STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE [Vol 2, No. 1 - 4, Winter thru Fall 1958]

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 23, 2005
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 1, 1958
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2.pdf28.44 MB
[CONFIDENTIAL STUDIES INTELLIGENCE 25X1 VOL. 2 NO. I WINTERI-fi 3 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF TRAINING Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 CONFlDENT1ALa All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the authors. They do not represent the official views of the Central Intelligence Agency or of the Office of Training. tONFIDENTIAL STUDIES 'IN 'INTELLIGENCE Articles for the Studies in Intelligence may be written on any theoretical, doc- trinal, operational, or historical aspect of intelligence. The final responsibility for accepting or rejecting an article rests with the Edito- rial Board. The criterion for publication is whether or not, in the opinion of the Board, the article makes a contribution to the litera- ture of intelligence. This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the trans- mission or revelation of which to an unauthorized person is EDITORIAL BOARD SHERMAN KENT, Chairman LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON CONFIDENT Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 CONFIDENTIAL CONTENTS CONTRIBUTIONS AND DISTRIBUTION Contributions to the Studies may come from any member of the intelligence community or, upon invitation, from persons outside. Manuscripts should be submitted directly to the Ed- itor, Studies in Intelligence, Room 2013 R & S Building 143- and need not be coordinated or submitted through nels. They should be typed in duplicate, double-spaced, the original on bond paper. Footnotes should be inserted in the body of the text following the line in which the reference occurs. Articles may be classified through SECRET. For inclusion on the regular Studies distribution list call your office dissemination center or the responsible OCR desk, = For back issues and on other questions call the OM the Editor, Page Origin, Missions, and Structure of CIA Lyman B. Kirkpatrick 1 Strategic Thinking and Air Intelligence Major General James H. Walsh 7 Concepts for a Philosophy of Air Intelligence Lewis R. Long 31 Developments in Air Targeting: The Military Resources Model . . . . . . . . . Robert W. Leavitt 51 Horrible Thought . . . . . . . . . W. A. Tidwell 65 ELINT: A Scientific Intelligence System Charles A. Kroger, Jr. 71 Report on Hungarian Refugees . . . . Guy E. Coriden 85 Paper Mills and Fabrication . . . Stephen M. Arness 95 Lost Order, Lost Cause C. Bowie Millican, Robert M. Gelman, and Thomas A. Stanhope 103 Critiques of Some Recent Books on Intelligence The New Class-An Analysis of the Communist System, by Milovan Djilas . . . . . . . . Lena Marks 115 The Soviet Secret Police, by Simon Wolin and Robert M. Slusser . . . . . . . . . . John Rondeau 123 We Spied . . . . . . . . . Walter L. Pforzheimer 131 CONFIDENTIAL 25 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 ORIGIN, MISSIONS, AND STRUCTURE OF CIA Lyman B. Kirkpatrick This is a brief summary of the history of the modern origin of the central intelligence concept and thus of the Central Intel- ligence Agency. In 1940 the fortunes of Britain and France were at their lowest ebb. Some high-level officials of the US Government were predicting that Great Britain could not hold out against the Germans. To check on this, President Roosevelt sent Colo- nel William J. Donovan, prominent New York attorney and winner of the Congressional Medal of Honor as Commanding Officer of the 69th Regiment in World War I, abroad to dis- cover and report his estimate of the situation. Donovan first visited the Mediterranean area, and on his second trip talked to leaders of both Britain and France. His report indicated that Britain would hold out, but he urged that. the US im- mediately organize itself for global warfare. Donovan's par- ticular interest was in the intelligence field, and he went to talk to Secretary of the Navy Knox, Secretary of War Stimson, and Attorney General Jackson about his concept of an agency which would combine intelligence with the forces of propa- ganda and subversion. On 10 June 1941, Donovan proposed "a service of strategic information." This service would have an advisory panel com- posed of the chiefs of intelligence of the Army, the Navy, the Department of State, and the FBI. It would draw its personnel from the Army and the Navy and would also have a civilian staff. It would not displace or encroach upon the intelligence prerogatives of the established departments, although it would collect information independently. This was the start of the Office of the Coordinator of Information which combined in- formation, intelligence, and clandestine activities. In 1942, however, the Coordinator of Information was split and the Office of War Information-the predecessor of the present US Information Agency-was created and given the respon- sibility for all overt attributable propaganda information, and to the Office of Strategic Services went the responsibility for SECRET MORI/HRP PAGES 1-5 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 clandestine activities and for research and analysis of intelli- gence. From the OSS the present day intelligence community in- herited certain assets. Among these were records and some methods and means of procuring both overt and secret intelli- gence. There were certain basic counterespionage files devel- oped with the advice and assistance of some foreign intelligence services, particularly the British. There was a considerable reservoir of knowledge of procedures for research and analysis of basic intelligence information. There were some skilled per- sonnel. Finally, but far from last in importance, there were agreements with key foreign intelligence services. The history of the OSS, and particularly its relationship with other US intelligence organizations during World War II, is far too detailed for discussion in this essay. But it should be noted that shortly after the creation of the Office of Strategic Services, top level officials in the US intelligence community started to think about a peacetime intelligence service. On 25 August 1942, Brigadier General John Magruder wrote a paper on a proposed plan for a joint intelligence bureau which would be an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For the next two years there was considerable discussion of this and similar papers. On 5 October 1944 a document was originated in the office of General Donovan entitled "The Basis for a Permanent World- Wide Intelligence Service." Certain of the principles enun- ciated in this document are interesting to note. This service would collect, analyze, and deliver intelligence on the policy or