POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070030-0
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T
Document Page Count:
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Document Creation Date:
December 23, 2016
Document Release Date:
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Sequence Number:
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Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 28, 1968
Content Type:
IM
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Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
(The Case of a Bombing Program that Includes the
Mining of the Harbor Areas of Haiphong, Hon Gai,
and Cam Pha.) (No. 12)
JCS review completed.
Top Secret
28 May 1968
Copy No. 12
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
May 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Possible Alternatives
to the Rolling Thunder Program
(The Case of a Bombing Program that Includes
the Mining of the Harbor Areas of Haiphong, Hon
Gai, and Cam Pha.) (No. 12)
Summary
. This memorandum analyzes the effects of a
Rolling Thunder program that is carried on with-
out the restrictions imposed on March 31 and
includes the mining of North Vietnam's principal
seaports. The campaign analysed assumes a sus-
tained and intensive effort at interdiction of
the key lines of communications connecting Hanoi
with Communist China as well as attacks against
the Haiphong port facilities.
A mining program would serve as an effective
means of interdicting North Vietnam's normal sea-
borne commerce. The disruption to this trade
would be widespread but temporary, given Communist
China's cooperation. Within a short period --
two to three months -- North Vietnam and its
allies would be able to implement alternative
procedures for maintaining the flow of essential
economic and military imports. Shipment of goods
from the USSR and Eastern Europe by overland routes
would raise costs and constitute a small additional
burden on Hanoi's Communist allies.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current
Intelligence and the Director's Special Assistant
for Vietnamese Affairs.
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There seems, in brief, to be no way of over-
coming Hanoi's ability to sustain a continuing
flow of essential material support from abroad,
to distribute these goods internally, and to forward
them to its forces in South Vietnam, except in the
unlikely event of Chinese intransigence. The exist-
ing capacities of the railroad, highway, and river
connections with Communist China -- some 14,500
tons a day -- are almost three times the daily
volume of North Vietnamese imports. In addition,
North Vietnam can resort to small coastal craft,
lightering, and even airlift, if necessary, to
maintain the flow of supplies. The experience of
three years of bombing makes it clear that these
alternative routes cannot be interdicted to the
point that traffic would be cut below present
levels.
A mining-bombing program would carry with it
significant liabilities. The possibility of
damage, sinking, or entrapment in port of foreign
shipping is high. This would present the USSR,
particularly, with difficult decisions and create
new risks of a Soviet-US confrontation. If the
mining were effective and forced a shift to alternate
overland supply routes, it would require more
extensive cooperation and assistance on the part
of the Chinese. This conceivably could result in
strengthening Chinese political influence in Hanoi
at the expense of Soviet influence. We doubt,
however, that any shift would be significant in
terms of influencing Hanoi's war policy, since the
North Vietnamese have tended, despite considerable
dependence on China in the past, to set their own
strategy and make their own decisions.
A mining program would also evoke protest and
critical reaction from Free World maritime states.
Almost all world powers would see the program as
further intensification of the war, even if the
program were to follow a breakdown of the Paris
negotiation.
If the negotiations were in process when the
mining program was started, Hanoi would probably
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break off the talks. However, any such North
Vietnamese decision would probably be based on the
total war situation, including the status of the
fighting in the south and the success of the talks
in undermining the position of the Saigon govern-
ment.
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Mining the ports, coastal, and inland water
ways of North Vietnam would result in the widespread
disruption of normal seaborne transport. The
intensity of this disruption and its duration would
depend on the amount of warning time given and the
extent of preparations that North Vietnam has made
in anticipation of the mining. A number of foreign-
flag ships might be caught in port and others en
route would have to be diverted.* The North Viet-
namese would have to quickly adopt alternative
distribution procedures; reroute import traffic;
reallocate small craft, rolling stock, and trucks;
and reassign personnel.
An uncompensated loss of seaborne imports would
be a serious threat to the North Vietnamese economy
and war effort. Seaborne imports -- 1.4 million
tons -- were about 80 percent of total imports in
1967. Imports of vehicles, machinery, generators,
steel products, and petroleum have been essential
to programs to repair domb damage and to maintaining
the transport systems, while imports of foodstuffs
and fertilizer have helped sustain the populace.
