THE ORGANIZATION, VOLUME, AND DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLIES TO COMMUNIST FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000900050022-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: November 1, 1968
• Content Type: HW

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DIA review(s) completed.
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Summazy
Overviw o Communist Supply Effort
Orgau.isation
Requirements
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CONWENTS
Volume
Di balm
Ccostruetion and xaprovelant of Roads in Laos and. South Vietnam
C-onzunist Sup-Ay to xxI 'Corps Ares
Requirement? s
Impact of Material Losses
Direoti?t of nos
Transportation Corridors in nx Carpi
Eno Supply Wvements from Catalmdia to Communtst
Jtoodstufts
Other Non-military Supplies
Supply Routes for Foodstuffs and Other ika-Military Supplies
Arms lubli Ammunition
Border Crossing Paiute tor Muniticas
Origin of Arms Supplies from Cambodia
Seaborne Arms Movements
Overland Arms Movements from north Vietnam
DIA review(s) completed.
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Quantities of kamitis from Cambodia
Involvement of Cambodian Personnel
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Append.xes
*ti Tables
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TELble
t Logistical Requirements in South Vietnam
Supply Losses in South Vietnano January4eptember 1968
Illua ratiOn
OrgistioDi Elements in Logistics Plow into South
' Vietnam and Comaunist and Allied Administrative Area.' (map)
Selected Segments or North Vietnamese Logistics Ifertvark Into
Leos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam (map)
Viet Cons and North Vitns. Commo-Liaison
Movement** and Support Areas (map)
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SuomirY
The No Chi lilaktTrail. is the principal supply route for the external needs
of the Communist forces in South Vietnam. This road, and trail, system has been
progressively improved and expanded since early 1965. During the 1967.68 dry'
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season improvements to the roads ware made so that supplies could be moved by
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trucks into southern Laos throughout the rainyseason (now drawing to a close),
a capability lacking in previous ears. Truck traffic to southern Laos is esti.
ted t?ave nverse4 Iso tons per day during the period &wary through Septem.
In 1968, double that aowet during a comparable period in 1967. The volume
of supplies either moved to Ccmunis. forces in South Vietnam or stockpiled in
Laos In the first nine months Of 1.968 averaged 115 tons a. days an
percent greater than the total for the comparable peri,1 in 1967,
tons of military supplies and food per de,;r roughly 30 per
'North Vietnamese ..Ar4 (hVA) ? Viet Cons (IC) euirexents
obtained fine external sources. About 4 percent of the
food, 30 percent of the Claes 32 and IV (weapons, 'clothing- and eqt4p1mk
percent of the 'intom4iiii requirements are Obtained .from eioternal-souretie..=
43 percent (aminly ammunitions weapons, ani equipment) of the vo1ue of-
th Vietnam from external sowives move through Laos 17
across the DemLUtarized Zone and 40 percent (mainly food) is received
from Cambodia.
The 539th Transportst
Group subordinate to the General Directorate of
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Roar Services of the North Vietnamese Ministry of Defense is responsible for
supply movements in southern Laos and its jurislictioa extends at least into
It also coordinates dolt'of suPplies with the 3-3 Front in la Corps
and with the Central Office for South Vietnam (COM) in III Corps and possibly
110' Corps. In 3.968 over 150 miles of roads have been eonstructed or imprOved by
es principally in I Corps thus extending the Laotian truck routes
into South Vietnam. But the north- south movement of supplies is dependent
predominantly oc porters moving short distances daily carrying loads or pushing
load carryiug bicycles over pe infiltration trails in South Vietamm or Cambodia.
Trucks are used when available on roads under Communist control, and rivers are
exploited to float supplies for short distances.
Rice and other foods from Cambodia move directly into Conmueist base'areas'
Cambodian territory and thence directly across the border into the food
deficit areas of South Vietnam. A mull amount also traneits the southern tip
, of Laos enroute. amnions which have transited Laos move through northeastern
Cambodia to UAW areas in South Vietnam, Commuhist forceQ. in UI and IV Corps
ceiving considerable amounts of ammaaitioni through southeastern Cambodian
:territory,' These emanate come net only from the flow from the north but also
fren'supplies infiltrated along the Cambodian coast or over-the-beach and thence
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the road and trail system.. Small quantities may also be illicitly diverted from
embodian military stocks.