strategy level. The proposed organization would have its own means of communication and control over its secret operations. It would not interfere with departmental intelligence and it would not have any police function. An individual rather than a collective responsibility for national intelligence was pro- posed. Finally, the director of the proposed organization would be responsible directly to the President. It is interesting to note that Secretary of War Stimson com- mented on the subject of intelligence coordination in his biog- raphy "On Active Service in Peace and War." This quotation. reads: "Stimson was insistent that no impatience with its occa- sional eccentricities should deprive the Army of the profits of co- operation with General Donovan's Office of Strategic Services. Throughout the war the intelligence activities of the United SECRET 3 States Government remained incompletely coordinated, but here again it was necessary to measure the profits of reorgani- zation against its dislocations and on the whole, Stimson felt that the American achievement in this field, measured against the conditions of 1940, was more than satisfactory. A full re- organization belonged to the post war period." On 18 January 1945, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee reported to the JCS on the subject of a central intelligence organization. The members proposed first a national intelli- gence authority composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy and the Chief of Staff to the President. There would be an advisory board consisting of the heads of the various intel- ligence services. The new organization would have the power to inspect the operations of the various departmental intelli- gence services and would have the responsibility for protecting sources and methods. At this juncture the press got wind of the discussions for creating a new intelligence organization and, on 9 February 1945, fairly complete details appeared in the Chicago Tribune and the Washington Times Herald. There was considerable furor, and some members of Congress took a dim view of the creation of what they felt might become a peacetime "gestapo." Shortly after this - just a few days before his death - President Roosevelt asked General Donovan to get together with the heads of the various intelligence and security services and get a consensus of views on a central service. Donovan did this and also went further and queried by letter all of the members of the Cabinet. Within the intelligence community there was general agreement that a central service might be appropriate, but there were several conflicting views as to whether it should report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Department of State, or to the President, and there was also controversy as to whether there should be individual or collec- tive responsibility for national intelligence. The response from the Cabinet members was varied and ranged from yes to no. After open hostilities had ceased, as we all vividly remember, there was almost frantic haste to demobilize not only the mili- tary services but many of the war agencies. On 20 September 1945 the OSS was disbanded. Its Research and Analysis Branch and its Presentation Unit were transferred to the De- partment of State, its Secret Intelligence and Special Opera- Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 4 SECRET tions Units were transferred to the Army, and the former were preserved in the Strategic Services Unit which reported to the Secretary of the Army. On 22 October 1945 a report prepared by Ferdinand Eberstadt on possible unification of the Army and Navy recommended a central intelligence organization and a national security coun- cil. On 14 November 1945 the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy met, discussed the proposed central intelligence organiza- tion, and set up an interdepartmental working committee to attempt to arrive at a unanimous recommendation. The end product of these reports and committees was the issuance on 22 January 1946 of the Executive Order creating the Central Intelligence Group. This Executive Order reflected much of the thinking and work that had gone on during the war. A National Intelligence Authority was created, composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy and the Military Chief of Staff to the President. The Director of the Central Intelli- gence Group was designated by the President, and personnel were to be assigned from the respective departments as well as recruited from civilian life. The Director of the new Central Intelligence Group was charged by the Executive Order with preparing plans for coordination. The new organization could inspect the activities of departmental intelligence if such in- spection were approved by the National Intelligence Authority. It could recommend policies and objectives. It was responsible for correlating, evaluating, and disseminating intelligence and for the performance of services of common concern and such other functions as directed. The Executive Order explicitly stated that the departments would continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence. Finally, an Intelligence Advisory Board, composed of the heads of the service intelligence agencies, was established to advise the Di- rector of the Central Intelligence Group. With the creation of the Central Intelligence Group there commenced a process of accretion of functions taken from the wartime agencies and from departments which were anticipat- ing reductions in budget under peacetime conditions. The Strategic Services Unit was transferred from the Department of the Army and became the Office of Special Operations - charged with espionage and counterespionage functions. The Washington Document Center was taken over from the Navy SECRET 5 and shortly after that the Army's German Military Documents Center at Fort Holabird joined this unit and together became the Foreign Documents Division. The Foreign Broadcast In- formation Service, an organization with worldwide bases for monitoring all non-coded radio traffic, which had originally been under the Federal Communications Commission, was transferred from the Army and became the Foreign Broadcast Information Division. During World War II the Army and Navy and OSS and occasionally other agencies had all ap- proached US businesses and institutions in search of foreign intelligence information. An early agreement was reached that this domestic collection should be performed as a service of common concern by Central Intelligence with other agencies participating as they desired, and this became the Contact Division. Another illustration of the type of functions taken on is the division of responsibilities with the Department of State on biographic intelligence. The list would be much too long if we attempted to enumerate all of the functions acquired in this method. Slightly over a year and a half after the creation of the CIG-on 25 July 1947-the Congress, utilizing most of the fea- tures of this Executive Order, passed the National Security Act of 1947 creating the Central Intelligence Agency. Thus, the mission of the Central Intelligence Agency becomes fairly obvious with the preceding background. The National Security Act of 1947 describes the general mission with em- phasis on coordination and on performing services of common concern. It should be clearly noted also that the legislation assigns two roles to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence - over-all coordination, as well as the role of head(s) of an Agency. Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 SECRET 7 Approved For RUease 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100020001-2 STRATEGIC THINKING AND AIR INTELLIGENCE Major General James H. Walsh My purpose in this article is to discuss, in very broad terms, some of the significant aspects of air strategy for the future and the vital functions that intelligence must perform in order to insure the success of future air operations. The suspicions currently entertained that the Soviet sputnik may be getting intelligence of both meteorological and cartographic nature re- quired for accurate firing of ICBMs illustrate some of the possi- ble relationships between air power and intelligence. In a rudi- mentary way, even the first earth satellites point up the tasks and capabilities of future intelligence systems required for survival under conditions of international technological com- petition - intelligence systems which must meet three basic criteria: global coverage, instantaneous discovery, and abso- lute accuracy. I believe that we have a reasonably good understanding of past and present concepts of air warfare and the relation of intelligence to those concepts. It is far more difficult to look into the future and to do so with the precision and clarity needed to prepare ourselves effectively for the trials and dan- gers ahead. The reason for this basic uncertainty is not that many people have neglected the problems of aerial technology and its stra- tegic implications. The reason is rather that we are in the midst of a technological revolution. Changes are becoming so rapid, so penetrating and, in many instances, so contradictory that the direct and indirect results of the technological revolu- tion tend to control - and at the same time toy confuse - the nature and application of tomorrow's air strategy. Neverthe- less, it is in this setting of dynamic technical change and a world beset by what often seems an unlimited number of related and unrelated political, economic, and military prob- lems that we must attempt to examine the future direction of air power. To begin with, we already have seen major alterations in the basic nature of air forces since World War II. The transition Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 $ SECRET to jets, nuclear weapons, sonic speeds, countless black boxes, and, to a degree, missiles typifies the changed environment which governs today's air capabilities as compared with those of 1945. Fifteen years ago the RAF qualitatively was the world's lead- ing air force. Today it is in third place. More important, it is not in a class, by a broad margin, with the air forces of the US and the USSR. It has neither the aircraft, the equipment, the bases, the research and development, nor the funds to become again a truly self-sufficient force, with strategic capa- bilities as required by world conditions. Fifteen years ago the Soviet Air Force was an adjunct- of the Russian army. Statistically it represented a force in quantity, but it had poor operational know-how and no strategic capa- bility. Its aircraft were fair, at best. Today the Soviet Air Force is the largest in the world. It is equipped with modern weapons, some of them as advanced as those of any other nation. It has a well-funded and aggressive research and de- velopment program. Although it still has many weaknesses, the Soviet Air Force is making a bid for world air mastery. The VS Air Force also has come of age in.the postwar period. It has held the quality lead for most of that time and still holds it for most of the important 'equipments. Its personnel are superior in training and efficiency. But the USAF has prob- lems, especially in areas outside the SAC program. Its progress is not to be belittled, but in some areas its progress perhaps has not been so fast or so forward as we would like it to be. The fortunate aspect is that during the postwar period the USAF has grown to be a global force. In fact, to this date, the USAF - not forgetting its naval support - is the only global force extant. This American capability is a fact of overriding importance. It will remain a controlling factor in the inter- national power equation, to a certain extent, irrespective of technological slippage and of the inevitable acquisition by the Soviet Union of a global missile force. The most important single change since World War II is that atomic airpower has become the dominant military force. The only way a nation can deliver nuclear firepower over long dis- tances and in a short time is through the air. Sea and ground delivery of nuclear warheads is important, particularly in spe- cial situations. But in terms of a global nuclear war, these SECRET 9 systems - and some of the secondary means of aerial de- livery - can do no more than furnish local, regional, and tac- tical support to the strategic air strike forces. One of the changes upon us deals with defense in nuclear aerial war. Whereas the offense still seems to have outdis- tanced defense, the old axiom that like weapons are the best defenses against like weapons again could become true. For the moment there is very little one can do when an atomic explosion occurs except to be underground, fully equipped with food and non-contaminated water or, preferably, plenty of Irish whiskey. Nevertheless, the very possession of nuclear weapons for defensive purposes may act as a "prevent- ing" factor - not because even the best defense would be capa- ble of halting an attack, but because a good defense system would boost the force requirements of the attacker, lower the probability that he can execute his plan with full success, and thus, in some cases at least, tend to induce him to delay his aggression until he has reached the required force and tech- nological levels. It is in the nature of a "race," that the aggressor may be unable to achieve such a posture of superi- ority that he can dare take the risk of nuclear attack. If this should be a vain hope, for example, because the defender has failed to keep up with the pace of the race, the actual use of nuclear warheads against incoming vehicles should reduce the effectiveness of the