* A mining program might catch a number of foreign-
flag ships in the ports, although it is possible for
mines to be equipped with delayed-action fuses to
provide sufficient time for foreign-flag ships to
clear the port. The average number of ships at
Haiphong per day during the first quarter of 1968
included 22 freighters (7 Soviet, 2 Eastern European,
7 Free World, 5 Chinese Communist, and 1 Cuban) and
1 Soviet tanker. The actual number in port on any
one day during this period ranged from 12 to 26
ships. One or two ships were loading coal at both
Cam Pha and Hon Gai on any given day. In addition,
an average of 8 to 14 ships can be expected to be
at sea and to have declared for North Vietnam.
These ships would either be diverted to Chinese
ports, continue to North Vietnamese waters for
Zightering operations, or possibly even return to
home ports, depending on contingency plans.
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The North Vietnamese, however, could sustain
the economy and the war effort at present levels for
about two to three months solely by drawing down
present reserves and maintaining, present imports by
rail. The high rate of imports during the past 18
months has probably permitted the accumulation of
reserve supplies of petroleum, metals, construction
materials, and transport equipment. Imports of
foodstuffs during 1967 totaled almost 450,000 tons
and have been at a higher monthly rate thus far in
1968. This level of imports exceeds the estimated
crop shortfalls during the last 18 months and
suggests that food reserves on hand are adequate
for several months of consumption.
By the end of three months, the North Vietnamese
could have taken the necessary countermeasures to
the mining program by rerouting essential seaborne
traffic to one or more of the many alternative
transportation routes. Two rail and eight highway
routes connect Hanoi with Communist China. The
upper reaches of the Red River from China provide
another route that can carry many kinds of imports.
These land alternatives were used to less than 10
percent of their capacity during 1967 and are being
used even less at present. Shallow-draft lighters
could be used to unload cargo from oceangoing ships
anchored in waters outside the mined areas. Large
numbers of coastal ships and junks could move
cargoes from ships diverted to the southern Chinese
ports of Fort Bayard, Canton, or Peihai and unload
in ports, over the beaches, or move into North
Vietnam's network of inland waterways. An airlift
from Chinese airfields to Gia Lam, which handles
international traffic and has not yet been struck
by air attacks, could potentially provide a means
for importing a large volume of high-priority goods.
Imports formerly received by sea could move by rail
all the way from the USSR and Eastern Europe or they
could be transshipped from South China ports without
placing a noticeable strain on either the Soviet or
Chinese rail systems. Two trains (of 35 freight cars
each) arriving each day from China could carry the
entire volume of Soviet and Eastern European sea-
borne goods imported by North Vietnam in 1967. For
selected transportation facilities in North Vietnam
and South China, see the map.
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OVERLAND IMPORTS, `'DURIN0 4kT
-r `11000 tans per day
idg?ming x _ I'
NORTH VIETNAM and SOUTH CHINA: Selected Transportation Facilities, May 1968
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, CA HN NO I LAO CAI
NA!LROAD CAPACITY
9 00 Sons each way per day
Selected airfield
Road
Railroad (meter gauge)
Railroad (standard gauge)
SECRET
~
CA ITY 8 ?~ C[{
5 1>!Gt CH NAB RDER
' FA
7 ~/ d 00(7 tpps each way der day average
Meng-txu_ f _ _~.~
Lei, chow
Pemnsuf.
1 l
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All of the countermeasures to a US mining pro-
gram, except for direct lightering from ships to
the shore, would require the cooperation of the
Chinese. If all Soviet and East European seaborne
shipments were diverted to an overland route via
the Trans-Siberian railroad, the Chinese would have
to permit a sixfold increase over the 1967 volume
of Soviet and East European traffic transiting
China. Using Fort Bayard', for example, would
require a willingness on the part of the Chinese
to transship cargo by rail 668 kilometers from
Fort Bayard to P'ing-hsiang. The Chinese would
probably be reluctant to emphasize the importance
of Soviet aid to North Vietnam by cooperating in
this manner. However, faced with the alternative
that the North Vietnamese could not continue the
conflict without major infusions of Soviet and East
European aid, the Chinese would probably be forced
to help maintain the flow regardless of the nation-
ality of the donors.
