COMMUNIST MILITARY AID TO CAMBODIA 1963-66

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070012-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2005
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: May 1, 1967
• Content Type: IM

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Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Communist Military Aid to Cambodia, 1963-66
Top Secret
COPY No. 171
RR IM 67-22
MAY 1967
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Summary
Page
1. Introduction . .
2. Communist Programs of Military Aid
Impact of the Shift to Communist Military Aid .
8
10
Photograph
Prince Sihanouk Inspects a MIG-17 Jet Fighter Received from
the USSR 9
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COMMUNIST MILITARY AID TO CAMBODIA*
1963-66
Summary
During the past four years, Communist countries have supplied Cam-
bodia with military aid amounting to nearly $15 million, four-fifths of
it in the form of grants. Delivery already has been made of nearly all
of the aid.
I Although the ability of the armed forces
to safeguard Cambodia's internal security has improved, the remain
small and probably could withstand only briefly a serious attac 25X1
I I
The overriding foreign policy objective of Chief of State Norodom
Sihanouk remains the strengthening of Cambodia against possible en-
croachments by Thailand and Vietnam. To this end, he probably will
continue to welcome military aid from Communist countries and France.
At the same time, Sihanouk may find an accompanying program of US
aid increasingly acceptable because of mounting economic problems,
growing dissatisfaction among conservative elements, and continuing
disarray in Communist China. His interest in military aid probably
would-be stimulated by the end of the war in South Vietnam.
* This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It. was prepared
by the Office of Research and Reports and coordinated with the Offices
of Current Intelligence and National Estimates; the estimates and con-
clusions represent the best judgment of the Directorate of Intelligence
as of May 1967.
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The interest of Cambodia in recent years in obtaining Communist
arms, like its earlier willingness to accept arms from the United
States, stems from anxiety over national survival. Although military
aid agreements negotiated by Cambodia have had the practical aim of
building up the country's military strength, the choices among potential
donors naturally have had a political coloration. Prince Sihanouk, the
chief of state and leading political figure, has long been obsessed with
fear of territorial annexations by Cambodia's larger and stronger
neighbors and ancient enemies, Thailand and Vietnam. This fear
has outweighed his apprehension about Communist China's aggressive
designs in Southeast Asia, which appeared to be a less immediate
threat and which in any case could hardly be resisted by so small a
country as Cambodia. For this reason, and as part of a delicate
balancing act, Sihanouk cultivated relations with China even in the
years of his closest association with the United States and has sought
Chinese support for Cambodia's independence and national security.
For a decade after gaining its independence from France in 1953,
Cambodia relied mainly on the United States for military, economic,
and political support. By 1963, when Sihanouk ended US aid, Cambodia
had received about $97 million in military assistance, as well as some
$265 million in economic assistance -- a sizable total for a nation of
only 6 million people. US military aid had equipped nearly all of the
Cambodian army and had provided the air force with a small recon-
naissance and transport capability.
During the first decade of independence, France also was a major
supporter of the Cambodian armed forces. This support consisted of
the transfer of equipment left behind when French forces pulled out of
Indochina, supplementary deliveries from France, and the training
activities of a French military mission numbering about 650 men in
1965. French aid has continued since the end of the US program. A
French extension of $11 million in July 1964 covered aircraft and ground
equipment, and an extension of nearly $6 million in August 1965 was
earmarked for vehicles. Most of the equipment under these agreements --
including 23 piston-engine fighter-bombers previously supplied to France
by the United States -- has been delivered, and the remainder probably
will be delivered by the end of 1967. A French training mission of some
300 men also continues to assist the Cambodians.
With the growing power of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, Sihanouk
apparently had doubts as early as 1961 about the efficacy of his policy
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of maintaining close relations with the United States. His persistent
efforts to convene a Geneva type of conference of leading powers in
order to "neutralize" South Vietnam and guarantee the integrity of
Cambodia's borders failed. Consequently, Sihanouk began laying the
groundwork for closer relations with Communist countries and a swing
away from the United States. Working within a basic framework of
neutralism, Sihanouk decided in 1963 to rely partly on Communist
countries for military aid because of his changing assessment of
great-power relationships in Southeast Asia and of necessary Cambodian
adaptation to them. One of the concrete early signs of the shift was
the negotiation of a military aid agreement with the USSR in April 1963.
The fall of the Diem government in South Vietnam in November
1963 brought matters to a head. This event apparently made Sihanouk
fear a rapid deterioration of anti-Communist strength in South Vietnam
and, since he suspected US complicity in the murder of Diem, greatly
heightened his apprehension about US interference in Cambodian
internal affairs. Sihanouk's reaction was to terminate the entire
program of US aid to Cambodia and inaugurate an era of bad feeling
that led a year and a half later to the severance of diplomatic relations
with the United States. The Communist countries responded to Sihanouk's
solicitation of new aid offers in the hope of persuading him to give
increased support to Communist policies in Southeast Asia. Also
important for the USSR and China individually was the aim of countering
the other's presence and influence in Cambodia.
During the past four years, the USSR and Communist China have
each concluded three military aid agreements with Cambodia, and
Czechoslovakia, one. Extensions of aid to Cambodia under these
agreements have amounted to nearly $15 million The
USSR and Communist China each extended roughly one -hal o t is
aid, Czechoslovakia's extension being of negligible amount. About
$12 million of the aid has been provided as grant aid and the remainder
on credit.
Nearly all of the equipment covered
by the agreements has already been delivered.
