LOGISTICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE BOMBING HALT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070043-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2005
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: November 1, 1968
• Content Type: IM

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Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Logistical Developments Since the Bombing Halt
Top Secret 25X1
ER IM 68-150
November 1968
Copy-No. 1'4)9
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
25 November 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Logistical Developments Since the Bombing Halt
Summary
The North Vietnamese, predictably, have been quick
to capitalize on the opportunities presented by the
bombing halt since 1 November. The main lines of
communication in the southern Panhandle have been
restored and the logistical base is being extended
further south. Supply movements into the southern
Panhandle have increased significantly. Traffic
moving into the Panhandle of Laos has also in-
creased but not to the extent observed in North
Vietnam. As yet there is no firm evidence that the
North Vietnamese are undertaking a major logistical
resupply effort in Laos that would jeopardize Allied
forces in the I or II Corps areas. More evidence
is needed before the significance of the resupply
effort north of the DMZ can be fully evaluated.
Key rail facilities in the Panhandle were repaired
rapidly following the bombing halt, and through
service to Vinh was possible as early as
F increase
in the n er o rail cars in e vinn nd
increased activity at transloading areas. The tram-
way south of Vinh also came into greater use soon
after the bombing halt, and tramway trains have been
observed around Bai Duc Thom, a key supply area about
25 miles north of Mu Gia.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current
Intelligence and the Director's Special Assistant
for Vietnamese Affairs.
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Large North Vietnamese coastal ships of up to
2,500 tons have been observed in. southern waters
for the first time since the bombing began in 1965.
By using such coasters, the North Vietnamese are
employing the most direct and effective method of
moving large amounts of materiel from Hainho
the southern Panhandle.
The level of observed truck activity in the Pan-
handle of North Vietnam has increased markedly.
Large convoys of trucks have been repeatedly de-
tected moving or parked along the principal routes
heading south toward the DMZ and southern Laos.
Very heavy traffic has been observed around Vinh. It
is not clear how much of this activity is an actual
increase in supply movements and how much reflects a
resort to overt daylight operations in a bomb-free
environment. Observed truck traffic along coastal
roads has also increased significantly with concen-
trations of trucks photographed on Route 1A as far
south as the DMZ. Several pieces of artillery and
antiaircraft equipment have also been observed moving
south.
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1. Through rail service to Vinh was restored
shortly after the 1 November bombing halt.
s owe small flatcars pulled by
truck locomotives just north of Vinh. Of the
seven trains sighted on these three days, three
were heading south, three north and one was in
the Vinh railroad yard.
The level o supp ies noted in
the Vin rai yard increased significantly and
rail-to-road transshipment areas in the rail yard
were being expanded.
2. The rapid restoration of through rail
service to Vinh was made possible by speedy repairs
to the railroad bridges at Dien Chau and Tam Da,
the two main chokepoints south of the 19th Parallel
that had been under heavy air attack. The original
bridges and alternative crossings were unserviceable
as of 29 October. Their reconstruction by 10 November
reconfirms the capability of the North Vietnamese to
repair bomb damage rapidly.
3. Rail activity at Thanh Hoa also increased
after the bombing halt. About 320 rail cars were
noted in the rail yard,
compared wi an average of Ibb observed
Activity at transloading areas a so
increase , and there was an overall increase in the
numbers of POL tank cars.
4. The tramway south of Vinh also became more
active soon after the bombing halt. Several small
trains of tramcars were observed around Bai Duc
Thom, a key supply area about 25 miles north of Mu
Gia Pass. Pilots had reported that this area
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appeared only nominally operable prior to the
bombing halt. Several bridges have been recon-
structed and there is evidence of reconstruction
of a five-mile rail spur which heads south toward
Mu Gia from Bai Duc Thom. A truck carrying rails
was observed south of the present terminus of this
spur, indicating that the North Vietnamese may
plan to extend the spur to Mu Gia.
Highways
5. The level of truck activity observed in
the Panhandle of North Vietnam since the bombing
halt has increased dramatically. Now free from
attack, the North Vietnamese have been moving
trucks and conducting major repairs and maintenance
o erati ns durin the da time.
there has been an in-
crease in support ac ivi ies, including the con-
struction of new facilities as well as road and
bridge repairs.
traffic moving south from Hanoi on
Route 1A in November was the heaviest observed
in more than three years.