Levels of Import Traffic
During 1967 North Vietnamese imports reached
record levels totaling almost 1.8 million tons as
shown in the following tabulation:
Economic goods
Annual
Daily
Bulk foods
447,000
Fertilizers
147,000
POL
256,000
Miscellaneous
809,000
1,659,000
4,600
Military goods
125,000
300
Total imports
1,784,000
4,900
During the first four months of 1968 imports
have been at levels 10 to 15 percent higher than
in the corresponding period of 1967. Most of
this increase has been in imports of foodstuffs
and petroleum.
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The volume of imports maintained by North Viet-
nam has been in excess of the current best estimates
of consumption patterns and requirements. Part of
the surplus may be to compensate for disruptions to
production or to distribution and storage systems.
On the other hand, it is likely that this high
level of imports reflects an element of contingency
planning by Hanoi to build up reserves and stock-
piles in the event that the port of Haiphong is
closed.
The importance of Haiphong is apparent in the
fact that seaborne imports during 1967 averaged
3,900 tons a day, or about 80 percent of North
Vietnam's total imports. Thus if the use of Haiphong
were denied, North Vietnam could possibly be required
to move almost five times as much cargo over its
existing land transport connections with Communist
China. The added burden on the land transport
connections could be reduced to the extent that
North Vietnam is able to cut back on its total import
requirements. On the other hand, North Vietnam
should be able to transfer some part of the import
burden to other means of transport such as coastal
shipping, lighters, and air transport.
Land Route Capacities and Import Requirements
The daily capacity of the railroad, road, and
water routes from China to the Hanoi area of North
Vietnam totals 14,500 tons and far exceeds the
daily tonnage requirements needed even if all seaborn6
imports were shifted to land routes (see Table 1).
The high volume 1967 import program would exceed
the capacity of the existing road and inland water
systems and could conceivably exceed the interdicted
capacity of the railroads. When the land transport
routes are viewed as a single system, however, the
combined capacity is almost three times greater than
traffic requirements.
While there would be initial delays and con-
fusion, the North Vietnamese would be able to obtain,
deploy, and operate the required number of trucks,
railroad rolling stock, and water craft to shift all
of their seaborne imports to land lines of com-munication. The North Vietnamese would probably
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Table 1
Comparison of Import Requirements
to Capacities of Lines of Communication
Tons per Day
Imports as a Percent
of Capacity
Actual 1967 imports
4,900
Capacities
Total surface
lines of communication
14,500
Railroads a/
9,000
54
Roads
4,000
122
Red River
1,500
327
a. These are uninterdicted capacities. Although the Hanoi
Lao.Cai line is given a current capacity of 700 tons a day,
its normal capacity of 3,000 tons a day is used here. It is
assumed that the alternate facilities that give a capacity of
700 tons a day at the Viet Tri interdiction point are more
than adequate to meet current small traffic requirements.
For the purpose of this memorandum, it is assumed that if a
higher traffic requirement existed, the North Vietnamese
would raise capacity to whatever level was necessary. More-
over it is estimated, on the basis of their demonstrated
capability, that the necessary alternate crossings could be
established and in operation within three months.
receive additional logistical support from the
Chinese in terms of rolling stock, engineering
troops, and transport specialists. To move the
entire volume of 1967 imports -- 4,900 tons a day --
by rail from P'ing-hsiang to Hanoi would require
the employment of about 300 standard gauge freight
cars in about seven trains arriving daily, without
even using the roads or Red River to move a portion
of the traffic. The roads and Red River have a
combined capacity of 5,500 tons a day. This provides
a cushion that is more than adequate to accommodate
whatever volume of traffic cannot be moved by rail.