offense. Some of our forward looking scientists are optimistic about the feasibility of employing anti-ICBM missiles, which would take advantage of the greatest point of vulnerability of the early ballistic missile, its fixed trajectory. Many ideas have been proposed about nuclear predetonation and sophisticated employment of modern electronics to interfere with incoming nuclear attack. There are a number of passive defensive steps which could be taken to lessen the vulnerability of our retaliatory force. These include the dispersal of aircraft and missiles, shelters, and other forms of base hardening, short exposure times, rapid reaction procedures, and maintenance of a substantial portion of the alert force in the air at all times. Unfortunately such systems can be very costly. They are limited in their coverage and may not be reliable enough for Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 the safety of personnel and certain equipment. Elaborate pas- sive defenses tend to disrupt and slow the ability of an air force to retaliate as rapidly as required. For these reasons the stra- tegic effectiveness of passive defense is predicated upon effec- tive warning. By warning I refer to technical alarms such as radar and infrared sensing and to interrelated strategic and tactical indications intelligence. The true effectiveness of defense will be a function of the scope, size, quality, and mental effort put into requisite weapons systems needed to furnish capabilities for protection, warning, interception, and countermeasure tasks. It may be dubious whether or not even the best defensive system pitted against combinations of different types of attack weapons ever will attain a high kill rate, but this may not be the critical point. Rather, countersystems embodying nuclear warheads and built around effective warning and reaction responses suggest that a nation may be able to close the gap between the power of the offense and present limitations on defense. Such sys- tems could pre-empt the advantage of surprise by sneak attacks by an aggressive nuclear delivery force. They would force the attacker into more elaborate and costly delivery means, pri- marily large and massive raids which are susceptible to stra- tegic and tactical detection and to interception measures. Through all these means and measures the offensive may not necessarily be priced out of business, but its effectiveness should be reduced against its primary objective -the opponent's re- taliatory force. Thus, it would be hoped, the attacker would be induced not to strike because of the uncertainty over the success of his initial blow and also because he would have -to risk his main force at excessive loss rates. In nuclear war the first blow must be decisive: the retaliatory force must be killed. It is quite clear that intelligence influences the effectiveness of defense. Whatever the technical proficiency of a defense system, it can be improved by better intelligence, whereas even the technically most promising defenses can be invalidated through intelligence failure anywhere along the "assembly line" - from scientific intelligence to tactical warning. Per- haps it should be observed that good intelligence would allow the utilization of foreign scientific and technological achieve- ments for the improvement of our own posture. Beyond pro- SECRET '11 viding us with better design patterns, such intelligence also would enable us to build our equipment to such specifications as to optimize its capabilities against the enemy's weapons. I should like to turn now to a discussion of various tech- nological factors, some of them here now and some on the horizon, and try to relate them into a strategic pattern. During the years ahead we shall be approaching practical terminal limits in certain key parameters of weapons systems. We already may have reached what could be called terminal explosive power, not that it would be impossible to achieve higher yields. Within the next few decades we probably will attain terminal speeds, at least for terrestrial operations. We cannot exceed certain speeds without being forced from the earth's gravita- tional field. Before we achieve theoretical terminal velocities we should reach a far lower practical speed limit for operations directed against targets on the ground. We must remember that the attainment of maximum speed in flight may require more time than would be necessary to reach a terrestrial tar- get at lesser speeds. We certainly shall be capable of terminal ranges in the sense that future air and missile systems will be able to circumnavi- gate the globe at least once. I am convinced that there will be no practical limits to altitude, although there may be tem- porary barriers to surmount before manned and powered space flight becomes a reality. Such restrictions could occur in metallurgy, engines, communications, aero medicine, and nu- clear components, among other fields. Let me dwell for a moment on the relationship of altitude to tomorrow's air strategy. In the immediate future, altitude essentially will be a matter of tactical advantage inasmuch as, with respect to powered flight, we still shall be competing in heights measured by thousands of feet. We have come to recognize that the attack force with the higher altitude capa- bility, generally speaking, is the force with the greater penetra- tion capability. To achieve tactical altitude advantage we are moving into speeds up to Mach 3 as a result of improved rocket fuels, higher thrust engines, aerodynamic advances, and even newer black boxes. I am talking about situations up to 100,000 feet. Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 12 SECRET But today we also stand on the threshhold of entirely new altitude dimensions. Space vehicles already have been climb- ing to heights of 600 miles, and unpowered satellites, or sput- niks, are flying around the earth approximately every hour and a half, at heights up to over 1,000 miles. This altitude is by no means a limit but soon will be exceeded. Disregarding the future development of orbital flight, even at this point the significance of the recent quantum jump is that we are acquir- ing the capability of staying in the air. This overriding technological fact will have the most pro- found impact upon military operations. At present altitudes, the airman must worry about hurricanes, fog, winds, and other weather factors characteristic of the dense air which lies just above the earth. Tomorrow's space flyers must be concerned with meteoric showers, cosmic radiation, electronic barriers, and Buck Rogers' conditions within his cabin. Instead of using flight as a means of traveling from one point on the earth's surface to another, either for friendly or unfriendly purposes, the new problem will be to reach an orbit, maintain it, and utilize nonpowered flight for scientific, military, and