POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
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CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070038-0
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Document Creation Date:
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Publication Date:
April 12, 1968
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ARMY review(s) completed.
JCS review completed.
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POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
(The Case Where All Except Approximately
Five Percent of the Attack and Armed Re-
connaissance Sorties in North Vietnam are
in Route Packages I, II, and III). (no. 7)
12 April 1968
JCS review completed.
ARMY review(s) completed.
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Foreword
The primary yardstick by which the effectiveness
of any bombing program against North Vietnam is-.
measured is the consequences which the neutralization
of the chosen group of targets has or will have on
Hanoi's ability to sustain Communist military opera-
tions in South Vietnam. The consequences of any
bombing campaign, however, are limited by the nature
of North Vietnam's contribution to the fighting in
the south. North Vietnam essentially serves only
two purposes:
a. as a source of manpower, and
b; as a logistics funnel.
Therefore, those economic activities which are
normally found to be lucrative targets for bombing
campaigns, namely, the industrial war-supporting
sinews of a nation, are essentially not present in
North Vietnam. They lie in the Soviet Union and
Communist China, who not only furnish the munitions,
petroleum, and other supplies needed by the VC/NVA
forces, but also stand ready to make up deficits in
the civilian economy, such as shortfalls in crop
production.
Potential effects of attacks on North Vietnamese
target systems, therefore, are necessarily somewhat
circumscribed by these circumstances. ,
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
12 April 1968
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES
TO THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
(The Case Where All Except Approximately
Five Percent of the Attack and Armed Re-
connaissance Sorties in North Vietnam Are.
in Route Packages I, II, and III). (No. 7)
Summary
This paper analyzes the anticipated effects
of a Rolling Thunder program that allocated all
but about 5 percent of attack and armed recon-
naissance sorties in North Vietnam against Route
Packages I, II, and III. This area is one which
has borne the brunt of the Rolling Thunder campaign
over the past three years. The proposed change
could raise the monthly attack sortie rate from
the 1967 level of 6,000 to about 8,000, or approxi-
mately 40 percent. Route Packages I, II, and III
encompass an industrially unimportant, sparsely
populated area, whose value is as a logistics
funnel to supply VC/NVA forces in Laos and South
Vietnam. We believe proposed concentration of
the bombing effort against North Vietnam on the
three southernmost areas would have the following
direct effects:
1. In the short run, it would
complicate the problems of supplying
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current
Intelligence and the Director's Special Assistant
for Vietnamese Affairs.
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the local population, but would be un-
likely to have more than a very tem-
porary effect on the flow of men and
supplies to South Vietnam. The routes
leading from the route packages into
Laos and the DMZ are utilized to only
about 15 percent of their capacity.
Within a week to 10 days, Hanoi could
shift the necessary repair crews from
the northern areas to cope with the
higher levels of damage. The demon-
strated capability of the North Viet-
namese to mobilize quickly the needed
men (about 15,000 in this case) and
materials to repair damaged key trans-
port points and construct alternative
bypasses means that any effects on the
flow of essential materiel would be
highly limited in time.
2. Added losses of trucks and
railroad rolling stock could be sup-
plied easily by other Communist
nations, primarily the USSR and Com-
munist China. These nations have
demonstrated an ability to respond
rapidly to Hanoi's needs for such
equipment.
3. Over time, Hanoi would prob-
ably shift some of its surface-to-air
missile systems and AAA guns to the
southern route packages. This shift
could raise the present very low loss
rate of 1.2 US attack aircraft per
1,000 sorties over Route Packages I,
II, and III to a level closer to the
general average for North Vietnam.
About 16,000 additional troops would
have to be added to the North.Viet-
namese forces if Hanoi succeeded in
securing replacement air defense
equipment from the USSR and Communist
China to redeploy in the northern
areas.
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Since the redirected Rolling Thunder program
would have no direct effect -- apart from some
highly temporary disruption -- on Hanoi's capa-
bility to sustain the wax in South Vietnam by
continuing the infiltration of men and materiel,
it is most unlikely that there would be any
direct effect on the will of the regime to con-
tinue the war.
The international reaction to confining the
bombing campaign to Route Packages I, II,'and III
would probably be favorable, since the attacks
would avoid the populated areas of North Vietnam
and would be confined to areas which are infil-
tration funnels to Laos and South Vietnam.
It is unlikely the proposed shift in the
bombing program would have any significant
effect on Hanoi's present position on negotia-
tions with the US. The North Vietnamese have
to date offered to meet with US officials only
for the purpose of discussing a complete cessa-
tion of the bombing.
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1. Air Operations
A. Previous Attacks Over Route Packages I, II,
and III
Since the beginning of the Rolling Thunder
program, Route Packages I, II, and III have borne
the brunt of the US air attacks. Almost 80 percent
of all attack sorties flown in North Vietnam during
1966 were against targets in these route packages.