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Water and Air Alternatives
North Vietnam can use other alternatives to
maintain its import traffic and thus avoid complete
reliance on its overland transport connections.
These alternatives include lightering of oceangoing
ships outside mined areas, the use of coastal
shipping from China, and the use of air transport.
In the case of lighters and coastal craft, North
Vietnam has adequate inventories to move import
traffic even at the higher levels of 1967. As a
practical matter the use of these water alternatives
would probably be limited. The off-loading of some
types of cargo -- bulky machinery and transport
equipment -- would be difficult. Also in the face
of air attacks and a widespread use of the MK-36
mine, it is possible that cargo losses might be too
heavy to warrant sustained use of lighters or
coastal shipping. They could, however, be used
sufficiently to be a significant means of easing
pressures on overland transport routes.
The use of air transport would probably be
limited to the import of high-value or urgently
needed imports. An air transport program would
be almost wholly dependent on Soviet and Chinese
assistance. Because the Chinese could not provide
the aircraft necessary to sustain a large airlift
without disrupting air transport in China, the
USSR would have to furnish the aircraft to sustain
such an operation. The Soviet military inventory
of high-performance transport aircraft as of
1 January 1967 included about 640 AN-12's designed
for short take-offs and landings on unimproved run-
ways. About 100 AN-12's could provide an airlift
between South China and North Vietnam at the 1967
import rate. of 4,900 tons a day.
The Chinese would have to permit the Soviets to
transit Chinese territory to a much greater extent
than they have thus far and permit Soviet personnel,
aircraft, and maintenance facilities on Chinese
airfields. Because an airlift would not be required
to move all imports, it is doubtful that the Chinese
would make such concessions. Furthermore, the
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Soviets themselves would probably not be willing to
risk the escalation of the war which might occur
if Soviet aircraft were destroyed during US air
attacks on North Vietnamese airfields.
The Experience of Past Interdiction Campaigns
An air campaign aginst the northern lines of
communication in circumstances when they are
required to carry all of North Vietnam's imports
should achieve greater interdiction of supplies
than any US effort to date. Target density -- in
terms of traffic volume -- would be about five
times that which moved over these lines during
June-August 1967, the high point of past US inter-
diction efforts. It is probable that the railroads
alone could not bring in the 1967 volume of imports
if they were kept under sustained air attack. The
1967 volume of imports would require slightly more
than one-half of total rail capacity, and an
intensive and sustained air interdiction program
may have a good chance of reducing rail capacity
by more than this amount.
However, on the basis of all the modes of
transportation that are available to the North
Vietnamese, an air interdiction effort against the
lines of communication from the China border is
not likely to be successful. Air attacks would
have to overcome the same problem that has pre-
viously hampered such efforts -- the combined
capacities of the routes greatly exceed the
requirements for traffic. Even a highly successful
air interdiction campaign against railroads could
not be expected to reduce their capacity to the
level necessary to impede the flow of essential
economic and military goods. The capacities of roads
and waterways would supply an additional cushion
or guarantee that adequate capacity was available.
Results of the June-August 1967 air interdiction
campaign, the heaviest of the war so far, support
the contention that an interdiction effort, even
against a heavier concentration of targets, will
not exact a prohibitive cost. from the enemy or
"succeed" where earlier efforts have failed. The
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heavy attacks during the June-August period damaged
bridges, interdicted roads and rail yards, and
forced the Vietnamese to use elaborate time-consuming
and labor-consuming bypass systems that consisted
of alternate semipermanent bridges, pontoon bridges,
causeways, and motor truck and railroad car ferries.
Nevertheless, the North Vietnamese transport system
was still able to function effectively.
Strikes in August against the Hanoi-Dong Dang
rail line -- the rail line most used for import
traffic from China, the USSR, and East Europe --
were effective in stopping through service for a
total of only ten days It was not possible to
interdict through traffic for a longer period of
time mainly because each bridge attacked had one or
more bypass bridges available. Photography taken
throughout the period indicates that several yards
were sometimes unserviceable for through rail
service after they were struck but had at least one
through track open for traffic within a short time.