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Az.L2witv of the Commi B.rfort,.
Organization
1. The General Directorate of Rear Serviees of the North Vietnamese Winistry
or Defense is responsible for procuring, storing and distributing logistic ilwe
port for the armed forces. The prime organizational element in the Coanunist
logistical 1.xt ut into South Vietnam (RVII) is the 559th Transportat,ion Group. which
operates under the direction of the General Directorate of Rear Services.*
Created in 1959, it is responsible for the =moment of men and supplies from Borth -
Vietnam to southern Laos andtthentW RVN via Laos and Cambodia. This responsi.
hint/ also embraces reconstruction and repair or existing roads, construction
of new roads, protection of the routes from both air end ground interdiction,
receipt of new ani maintenance of old vehicles and construction equipmant, an
administration of the personnel necessary to implement this mission.
zonsiderable data on the mission end
formance of the 559th Transportatiom Group. Rekdquartered U. the Tchspone area,
it tunotionz through 10 military stations and their subordinate battalions in
southern Laos with aninventory of about 1,000 trucks. Its organizational control
extends into South :Vie via Route 9 (Dm Sank), Route 922 (A Shen Valley), and
Routes:145 and 96/134.
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Tririralis174P7riur* 1
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ti 8 South
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h Vi tau& Arigy (NVA) end Viet Cons (va) regular and administrative
upport ornes ARVN require about 290 short tons* of supplies ger day of which
Ma estimated 90 tons roughll 30 perc.iit ars obtained frau ecternal sources.
25 percent of the total daily food* 30 percent or the Clam XX and IV (vata
sons and equip:rent) and 85 percent of the ammunitions requirements are plied
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from external sources:*
Vol e
5. upplies delivered to southern Laos by the 559tb, Transportation Group in
he first nine months of 2.968 have averaged 180 'Woe Pei ds4r, 115' tone* of which
were available for stockpiling in Laos or :orwsrUng for use in South Vietnam.
These aeounts are greaterly 100 percent and 130 percent, respectively, than the
totals for the comparable period in 1967. The dramatia increase in the volume
in 3.968 has been estimated on the basis of reports from roadwatch teams. Aerial
observers who report a heightened level of truck activity on the main supply
routes in the Laotian Panhandle during 3.968 tend to support this estimate. Aerial
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observers, moreover, reflect an increased level of traffic
four routes (Rotates
9, 922 165, sad, 110) leading into RVN frcei Lees ** The table below shows aerial
the four routes in 2.968 omparedwith 1967.
* bee Table in the Appendix.
*0 Derived by subtracting estimated average daily requirements for the Communists
in southern Laos which amount to about 6, tons.
*** Although roadwatch teams do not confirm a comparable increase on routes
ing to RVI, this failure may be a function of security difficulties in emaScing
and maintaining the teams on the infiltration routes, and41;ficatiesi of the
teams in observing traffic.
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Truckis
i8 Jan= to OCtObe
oilLa otal Total
9 342 1 2108
922 432 1
165 29 Mal* 155
p
3.10 656 2 767
Total 1661 2 - Zgl 14
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tiources betense Intelligence Acency. It must be noted, that sharply
increased attack sorties in 1968 probably* played a role in the dramat1cal1y
increased truck. sightings in 1968 as compared vith 1967.
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Distribution
7. AA stimated 43 percent of the volume of supplies equirol Lel= frau
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brna sources nom through Laos, 17 percent across theDemilitarised Ion
and 40 percent are received from Cambodia (nearly one-third of which transi
). Although waterways and rudtnentary mechanical and human modes of an
exhaustible variety are used to move supplieo, motor trucks remain the key fac-
tor in this activity. The Beal Minh Trail contlause to be the principal supply
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route for the Class= 1,1, IV, and V external needs of the Communist forces in
Routes 15 and 137 in forth Vietnam and thence Routes 2.2 end 932 in Laos pro..
? entry into the logistical land bridge in southern Laos and link with Route
soutik axis route Lu Laos. 8hipments south through Laos on
Route 911 are shunted east from the vicinity of Tchepone into ON via Route 9 and
parallel s Shipments moving south of Tchepone travel over Routes 92 or 914
to the ',lunation of Route 92 and Route 922 which provides another entry point into
aVill. Bouth of the 92/922 junction, movement aonti.nu.es over Route 92 to Ban, Bac.' ?