In 1967 the increased emphasis on targets in the
Hanoi and Haiphong areas and on points on the lines
of communication (LOC's) in the Northeast brought
the share of attacks on the three southern route
packages down to about two-thirds. However, because
of the increased intensity of the bombing program
last year, the average number of attack sorties
flown per quarter over Route Packages I, II, and
III increased from about 16,200 in 1966 to 17,900
in 1967. Sortie levels have been consistently
highest in the third quarter, when the best flying
weather prevails, and lowest in the first and fourth
quarters in the face of poor weather. Attack sorties
over Route Packages I, II, and III during 1966, 1967,
and 1968 are given by quarter in the following
tabulation:
January-March
6,500
15,430
11,130
April-June
14,900
22,180
July-September
26,500
20,220
October-December
16,650
13,960
Total
64,550
71,790
N.A.
During 1967, about 140,000 tons of ordnance was
dropped on targets in Route Packages I, II, and III, an
increase of about 60 percent over 1966. B-52
aircraft delivered about 30 percent of this tonnage,
largely against tactical military targets. Of the
total delivered by B-52's, approximately 70 percent
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was against military targets, nearly 14 percent against
storage and supply areas, and the remainder against
infiltration and logistics targets, such as roads,
truck parks, and staging areas. The B-52 attacks were
heavily concentrated in the area' immediately north
of the DMZ and areas close to the Mu Gia Pass. The
98,000 tons of ordnance delivered by attack aircraft
other than the B-52's was targeted largely against
infiltration and logistics targets -- bridges, vehicles,
storage areas, transshipment points, and watercraft.
The US aircraft loss rates sustained over
Route Packages I, II, and III have consistently been
the lowest of the war because enemy air defenses have
been relatively weaker in the southern than in the
northern route packages. Slightly more than one-
third of all Rolling Thunder combat losses have been
sustained in Route Packages I, II, and III, despite
the large share of total attacks flown against these
areas. During the last three quarters -- July 1967-
March 1968 -- 76 aircraft were downed by Communist
defenses in these areas while participating in a
total of 65,300 attack and support sorties -- a loss
rate of 1.2 aircraft per 1,000 sorties. By comparison,
the loss rate of attack and support aircraft throughout
North Vietnam during the same period was 2.0 per 1,000
attack and support sorties. The comparable loss rate
over Route Package VI was 4.3 -- three and a half times
greater. Losses and corresponding loss rates of
attack and support aircraft in Route Packages I, II,
and III are given by quarter in the following tab-
ulation:
Route Packages
1967
I
II
III
Total
Loss Rate a/
January-March
13
0
10
23
1.0
April-June
15
3
11.
29
1.0
July-September.
30
5
3
38
1.4
October-December
17
1
4
22
1.0
January-March
9
5
2
16
1.0
a. Losses of attack and support aircraft per 1,000
attack and support sorties. Loss rates for the first
two quarters of 1967 are estimated.
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B. Ste ped-up Attacks Against Route Packages I,
II, and III
Assigning all but 5 percent of the Rolling
Thunder sorties to strikes against Route Packages I,
II, and III (assuming the same level of attacks
against North Vietnam as in 1967) would make available
almost 30,000 more sorties than were targeted against
the three southern route packages last year. This
would raise the monthly attack sortie'rate to almost
8,000, compared with 6,500 in 1967 in this area.
Such a shift in geographic coverage could increase
by 42 percent the level of attack in this area.
Weather constraints, however, suggest that the
additional sorties available might have to be divided
between targets in Laos and the three southern route
packages, so that the number of sorties available
for attacks against Route Packages I, II, and III
would represent a 2-5-percent increase over 1967.
If it is desired to achieve a 40-percent increase
in southern North Vietnam, this could be done by
diversions of aircraft from targets in Laos.
Poor weather restricts the level of attack
in North Vietnam and in Laos'during alternate halves
of the year. The best weather for air operations
over the panhandle of North Vietnam normally extends
from mid-May to mid-September, corresponding to the
poorest flying weather in Laos. The best weather
for air operations in Laos extends from mid-October
to mid-March when attacks are sharply reduced in,
North Vietnam. Parts of September, October, March,
May and all of April are transition periods when the
weather is fair for attack over both areas. By the
use of radar systems runs, attack sorties are flown
in the southern route packages throughout the year.
The limited number of aircraft equipped with the
needed radar systems, however, suggests that the
level of attack sorties in the sourthern area pro-
bably would not be increased during the poor flying
weather.
During 1967 the total of 117,950 attack
sorties flown against Laos and the North Vietnamese
panhandle were distributed 61 percent in North
Vietnam and 39 percent in Laos. If this 60-40
ratio is used to distribute the 30,000 additional
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attack sorties, a one-quarter increase in attack
sorties could be achieved in both Laos and the
North Vietnamese panhandle. About one-half of the
additional attack sorties over each area could be
flown in the good weather season, about one-quarter
in each of the fair weather seasons, and none in
the poor season. Attack sorties flown per month
during 1967 for each weather season are shown in
the following tabulation:
Route
Packages I, II, and III
Laos
Season
Weather
Attack Sorties
der. Month
Weather
Attack Sorties
per Month
Spring transition-
(Mid-March to
Mid-May)
Fair
6,870
Fair
4,260
Southwest monsoon-
(Mid-May to Mid-
September)
Good
8,050
Poor
1,390
Autumn transition-
(Mid-September to
Mid-October)
Fair
5,310
Fair
2,020'
Northeast monsoon-
(Mid-October to
Mid-March)
4,110
Good
6,010
C. Limited Attacks in Route Packages IV, V,
and VI.