Strikes against the three highways which generally
run parallel to the Dong Ding line and can serve as
alternates for the rail line -- Highway Route 1A and
two other highways from Mong Cai and Cao Bang --
were probably even less effective:. Observed
countermeasures indicate that no significant or
sustained reduction of capacity was made.
Strikes against the Hanoi-Lao Cai rail line
--
the other rail line used for import traffic from
China, the USSR, and Eastern Europe -- did not
reduce the capacity of the line below the 700 tons
achieved by the destruction of the-Viet Tri bridge
in 1966. The line's capacity of 700 tons was
maintained by a rail car ferry at the site of the
still unrepaired Viet Tri bridge.. If more capacity
had been required, there is every reason to believe
that additional facilities would have been installed
at this location to restore the through capacity of
the line.
Strikes against the two highway routes that
parallel the Lao Cai rail line were equally ineffective.
Highway traffic around the destroyed bridge at Viet
Tri was moved throughout the June-August period by
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ferries, a pontoon bridge, and in part by a cable
bridge. Damage to other highway bridges attacked
on the two routes was not significant; structures
were quickly repaired or bypassed.
Prospects for Interdiction of Alternative Routes
An air interdiction campaign against North
Vietnam's lines of communication in conjunction with
a mining program must allocate the total number of
sorties available to a conventional mining program
against oceangoing shipping; the MK-36 mining pro-
gram.; strikes against fixed targets such as bridges,
ferries, rail lines and highways; and strikes against
fleeting targets -- railroad rolling stock, trucks,
and watercraft.
The essential problem is to reduce the capacity
of 14,500 tons per day that is avaiable to the North
Vietnamese for moving supplies south from China to
a level that puts a meaningful ceiling on traffic
flows. This objective requires interdiction of
facilities or equipment to a much greater extent
than has been achieved thus far in the air war.
Three years of air war in North Vietnam have shown --
as did the Korean War -- that, although airstrikes
against rail and road segments will destroy transport
facilities, equipment, and supplies, they cannot
successfully interdict the flow of supplies, because
so much of the damage can frequently be repaired
within hours.
The complexity of the interdiction effort is
apparent in the multitude of targets that must be
kept under attack. North Vietnam, for example, has
650 permanent bridges on the principal lines of
communication that could be used to circumvent the
mining of Haiphong. If all of these permanent
bridges were provided with alternate crossings to
the same extent as the bridges on the vital Hanoi-
Dong Dang line, there could be as many as 2,000
fixed transport targets. In addition, the North
Vietnam logistics target system includes large
numbers of transport vehicles that must be
neutralized. North Vietnam could commit to its
resupply programs an estimated 120 locomotives,
2,000 to 2,300 freight cars, 11,000 motor trucks,
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and more than 30,000 water craft. Only a small
share of these vehicles would be required to
maintain import programs at 1967 levels.
From June through August 1967 the lines of
communication in North Vietnam were subjected to
the heaviest scale of attack achieved to date. On
the basis of an assumed 50 percent increase in the
scale of the attack (from an average of 285 to 425
sorties a day) and damage effects similar to those
achieved to date, the prospects for an escalated
interdiction campaign can be estimated. The results,
summarized in Table 2, show clearly that even this
heightened campaign offers little promise of reducing
the flow of supplies significantly.
If this campaign were flown exclusively against
fixed targets, hits against facilities such as
bridges or alternate crossings would range from 24
to 47 a day, depending on the ordnance mix. If the
attack were flown solely against fleeting targets,
it is estimated that 75 vehicles a day would be
effectively destroyed. In either case, or in any
combination of attacks, it is probable that weather
and operational problems would make it impossible
to maintain this extent of damage on a daily basis.
The frequency with which bridges and bypasses
could be kept under attack would obviously be less
than the time required to offset damage effects.
On the basis of past effectiveness of North Viet-
namese countermeasures, an interval as short as two
to four days would be more than enough to repair
the bomb damage done to the majority of the specific
facilities or to institute substitute means of con-
tinuing traffic.