Hers Route 96 south continues from Ban Bac to C'havane where Route 3.65 extends east
to RVN. Route 96 then continues south cmChsvens to Join with Route 11.0 east
of Attopiu, and provides the southernmost entry point into RV 11 from Laos via the
,
title in I Corps are supplied by ndlitery stations of the 559th
ion Group as well as directly across the DIAZ by way of Sately Forward
Vietnam. ? COalnaUltit units operating in XI Corps exe supplied by two
tive entities WO the B?3 Front in the western higiannela and the Rear
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ervices Group of MR..5 in the eastern regions of 11 Corps. These two entities
ors supplied by two MALA routes* (1) lb* route supporting 1R-5 extends roughly
-
from the northwestern tip of Rout= over to the area of western Quang Eggi and
a the southern portion of Binh Dinh 1./ and (2) tne route supporting
Bo.,3 Front runs south along t
Cambodian/KU border to Base Areas 702 and 701
west of flaiku, and further south into Darlac at least as far as the area nocth.s
east of Ban Me Thuot.
9. Part of the route -south of Base Area 701, has been defined by a TW in
December 1967 as the Co. 10 Transportation Corridor with stations 3.8 kiloseters
(los) apart and capable of carrying rice and munitions. J This route enters RVX
the Darien...1'14,11ot border area. Another route, farther south, was impli
di captured document marked "wrgent" which was to be passed. to the B.3 Front Com..
d. The document stated that most of the 18 B regiment would withdraw from
the Ma Trang area of nanh Hos Province via the ". . cormunication corridor
orov. rovince (VC) located south of Ban Na Thuot City to We Station 54 ?
soul from there to the entry-exit point of R (possibly COWS). Prom this point
regiment was to proceed to Station 17 to receive weapons and other swplies?
as well as to undergo a reorgaillention. The entry point of the supply infiltra.
route described above was also known as Station 17.
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Elements of the lit NU Division are currently located in Phuoc Long Pro-
dependent upon COME for logistical support. Previously, other NU
elements have been dependent upon supply caches in Cambodia west of Darle.c Pro-
vises. In December 1967, the 590th Transportation Battalion supplied. the 33rd
EVA regiment and 401st Local Farce unit with food., MAIX2ititX1 and sma13. arms from
*aches in Cambodia. ,V Similar instances have been reported IA 19684 ?.1
Construction and Im raw wart of Roads in Laos and Bouth Ifi
10. Since early 1965 the Consumista have been. constructing new roads and ist-
proving existing roads. By March 1967 the Corivori ate had developed within the
Laotian Panhandle a road network capable of moving at least 530 tons per day of
supplies by truck all the way to the borders of EVE during the dry season.
Beginning in the last quarter of 1967, at the, and of the monsoon season,the Com-
munist road construction and repair effort was notiosablY intensified.. Aa a
*moquette* of the repairs, improvements, and exte ions .completed during the
1967.68 dry season the estimated wet-season capacity for continuous truck moge-/
A
merit as far soutb as the A Shan Valley was increased from 30 to 100 short tons
day. additional 50 tons of capacity has been made available for movements
along routes leading into Quang Tin and. Kant= Provinces. Throughout the rainy
season wbich is now drawing to a close, construction workers have been active
in sadntaining the essential routes. For the first time the Comawnists have been
- 9 ?.
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able to 'maintain a significant logistic floor irto southern Laos during the wet
$641104 as shown beim
Short Tons Per Day
Ea-----"--=
/day
90
120
.
June
20
135
..%.1y
110
August
5
75
September
120
95
During 1968 the Communist forces constructed, or improved 130 miles or
roads in RVS. This construction activitwas centered primarily in I Corps an
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was concentrated on the improvement of Route 9 into Owing Tri Province. Other
activity in I Corps warn the irrcIproveranat or Route 922 into Thus =ea Province.