Assuming the 1967 level of sorties but
limiting attacks against targets in Route Packages
IV, V, and VI to 5 percent of total Rolling Thunder
sorties results in only 5,300 sorties being available
for targeting against the northern route packages,
compared with 35,000 last year.
The reduced number of sorties, if judiciously
targeted, could have, however, a significant impact
on some aspects of the North Vietnamese economy and
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military posture. During 1967 the number of sorties-
flown against some target systems in the three
northern route packages was not large. About 1,030
attack sorties were flown against industrial tar-jets.
As few as a quarter of this number of attacks pro-
bably would prevent any major restoration of electric
power and industrial. production. Something less than
1,600 sorties were directed at airfields in the
northern area and about 1,600 against radar systems.
In 1967, only 290 attack sorties were made against
the key Doumer and Canal des Rapides bridges in the
Hanoi area, and about 4,000 sorties were flown
against industrial, military, and logistics targets
in the entire Hanoi/Haiphong area.
It would not be possible, however, to maintain
a significant interdiction effort against the main
LOC's throughout the northeast. Between 9,000 and
10,000 sorties were flown against rail lines in
the northern route packages in 1967, and at least
as many against highways and waterways together.
About 3,000 attack sorties were flown against the
key Ilanoi-Dong Dang rail line alone.
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II. Importance of Route Packages 'I, II, and III
The importance of Route Packages I, II, and III
sterns mainly from their strategic location astride
the logistical pipeline to southern Laos and South
Vietnam. Men and supplies from North Vietnam sent
to support the war in the south must transit all or
part of these three route packages. Although poor
in resources, the area supplies manpower and local
construction materials for repair of these critical
LOC's.
The three route packages are of only slight
economic importance. They contain less than 15 per-
cent of the population and 20 percent of the land
area of North Vietnam, about equal to the area of
Connecticut and Massachusetts combined. There are
no identified mineral resources and much of the
region is mountainous, forested, and sparsely
populated. The population of the area is pre-
dominantly rural; only four communities have more
than 4,000 -- Vinh, Dong Hoi, Vinh Linh, and Ha
Tinh. Agriculture and fishing are the principal
occupations. Rice and other foods are grown in
all three route package areas, but only Route Package
III is self-sufficient in food production. There
are a few minor industrial plants in the Vinh area,
including an electric generating plant and a small
machine plant (both rendered inoperative by the
bombing), a small cement and concrete products.
plant, and a sugar mill. A few other small industrial
facilities are scattered throughout the area. With
no ports capable of receiving foreign imports directly,
Route Packages I, II, and III depend on supplies from
the north for almost all of their manufactured goods,
including spare parts and materials for repair of
transport equipment. In addition, Route Packages
I and II import a small part of their food needs
from the rest of the country.
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;III. The Logistic System
A. Transportation Facilities
The road system constitutes the most im-
portant form of transport in Route Packages I, II,
and III, although other forms of transport -- rail,
tramway, and waterway -- supplement the roads and
add to the total capacity and flexibility of the
logistic system. Distances are short; the north-
east corner of Route Package III to the Mu Gia
Pass is about 125 miles and the northern border of
the area to the DMZ is about 200 miles (see the
map). Total capacity of the transport system in
these route packages is far in excess of both the
tonnages that move to support the military and
economic requirements of Route Packages I, II, and
III, and the tonnages of military.supplies that
are funnelled through the region to Laos, the
DMZ,. and South Vietnam.
H ighw s
Two roads of moderate capacity --
Route 15 and Route 1A -- support most of the
through movement in the area. These two routes
have a combined capacity of 2,100/500 tons* each
way per day near the northern border of Route
Package III. The capacities of the highways
it The first figure (2,100) denotes dry season
capacity during about nine months of the most
favorable weather, and the second figure (500)
denotes, the wet season capacity during three
months of heavy rainfall. Heavy rains begin some-
time between August and October, depending on the.
location in the southern part of North Vietnam,
and extend for about three months.. Capacity fig-
ures given are estimated theoretical capacity.
Photography of truck activity in this area, es-
pecially during the recent holiday truce periods
which occurred during the wet season, indicate that
the roads --
especially
Route 1A
--
can
accommo-
date levels
capacity.
of movement
in excess
of
the
estimated
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North Vietnam: Logistical Systems in Route Packages 1, 2 & 3
Hoa 6 ~
05
bs Binh Ha1pt~?bn~U 4
Son
Ninh
Binh
?'!,Cua Rao
h Linh
DEMARCATION LINE
Dbh&~ Ha
Q~iahg Tri
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Area of POL storage
Other storage area
Transshipment point
Road added or improved
since March, 1965
Route package boundary
Major inland waterway
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within the southern route packages, and the
capacities of the roads exiting into Laos and
the DMZ are both in excess of the capacities of
the two roads leading into the route packages,
giving the highway system within the area excess
capacity to counteract the results of air attacks.
