NORTH VIETNAM 'S ABILITY TO WITHSTAND MANPOWER ATTRITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070046-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2009
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: June 1, 1968
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
North Vietnam's Ability
to Withstand Manpower Attrition
JCS review completed.
JCS review completed.
ARMY and DIA review(s) completed.
Secret
JUNE 19
~~
COPY N0.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
,Tune 1968
North Vietnam's Ability to Withstand
Manpower Attrition
Summary
This memorandum analyzes North Vietnam's ability
to withstand manpower attrition at the very high
levels sustained during the first five months of
1968.
Manpower losses are placing a heavy burden on
North Vietnam but have not exhausted its manpower
reserves. Even if losses are sustained at their
present high levels, North Vietnam can maintain
the combat forces in South Vietnam at their current
strength well beyond 1969. It could, at least
through 1968, probably also significantly increase
Main Force strength levels by increasing infiltration
or deploying additional new units. The sharp accel-
eration of manpower inputs into the South and the
need to sustain them over extended periods of time
will, however, produce increasingly severe strains on
North Vietnam. Both military and civilian morale may
decline, and the combat effectiveness of the Northern
troops sent South will suffer. In addition, North
Vietnam will have to sacrifice even greater elements
of its most prized human resources.
The present and prospective manpower drains may
have influenced Hanoi's shift to the current fight-
talk strategy in an effort to achieve a decisive
outcome in a relatively short period of time. In
the final analysis, however, North Vietnam's will-
ingness to bear this manpower burden will be
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared ~jointZy by the Office of Economic
Research and the Office of Current Intelligence and
was coordinated with the Office of National Esti-
mates and the Director?s Special Assistant for
Vietnamese Affairs.
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determined by the extent to which Hanoi feels that
its effort is moving the war toward a satisfactory
solution. Hanoi's strategy in short will be
dictated more by political judgments than by
simple questions of physical capability.
Enemy losses in North Vietnam, Laos, and South
Vietnam have reached record levels during 1968 and
are running in excess of 32,000 a month. More than
90 percent of these losses take place in South Viet-
nam. Because the Viet Cong have only a limited
recruitment capability -- an estimated 7,000 to
10,000 a month -- most manpower replacements must
come from the North. This requirement has forced
Hanoi to mount an unprecedented infiltration effort.
At least 150,000 persons have been placed in the
infiltration pipeline, and an estimated 60,000 to
80,000 North Vietnamese troops arrived in South
Vietnam during the first five months of 1968. If
the present trend continues, total infiltration
could reach 240,000 by the end of the year.
The limits of estimated Viet Cong recruitment
capabilities would indicate that North Vietnam might
have to provide as many as 260,000 to 300,000 men a
year to replace all losses -- in the North, in Laos,
and in the South. This requirement seems excessive
because the losses in the South may be overstated
or include personnel in low-order irregular units.
Nevertheless, it is estimated that infiltration to
the South will be adequate to replace losses among
regular combat units and to provide for some expan-
sion of the force structure.
A possible requirement to furnish as many as
240,000 men to the South and to make up losses in
the North and in Laos will force North Vietnam to
dig deeply into its manpower reserves. The esti-
mated requirements far exceed the annual draft
input of about 120,000 males. To furnish the re-
mainder North Vietnam has several options. It can
draw down its in-country military establishment,
but, unless it is willing to go into the strategic
reserve, this option would provide only about 50,000
troops. It could also widen draft age limits for
military service. A large part of this manpower --
from about 25 to 30 percent -- must come from the
civilian labor force which contains an estimated
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mobilization pool of 500,000 physically fit males.
It is estimated that this drain will not be excessive
as long as North Vietnam can continue to import
increasing amounts of foodstuffs and consumer goods
from its Communist allies.
The interplay of infiltration, recruitment,
and losses has brought about sharp fluctuations in
the strength of enemy forces since 1 January.
However, the net change from 1 January to 30 April
has been an increase of only about 10,000 troops.
An analysis of current infiltration patterns and
loss rates does not enable firm judgments on the
extent to which the force structure will be further
increased, either nationally or in specific regions.
It is apparent, however, that further expansion is
under way. Whatever the rate of infiltration, it
will, at a minimum, be adequate to give the Com-
munists a continuing ability to maintain pressures
against Allied forces and urban areas such as
Saigon.
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I. Assumptions
This analysis of North Vietnam's capability to
withstand manpower attrition is based on the following
assumptions:
1. The level of combat during 1968
and 1969 will result in enemy manpower
losses at the extremely high rate
sustained during the first five months
of 1968.
2. Manpower requirments must be
met completely from resources within
North Vietnam and South Vietnam, with
no manpower inputs from third
countries.
3: The present bombing of North
Vietnam will continue, and, because
of uncertainty about future bombing
programs, the North Vietnamese will
not feel free to disband the civilian
labor forces or air defense forces
organized against the bombing
program.
4. The North Vietnamese will
attempt to furnish manpower without
reducing their strategic reserve,
estimated to be about 300,000
troops.
II. Present Manpower Distribution
A. North Vietnam
1. Military Forces
The North Vietnamese are estimated to
have about 500,000 men in the Regular Armed Forces
and another 400,000 in the militia/security forces
as of 1 April 1968. About 35,000 of these troops
are deployed in Laos; an estimated 115,000 to 130,000
regular troops and support personnel are deployed
in South Vietnam.*
* These are independent CIA estimates of the strength
of North Vietnamese forces zn South Vietnam. As esti-
mates they tend to be higher than the strength ZeveZs
derived by conventional Order of Battle techniques.