In the A Sham Valley, where Route 922 becomes Route 5148 (South Vietnam), Route
547
was im;proved and extended toward Hue. Route 548 was extended south frcxa
the junction with Route 547 through Base Area 607 in Laos and. into quang Nan Pro-
V12ICO? Following construction of the extension of Route 165 east from Chavan
Laos,to Routs 14 in South Vietnam, the Comuniste uncle improvemen ?
Quang Tin Province northward toward Thuong Due.
12 Significant construction activity was noted in the tri-border area of
?
Corps in 1968 Communist forces improved Laos Route 110 from Base Ares. 609
junction with Route 512 which connects with Route 14 at Dak To. Another
as extended south for 44) miles from the new extension of Route 3.10 in Base
Area 609 through Kontos Province near the Cambodian border and ending in Pleiku
Route 3.4
o 10 0.
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tf. et?". r 944 el 0?etaL7C--,
edeC.-
" cr,res."( r-Z4-4.. e ofre4011/1e.t:
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Province, about 2, miles west of the town of Pleiku.
13. Enemy road construction in III Corps, however& was not as extensive as
it was in the twonorthern Corp., the area, already havingawellodeveloped net.
work of roads and waterways. However, in April. 3.968 a special forces team cone
firmed a new north-south Creemeetstebuilt road and two large camps ,between EW
Routes Ile and 309, both of which parallel the South Vietnamese * Cambolian border.
he road is about 20 miles long.
Communist Supply to the pi Corps Area
far Rorth V etnameae external supply of Communist forces in I and
rc carps or
Vietnam has been made ebov 0 That a portion of these supplies
? flow farther southward into III Corps is less known and deserves especial con*
* derelict% and documentation.
Requirements,
Caumenist forces in XIX Corps require a daily' average or about 70 short
teas of supplies, 18 tons of which are derived from external sources. Eleven
of e external requirement is in food and seven tone in weapons& ammuni*
& clothingand equipeent. All of the external food requirement in III Corps
is obtained free Cambodian sources and the bulk or cu. a Et, IV and V external
requirements are met by imports over the Laotian infiltration corridor,. The
sevesent of seven short tones per day from Leo
ropresentI no hardship for
to
in northern UI Corps
he enenj. To move this amount from the southerresoat
road avathb3.e to them in Laos to northern Phzaoc Long Provinces in RV a
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' distance of roughly 220 km -- the Communists would require about 2,500 people,
most of whomvould be local conscriats or soldiers used 64 porters.
Imeact .orYaterial Lonees
15. Communist forces in III Corps have austained heavy supply losses in the
firet nine meths of 1968. III Corps vas second only to I Corps in aupply
losses ;luring this period** From Januery through August 1968 eight tone of sup-
plies per dgy were captured or destroyed by Allied ground forces in III Corpse
about 47 percent of the external resupply requirement. or the total losses, six
tons e in toed And two tons in munitions supplies? The Cc uniat have the
capability to maks up most of this lose from internal sources but if they de.
ided to replace the loss from external sources, daily resupply requirements
in 640 to about 78 tons of which external requirements would amount to
26 tons per tiny* Such losses in XXX Carps have contributed to a disruption of
?ome planned military operations and have aggravated Communist resupply and
internal distribution problems. The relatively low level of motions initiated
recently by the Communists maybe attributed in some measure to the dsatrw2tion'
cloture of propositioned supply oodles in forward 11"64 by Allied forces.
We do not believe,, however, that these losses would cause the economists to seek
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Djmot4:42 or Flow
4./ t. __j-..._.
selialale 2 in the Appendix
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munitions movements to Communist units in In Corps are ;iredossicently from
arth to south* The southfarly movement may be augmented. by munitions me &rutting
in C (as distinct from those transiting Cambodia) but the eviAence for
this is ii
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Traocoiior in UIorpffiC
17. Cemmunist units operating in III Corps receive aupplies from acreacont ...
shaped supply sre xtending from the Ks Ir area in Cambodia v st of Due La
around Tay Binh Province (flVN) and down to the Parreit's Beak area of Bvay Rieng
Province in oaMbodia. The enemy reportedly makes use of trucks throuenout the-
orem but rorely for any distance inside Wil. Trucks often have been roport4 at
--infiltration points along the Binh Long/Cambodia border and the Phuoe Lona,
Oism an
mops.*
Trucks are also believed to be available in Base Arca 740
used many. times for the infiltration of KVA units Jac. na
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the
14:ore 3.