Road distances are not great. Truck traffic
flows into Route Package III primarily' by Route
1A, but also by Route 15, and continues southward
39 and 69 miles, respectively, to the Vinh and Ha
Tinh areas. Truck movements southward from Vinh
and Ha Tinh generally move either to Laos (via
Routes 7, 15, and 137), a distance of about 120
miles, or'to the Dong Hoi and DMZ area (via Route
1A and 101), a distance of about 140 miles.
2. Railroads
Rail service into the area moves on
the 68-mile Thanh Hoa - Vinh segment of the 200-
mile Hanoi - Vinh line. The line has an uninter-
dicted capacity of 2,200 tons each way per'day, but
through service is usually impossible because of
bombings, although shuttle traffic continues. The
yard at Thanh Hoa, just north.of the northern
boundary of Route Package III, serves as a. major
distribution center for the movement of supplies
south to Vinh. Before the bombing, trains ne-
gotiated the run between Thanh Hoa and Vinh ins
six hours, but movement is much more difficult
and time consuming today. Despite the heavy bomb-
ing, however, traffic continues on the line. At
Vinh, freight is transshipped from the main rail-
road line to trucks or inland watercraft and some
of it is moved to Xom Khe for further shipment on
a tramway.
In addition to the main railroad line,
there is a rail tramway which extends from Xom Khe,
30 miles south of Vinh, to Dong Tam, a distance of
47 miles. The estimated uninterdicted capacity
of the tramway is about 500 tons each way per day.
The tramway is used by small meter-gauge cars
hauled by motor trucks with flanged wheels and
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is generally not used to any great extent, but
some movement has been observed during truce
periods.
3. Waterways
The use of water transport is limited
by geography and US naval and air action, but a
substantial amount of goods continue to move over
inland and coastal waters. The inland waterways
within the region do not provide a through route
for the movement of traffic south to the DMZ or
west to the Laotian border. Locally, however, in-
land watercraft are used extensively to support
overland transport. Sampans, ferries, junks,
rafts, and canoes are widely used to ferry goods
across interdicted LOC's. They also perform a
significant part in the distribution and dispersal
of supplies away from the important transshipment
areas. Coastal routes are almost exclusively
restricted to use by barges, junks, and other simi-
lar craft. These craft are unloaded at makeshift
transshipment areas into trucks for movement by
road or sometimes into other watercraft for further
movement on the inland waterways. By hugging the
coast and moving at night, this coastal traffic
is able to continue, although at a reduced level,
in spite of US naval operations. The use of larger
craft has been made difficult by both naval patrols
and Rolling Thunder bombings of port facilities'.,
4. Primitive Transport
Primitive means of transport such as
cargo-carrying bicycles also perform a significant
role in moving goods through the southern route
packages. The North Vietnamese have imported
thousands of specially designed bicycles, capable
of carrying about 500 pounds each. Twelve such
bicycles have the carrying capacity of one three-
ton cargo truck. These bicycles, together with
coolies, elephants, and water buffaloes, have been
often reported transporting supplies in the more
remote areas.
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5. Storage Facilities
Although Route Packages I, II, and III
are closer to the fighting fronts than other areas
of North.Vietnam, less than one-half of the more
than 700 identified supply, storage, and trans-
shipment areas in North Vietnam are located in
these areas. Only about 8 percent of the storage
capacity for military supplies in this area
originally on the JCS target list remains active.
The destruction of military stores in this region
by the Rolling Thunder program has been considera-
ble and almost all supplies maintained in these
route packages are now stored in small, dispersed
sites.
B. Operation of the System
The North Vietnamese logistical system is
well organized and adequately maintained. Mili-
tary shipments are under control of the Rear
Services Headquarters near Hanoi. Economic ship-
ments are controlled at the province and district
levels. Liaison is maintained between the mili-
tary and civilian transport authorities at nearly
every level so that the best use can be made of
the scarce transport resources and that vital
traffic can be maintained.
To counter the effects of the Rolling
Thunder program against the LOC's in Route Packages
I, II, and III, the North Vietnamese have employed
numerous techniques to insure the continued through
shipment of necessary material. Most transport
operations are conducted only during hours of
darkness, or under the cover of poor weather.
Elaborate traffic control systems, staffed by the
local population, have been established to expedite
the flow of traffic and warn of impending air
attack. In addition, the major storage, dispersal,
and transshipment centers have been strategically
located in the large populated areas exempt from
the bombing. These centers, principally Thanh Hoa,
Vinh, and Ha Tinh, are all at the junction of major
supply routes. Trucks can make round-trips between
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them under cover of darkness (see the tabulation
below). South of IIa Tinh, logistic supplies are
widely dispersed along the infiltration routes
leading into Laos and the DMZ.
Area Distance Estimated Turnaround*
Time (Hours)
At an average speed, 20 miles per hour, and
including three hours for loading and un-
loading. .
