-
ing; tee use of C-130 flare aircraft), Herbicides are used occasionally
to; defoliant operations in order to overcome the handicap of heavy
tr(e coves..
Lao Air Operations
In May 1964 .the RLAF had only 6 T-28's (a propeller-driven
trainer) and 12 qualified pilots. The ordnance of these planes con-
sisted of 50-caliber machine guns and 2.75-inch rockets. Subse--
quently, the United States provided bombs for use on the T-28's and,
more irr_portantly, began to build up the number of both T-28 planes
The present force of about 40 T-28's is divided into two groups
of planes and pilots, both nominally under the RLAF but controlled
A.ir :'?.ttache's Office.. Airstrikes are coordinated with the FAR
Ger,, ai Staff, with army field commanders, and with the local
ribal people. The other half of the RLAF force operates mainly
against Communist-controlled areas in southern Laos, also in close
coordination with the US Air Attach&'s Office, the FAR General
and field commanders. USAF advisers at Savannakhei; pro-
vicLe technical guidance,
gFC-..P FT
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Areas Covered by operations bAKKtL KULL and blttL IMOM
IC, Muang Luong a' /
Nam Tha
,/ (0Sop Ngin 0Muong Sal
LAOS
~??- International boundary
Province boundary
National capital
O Province capital
Railroad
Road
Track or trail
BARREL ROLL = STEEL TIGER
25 50 75 100 Miles
0 25 5 100 Kilometers
0 ' 25 50 75 0
If `~,iLAO CAI
~,?,' PHONG SALY /cliDien Bien
BURMA I MLong 0~?~..~.?L.,,..r - ~.( I\ Phu
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c
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SAVANNAKHET IQ? j_..- ~.? ?.O - _
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es wrvo sourv oanv asraes
nor rvecessn_v ,.uraoairnnve
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~.._??:~?o: f.o-?....~; 25X1
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}
NUMBER
OF
SORTIES
11,000
LAOS: US AIR OPERATIONS, 1965-66
1965 a
Attack Sorties 10,830
Support Sorties 5,200
J J
1965
Attack Sorties 48,480
Support Sorties 27,630
TOTAL 76,110
J J
1966
aSorties flown over Southeast Asia during 1965 by US and Vietnamese Forces totaled 181,550; 8.8 percent of these were flown over Laos.
b Sorties flown over Southeast Asia during 1966 by US and Vietnamese Forces totaled 428,080; 17.8 percent of these were flown over Laos.
c Attack sorties include strike plus flak suppression sorties.
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General Ma, commander of the RLAF, attempted a coup on 21 Octo-
ber by sending a number of T-28's to bomb military posts in Vientiane.
The attempt was unsuccessful because he did not have ground support.
were subsequently returned to Laos, and some of the pilots are again
flying in government operations controlled from Vientiane.
T-28 operations include trail interdiction both in the north and in
the Panhandle, strikes against fixed military targets, and close combat
support for ground operations. Since the spring of 1964 the RLA.F has
improved its skills and has made a commendable showing. Two of the
larger operations which involved planned, coordinated actions of ground
and air forces were OPERATION TRIANGLE in the summer of 1964 and
during the summer of 1966. (For the number of
T-28 sorties flown monthly in 1965-66, see Figure 8. )
The RLAF has a number of C-47 transports, which are used prima-
rily as transport and cargo planes. They are used also for night bombing,
as flare ships in support of ground operations, and as communications
relays between front lines and command posts.
3. The US Air Attache's Office
The US Air A.ttache's Office in Vientiane is the focal point for
coordination of all tactical air operations in Laos. Targets for the
T-28 program and for BR/SL programs are developed in the current
intelligence and photointelligence sections of the office. The office
assists the FA.R General Staff in planning operations which involve air
support, plans and coordinates joint RLA.F-USAF missions, and deploys
USAF and sometimes RLAF forward air control teams. An Air Oper-
ations Center at Vientiane is operated by USAF personnel who carry out
mission planning, briefing and debriefing, ordnance storing and loading,
and aircraft maintenance.
4. Enemy Antiaircraft Defenses
The buildup of air activity since the spring of 1964 has resulted in
some increase in enemy antiaircraft activity, but these defenses remain
weak relative to the offensive capability of Lao-US forces. The number
of antiaircraft weapons increased from about 120 in June 1964 to about
325 in April 1966. During the rainy season, when fewer missions are
flown, fewer weapons are deployed. Thus by August 1966 the number of
antiaircraft weapons had decreased to about 265, and some of the
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reduction was accounted for by the return of the weapons to North Vietnam.
An estimated 14 antiaircraft battalions and 2 unidentified batteries were
in Laos in the autumn of 1966. In addition, PL infantry units use their
.50-caliber machineguns for air defense as well as in ground combat.
Antiaircraft weapons include . 50-caliber heavy machineguns, Soviet
',7mrn antiaircraft guns, and Soviet 14. 5mm ZPU antiaircraft ;duns. The
machrineguns are mostly remnants of World War II and the French-
Indochinese War. The heavier weapons were supplied by the USSR to the
Neutralists under Kong Le during 1960-62 and were retained by the
(::orn:rnunists after their split with Kong Le. Apparently few, i:F any,
direct deliveries of antiaircraft weapons have been received from the
USSR since 1962. North Vietnam -- andindirectly, Communist China --
has been the main source of the increase in weapons since 1961, but
increased requirements in North Vietnam itself have curtailed deliveries
to Laos.
The Communists have sought with some success to compensate for
a lack of air power by mobility of deployment and by the use of heavy
concentrations of armament at important points. Camouflage has also
helped to improve the effectiveness of antiaircraft defenses. Mobility
is achieved by the maintenance of about 3, 000 well-distributed gun
positions, and guns are moved in and out of these positions according to
need. In addition, a number of armored cars mounted with ZPU 14. 5mm
antiaircraft guns travel with truck convoys and troops. Heavy concen-
trations of antiaircraft positions are deployed at important route junctions,
bridges, mountain passes (Nape and Mu Gia), and important enemy bases
such as Tchepone. In December 1964 and January 1965, for example, the
enemy built at least 25 antiaircraft sites containing over 100 gun emplace-
cnents in the vicinity of Ban Ken Bridge over the Nam Mat River on Route 7.
Another impressive concentration has been developed near the junction of
Routes 12 and 23 in the Panhandle, where over 100 sites have been set up
in an area less than 5 miles in diameter.
5. The Effectiveness of Air Interdiction
The air interdiction program in Laos has greatly increased the cost
i:o the Communists of moving their supplies but has not reduced the flow
of supplies. For example, during a 30-day period in December 1965-
January 1966 about 16, 000 tons of ordnance were dropped on the main
supply routes in the Panhandle, but the level of traffic moving south
during the same period --- 29 trucks per day -- was twice the level of
truck traffic in the same period one year earlier. The Communists have
made intensive efforts to camouflage roads, to effect rapid repairs, to
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LAOS: SORTIES FLOWN BY THE ROYAL LAOTIAN AIR FORCE
1964-66
1964 1965 1966
Total 3,106 Total 6,706 Total 5,933
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travel at night, and to adopt other innovations to keep the traffic moving.
At the same time they have been able to improve and expand the original
road network, and the level of traffic moving on the routes uses only a
small proportion of the road capacity. Air attacks will continue to be
relatively ineffective because of these evasive tactics and because the
trucks can be well spaced along the roads. Therefore, the CommL'nists
in Laos will have a continuing capability to maintain a logistics system
over which supplies from external sources can be moved.
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Secret
Secret
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