In 1967, only the attacks against the key Doumer,
Canal des Rapides and Haiphong bridges required a
repair time in excess of 30 days. In all three
of these cases, however, the North Vietnamese have
built numerous high-capacity bypasses that have.
been more than adequate to keep traffic moving.
Numerous other examples.exist to show that even
heavily damaged bridges were repaird within a few
days of being hit. When two 53-foot spans were
dropped at the Bac Giang Railroad/Highway Bridge on
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30 April 1967, the Vietnamese and Chinese had it
repaired and serviceable one day later. The isolated
and intermittent cuts that can be expected along the
various lines of communication would not be sufficient
to seriously impede the flow of supplies.
The maximum attack against fleeting targets
could be expected to deplete the inventory of
freight cars and motor trucks* committed to import
operations within four or five months. This prospect
is lessened by several factors:
1. Inventories of transport equipment could
be maintained through increased imports.
The Chinese inventory of standard gauge
railroad cars would be available to move
essential supplies from China to the Hanoi
area. Imports of trucks would have to
increase substantially, but total imports
would not have to exceed 1,8.00 per month.**
2. It is doubtful that previous kill ratios --
heavily weighted by operations in the
panhandle of North Vietnam where antiair-
craft fire is much less than over Route
Package VI -- can be maintained.
* It is assumed that, because of priority uses in
North Vietnam and Laos, only one-half of the total
inventory of motor trucks, or some 5,500 vehicles,
could be allocated to the import operation.
** This would not be an impossible drain on Com-
munist truck production. During the Korean War,
the enemy was estimated to have had 8,500 vehicles
in operation. Some 48,000 were destroyed and
damaged during an eleven-month perid by
the
US
Air Force alone. The operable inventory
of
vehicles,
therefore, was replaced or rebuilt more
than
five
and one-half times during this period if
the
Air
Force claims were accurate. To maintain
the
operable inventory of 8,500 during the eleven-
month period, about 4,400 vehicles would have had
to be imported or restored each month, more than
double the monthly vehicle kills of 1,800 estimated
for North Vietnam under the assumed escalation of
the airstrikes.
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3. Furthermore, the experience of the air war
has shown that, because of bad weather,
intensive attacks against lines of com-
munication cannot be maintained over long
periods of time. For example, during
July 1967 a daily average of 120 attack
sorties were directed against targets in
Route Package VI. In December.1967,
bad weather reduced this average to only
27 attack sorties.
Both of the damage effects discussed in this
section represent maximum results from a concentration
of the attack on either fixed facilities or fleeting
targets. The effects of a mixed target program would
be between the extremes discussed here. Whatever
the mix of targets, it is apparent, however, that
the attacks contemplated in this section -- up to
50 percent greater than those accomplished so far
against the lines of communication -- would create
widespread problems for the North Vietnamese and
there would be a much higher rate of destruction
of transport equipment and cargoes than has been
achieved thus far during the air war. It is probable
that for certain periods of time -- days or even
weeks -- the North Vietnamese could not move the
total volume.of 1967. imports, 4,900 tons a day.
Over the longer pull, it seems certain, however,
that by using all facilities available to them, and
by receiving additional aid, the total volume of
military and. economic goods necessary to continuing
the war 'could be maintained.
Targets in the Haiphong Port Area
There are a number of targets in the Haiphong
port complex that could be included in a complete
interdiction campaign. These targets include:
JCS
Number
Facility
Haiphong Docks (Area E)
Haiphong Naval Base (Area D)
Haiphong Shipyard 3 (Area B)
Haiphong Shipyard 1 (Area F)
Haiphong Shipyard North (Area G)
Haiphong Railroad Yard Shops
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Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070030-0
JCS
Number Facility
The attacks would compound distribution and
storage problems and deprive Hanoi of a valuable
sanctuary, and initial attacks might destroy large
quantities of stockpiled supplies. Many of these
targets, however, would lose their lucrative
character after the first attacks. The open storage
and warehouse areas, particularly, would not be
used after attacks against this area. Stockpiles
would be moved to dispersed storage areas, and
little new materiel would be entering Haiphong dur-
ing a mining campaign.