C. Traffic Flows
The North Vietnamese have continually
increased the volume of supplies moved south
through the three southern route packages. The
total daily volume moved south into Route Package
III in 1967 was about 770 tons, more than double
the volume of 1965. Large increases occurred in
late 1965 and in 1966 as countermeasures to the
bombing became more effective and the insurgency
in South Vietnam increased in intensity. The
increase in 1967 over 1966 was quite small,
possibly only about 10 percent, but thus far in
1968 there has been a further increase in the
volume moved into Route Package III. This in-'.'
crease is mainly the result of the step-up in
personnel infiltration into South Vietnam,
logistic support for the war in South Vietnam,
and the increase in Communist troop strength
and activity in Laos.
About one-third of the total flow into
Route Package III is strictly economic goods,
and the other two-thirds are military supplies
and military-related economic goods such as
petroleum. About 80 percent of the volume that
moves into Route Package III is used in the three
southern route packages and in the DMZ area, about
15 percent is moved into southern Laos for use
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there or in South Vietnam, and the remainder is
moved west on Route 7 into northern Laos to
support Communist troops and civic action pro-
grams in the Plaine des Jarres area.
The above estimates, however, are based
on indirect evidence, rather than on firm intel-
ligence. The estimates are derived from Communist
military requirements in the DMZ; military and
economic requirements in Route Packages I, II, and
III; traffic movements reported by US pilots flying
over the area; and reports by road watch teams of
traffic moving into Laos.
Road watch reports indicate that the
average daily volume of goods delivered into
southern Laos has increased markedly, as shown in
the tabulation below. The volume delivered into
Southern Laos in the first quarter of this year
has been more than 60 percent greater than the
same period last year. If this trend continues,
the average volume delivered during 1968 will be
about 160 tons per day. This tonnage is sufficient
to meet current requirements in Laos, to satisfy
the external supply requirements of the Communist
forces currently in South Vietnam, and to support
further augmentation of these forces by four
divisions.
Short Tons Percent Increase
per a over Previous Years
1965 35
1966 75 114
1967 95 27
The volume of traffic flowing into the
three southern route packages is small in re-
lation to transport capacity. Compared with
about 850 tons a day moving south into Route
Package III during the first quarter of 1968,
truck routes had 2,100/500 tons of uninterdicted
capacity, with a railroad as well as inland and
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coastal water routes available to provide ad-
ditional transport capacity. Furthermore,
the volume of tonnage moving within Route Package
III rapidly diminishes as the supplies are moved
south, and the total. capacity of the transport
system decreases less rapidly than the decrease
in traffic. Routes leading into Laos are used
on the average at less than 15 percent of their
capacity.
Route Packages I, II, and III have also
been heavily used for the infiltration of North
Vietnamese troops to South Vietnam. 'MACV's esti-
mate of total infiltration, accepted and possible,
from October 1965 through February 1968, totals
203,500. In the first quarter of this year the
North Vietnamese may have mounted the largest
infiltration effort they have ever undertaken.
Total infiltration to South Vietnam for the first
three months of 1968 may have reached 40,000 to
50,000 men. The speed with which some infiltrators
have reached South Vietnam tends to confirm earlier
indications that some of the troops are being moved
by truck despite the US air interdiction campaign.
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IV. Probable Effects of. Escalated US Air Attacks
The record of the Rolling Thunder program
against Route Packages I, II, and III during the
previous three years of bombing indicates that even
escalated attacks against these route packages
will not have a significant impact on the area's
transportation system. Throughout the past three
years, all highways, waterways, and rail facilities
in the area have been attacked repeatedly, as well
as fords, ferries, pontoon bridges, transportation
equipment, truck parks, and storage and supply
areas. Despite the high level of attacks which
have hampered some operations, the transport net-
work continues to function, and the North Vietnamese
have organized substantial repair forces to cope
with the damage. The network provides adequate
service and capacity to meet North Vietnam's,
logistic requirements in the area and to the South.
A. Railroads
The rail line between Thanh Hoa and Vinh,
the tramway south of Vinh, and the rail yards at
Vinh and Thanh Hoa have been attacked and damaged
repeatedly during the three-year bombing campaign,
but quick repairs and emergency arrangements have
allowed goods to continue to move by rail. In
1967, about 3,500 sorties were directed against
these targets, nearly one-half the total directed
against the entire Hanoi-Vinh line. The intensity
of attack against the rail line over the past
three years has prevented through service to Vinh
and has limited the line's capacity by causing a
shift of some traffic from the conventional meter
gauge rail equipment to the smaller tram cars
because of line and bridge limits south of Thanh_
Hoa. Despite the heavy damage inflicted by the
bombing, operations between interdicted points
have continued. Various alternate facilities
constructed around bridges and yards and quick
repairs have contributed to the overall flexibility
of the system. Most movement occurs at night,
when attacks are less effective against supplies
being moved.