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The North Vietnamese forces in South
Vietnam are a significant element of the total
enemy combat strength in South Vietnam. They
account for about 70 percent of the organized
strength of Main and Local Force units.
2. Civilian Labor Force
North Vietnam has an estimated 10.4 mil-
lion people in the 15-to-64 age group. Excluding
the 500,000 in the armed forces and the approximately
120,000 students 15 years of age and above, the
civilian labor forces comprises about 9.8 million.
The number of civilian workers that have been re-
quired to offset the effects of airstrikes on North
Vietnam is estimated to be about 600,000, including
full-time and part-time workers, both male and female
of all ages. Nearly a third of these workers are
occupied full-time in the reconstruction and main-
tenance of lines of communication and in the move-
ment of supplies. The part-time civilian force
required for war-related tasks is used primarily as
conditions warrant in civil defense activities,
bomb damage repair, and movement of supplies.
B. Sauth Vietnam
The Viet Cong have established an organized
insurgency base that numbers roughly 500,000 people,
including the NVA troops in South Vietnam. This
insurgency base includes organized military and
irregular units as well as the political infrastruc-
ture. Less than half of the people are full-time
personnel in the organized military and irregular
units that constitute a true military threat. The
remainder includes large numbers of older people
and youths as well as women, most of them organized
on a part-time basis. Although they are vital to
the functioning of the VC infrastructure and are
important for support of military forces, they do
not constitute offensive military threats.
III. Man ower Availabilities
A. North Vietnam
1. Annual Additions
Of North Vietnam's population of 18.7
million at the beginning of 1968, approximately
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2.8 million are males within the draft ages of 17
and 35. About 1.5 million of these draft-age males
are believed to be physically fit, and about 500,000
are already in the armed forces, leaving a poten-
tial military manpower pool in the civilian labor
force of more than one million physically fit draft
age men. During 1968, slightly less than 200,000
will reach the military service age and an esti-
mated 120,000 of these probably would be fit for
military service. Although total forces have
increased only slightly since the beginning of
1967, induction at an annual level of 100,000 to
120,000 was almost certainly continued during 1967
to replace normal attrition and the greatly increased
Communist losses in South Vietnam. If Communist
losses continue at the level of the first five
months of this year and if the North Vietnamese
replace these losses, the estimated 120,000
physically fit men reaching draft age this year
will fall far short of meeting these demands.
Three alternatives are available to make up this
deficit: (a) further reducing in-country forces;
(b) tapping the physically fit civilian manpower
pool; or (c) widening the draft age limits for
military service.
In-Country Forces
The current Joint Staff/DIA estimate is
that North Vietnam probably considers about 300,000
of the present in-country forces necessary to provide
for defense of the homeland. This basic defense
force includes six infantry divisions, air and
coastal defense forces, and command and logistics
elements. A force of about 50,000 would be available
for out-of-country deployment during the last half
of 1965. This diversion of 50,000 military personnel
would be a one-time nonrecurring input to the Com-
munist force level in South Vietnam until such time
as the original units were regenerated in the North.
3. Civilian Labor Force
North Vietnam has a civilian manpower
pool of nearly one million physically fit draft-age
males. An estimated 500,000 of these could be mobi-
lized from the civilian labor force for military
service without grave disruption to the economy.*
~' In addition, many of the 120,000 students above
the age of 15 could be put to work to replace draft-
age laborers not now i.n military service.
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As with the drawdown of in-country military forces,
the drains from the labor force would be a one-time
nonrecurring gain for the armed forces and when
exhausted could not be regenerated.
Labor could be drawn from several
sectors of the economy. The North Vietnamese
labor force is largely unskilled, underemployed,
and, at least in agriculture, seasonally unemployed.
Agriculture (including animal husbandry, fishing,
and forestry) employs about 7 million people, or
almost 70 percent of the civilian labor force,
and is particularly labor-intensive. It is esti-
mated that at least 200,000 workers could be drawn
from agriculture without a decline in agricultural
output because of the low average productivity of
North Vietnamese farmers. Moreover, additional
labor can be withdrawn from agriculture by sub-
stituting imported food for lost domestic produc-
tion. Of the approximately 800,000 in the indus-
trial labor force, about 600,000 are engaged in
handicraft activities. Probably about one-fourth
of these could be diverted to the armed forces
without a significant loss in essential output.
Consumer goods would be scarcer, but increased
imports could be at least a partial offset. It
is estimated that 10 percent of the 1.1 million
workers in the trade and services sector of the
economy could be diverted to the military establish-
ment with only a slight effect on the economy.
Much of the labor in the trade and services sector
is engaged in marginal occupations such as personal
services, sanitation work, and the like. These
workers can be easily replaced by less trained
people, without serious economic disruption.
Since the beginning of the year the Com-
munists have substantially increased the South
Vietnamese population under their control and,
consequently, the manpower available for recruit-
ment. Although the Communists claim that by the
end of March 1.6 million people had been "liberated,"
US population control data indicate that the
figure probably is closer to 1 million. At the
end of 1967, the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES)
recorded 2.8 million people under VC control. At
the end of March 1968, the HES data recorded more
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than 3.1 million under VC control. An additional
720,000 were added to the contested category. The
VC are able to draw on this base plus other popu-
lation groups not directly under their control.