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a. Armed Forces
Communist military aid to Cambodia -- although small compared
with the earlier program of US aid -- has permitted a significant
expansion and modernization of the Cambodian armed forces. Valued
at US prices Communist aid is estimated
to equal between 20 and 30 percent o U ai.d during 1954-63. To some
extent, Communist equipment has become important in the Cambodian
inventory simply because it is the newest and (in certain instances) the
most advanced equipment available. On the other hand, the sharp
transition to new sources of supply no doubt has raised problems.
Communist deliveries have been offset partly by a declining usability
of weapons received previously from the United States.
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Much of the equipment delivered by Communist coup* ries has
served to substantially increase the firepower of Camboct.-.a's army,
w,~,hich, although expanding, is still comparatively small
Nevertheless, the army, which accounts for 32, 000 out of a
total of 35, 000 men. in the regular armed forces, is capal,le of
little more than carrying out an internal security role:, A [though it
is reasonably well equipped and apparently displays good morale in
border areas at least, the army still suffers from a poor .y developed
logistical system, inadequate training, and a shortage of good
officers, especially of the rank of major and higher. The army is
not large enough nor sufficiently well organized and trained to resist
an attach
The Cambodian navy has received little aid from Communist
sources and remains a small force with only 1, 400 men. It is
capable of little more than coastal and river patrolling aimed at
preventing smuggling and other violations of Cambodia's territorial
waters:
Communist deliveries of I lair-
craft represented an important addition to Cambodia's tiny air force
and must have pleased Sihanouk, considering earlier US i eluctance to
s~u.pply jet fighters (see the photograph), Cambodia's 1, 4!30-man air
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force contributes to internal security by providing air support, aerial
reconnaissance, and transport and communications services for the
army, The MIG's and some rudimentary radar facilities also provide
a small offensive and air defense capability. The air force nevertheless
has relatively few aircraft and is handicapped by shortages of jet pilots,
skilled technicians, spare parts, and communications facilities.
In mid-1965 the Cambodian government expressed the intention of
promptly increasing the armed forces by 10, 000 men (to some 42, 000)
and eventually raising these forces to 50, 000 men. So far, about 3, 000
men have been added to the army and 200 to the air force.. Backing up
the regular armed forces is a 64, 000-man paramilitary defense force
composed of the police, militia, and volunteer village defense units,
but this force is of questionable value against a serious attack. Sihanouk
himself has admitted that Cambodia "could not support a frontal or
classic type of war for more than a few days, " The Cambodian army
could put up only a limited and brief resistance against full-scale
invasion by its neighbors and probably could subsequently continue
operations only by withdrawing to the interior and conducting a guerrilla
campaign.
Because Communist military aid so far is small and has been
provided largely as a grant, it has had little direct effect on the
Cambodian economy or the country's reserves of foreign exchange.
The defense budget approximated $45 million annually during 1964-66
and declined to 22 percent of total expenditures under the national
budget in 1966, compared with 25 percent in 1964.?
b.. Soviet and Chinese Influence
Military aid in itself has done little to increase Chinese or Soviet
influence over Cambodian policy. Deliveries of equipment so far
have been comparatively small and only a few Communist military
technicians are in the country. France provides an alternative to
Communist offers and the United States and other Western countries
potential alternatives, and Sihanouk remains highly sensitive to
foreign pressures and tends to react negatively to them. If the programs
continue -- and as the inventory of US weapons becomes increasingly
outmoded or inoperative -- growing Cambodian dependence on
Communist sources will give Communist China and the USSR somewhat
more leverage over Sihanouk's policies, but still not much. As in the
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past, these policies can be expected to reflect Sihanouk's overall
assessment of the course most in keeping with Cambodian security
and maintenance of his political position.
Sihanouk has remained basically anti-Communist in his internal
political policy. His support of Communist China and North Vietnam
has been largely verbal, apart from his general acquiescence in the
use of Cambodian territory by Vietnamese Communists -- action on
the matter being inhibited both by Cambodian military capabilities
and his reluctance to become actively embroiled in the Vietnamese
conflict. Diversion of Communist arms from Cambodia to the Viet
Cong may have occurred under local initiative, but the quantities
could not have been large.
Sihanouk will continue to seek military aid because he no doubt
feels that Cambodia's military inferiority relative to Thailand and
South Vietnam must be reduced. He has unfulfilled requirements
under Cambodia's present military program that he will try to satisfy
somehow; sizable further receipts of arms and technical assistance
will be required to build up the armed forces to 50, 000 men. Cambodia
would have difficulty, however, in absorbing large amounts of aid over
a short period. Cambodia also will have a continuing interest in the
acquisition of spare parts and technical services from the USSR and
China so that the arms already received can be kept in good condition.
Both China and the USSR wish to increase their influence in Cambodia
and presumably stand ready to provide further aid. It seems likely,
therefore, that Communist military aid to Cambodia will be sustained
at a moderate level over the next few years.
Further US progress in the Vietnamese war may persuade Sihanouk
to take a more genuinely neutralist position -- a move that some
influential Cambodians favor and that the disarray in China perhaps
makes more feasible. Sihanouk himself may be wondering whether
he has not veered too far in espousing Communist policies in Southeast
Asia. A more moderate neutralism probably would not presage the end
of Communist military aid but could lead to overtures for both military
and economic aid from the United States. An aggravation of economic
difficulties may also strengthen Cambodia's incentive to solicit US aid
again.
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Sihanouk's determination to obtain additional aid somewhere would
probably not be diminished by the prospective or actual ending of the
war in Vietnam. Whatever the circumstances of victory or settlement
there, Sihanouk still would be concerned about the superiority of
Vietnamese as well as Thai forces. Indeed, his desire for military
aid might be stimulated because he felt particularly threatened by the
large Vietnamese forces suddenly freed of the distraction of internal
strife.
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