probably economic purposes. The flying machine of outer space will not spend 90 percent of its time on the ground, but 100 percent of its time aloft. In simple statistics, we are moving from transonic speeds and periodic flights of several thousands miles in length into an environment where speeds will be of the order of 16,000 knots and "ranges," depending upon the height and shape of the or- bit, easily may exceed 1 million miles per day and hundreds of millions of miles per year. The development of terminal weapons - in terms of ex- plosive power, range, endurance, and speed - will not bring the technological race to an end. Strategies will capitalize on the new dimension of altitude and perhaps endurance rather than distance as a decisive area of military competition. Mili- tary superiority will be dependent upon relative advantages in electronics, warning, and deception. Thus the sciences of in- strumentation and intelligence will become truly decisive ele- ments in the equation of a strategy in which the chief maneu- vers seek to conquer altitude and achieve enduring control from the ground to outer space. SECRET 13 Modern air strategy will be affected by a number of additional problems, each of which could become crucial in varying cir- cumstances. There is, for example, the requirement that a portion of the aerial strength must be on constant readiness status. A strike force that requires one or two days to get ready is a military liability. Even in today's war it would be caught on the surface. An effective air force must be numerically strong and able to get its combat aircraft into the air in time. It must be located on a large number of bases, preferably distributed on several continents and located at varying distances from the enemy. Moreover, it must be supported by reconnaissance forces operating vigilantly around the clock. Only such an air force is in a position to achieve a strategic, though not neces- sarily physical, invulnerability. In former wars, material strength was the decisive factor. The speed with' which fire power could be delivered was an important but still a subsidiary element. The nature of a future war is essentially no longer a dispute about territory but a competition for gains in the time dimension. This is because, in the first place, technology is a variable in time. The speed with which this factor varies will continue to increase as long as technological progress continues. In the second place, sur- prise being a key to success in air and missile warfare, the initial rounds of conflict are little more than a contest to operate faster than the opponent. Surprise attack will be successful if the attacker moves faster than the defender. It will fail if the defender's "reaction time" deprives him of targets and dis- rupts the attack schedule. Intelligence must come to closer grips with the time dimen- sion. We are dealing not with one uniform period but with a whole set of different time categories. There is the time prob- lem of maturing manpower, scientific discovery, and technolog- ical invention - measured in generations. There is the dura- tion of research and development programs, decisionmaking, production, and incorporation of weapons into battle orders - a period of years to decades. There is the complex problem of warning - ranging all the way from advanced strategic warn- ing measured in weeks, months, or even years, to tactical warn- ing, measured in minutes. There is the problem of reaction time and interception, measured in seconds and microseconds. Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Pre-emptive, retaliation, deterrence, counterforce, retarda- tion, and disruption attacks all, in one way or another, are tied to a specific time requirement. The more mobile warfare be- comes, the more moving targets are assuming significance, the less it is a question of mere "capability" than of "capability in time." An airplane carrying a high yield weapon can knock out an air base; the problem is to destroy it at a time when the target will be most lucrative - for example, just before the moment when an attack is to be launched from that target. Need I add that only intelligence can provide this all-impor- tant "timing capability"? Perhaps an additional illustration will clarify this thesis fur- ther: "Reaction time in guided missiles." It is important to count missiles in terms of numbers, warhead yields, and the like. But the foremost problem is that of reaction time or response. If it takes a strategic missile force four hours to launch, whereas the opponent can launch within minutes, the obvious advantage belongs to the side with the shorter reaction time - provided it has adequate warning. The 4-hour reacting force will never leave the ground; its threat will be pre-empted. If this is correct, it appears to be a mistake for intelligence to count the degree of deterrent power primarily in numbers of missiles or warhead yields. It will be necessary to assess, above all, relative times of reaction. Earlier we discussed the new parameters of altitude. It is appropriate, I believe, that we reflect on the purpose of operat- ing at such altitudes. The use of outer space will permit al- most continuous observation of any point on the earth, a situa- tion which, although not entirely without precedent, marks a new departure in modern strategic warfare. Space platforms are becoming indispensable elements of effective warning sys- tems against future means of weapons delivery. Unless we conquer space, a great deal of the scientific knowledge which we require to remain in the technological race will not be avail- able. Furthermore, orbiting vehicles eventually will be used as weapon carriers and thus will develop into crucial components of offensive and defensive missile warfare. All this poses the spectre of outer space military conflict which will involve three phases: first, the competition to get vehicles into space in sufficient quantities to occupy desirable orbits and to make profitable scientific use of orbital flights; second, the development of military techniques for operating from our own orbits and for countering the enemy's militarily significant orbital activities; and third, the ability to neutralize or destroy terrestrial and aerial components of orbital systems This new sphere of warfare raises some perplexing problems in world relations. In addition to traditional surface bound- aries, there will arise sovereignties over vacuous orbits and the areas beneath them-a system of interlaced surface and spatial boundaries thousands of miles in depth and tens of thousands of miles in length. A new pattern of international relations must be developed in which orbits are occupied peacefully or conquered and in which orbits must be delineated. During peacetime the nations must respect each other's scientific and security operations in the