IV. Manpower Losses
Losses sustained by Viet Cong/North Vietnamese
enemy forces have been running at unprecedented
rates during 1968. On a monthly basis, total man-
power losses have exceeded 32,000 a month, more
than 90 percent of these taking place in South
Vietnam.
A. South Vietnam
According to MACV estimates, Viet Cong/
North Vietnamese forces have lost more than 145,000
men during the first five months of 1968. This
estimate includes all causes -- killed, died of
wounds, disabled, died of sickness and accident,
deserted, defected, and captured. We believe this
estimate is high enough to include those lost from
airstrikes, losses during infiltration, and would
note that it probably includes large numbers from
the insurgency base outside the Regular Forces.
The average monthly rate of 29,000 is in contrast
to a monthly rate of about 13,000 during the last
quarter of 1967.
B. North Vietnam and Laos
It is estimated that the forces within
North Vietnam lose personnel, through such causes
as disability, retirement, and losses resulting
from air attack, at a maximum annual rate of about
10 percent. This amounts to about 35,000 a year,
or a monthly rate of about 3,000 persons. North
Vietnamese civilian and military losses resulting
from air attacks have been negligible since
31 March because of the reduced level of bombing.
There is little information with which to
estimate the attrition of enemy forces in Laos.
For purposes of this estimate, it is assumed that
the forces in Laos experience annual losses of
about 15 percent, or about 5,000 troops.
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V. Current Manpower Replacement
A. Viet Cong Recruiting
Primarily because of the large rural popu-
lation now under Viet Cong control, the Communists
in South Vietnam have apparently been able to come
by sufficient manpower to replace most of the
heavy 1968 losses in Viet Cong organizations. But
the average quality of these forces has declined
somewhat. We believe that present Viet Cong monthly
recruiting is on the order of 7,000 to 10,000.
The Viet Cong have resorted to an increasing degree
of coercion in its recruitment program during the
last few months. To the extent that the need for
coercion may portend an inability to keep recruit-
ment at the 7,000 to 10,000 level then the drain
on North Vietnamese manpower could become even
greater than estimated but still would not exceed
North Vietnamese capabilities.
North Vietnamese infiltration into South
Vietnam in 1968 has already assumed unprecedented
proportions. The full extent of this activity is
not known, but about 25,000 men in organized units
arrived in South Vietnam since 1 January. Analysis
of Rear Services traffic has enabled us to estimate
that about 250 battalion-size groups have begun to
infiltrate since the first of the year. On the
basis of the evidence available, it is estimated
that at least 150,000 North Vietnamese troops had
been put into the infiltration pipeline by the end
of May .
It is estimated that 60,000 to 80,000 North
Vietnamese troops arrived in South Vietnam during
the first five months of 1968, and the number may
be significantly higher. All of the troops now
engaged in infiltration movements should have
arrived in the South by the end of August. The
peak in arrivals will probably occur during June
and July. On the basis of these movements, it is
estimated that infiltration for the first eight
months of 1968 should average about 20,000 a month.
If the present trend continues, total infiltration
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could be 240,000 by the end of the year.* By way
of contrast,- North Vietnamese infiltration --
organized unit and filler -- is estimated to have
been on the order of 100,000 in both 19.66 and 1967.
VI. Manpower Replacement Capabilities
A. Quantitative Aspects
Total estimated enemy manpower losses dur-
ing 1958 are heavily weighted by the MACV estimates
of losses in South Vietnam, which account for more
than 90 percent of the estimated average monthly
loss of 32,000 persons, or more than 380,000 for
the year. The MACV estimate of 29,000 losses a
month includes in it a substantial number of
laborers and other civilians as well as persons
in lower order irregular elements such as Self-
Defense Forces and Assault Youth. Thus they should
probably be regarded as an overstatement of the
manpower that must be provided to maintain the
strength of the regular military forces.
It is impossible to differentiate between
losses sustained by regular combat units and other
categories of organized forces or civilians. The
available evidence on current recruitment efforts
as well as infiltration movements makes it apparent
that the Communists are intent on and have the
capability of maintaining the strength of regular
combat forces-and guerrillas at their pre-Tet
levels.
Recruitment in South Vietnam is estimated
to have averaged about 7,000 to 10,000 a month
thus far in 1968. Unless Viet Cong control over
its population base is significantly eroded, this
rate can probably be maintained, giving the Viet
Cong a total manpower input of from 80,000 to
120,000 for 1968.
'~ Losses among infiltrating personnel from aZZ
causes are estimated to be on the order of 10 per-
cent. We believe that since the MACV Zoss estimates
are Zar~ge enough to iraeZude infiltration losses
there is no need to re-duce the estimate of the in-
filtration flow to South Vietnam. A few of the
infiltrating groups are probably destined for
service in Laos and the North Vietnam Panhandle.
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With this capability in the South and
assuming that the remainder of the manpower burden
must be assumed by North Vietnam, then Hanoi must
provide from 260,000 to 300,000 personnel.