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B. Highway stem
Air attacks against the highway system in -
Route Packages I, II, and III over the last three
years have not sustained the interdiction of high-
way operations. The heaviest attacks of the entire
Rolling Thunder program have been concentrated
against highway targets located in the three
southern route packages, with Routes 1A, 15, 7,
and 101 receiving the greatest damage. Although
these strikes have interrupted and impeded traffic,
repair efforts and countermeasures have been
effective in maintaining traffic flows throughout
the system.
Despite the bombings, the overall capacity
of the road network in Route Packages I, II, and
III has been increased. Two major roads --- Routes
101 and 137 -- have been built and several
secondary roads improved since the start of the
bombing campaign in 1965. Route 101, completed
in 1966 and more than 200 miles in length, was
built to serve as a less vulnerable north-south
inland alternate to coastal Route lA. Route 137
was built to provide an additional road into Laos.
This route connects the important Quang Khe trans-
shipment area to Route 911 in Laos (26 miles). A
new, well-built road extending from the Dong Hoi
area toward the southwestern corner of the DMZ
(16 miles) is well under construction and is now
only two miles from the Laotian border.
An increase in sortie rates would probably'
have little effect on truck traffic. A comparison
of truck traffic observed moving into southern
Laos through Mu Gia Pass (see the chart) by months
in 1967 and 1968 with the sortie rate over Laos
and North Vietnam in the area of the Pass shows no
obvious correlation, either direct or inverse.
In some months, both sortie rate and truck traffic
increased or decreased together, whereas in other
months one factor increased and the other decreased.
C. Waterways
Attacks against water routes in Route
Packages I, II, and III have hampered waterborne
transport, but traffic continues to move.
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Average Number of Trucks per Day Moving South Through Mu Gia Pass
January 1967-March 1968
40-
AVERAGE
JAN-MAR 1968
I I I- I I I I ? I I I I I I I
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar 25X1
1967
1968
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The coastal ports in Route Packages I,
II, and III have been heavily damaged but are
still in partial use. Wharf areas have been
damaged, berthing blocked by sunken vessels, and
nearly all storage space has been extensively
damaged or destroyed.. The small port and trans-
shipment facility at Quang Khe is probably the
most heavily attacked target in North Vietnam.
However, numerous small craft, such as sampans,
still operate at these port facilities'.and
transit rivers on which the ports are located.
Operation Sea Dragon, a US Navy surveil-
lance and interdiction operation of North Vietnam
military and logistic targets along the North
Vietnamese*.coast south of 200 North latitude,
supplements the Rolling Thunder program in the
southern route packages and has denied the use
of coastal waters to large North Vietnamese ships,
but some coastal traffic continues to move. One
cruiser and four destroyers are normally maintained
on station patrolling these coastal waters. Since
the operation was begun in October 1966, it has
reportedly destroyed about 1,000 craft and damaged
another 1,300. The operation appears successful
in prohibiting large coastal vessels from operating
in these southern coastal waters.
The mining program using the MK-36
Destructor weapon has been in effect against the
waterway system since June 1967, but the overall
performance of the weapons has been uneven and
has not denied the North Vietnamese the use of
important waterways. About 10,000 MK-36's have
been employed in the three southern route packages.
Targets that have been heavily seeded with
Destructors continue to be used. An example is
the Kien Giang River, near Dong Hoi, in Route
Package I. From 1 December 1967 to 31 March 1968,
a total of 1,783 MK-36 devices were seeded from
the mouth of this river to about 10 nautical miles
upstream, but most waterway and transshipment
facilities were still operational.
The planned increase in seedings of the
MK-36 may increase the effectiveness of the mining
program. It is anticipated that by June of 1968,
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13,000 devices per month will be available and the
level of seedings will reach this level soon after-
wards. The total amount of weapons deployed in the
June 1967 - 31 March 1968 period was 19,500. Of
this total, 10,000 have been dropped in Route
Packages I, II, and III. Thus the anticipated
increase in weapons deployed is from 19,500 in a
ten-month period to a level of 13,000 per month.
The planned rate of increase, therefore, is quite
rapid and it is difficult to estimate final results
this early in the program.
D. Bridges
Much of the bombing activity against the
transportation system in Route. Packages I, II, and
III has been directed against key bridges along
the major land routes. Through 1967, 285 such
bridges had been repeatedly attacked and damaged
in the southern route packages, compared with 404
bridges attacked in all of North Vietnam. Although
these strikes have interrupted and impeded traffic,
repair efforts and countermeasures have been
effective in maintaining traffic flows throughout
the system.
The North Vietnamese should be able to
counter an increased level of bombing of bridges
in Route Packages I, II, and III. The North
Vietnamese have already built an average of 1.42
alternate facilities or bypasses -- pontoon
bridges, cable bridges, ferries, and fords --? per,
bridge in the south. Although there are more
water crossings in the south than in the north,
they are less formidable to bypass. For example,
the water crossings in the south are not as wide
or as deep as the streams in the Red River Delta.
Moreover, in Route Packages I, II, and III, river
crossing targets will. be principally those
associated with truck movements, and it is easier
and cheaper to repair such facilities than rail-
road bridges. A relatively small additional
diversion of the North Vietnamese labor force
would be able to make necessary repairs and by-
passes.