7. Large concentrations and convoys of trucks
have been repeatedly observed moving or parked
along the principal routes heading south toward
the DMZ and southern Laos. At Tam Da, ten miles
south of the 19th Parallel, 25X1
I Imore than 200 trucks on Route IA, concen-
ra e on both banks of a ferry crossing. Prior to
1 November, only light traffic had been noted on
this heavily bombed road segment. Very heavy
traffic has been noted in Vinh and the surrounding
area, suggesting that Vinh is becoming an even more
important logistical center. Before the bombing
halt, no more than 50 trucks were detected in the
city at any given time, but since the halt more
than 200 trucks have been counted within the city
limits, and many more have been detected on nearby
roads. 25X1
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8. South of Vinh, most trucks have been
moving inland toward the Laotian border along
Routes 82, 15, and 137. On Route 82, several
hundred trucks have been observed on each of
several different days. On Route 15, between 100
and 170 trucks have been observed, and a group of
about 350 troops or construction workers was
detected I labout
ten miles from the Laotian border. On
as many as 100 trucks have been sighted)
On coastal Route 1A, truck
uTrrrr%- sed significantly, with
concentrations of trucks observed along the route
as far. south as the DMZ.
9. Several pieces of artillery and antiair-
7-mm and
51-mm antiaircraft pieces pu y rfrucA were
detected on Route 15 moving toward Mu Gia Pass.
Four 100/122-mm field guns towed by trucks were
observed on 9 November on Route 1A near Dien Chau.
122-mm howitzers pulled by three
trrt~Y` ?rved heading south on Route 72
northwest of Vinh.
craft equipment moving south have been noted
10. Trucks carrying pontoon
POL tanks have also been noted
Pontoons similar to the ones observed have been
recently used to repair several bridges on Route lA.
The large POL storage tanks being moved south are
used at new dispersed POL sites under construction
along key roads.
Watercraft
11. Almost all of North Vietnam's small fleet
of coastal merchant vessels and tankers have begun
to move cargo from Haiphong directly to the Quang
Khe and Dong Hoi areas since the bombing halt.
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Photograph Ishowed the Ben Thuy,
North Vietnam's largest coaster with a capacity of
about 2,500 tons, lightering into smaller high-
speed coasters off Hon La Island, about 14 nautical
miles northeast of Quang Khe. Three other North
Vietnamese coasters -- the Hoa Binh, Thong Nhat,
and Nuu Nghi -- also have been photographed off
the coast of southern North Vietnam. 25X1
This is the first time that large
coasters have been active in southern waters since
bombing began in 1965. By using merchant coasters,
the North Vietnamese are employing the most direct
and effective method of moving large amounts of
materiel from Haiphong into the southern Panhandle
region.
12. Other water transport south of the 20th
Parallel has also increased.
A convoy o eight SL- -type craft
was Morea eading north from the Vinh area on
I and there have been numerous other
sig ings -1 this type of vessel in the Vinh area
and at Quang Khe. The SL-l can carry 200 tons --
the equivalent of 70 trucks -- at a speed of 18
knots. Transshipment areas at Vinh, on the Song
Ca, at Quang Khe, and at Dong Hoi have all been
active.
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19. A roadwatch team on Route 15, which leads
to Laos via the Mu Gia Pass, reported an average
of 14 trucks a day moving south toward Laos during
the two days the team was in place in early
November. Communist troops have apparently kept
the team away from the road since that time.
During the previous month, an average of 19 trucks
a day moved south.
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show an average of 14 trucks a day moving west
from 3 to 6 November.
21.1
that an average of five trucks a day moved south
past it from 1 to 16 November, about the same level
of traffic as in August and September.
22. The average number of trucks sighted by
pilots per week in southern Laos since the bombing
halt through 14 November has increased about 20
percent, compared with the average for October.
Sightings were particularly high during 12-14 Novem-
ber. Much of the increase, however, may be ex-
plained by the increase in the number of sorties,
as shown in the following tabulation:
Average
Number
of
Trucks
Sighted
per Week
Percent
Increase
over
Previous
Month _
Average
Number
of
Sorties
er Week
Number
of Truck
Sightings
per Ten
Sorties
Oct
248
584
4
Nov
1,062
328
932
11
Oct
261
1,080
2
1-14 Nov
316
21
2,628
1
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23. The reasons for the apparent decline in
truck traffic during November of this year when
compared with the same month of 1967 are not clear.
It may be a result of the existence of adequate
stockpiles having been accumulated in the first
ten months of 1968 when record volumes of supplies
were moved into Laos. It could also be a reflec-
tion of the current lull in combat activity in
South Vietnam. The intensified bombing of Laos
could also have made logistics activity more dif-
ficult. Data on truck sightings on.specific routes
in the Panhandle. of Laos do show, however, that
through truck movement is being maintained. On
several routes within the Laotian Panhandle, pilots
are reporting significantly higher levels of traffic
this year than during November of last year, as
shown in the following tabulation:
Average Truck Sightings per Day, by Pilots
Nov 1967 0.9 10.2 3.5 0.6 1.2 0.2 9.8
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