Quantitatively this burden is within North
Vietnam's capabilities, as shown in the following
tabulation for 1968 and 1969::
1968 1969
Annual draft 120 120
Military redeployment 50
Drawdown from
civilian labor force 90 to 130 140 to 180
These manpower requirements imply a draw-
down of the civilian labor force of about 110,000
in 1968 and 160,000 in 1969. This is roughly
25 to 30 percent per year of the 500,000 laborers
estimated to be available for mobilization. A large
number of these would already have had some training,
being members of reserve or militia units. Thus
the quantitative limits of North Vietnamese manpower
would not be exhausted by the end of 1969 and indeed
could be continued for at least another year or two.
The provision of this much manpower implies
that North Vietnam would replace all losses, regard-
less of the type of forces sustaining them. This
is doubtful because, as noted above, many of the
.casualties are sustained by low-order irregular
elements or civilians. If, however, infiltration
is maintained throughout the year at the higher
rates observed during the first eight months --
20,000 a month -- then North Vietnam could move
South as many as 240,000 troops during 1968. Most
of this infiltration is almost certainly intended
to refurbish regular combat units and is dictated
by the amounts necessary to keep these forces at
current levels.
It should be noted that about 40,000 of the
estimated losses are sustained by forces in North
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Vietnam and Laos. They do not enter into the infil-
tration estimate. When they are subtracted from
total losses, the maximum call on North Vietnamese
manpower to serve in the South is from 220,000 to
260,000. These figures are roughly consistent
with the projections of infiltration for 1968.
Since a flow of this magnitude would not be designed
to replace all losses in South Vietnam, it must
be regarded as an indicator of a decision to expand
somewhat the NVA force structure in the South.
Current intelligence on the possible arrival of
new units indicates that the NVA force structure
may, indeed, be undergoing some further expansion.
B. Qualitative Aspects
In general the information on the age
distribution, extent of training, and physical
fitness of North Vietnamese troops infiltrating
South Vietnam since the beginning of 1968 is still
too sparse to enable a firm judgment to be made
about reductions in physical and training standards.
The use of personnel either below or above normal
draft age limits is not a new phenomenon, although
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it may be increasing somewhat. About 20 percent
of troops infiltrating during 1967 were over 35,
and a few teenagers also have been noted previously.
Similarly, there were reports in late 1966 and mid-
1967 of personnel being infiltrated into South
Vietnam with less than six weeks basic training.
Since a large number of the current infiltrators
are reserves or militia personnel with previous
training, a six-week training period may not be
inordinately low.
Available evidence suggests that groups
entering South Vietnam during 1968 have experienced
the same problems as in previous years. A study
based on documents from 1966 and 1967 indicated
that permanent losses from all causes during in-
filtration were on the order of 10 percent. Most
of these resulted from sickness. Air strikes and.
desertions each accounted for about two percent.
Prisoner and defector interrogation reports
have always contained references to poor morale
and low motivation. The reporting in 1968 inter-
rogation reports has not differed enough from
previous years to warrant a firm judgment of any
significant or general decline in the quality of
recent infiltrators. Although the reporting does
indicate some further decline from that noted
previously, it does not yet seem to reflect a
serious problem particularly when other evidence
is considered. To the extent that quality has
deteriorated, it may partly reflect the limitations
of the North Vietnamese training base.
The evidence is not sufficient to make a
hard judgment of the extent of decline in the
physical and training standards of 1968 infil-
trators. There is increasing evidence, however,
that regardless of quality there has been a
decline in morale and fighting effectiveness.
Training obviously has an important influence on
morale as well as combat effectiveness. Some
draftees have not completed a full cycle of basic
or infiltration training, and reservists who make
up the majority of several infiltrating groups
have not received additional training after being
called up. Amore significant explanation of
some decline in combat effectiveness is the fact
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that some battalion-size infiltration groups --
at least in the eastern DMZ and around Saigon --
recently have been put into battle as combat units
with very little prior training with their assigned
.unit. The use of new personnel in this manner,
particularly in unfamiliar areas, does enable the
enemy to maintain pressure on friendly forces in
an area of his choosing, but only at a very high
cost in personnel losses. There is an increasing
body of evidence indicating that the high number
of casualties being taken by enemy forces and the
fear of air attack contribute to a decline in troop
morale and combat effectiveness.
These problems have not yet reached
serious proportions, but they must be of some
concern to Hanoi. Although the defection rate
has been lower during 1968 than it was during
1967, there is a larger share of officers,
including North Vietnamese, among 1968 defectors.
Within the last month, there have been two
instances of over 80 North Vietnamese soldiers
surrendering en mass in I Corps. One recent
document stated that infiltrated replacements
"displayed poor combat spirit and abandoned their
positions," adding that "nothing could stop them."
The North Vietnamese are now employing an
estimated four divisions and two training groups
for basic infiltration training. By employing a
three-month training cycle, it is estimated that
from 145,000 to 175,000 recruits can be trained
each year. By shortening the training cycle or
expanding the training base, an additional 50,000
to 60,000 recruits could be trained. Since the
number of infiltrating thus far this year exceeds
the number that could have been trained during
the same period and because only a small drawdown
of trained in-country forces has occurred, it is
probable that the training cycle has been shortened
for some of the infiltrators.
Formal non-commissioned officer (NCO) and
officer training schools, as well as the military
academy at Son Tay, were abandoned after they
were taken under attack by bombing. Officer
training classes -- conducted at division level
and lasting from two to three months -- are com-
posed of senior NCO's or individuals who have
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completed at least seven years of formal schooling.
NCO training is no longer mandatory, but some
divisions conduct short courses. Soldiers who
have good records and exhibit political zeal are
eligible to hold NCO rank. The largest single
source of .junior officers is now believed to be
from battlefield promotions.