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E. Transport Equipment
1. Trucks
Since the beginning of the Rolling
Thunder program, the North Vietnamese have lost
about 5,200* trucks in North Vietnam. Estimates
of yearly losses are given in the tabulation
below:
Year
Effective Truck Losses*
1965
360
1.966
1,900
1967
2,700
1968
(first quarter)
250
During 1967, 72,000 attack sorties
.were flown over Route Packages I, II, and III,
resulting in the loss of about 2,400 trucks, a
ratio of about 29.4 sorties for each truck
destroyed (see Table 1). Truck losses in Route
Packages I, II, and III were especially high. in
the second and third quarters of 1967, the periods
of good weather. During the third quarter of
1967, when the best flying weather prevailed,
only 15 sorties were flown for each truck destroyed,
compared with 63 sorties in the fourth quarter.
A To arrive at an estimate of effective truck
losses in both North Vietnam and Laos, pilot re-
ports are first adjusted to eliminate double
'counting. Then a deflation factor is applied to
adjust for inaccuracies in the data and for the
North Vietnamese ability to repair and rebuild
trucks. Inaccuracies are caused by high aircraft
speeds; poor visibility resulting from weather,
smoke, and dust after attacks; night operations;
and intense AAA fire. The formula for computing
effective losses agreed to by CIA and DIA is as
follows: 75 percent of those trucks reported
destroyed and 25 percent of those reported damaged
are considered to be effective losses and are
deducted from the inventory.
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Trucks have been much more lucrative targets in
the southern route packages than in Route Packages..
IV, V, and VI. In the third quarter of 1967, more
than 11,000 sorties were flown over the northern
route packages, but only 60 trucks were destroyed.
In comparison, 20,000 sorties in Route Packages
I, II, and III destroyed 1,300 trucks during the
same period.
Despite these large losses, there are
no apparent shortages of motor trucks in the area,
primarily because of continued large imports
through Haiphong and by rail through China. Truck
activity has continued at a high level, and road-
watch teams situated along the major infiltration
routes in.Laos have noted steadily increasing truck
traffic from North Vietnam into Laos over the past
year. North Vietnam has increased its truck inven-
tory from the pre-bombing level of 9,000 vehicles
to more than 11,000 vehicles at present.
Increased truck losses from escalated
attacks would have little effect on.truck inven-
tories. If the number of sorties against Route
Packages I, II, and III increases by 25 percent
in 1968 and the ratio of sorties to destroyed
trucks remains the same, then about 3,100 trucks
could be expected to be destroyed annually, in the
three southern route packages. However, North
Vietnam's Communist allies have in the past quickly
provided trucks to make good such losses. About
4,700 trucks were imported during 1967, and North,
Vietnam received about 900 trucks by rail from
the Soviet Union in December 1967, only two months
after a request made in October 1967.
2. Watercraift
About 6,700 watercraft have been
destroyed during the Rolling Thunder program.
The following tabulation gives total number of
watercraft estimated to be destroyed and damaged
by year as reported by pilots;
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Watercraft
Destroyed/Damaged
1965 1,200
1966 9,250
1967 11,600
1968 (first quarter) 800
In 1967, destruction and damage to
watercraft was greatest in Route Package III,
which has a more developed inland waterway system
than the other two route packages south of Thanh
Hoa. The reported destruction of watercraft in
each route package by quarter is given in Table 2.
The impact of past and future water-
craft losses is slight. There is no evidence that
the transport system has been limited by a shortage
of watercraft. If the number of sorties against
Route Packages I, II, and III increases by 25
percent in 1968 and the ratio of sorties to
destroyed or damaged watercraft remains the same,
about 9,500 watercraft will be destroyed or
damaged in 1968. This loss would be nominal
compared with the estimated total North Vietnamese
inventory of 30,000 small craft. These small
craft can be replaced by local construction or
by imports from China if necessary.
3. Railroad Equipment
Data on the destruction of railroad
cars are not available by route package. How-
ever, on the entire Hanoi-Vinh line in 1967,
pilots reported destroying 355 railcars and
damaging 658. During the same period, a total
of 6,988 sorties were flown against the rail
line, of which an estimated 3,470 sorties were
flown against that portion of the line in Route
Packages I, II, and III. Against the entire
Hanoi-Vinh line, 19.7 sorties were required for
each railcar destroyed and 10.6 for each railcar.
damaged. if the bombing effort against railroads
is increased by 25 percent, and assuming that the
ratios of sorties per railcar destroyed or damaged
were maintained under an increased level of
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attack, about 400 cars would be destroyed and 800
damaged.
Despite this attrition, there are no
apparent shortages of rail. equipment in the area.
Photography of Thanh Hoa continues to show large
concentrations of rail equipment. While the
reported figures of equipment destroyed and
damaged on the Vinh line represent about 40 per-
cent of country-wide losses, the total inventory
of railcars in North Vietnam has actually
increased since the bombing began. Counts of
cars from high-level photography. in 1967 reveal
about 2,000 to 2,300 railcars in the country,
compared with about 1,800 before the bombing.