orbits, and in wartime, of course, the purpose will be to elimi- nate all of the opponent's space vehicles. In turn, there must be capabilities for protecting the satellites. It is clear that this involves entirely new types of "aerial" operations, as it is also clear that the diplomats and international lawyers will have to do some hard thinking to settle peacefully the problems of orbit allocation and orbit sovereignty. The introduction of the orbital dimension into warfare sig- nifies that factors such as Iron Curtains, the dispersal of air bases and missile sites, and the ability of navies to "hide," so to speak, in the vastness of the oceans will tend to lose signifi- cance. The nature of the new implements is definitive enough to suggest that the use of truly underground and of undersea facilities may dominate the terrestrial scene. As a result, the roles and techniques of surprise will undergo very profound changes, the exact nature of which we cannot predict. For a nation to exist and survive under these conditions, its intelligence system must become a predominant security tech- nique. Such a system must meet three criteria: global cover- age, instantaneous discovery, and absolute accuracy. The sys- tem must be fully operational both in war and peace. Intelli- gence must be run not only for the benefit of, but by those who are responsible for decisions of life or death. I believe I have reached the point where it is necessary to examine this strategic framework with its epochal implications Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 16 SECRET in the practical light of where we are today and to consider the future directions we must take. The problems of strategic and technological surprise are becoming increasingly serious. The danger of tactical sur- prise is not lessened when the enemy, in addition to a high alti- tude and rapid strike capability, also has a capability for low altitude air attack and may be developing mixed high and low altitude offensive forces. Taking an even broader view, we can say that the nuclear explosive and the supersonic delivery vehicle have appeared at a moment when society is quite defenseless against such weap- ons. During the last few centuries, war has taken place at the margins of society. Society supported the war from its produc- tion surpluses and remained intact as a going concern despite losses and devastations. You recall that during ancient times, the situation was dif- ferent. During the Middle Ages, every town had to be self- sufficient for defense, with walls, moats, shelters, food, and water reserves. Practically every citizen had to bear arms. The American frontier town serves as a more recent example of this dangerous way of life. I believe that society eventually will adjust itself to the mod- em technology of destruction. Perhaps we may have to be- come troglodytes; our ancestors were. Architects may develop new types of resistant houses and "safe" urban settlements. Perhaps we shall develop anti-radiation protection. The prin- ciple of "hardening" can be applied to many human needs. I am predicting only that the human mind will not stop in- venting. After it realizes the grim threat of modern weapons, society gradually but inevitably will take measures to assure its survival. I am basing this prediction on my faith that mod- ern man, morally and intellectually, is not inferior to previous generations of 700 and 2500 years ago. Whether this process of social adjustment is going to last 20 or perhaps 50 years I am unable to say. But during this interim phase, humanity well may be passing through the greatest peril of its existence. A war five years. from now prob- ably will be immeasurably more destructive than a war around 2000 A. D. Our security, therefore, must be tailored to get us and the Free World safely through this immediate period of extreme hazard. SECRET 17 It is this interim character of the present military situation which confronts us with many perplexing problems. Defense planning, which includes intelligence, is faced with numerous paradoxes. In this age of maximum offensive strength, there may be a great deal of reluctance to use up-to-date weapons, simply be- cause no one wants to unleash a nuclear war. Yet we must prepare ourselves for a contest which requires us to put the bulk of our resources into nuclear armaments. As a result, we may have only limited capabilities to wage war in which nuclear weapons do not provide the basic fire power. Yet some people have gone so far as to advocate the retention of full-fledged non-nuclear forces in addition to atomic forces. It is generally agreed that we should prepare ourselves to fight with nuclear weapons. Yet some contend that we also should retain a capability to fight in the style of World War II - high explosives on the ground, at sea, and even from the air. We probably could agree that the availability of non-nuclear forces would be very advantageous. Several types of non-nu- clear explosives will remain with us, even in the nuclear age. Under certain tactical conditions, those may be even more ef- fective than nuclear materials, which is the main reason why they should be retained. Unfortunately, the question is not one of advantage or dis- advantage, or even of choice. The question is one of capability in all aspects -manpower, military organization, research, funds, training, equipment, tactics, and so on. Suppose that we maintain both a nuclear and a non-nuclear defense establishment. There is the high probability or near- certainty that the investment in non-nuclear arms would be invalidated as soon as the first atomic weapons are used. This will happen, almost inevitably, at the first serious military set- back of either belligerent. But the question of non-nuclear armaments is not just a matter of duplication. The cost of matching atomic systems with non-nuclear weapons in terms of relative military effec- tiveness would be exorbitant. More significant, such a second force could not be established on any reasonable scale unless we acquire two sets of our national resources, two sets of our qualified manpower, and two sets of our country. Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 18 SECRET I am not raising the issue of limited versus general war. The requirements of any local war situation can be met from avail- able and programmed forces and resources. Rather, I am addressing myself to the problem of attempt- ing to build a non-nuclear force at the expense of our atomic strike and defense units, which must be maintained at an in- creasing degree of readiness because of the overwhelming pri- ority of the Soviet nuclear threat to the US and the Free World. We cannot turn back. There may be a collapse of nuclear courage, but no longer can there be any doubt that we have crossed the nuclear Rubicon. A similar paradox confronts us in disarmament. If the danger of attack could be eliminated by reductions of force levels and by the outlawing of particular types of weapons, the security of all nations unquestionably would be enhanced. The trouble is that with the power of modern weapons, even minor infractions to disarmament agreements may prove fatal. After 1919, the Western Powers tried to control German arm- aments. But practically every week a German arms violation of the Versailles Treaty was reported. Many work shops re- peatedly were discovered in which, it was said, machine guns were being produced under the guise of baby carriages. Nevertheless, the security of the Western Powers did not seem vitally threatened, despite the fact that the Germans maintained secret arsenals and continued surreptitiously to produce weapons which they were not supposed to have. These weapons did not seem powerful enough to pose a real threat to Western security. Neither were the camouflaged divisions which the Germans maintained secretly. But in our time a nation which produces perhaps as few as 50, or as many as several hundred high-yield weapons could become a real threat to the peace, even with makeshift delivery vehicles, especially if other nations faithfully adhere to their disarmament agreements. You are well aware of ominous in- fractions to such agreements in North Korea. The point is that we cannot go back in history and undo the discoveries of nuclear fission, electronics, and aviation. We have to live in the modern world. Technological progress tend to "break through" even the most elaborate and sophist", cated disarmament "controls." Each breakthrough will neces SECRET 19 sitate renegotiation of agreements. There will be little, if any, stability and durability, let alone guarantee of assured inter- national safety in such arrangements. I confess that this is a very dismal picture. It will not be changed by expectations that the human race will become peaceful and angelic in the next 20 years. There are two brutal facts which we have to remember. The first is that the Soviet regime still is around. Although it sometimes seems to be showing signs of middle or even old age, there is no new evidence that proves that Kipling was wrong when he wrote: "Make ye no peace with Adanizod, the Bear who walks like a man." The Soviets have not changed their basic objectives. Their policies have remained constant in areas that count, including their fantastic military preparedness effort. It is clear that the Soviets do not expect that the millennium of peace has dawned. While they prepare for war we cannot turn our backs. When they talk conflict, we cannot risk to ignore the peril. When they arm themselves with the most modern weapons, we cannot reduce the magnitude of the threat by wishful thinking about their supposed inability to do that which manifestly they are doing. We can philosophize that the Soviet Union will enter into an evolution which, after some time, will transform the present Bolsheviks into Jeffersonian Democrats or Puritan pacifists. I do not believe that anyone who has studied Russian and other revolutionary history seriously expects such a mutation will take place. Naturally, I do not postulate eternity for the Soviet system: their time will come. The question is, when? So far, reports about their demise usually proved quite "exaggerated." Their resilience has been extraordinary. Distinguishing our hopes from realistic planning assumptions, we would be foolhardy not to give them an additional life expectancy of one or two decades. We must assume that they will remain in power dur- ing the entire period when the technological challenge to the US will be at a maximum. It is not certain, of course, that the Soviets deliberately will launch an attack on the US. But at the same time we cannot be sure they will not. In the same vein, there is no doubt but that the social system of Russia is changing in many ways. Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 20 SECRET But is this necessarily a favorable development? One danger surely is that if the Soviet dictatorship were liquidated by force or otherwise, this event - which only optimists expect at this time -could precipitate a major internal crisis. Such a crisis would be uncontrollable. This means that it could lead very easily to a world conflagration. There just is no way by which we could conjure away the ominous dangers in our future. This leads me to the second point of pessimism about peace in the foreseeable future. It is a mistake to consider the Bol- sheviks as the only cause of conflict. Wherever we look at the continents today, there is plenty of politically combustionable material. Old political structures are breaking down. New nations are emerging. Most of them have their own imperi- alistic ambitions, and some of the older nations show frighten- ing signs of decay. Economic difficulties, cultural transfor- mations, intellectual crises, and ideological passions acerbate many of these political changes, not to mention inflammatory propaganda campaigns, political warfare, and the like. Unfortunately many of the political minds still function as though we were living in the time of gun powder and sea power. Few have grasped the significance of the modern technology. There is a dangerous timelag between political thinking and technological reality. As industrial technology advances, psychological stability weakens. We must admit the possi- bility that world society will grow sicker and ever more un- stable, even as the descendants of Icarus reach out for the moon. It is unjustified, therefore, to expect that all nations will observe restraint in order to avoid nuclear conflict. Perhaps most nations will, but the odds are that there will be a few who will act irresponsibly. Hitler was not the last specimen of his type. Recent sociological research asserts that a large percentage of political rulers and regimes have been, historically speaking, criminal in motivation and action. There is no doubt that many rulers, especially those who acquired unlimited powers, may have been, at least partly, insane. In fact, a German historian coined the term "Caesarian insanity" in order to describe the actions of many Roman emperors. Although we have made some political progress, the world nevertheless has had more than its share of insane, criminal,!. SECRET 21 and power-hungry rulers during the 20th century. Crime and insanity rates tend to rise as industrial civilization advances. It may be very convincing to us to say that because of the existence of hydrogen weapons the power-seekers should mend their ways. This type of argument remains unconvincing to the evil doer who is willing to accept the risk, regardless of the consequences. There is only one way to reduce the probability of criminal aggressiveness. That is, to remain militarily overpowering and mentally more vigilant