The North Vietnamese army is apparently
experiencing a shortage of trained personnel to
fill platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and squad
leader positions, and the overall competence of
the company-grade officer has declined. These
factors are probably the result of increased
demands of the air defense effort, the upgrading
of several brigades to divisions, and the require-
ment to create additional divisions, regiments,
and supporting elements for infiltration into
South Vietnam. This quality problem will probably
continue to plague the North Vietnamese army. It
undoubtedly has caused some reduction in the
effectiveness and regenerative capacity of some
units.
The fact that the 1968 filler groups are
comprised increasingly of men outside of the prime
military age group -- many of them young, recent
draftees and older reservists -- is consistent
with Hanoi's desire not to weaken the quality of
the home army. Hanoi, moreover, may be trying to
avoid creating a large gap i:n particular age groups
and to husband a share of the superior manpower in
each age group. Some evidence of this is the fact
that large numbers of prime candidates for lower
level military leadership could be found among the
student population which has expanded during the
past three years, despite the increasing need for
troops.
VII. Impact of Manpower Inputs on Enemy
Capabilities
Since the heavy February attacks, most of North
Vietnam's manpower inputs have come from filler
infiltration to offset current losses or to build
up units that were weakened during the Tet offen-
sive. The combination of filler infiltration and
in-country recruiting/upgrading has probably
enabled the enemy to build up his Regular Forces
by something on the order of 10,000 men during
January-April 1968, despite heavy losses.
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I I
The deployment of Viet Cong/North Vietnamese
Main and Local Forces did not change significantly
during the first four months of 1968. The changes
in relative troop dispositions, by Corps areas,
seemed principally to raise force levels in the I
and II Corps areas. In addition to the movement
of at least two divisions into I Corps, the most
significant redeployment of troops was the move-
ment of the 325C North Vietnamese Division from
the I Corps area into the northern highlands in
the II Corps area during March and April. There
were small decreases in the relative numbers of
troops deployed in the III and IV Corps areas.
at least 150,000 infiltrators have
arrived or are expected to arrive in South Vietnam
during the first eight months of 1968. Of -this
number, 60,000 to 80,000 are estimated to have
reached the South by 1 June.
it is estimated tentatively that the
infiltrating troops arriving in the South during
the first eight months of 1968 will possibly be
deployed in the following Viet Cong/North Viet-
namese military jurisdictions:
Percent
DMZ/Tri-Thien-Hue
25
area
MR 5
18
B3 Front
10
COSVN
37
Unknown
10
This estimate of relative distribution of infiltra-
tion personnel tends to confirm that the enemy is
deploying replacement and filler personnel to the
areas where he has been hardest hit and sustained
the greatest number of casualties. The estimated
deployment. of infiltrating groups does not neces-
sarily represent a significant shift in the enemy's
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strategy. The unusually large number of troops
apparently destined for the COSVN or III Corps
area, for example, seems justified. Viet Cong/North
Vietnamese losses in the III Corps area during
January-March amounted to 28 percent of total losses.
Total troops deployed in that area amounted to 24
percent during the same period. We do not yet have
May losses broken down by Corps area, but on the
basis of preliminary calculations, it appears that
losses in the III Corps area may be on the order
of 40 percent. Since the beginning of the year,
the enemy seems to have suffered about 50,000
losses -- one-third of the total -- in the III
Corps area. Thus the earmarking of about 37 per-
cent of infiltrators for the COSVN area, which
may also have responsibility for supplying troops
to MR 10 and MR 6 outside the III Corps area and
possibly to the IV Corps area, appears to be designed
to maintain a constant level of troops in an area
that has experienced heavy casualties rather than
to increase troop strengths. Although the probable
deployment in the III Corps area apparently is not
intended to expand the forces in this area, it is
obviously designed to retain the enemy's capability
to maintain sustained pressure on the Saigon area.
VIII. The Price of Maintaining Force Levels
North Vietnam's manpower losses in support of
the war in the South have been high, amounting to
probably well over 200,000 men. It is possible that
the present manpower drain and the prospects for its
continuation have been an important influence on the
North Vietnamese in their shift of policy on the war
this year. Their decision to move to a "fight-talk"
stage in the confict -- seen in the current Paris
talks -- appears to involve a desire to achieve a
"decisive" outcome in the war in 1968 if possible,
or in 1969 at the latest. Rather than face the drain
of a continued long and piecemeal attritional war
with the U5, Hanoi may have opted for a near maximum
effort in the hope that it could force a decisive
outcome in a relatively short period of time. It.
may have viewed such an effort as potentially less
costly -- if it could be brought off successfully --
than a continuation of its strategy of prior years.
Having opted for such a course the North Viet-
namese will now be under strong pressure to make
sure that their gamble pays off, and that the
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expend:i.ture of manpower is not in vain. They may
thus be more willing to accept some compromises,
at least on the less significant elements of a
settlement in the South, than they would have been
had they attempted to continue along past policy
lines. In the final analysis, however, Hanoi's
willingness to continue to bear the burden of a
stepped up input of manpower to the South will
relate primarily to its judgment on extent to which
the effort is moving the situation in South Vietnam
toward a satisfactory solution.
As the North assumes an increasing role in the
fighting, its share of the manpower drain is
undoubtedly a matter of growing concern. Neverthe-
less, Hanoi shows no signs yet of backing away from
its commitment and is apparently willing to increase
its manpower investment if that is the price of
achieving its political goals.