It is believed that imports from China have more
than offset losses.
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V. Countermeasures
A. Air Defense
An increase in air attacks against Route
Packages I, II, and III probably would he countered
by shifting some antiaircraft artillery and SAM
firing battalions from Route Packages IV, V, and
VI. The movement of equipment and related
operating personnel could be accomplished within
ten days. An air defense capability against a
decreased level of attacks would still remain in
the northern areas after the redeployment, because
the regime would continue to regard the defense
of Hanoi and Haiphong as a high priority.
An increase of 40 percent in attack sorties
in the southern area might be countered by re-
deploying about 750 antiaircraft weapons to Route
Packages I, II, and III. This level of redeploy-
ment could be accomplished by reducing the AAA
inventory in Route Packages IV, V, and VI by 20,
40, and 10 percent, respectively. This equipment,
weighing 4,000 tons, could be moved south in a
week to ten days. The AAA order of battle in the
three southern route packages averaged 1,885
weapons of 37-mm or larger during March-December
1967. The remaining AAA inventory in the north.
would still be formidable. The North Vietnamese
might attempt to offset an AAA redeployment by
increased imports to continue'their present air
defense order of battle in the north.
North Vietnam might redeploy perhaps five
SAM firing battalions and one support battalion
to Route Packages I, II, and III. This shift
would about double the SAM order of battle in
Route Packages I, II, and III, currently estimated
at five to six firing battalions. The redeployed
battalions, with equipment weighing 3,000 to 3,500
tons, could be moved south in three to four days
and could be moved back to the north in the same
length of time in case of a sudden increase in
attacks against that area. However, the North.
Vietnamese probably would try to import equipment
for an additional five firing battalions to bring
the inventory in the north to the present level.
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If they moved five units south, an additional 25
SAM sites probably would be constructed in Route
Packages I, II, and III to augment the 19 sites
that are currently capable of accepting SAM
equipment.
B. Manpower
North Vietnam would probably counter the
escalated attacks by moving additional manpower
into Route Packages I, II, and III to'maintain
the logistic system and to man the additional
AAA's and SAM's, but this manpower requirement
would be small and would have little effect on
the country as a whole.
The North Vietnamese would probably respond
to the stepped-up bombing by transferring 15,000
full-time workers to repair damage to the lines
of communication in the south. At present, there
are an estimated 72,000 North Vietnamese civilian
road construction workers, including 56,000 workers
in Route Packages I, II, and III and 24,000 to
40,000 Chinese construction troops employed
throughout the country. About 15,000 experienced
workers could be transferred within a short period
of time, bringing the permanent labor force in
the area up to about 70,000 personnel. This number
of workers would be adequate to repair damage and/or
construct additional bypasses caused by the change
in the bombing pattern. Additional part-time
workers could readily be obtained from the indige-
nous population of 2.7 million.
Redeployment of air defense equipment
probably would result in an increased requirement
for about 16,000 personnel -- 15,000 for the
antiaircraft artillery and less than 1,000 for
the SAM's -- but it is likely that troops would
accompany their equipment being deployed to the
south. There would be a requirement for an equal
number of trained personnel in the north if and
when imported equipment became available to replace
equipment moved to the south.
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Estimates of Effective Truck Losses in North Vietnam, 1967
Quarterly 1967
First Second Third Fourth Total
Route Packages I, II, and III
Losses 195 684 1,343 220 2,442
Sorties 15,426 22,182 20,216 13,961 71,785
Sorties per loss 79.1 32.4 15.1 63.5 29.4
Route Packages IV,-V, and VI
Losses 39 65 61 77 242
Sorties 5,126 9,543 11,363 8,414 34,446
Sorties per loss 131.4 146.8 186.3 109.3 1 142.3
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Estimates of Watercraft Destroyed and Damaged
and Sorties Flown by Route Package, 1967
Route Package
I
Destroyed/damaged
319
975
867
467
2,628
Sorties
11,334
12,919
15,032
11,324
50,609
Sorties per destroyed/damaged
35.5
13.3
17.3
24.2
19.3
II
Destroyed/damaged
261
680
576
177
1,694
Sorties
1,588
3,987
2,554
1,134
9,263
Sorties per destroyed/damaged
6.1
5.9
4.4
6.4
5.5
III
Destroyed/damaged
410
1,534
782
553
3,279
Sorties
2,504
5,276
2,630
1,503
11,913
Sorties per destroyed/damaged
6.1
3.4
3.4
2.7
3.6
IV
Destroyed/damaged
442
864
765
1,049
3,120
Sorties
2,726
3,144
2,610
2,298
10,778
Sorties per destroyed/damaged
6.1
3.6
3.4
2.2
3.5
V
Destroyed/damaged
1
20
6
2
29
Sorties
720
1,201
939
844
3,704
Sorties per destroyed/damaged
720.0
60.0
156.5
422.0
127.7
VI
Destroyed
122
.188
206
361
877
Sorties
1,680
5,198
7,820
5,272
19,970
Sorties per destroyed/damaged
13.8
27.6
38.0
14.6
22.8
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TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
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