Haiphong Warehouse Area, Port
Haiphong Warehouse Area
Haiphong Shipyard Vinh
Don Nghia POL Tank Fabrication
Haiphong Shipyard Central
Haiphong Air Defense Center
Haiphong Open Storage Mall
Haiphong Storage 5
Haiphong Open Storage
Haiphong Storage2
The effects of successful attacks on port and
shipyard facilities might have some immediate
significance, but these effects would be short-lived
for several reasons. The shipyards taken under
attack contribute a relatively small percent of total
North Vietnamese shipbuilding and ship repairs
capability. These yards are engaged principally in
building and repair of small craft and barges. This
type of activity is easily transferred to other
locations, and the production that is lost can be
replaced by new imports or transfers of Chinese
small craft and barges. More to the point, a complete
cessation or sharp decrease in seagoing commerce
resulting from a mining program would mean that these
facilities would fall into disuse as imports are
transferred to alternative routes. The use of such
alternatives as lightering and coastal shipping
generally would not require the use of Haiphong port
facilities.
All of the targets listed are located within a
radius of 1.5 miles from the center of Haiphong.
They are located in formerly prohibited zones that
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are built up and heavily populated. It would be
almost impossible for air operations to avoid
spilling over into areas where civilian casualties
would be at high rates.
Finally, these targets are located in one of
the most heavily defended areas of North Vietnam.
The experience of previous campaigns showt that
attacks against targets in the immediate areas of
Hanoi and Haiphong have resulted in loss rates for
US aircraft from seven to eight times greater than
the rate for operations over all of North Vietnam.
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Hypothetical Escalated Attacks Against
the Northern LOC's in North Vietnam
Scale and Weight of Attack
Average
Sorti
es per Day
June-August 1967 2
85 a/ Fixed targets
Assumed escalation 4
25 b/ Permanent railroad
bridges
141
Allocation of sorties
Permanent highway
bridges
500 +
sorties
Total permanent
bridges
650
MK-36 program
40 c/
Other targets 3
Total potential fi
85 transport targets
xed
2,000 d/
Estimated Effects Mobile targets
Total per Day Locomotives
Hits on fixed
facilities 24 to 47 e/
Freight cars
Motor trucks
Mobile targets
120
2,300
11,000
destroyed 76 f/ Junks, sampans, and barges 30,000 +
a. Average against all lines of communication (rail and highway) in North
Vietnam.
b. An increase of about 50 percent above the June-August 1967 rate con-
centrated against northern lines of communication only.
c. The MK-36 program calls for 13,000 weapons to be delivered per month by
mid-1968, which would require an average of 40 sorties per day. About 385
sorties would therefore be available for delivering standard ordnance --
about 1.7 tons per sortie -- the rate at which it was dropped during attacks
on the lines of communication during June-August 1967. For the purpose of
this illustration, it is assumed that most of the MK-36's will have to be
used to attempt to halt Zightering operations.
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Hypothetical Escalated Attacks Against
the Northern LOC's in North Vietnam
(Continued)
d. Total permanent bridges plus improvised alternate facilities
extrapolated at the rate that they exist on Yen Vien - Dong Dang line.
e. A case study of the attack on 48 JCS-targeted bridges in North Vietnam
during the period February 1965 through December 1966 reveals that on the
average one hit was scored for every 47 bombs dropped. Using this
experience, 550 tons of conventional ordnance has a good probability of
providing 47 hits with 500 pound bombs, or one-half that number with 1,000
pound bombs. A hit was defined as causing the collapse of one or more
spans or causing structual damage to piers or abutments.
f. During 1967, it is estimated that there was one effective loss to a
vehicle (locomotive, freight car, motor truck, or watercraft) per 5.1
armed reconnaissance sorties flown. Therefore, 385 sorties per day would
destroy about 75 vehicles.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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