The gross levy on North Vietnam's manpower base
will have reached highly significant levels if the
inputs observed thus far in 1968 have to be main-
tained for extended periods of time. The manpower
reserves are, however, adequate to absorb this level
of attrition well beyond 1969. Hanoi, moreover,
has other options that make the quantitative man-
power drain more manageable. These would include
a widening of draft age limits, additional drawdowns
from the in-country military force, a reduction of
the air defense and labor forces still kept intact
to react to the bombings, and deeper cuts into the
civilian labor force. The major effect of most of
these measures would be an increase in North Viet-
nam's vulnerability to offensive military action,
an increase in its dependence on its Communist
allies for material aid, and additional personal
sacrifice and deprivation.
Although a sustained and heavy input of man-
power into the South is within North Vietnam's
capabilities, there are additional considerations
that make the effort a costly venture. These are
primarily the long-term effects of substantial
manpower losses and the probability of a worsening
of morale among military forces and civilians.
Although morale in North Vietnam is adversely
affected by .results of the fighting in the South,
the regime tightly controls the amount and kind of
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information made available on the home front. The
nature of the war, its direction, and the level
of casualties suffered by North Vietnamese is
probably not fully understood by most North Viet-
namese. This knowledge will, however, be more
difficult to conceal as the manpower commitment
is sustained and casualties continue to mount.
As draft calls continue, the effect on the morale
of draft age males within North Vietnam probably
is debilitating. By appealing to patriotism and
by expounding the theme that victory is within
sight, the regime is probably able to minimize
the degree of resistance and resentment. The
main contact that the average North Vietnamese
civilian has with the war is tkze US bombing in
the North, which has caused the separation of
families, the loss of possessions, mental anguish,
and physical pain. With the cessation of the
bombing north of the 19th parallel, the morale of
much of the population has undoubtedly improved.
To convince the populace of the continuing need
for the draft and other sacrifices, the regime
is striving to remind the people that the US
bombing program continues in part of North Vietnam
and could be expanded at any time. There has,
for example, been little relaxation of population
controls of civil defense programs, and the air
defense reaction to reconnaissance flights is
vigorous and complete.
Although there are indications that the average
quality of North Vietnamese troops has probably
declined somewhat, military effectiveness has not
yet been seriously affected. Some instances of
significant desertion rates amongst North Viet-
namese troops in recent weeks, particularly in the
Khe Sanh area, have been noted, and there are
reports from high-level defectors and prisoners
that depict low morale.
The increasing evidence of declining morale
among military forces and the likelihood that this
will become more pervasive among civilians cannot
be overlooked by Hanoi. These problems, however,
are not governing for the regime. In a society
as rigidly controlled as is that in North Vietnam,
it is unlikely that popular disaffection will grow
to the point at which it begins to exert a con-
trolling influence on Hanoi's war policies.
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I I
The final determinant of Hanoi's willingness
to sacrifice manpower will be its judgment of the
likely course of events' in the South. If the
regime is convinced-that its persistence can lead
(1) to a toppling of the South Vietnamese leadership
and the ascendancy of_ the National Liberation
Front or the Alliance, (2) to a weakening of US
determination to stay in the war, or (3) to a
movement of the Paris talks along paths favorable
to Hanoi's interest, the price will seem worthwhile.
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APPENDIX
Nates on Methodology and the Data Base
A. Estimates of NVA Forces in South Vietnam
The upward
adjustments are of several t es: (1) the addition
of new units and newly formed 25X1
or newly identified units not carried in the
collateral order of battle by MACV because they
have not met the criteria for acceptance into the
order of b attle; (2) the use of estimative techniques
to add unlisted support personnel integral to
divisions, and (3) estimates made to reflect the
enemy's measures through the infiltartion process
to bring units back to normal strength after losses
have been sustained.
The major benefit of using estimative techniques
to estimate enemy strengths is that they tend to
eliminate most of the time lag in the acceptance of
units into "order of battle" holdings. These esti-
mates are believed to provide reliable approxi-
mations of enemy strength for the purpose of national
intelligence and policy decisions. They are not
intended and could not be used as OB holdings for
field command and tactical purposes.
B. North Vietnamese Labor Force Data
According to US Bureau of the Census estimates,
there are presently about 10.4 million North Viet-
namese in the 15-to-64 age group. By excluding
from this total the 500,000 in the armed forces
and the approximately 120,000 students of working
age, an estimated labor force of 9.8 million is
derived. Such a figure represents a rate of
growth of the labor farce of 2 percent per year
above the officially reported 1960 labor force
figure of 8.1 million. This growth rate of 2 per-
cent appears reasonable in view of the population
growth rate during the period.
25X1
25X1
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The U5 Bureau of the Census also estimates
about 200,000 North Vietnamese males will reach
the age of 17 in 1968 and about 205,000 will reach
the age of l7 in 1969. Of these totals, at least
120,000 17-year-old males will be physically fit
for military service in each of the years 1968 and
1969
~i'he number of males regarded as physically fit
may actually be higher. A recently captured North
Vietnamese soldier reported that in 1965 only people
with acute tuberculosis and heart disease were
excused from the draft for physical reasons.