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iso? These =Gs (81 through 86) have long been reeponsible for the movement
of material inside XIX Corps.
ty af follows Vs
Bear Service
ne source give& their respective area* of reapons1,-
roup
82
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VC Sub-Region 1. Generally
ting in in the tri-border arca of
Binh Long* Tay Dia, and Binh Dion
Provinces.,
83 VC Sub-Region 5 (Area north of CVO),
in caetern Binh Duong Province.
81
ate
VC Well Zone D. Southern Pbuoc
Long* eastern Lone Ettnnh Provinces.
Eastern Long aLanh Proviwes.
BaSe Area 350, Northern Binh Long*
Phuoc Long Province Border Area.
Northern Phuoc Long Province on
'Canbodian Border (Base Area 351).i.
20, The RBOs on the Cambodian border ere generally supplied at way etatione
along the border by trucks from uoknown areas. There are unconfirmed reports
?
by returnees and Pitts stating that some munitions came from Cambodian Ary sources.
general movement in the rear services groups is south or east to caches or
se areas,, in XIX Corps usually under the adminietration of sub-regions subordinate
to COM
21. The movements alms the RVNidatbodian border within the afore-mentioned
crescent vary in direction according to the source consulted.* On the Tay Binh/
Cagabodlan border there have been marl
report's of
movements south and east. The southerly uovenente begin in Cambodia cppoctte the
stern corner of Tay Nia Province and continue along the border to grey
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Riese Provinoe in Cambodia and through Ba Thu. village, Cambodia, to caches 15
rallat,west.eOuthwest or Saigon. 71 There are also reports of Material mciving
free area south of ay Dinh 'City' to the Parrot's Deals area. 4,/ XII 1442`Cil Or
968 a heavily-erned VC battalion was located 10 miles east of Tay Ninh City
awing in a weaterly direction Implying a source of supplies east of the city,
Other reports indicate an easterly logistics flow tram Cambodia nort ortheast
lab City. There are few reports of materiAl infiltration on the northern
border of Tay Zilch, The Cambodian/Binh Long and the Cambodian/Phuoc Long borders,
however, are aittensively %ma by enemy units for the infiltration of supplies in-
eluding food and munitions.
22. Pi10-86 hern Phuoe Long Province, is perhaps the most active of
ear eervice groups Operating in XXI Corps. It is known to support PS041
in
lautbsz'n PbuOs Long and eastern Long Ihanh Provinces and probably R80-84 in
outheastern Long Ihanh. Ths main resupply area for 16R-6 reportedly is in
the *ajar area of operations of 11130-86 ,a1 The moment of supplies from It3G-,
86 to 14114 is substantiated by a document captured in northern Lea Dong Province
between Rao.-86 and mit-6 which indicated the existence of a corrj4oz unit subordi.
nate to 14Et..6 and staffed by Assault out. a/
The fUnction of R804b currently is unclear. It
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reported to have`
*en deactivated in late 3.967 and divided into two ,parts designated Group 50
A4 Group 70 but has appeared in documents dated 1968. However, there are
eubsequent reports of Groups 70 and X) as well. The coat:aim may stem from
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subordination. Groups 50 and 70 reportedly have operated on the Cambodian/ON
border area adjoining Tay Ninh and Binh Long PrOVIACOBJ, and also have received
and transported tactical goods coming from North Vietnam through Cambodia to EVN.
Grout 50 delivered goods to N30-83 and Group 70 delivered toods---te-R2G-81.
4. Group 50 was reported to have moved rockets frost an entry and exit point
on the western Binh Long/Cambodian border is far 'Smith; to 'NSG-83. RG-83 has
been reit6d .(2t.1),.1.:il A captured VC document clacei.
'
tied Absolute 8ecr.t spoke ots planned raovement along that part of the Saigon
River Which ie irainh Duong, Province end in VC Slt-1. al/ The aovemont was from
"major depot" of t3R-1 and, the total ordnance shipped was to be 700 short tone
irr?a period of 40 to 0 days. At least Some of the ordnance AA this depot
pparently moved southward from northern Binh Long.