The following tabulation shows an estimate of
the labor force, according
as of 1 January 1968:
to sectors of employment,
Sector of Employment
Thousand Persons
Agriculture
7,000
Services
800
Industry (including
800
handicrafts)
Transport and com-
400
munications
Trade
300
Construction
250
Other
250
Total
9,800
These figures were derived from the official
data on the 1960 labor force and from various state-
ments and figures announced by the regime during
the last eight years.
The estimated total number of civilian workers
countering the air wa.r over North Vietnam amounts
to a maximum of about 600,000 individuals, includ-
ing full-time and part-time workers (both male
and female) of all ages. The tabulation below
shows that of this total less than 200.,000 workers
were engaged full time:
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Repair and re con- 72 100 to 200
struction of
lines of com-
munication
Transport workers 100 to 120 25
Civilian defense 150
The number of full-time workers on repair and
reconstruction of lines of communication (72,000)
was cross checked by using aerial photography to
determine the extent of reconstruction and repair
activities.. A ratio of two part-time workers to
every full-time worker was established from a
variety of intelligence sources.
The additional 100.,000 to 120,000 full-time
transport workers include laborers for the exten-
sive transloading required in bypassing interdic-
tions in the transport system, additional truck
drivers and boatmen, and the increased use of
primitive transport,. particularly for moving
supplies south.
The estimate of 150,000 part-time civilian
defense workers was based on collateral sources
C. Infiltration Estimates
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I I
The method employed in determining the geo-
graphic areas of South Vietnam to which infiltrators
are being deployed is also the result of analyzing
information derived from collateral
sources. Prisoner reports and captured documents
are reviewed to determine the point of arrival for
infiltration groups with known numbers to determine
any correlation between designation and destination.
It was discovered that the first digit of each
infiltration group number appeared to indicate
specific geographic areas within South Vietnam.
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D. Enemy Losses
Total enemy losses of about 150,000 men during
the first five months of 1968 are assigned as
follows:
Killed in action (KIA)
100,055
Died of Wounds/
Permanently
(DOW/PD)
Disabled
32,200
Defections
2,633
Prisoners of war
2,307
Other losses
10,000
Total
147,195
The KIA data are subject to both upward and
downward biases. There is, however, no assurance
that they cancel each other out. In some situa-
tions, an actual count of bodies can be made, but
in others, confusing and hectic combat conditions
preclude such an estimate. The inclusion of
civilians, laborers, and self-defense militia
elements in KIA data all tend to .overstate the
actual number of enemy killed. During February
1968, MACV reduced tYie total monthly KIA figure
by 10,000 to account for what they believed to be
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unusually large inclusions of these elements as a
result of the Tet offensive. On the other hand,
failure to include enemy forces killed by un-
observed airstrikes and artillery barrages as
well as the enemy's practice of removing dead
from the battlefield tend to result in an under-
statement.
The DOW/PD estimate is calculated by multi-
plying KIA data by a factor of 0.35 which was
derived from a 70-document study done by MACV in
late 1966. For the February 1968 data, MACV used
a factor of 0.18 on a portion of reported KIA's
to allow for a lower DOW/PD to KIA ratio as a
result of the urban fighting during the Tet
offensive. This resulted in a factor of 0.28 on
a countrywide basis for computing a DOW/PD esti-
mate.
Although there have been difficulties in deter-
mining the number of detainees permanently detained,
prisoner of war and Hoi Chanh data are probably the
most reliab le elements of the total losses estimate.
"Other losses" include desertions, permanent
losses as a result of sickness and accidents,
discharges, and retirements. MACV has carried this
total at 2,000 per month since 1967. Although
little is known about these types of losses, evi-
dence exists that they may be substantially greater
than 2,000 per month. Desertion is believed to be
.far more common than defection (Chieu Hoi).
Substantial permanent losses also occur because
of malaria and diet deficiencies. Furthermore,
some military personnel have. been active since
the Viet Minh days and are becoming tao old for
strenuous combat duty.
E. Viet Cong Recruiting
The recruiting estimate of 7,000 to 10,000
per month for the last few months is reasonable
and perhaps even conservative. The estimate is
based on information on recruiting and upgrading
activity and on our estimate of the overall
strength and losses among the various Viet Cong
elements.
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Replacements for losses in the Main and Local
Forces and Administrative Service troops come
from direct recruiting and from upgrading from
the Guerrillas. We believe upgrading is a larger
source of manpower for the Regular Forces than is
direct recruitment. The Viet Cong consider a
"volunteer" from a Guerrilla unit as a recruit.
In addition to these personnel moving into the
Regular Forces, the Viet Cong recruit large numbers
for the Guerrillas and other elements of the infra-
structure. Many of these are of lower quality.
At present, quotas for Guerrillas call for 40 to
60 percent females and 10 to 15 percent teenagers
under sixteen years of age. We believe that the
average. quality of recruits for the regulars has
not fallen seriously, because the better motivated
and more experienced persons are. taken. The
average quality of Guerrillas continues to fall,
as it has throughout the war. Although the quality
of the Guerrilla soldier has decreased, the effec-
tiveness of Guerrilla units has not decreased com-
mensurately, because of the increased quality and
quantity of Guerrilla weaponry.
On the basis of an assumed undiminished Viet
Cong control over large elements of South Vietnam's
population, we believe this rate can be maintained.
On the basis of the same indications that we have
used, MACV has recently revised its estimate of
1968 recruiting upwards. During the summer and
fall of 1967, MACV believed that the recruiting
rate had fallen off to about 3,500. After con-
sidering the apparent ability of the Viet Cong to
replace losses during 1968, MACV has used estimates
of between 7,000 and. 12,000 in its retroactive
adjustments of the order of battle.
F. North Vietnamese Defensive Requirements
It is recognized that the North Vietnamese
army has a significant capability to reinforce in
South Vietnam with regular forces, should the
political decision to do so be taken. The dispatch
of most of its division-size forces would, for
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example, lead to a greatly stepped up enemy war
effort along more conventional lines, with its
resultant increased casualties, logistic require-
ments, and the like. If the North Vietnamese-were
to make such a decision, they would leave them-
selves open to the threat of an invasion. While
they might hope that their regional forces and
militia would be able to bear the initial brunt
of such an invasion, they would be unable to con-
tain an invasion and would probably have to recall
sizable forces from South Vietnam or invite the
Chinese to defend them.
In addition, they would be stripping the North
of a major portion of the army's training base.
The deployment of such sizable forces would create
.logistical requirements beyond the capability to
sustain them in conventional combat, unless the
bombing campaign were stopped.
For the purposes of this memorandum, therefore,
we are assuming that a prudent North Vietnamese
government faced with a threat of a US invasion
would want to maintain at least six divisions and
other forces in a position to counter any invasion,
about 300,000 men. These forces would be needed
to cope with the threat of an Inchon-type landing
or an armored thrust north of the DMZ and to pro-
vide a North Vietnamese training base.
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TAP SECRET
THE JOINT CHEFS OF STAFF
WASkINGTON, D. C. 20301
JCSM-364-68
11 June 196$
TS 189080
Subject: North Vietnam's Ability To Withstand
Manpower Attrition (U)
1. (S) Reference is made to your request of 10 June 1968
for the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a draft intel-
ligence memorandum, subject as above, to be transmitted. to the
President along with your memorandum.
2. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the draft
memorandum and have noted that the estimate of North Vietnam
Army troops in South Vietnam is somewhat higher than the 90,000
to 93,000 currently accepted by MACV. In view of the uncertain-
ties caused by the impact of the current high level of infiltra-
tion,- however, any estimate of these forces would be tenuous and
would be subject to continuous refinement.
3. (TS) On balance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in general
agreement with the judgment that manpower losses have not exhausted
North Vietnam's reserves and that, under the assumptions advanced
and with present operating restraints, Hanoi can maintain the
combat forces in South Vietnam at their current strengths beyond
1969. It is also believed that continuing heavy manpower require-
ments will produce increasingly severe strains on North Vietnam,
but there is as yet no indication that these developments have
reached the point where they are influencing Hanoi's determination
to carry on the war. Thus, in the absence of actions or develop-
ments to increase attrition, the arithmetic does not support a
hope that a pure attrition battle can be won in 2 years.
4. (TS) Nevertheless, the prospect of continuing heavy losses
cannot be attractive to the enemy unless he believes they will
pay off. Weighing the costs of protracted war, it may well be
TaP SEG'~ET
GROUP - 1
Occluded from autcmat~.
downgrading and
deClasslfiCaUon li
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TAP S~C~~T
that he intends to bring the contest to final issue long before
2 years have gone by. If this is the case, and there is increas-
ing evidence to support it, he may have already organized and
trained larger forces than we know from the one-half million man-
power reserve available to him now. If this turns out to be the
case and if 1968 is the year of decision, then long-term attrition
estimates are not meaningful except as they may have influenced
his decision to go for the main chance now.
5. {Z'5) On the other hand, if he seeks to retain the option
for protracted war - as a hedge against failure in 1968, then raw
attrition is only one of his problems. An immediate problem he
faces is the relationship between his strategy and his losses.
In 1968, he has been losing men (both North Vietnamese Army and
Viet Cong) a?t a rate which, if it continues, would produce losses
of approximately 350,000 men in South Vietnam. This high-loss
rate is the consequence of his offensive strategy, the forward
deployment of his main forces, and his effort to achieve a maximum
impact in a short period of time. From a military standpoint, we
do not believe that he can absorb such losses over a protracted
period of time and maintain the level of battlefield effectiveness
required to pursue this strategy and attain his goals.
6. (TS) If he does not throw his entire force into a final
climactic battle, regardless of casualties, we believe he can be
forced back into his bases by allied offensive operations. He
still can attack on a selective basis, but the basic dilemma he
would face in the long run will not change. If he chooses to
withdraw his main mobile forces from the populated areas or is
forced out by allied action:
a. Pressure on the Government of Vietnam will be relieved,
and it will continue to gain strength.
b. Pressure on the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces will be
relieved, and they will gain strength and effectiveness.
c. Enemy access to they population will decrease, and his
recruiting will fall off .
d. The effectiveness of his cadre will diminish as the rres-
sure on it increases.
e. His hope for an uprising will disappear.
TAP ~E~~~~
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e UI~' ,tG6~t t
7. (TS) His long-term military prospects on the ground in South
Vietnam against allied forces are not good. His best hope is that
through spectacular attacks, even at very high cost in casualties,
he can create a short-term image of success on his side and the
image of hopelessness on our side. If he can bring about a loss
of confidence in the Government of Vietnam through military action
or negotiations, he will have achieved a major goal.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
~:.e ~Ui.
EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
faint Chiefs of Staff
TOP .~3fi
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TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
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