25. Orcua? 50 reportedly'prrehased "goods" at }lima from ClIA2)00.8411 which were
delivered to the western Binh Long/Cambodian border entry points. There is not
indication that these "good4" were munitions and probably were not because the .
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tactical goods moved by this group were originally from North.Vietnam and would,
# not have to be purchased. All the reported movements of munitions into
III Corps by Group 30 is in a southerly direction tram northern Binh Long Pro.
6 According to some reports, ESG..82 m.oves material along a southerly route
parallel, if not identical, to the routes mentioned above as belonging to Group
50 and 100-83 from the area near the meeting of the Tay Ninh/Binh. LoogiCembodian
3.7
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bcvders roughly to the Michelin Plantation area, about 30 miles northwest of
Saigon. Other reports indicate that RS0.82 operates in other and posaiWy all
TvlLtrth Province.
for instance, states that SR-5 was
GU ed by RSGa 81 and 824 BA gave the tri-border area of Rau, Ngbia? Binh
Duong, and Tay Minh Provinces as WG-82's area of responsibility. This 'would in-
votve s, wept to east movement. The Michelin Plantation etre& is also supy
the 103-C Transportation Group operating in the Parrot's Beat area, How
this group is supplied is unclear, but there has been movement into thises:
by
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from south of TayXith City,and from the Cambodian side or the northwest area of MY
Minh Prov
27 Other reported movements of munitions Into XII Corps show a southwesterly
flow &teethe middle of the num Long/Cambodian border as far west as Tay Ninh
had as far south as Binh Duong Provinces. Moreover* there was a report of
deactivation of the 52nd regiment of 320-A Division and the activation of
Couseo-Liaison Transportation Group 90 in October of 1967. It was obtained by a
1967-1968.
stated that the group was . reeponsible
. for the ammo-liaison route from (Darlac to Dinh Loc) and the tran
service for R (COSVN)?"
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APPENDIX A
STATX8710134 TAM=
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Table I
Ccoraunist Logistical Remdrenents
- in South Vietnam
?
Class I (food)
Class II (clothing and
equipment)
Class In (POL)
Class V (=munition)
Total
Short Tons Per Day
I Corps
Total External
II Corm..
Total Externgd
88.54 25.00 60.58 24.00
14.83 4.45 2.0.15 3.04
III ors
Total Ext? ernal
55.92 11.00
9.37 2.81
J.Yor
Total
27.96
4.68
-External
negl,
1.41
seal. neg./. negl. negl. negla :lea* negl. negl.
8.92 7.58 2.91 2.47 4.37 3.71 2.00 1.70
112.29
37.03 73.64
litatgIgizzlt= V.X=2.1M3S
29.51 69.66
? =ass moi 6CCICPCNI
2.7.52 34.64
fraklartni 41:001t-^...211
3.11
mamas
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Table n
Cunit&xppi Los-es in South Vietnam
1960
Short Tces Per
' X Corns 11 Corps 111 Corps IV Corps
6541 1.57a 6.57 .67
1.05 .23 .73 -.33
Class I (fool)
Class II and Iv (1othfte and.
equipment)
Class nz (POL)
Class V (Ammunition)
Total
negi.
2.39
nee..
.93
8.23
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.15
VMS=
6%
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. eb
V0046?1
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III.roa.w.)17 Movenenta from Car:sod:1a to Corn:unlat
Vor4es in South Vietnam
4irtua11y all of the major Cambodian roads ond waterways
'extending. to the border of SauthVietnam carry Cathedian Goods
to Viltnamese Communist forces. The shipments consist princi-.
pally .of foodstuffs, larcely rice. Yuch smaller but unquan- -
tifitle -amounts of muuitione apparently move across the border.
in soci areas -- predominantly in the south.
FoodstUfro
censumption requirermnts of Viottamsc Communist Plain, Local, and
Administrative SUppo* troops in South Vletnam for Cathodian foOdatuffs in
- 1968 vill total approximately 13,000 short tons. acquirements for stock.-
piling and the feeding of transients would. ba additional to these =nits.
The bulk oi the Commulist requirement for Cambodian foodstttffs consists or
rico. for their Orces in the 7 rice-deficit, border provinces: becinning
with TeorMinh in the south and including Kent= in the morthoentral bidn-
lands,
?
t 10,000 short tone of mi1Ie