than the would-be aggressor - to outsmart and outarm him at every turn and to apply per- suasive techniques to protect him - and us - from making a miscalculation. It is not enough to possess what could be called a "statistical posture of deterrence." The aggressor also must be convinced that it is inadvisable for him to break the peace. But do we master the techniques by which we could have such an impact on the opponent's mind? We are in the midst of a lasting crisis which Mao Tse-tung has described as "protracted conflict." Political and psycho- logical weapons are being used every day to advance the Com- munist cause. In modern conflict, even though actual shoot- ing may not be taking place, air power and the threat of almost instantaneous massive destruction have become the key ele- ments of the psychological as well as the physical struggle. The extent to which we can deter the opponent from attack- ing us determines our freedom of action on many of the world's battlefields. If the level of our ready deterrent strength is too low to provide the assurance that the enemy will not react with an all-out attack, we could be inhibited in executing proper defense actions in subsidiary theaters. Deterrence is a necessary condition for the maintenance of peace - and the waging of limited war - but it cannot be a static condition if it is to keep that peace. If any nation acquires a more effective weapons system, the best posture of deterrence existing before the technological mutation is subject to rapid nullification. We live in a world where the threats to tomorrow's peace are developing today in the laboratories and on the drawing boards. It is true that so long as the two main competitors run neck to neck, even a major advantage in one or more technological fields may not necessarily upset the balance. A state of mu- Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 22 SECRET tual deterrence may be reached which essentially would mean that a world conflagration could occur against the deliberate planning of both the US and the Soviet Union. Hence I do not believe that the Soviets merely are trying to catch up in the technological race. On the contrary, they seem to have organ- ized themselves to win the technological race on a broad front, not only in many significant scientific areas but also in combat operational strengths as distinguished from mockups and pro- totypes. In other words, they may be trying to surpass us simultaneously by at least one whole and perhaps two weapons generations. The technological race is the very essence of protracted con- flict. It is the main event which we cannot afford to lose. The essence of this conflict is not, as many of our contemporaries believe, a series of limited wars in the jungle and in the desert. Any American intervention into limited war depends crucially upon our relative technological posture. If we lose the tech- nological race we cannot fight on local and regional fronts. Nor will an increase in our capability to fight in Bali or Tim- buctu improve our over-all deterrence. It certainly is not likely that, should the US fall behind in technological capability, the Russians will press their advantage merely to get a few fringe benefits. The struggle between Rome and Carthage is more meaningful to our times than the formalized and restrained war-tournaments of some epochs in the history of Christian Europe. Technological superiority in means of delivery is the essence of success in nuclear war. The idea that nuclear war will take the form of an exchange of mutual blows perhaps forecasts Ii correctly what is going to happen. However, this is not neces- sarily a concept on which the military planner should work. The purpose of planning for nuclear war is to achieve such a predominance of strength that a nuclear blow can be delivered, without the undue risk that a deadly retaliatory blow will be returned. Even the Soviet military leaders who, during the Stalinist period, belittled the importance of military surprise: now appear to recognize that surprise could be the condition of nuclear success. The acquisition and maintenance of a dynamic capability to' deliver a rapid and devastating blow - plus a proportionately, dynamic defense - are prerequisites to survival. The natio SECRET 23 which insures that its retaliatory force is, in fact, effective at all times, is obtaining maximum protection against preventive and pre-emptive attacks. The success of preventive war and pre-emptive nuclear launchings depends upon the achieve- ment of triple or quadruple surprise - technological, tactical, timing, and conceivably strategic. The US can keep its re- taliatory guard up only if it is able to render those surprises too costly, too impractical, and too uncertain. Thus surprise attack will be too risky for enemy resort only if the US keeps ahead in technology and intelligence, as well as in its force levels and, above all, in reaction times. Should we lose tempo and should one or more of these four pillars of our security crumble, the enemy's superiority may become such that he need not use nuclear weapons except as a threat. The so-called ultimate threat of large hydrogen weap- ons could become "demilitarized" - by manipulated fear. Suppose the aggressor says: "I grant that you can retaliate, but you will be completely devastated through my first blows. We leave it to you whether or not you want to elect your own death. If you retaliate, you will die, at best with the comfort- ing thought that you have killed some of us. Or you may survive under our whip. That is your alternative." It is known that the Soviets are doing considerable research on conditioned reflexes and brain-washing techniques. Manipu- lated fear and the conditioning of the opponents' mental and psychological reactions are strategic concomitants to nuclear weapons. The Soviets don't overlook a bet. Previous wars have lasted for years. Ever since the emer- gence of a modem industrial society with its long mobilization requirements, war could not be short. A future war may be decided within a matter of a few hours. I think it is wrong, however, to place all attention on the destructive phase of this type of conflict. in previous times, the length of the war allowed us to remedy the shortcomings and omissions of peace. Today and tomor- row, once the climax of the conflict has come, we shall be the prisoners of our previous decisions. In that critical phase we shall not be able to increase our force levels, acquire a new set of technological weapons, adjust our tactics to outdo those of the enemy, or even reassure the fearful and give orders to the panicky. Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 24 SECRET .The protracted conflict may last longer than any previous war. Although the climactic or decision phase of this conflict may be short, still, the conflict could endure for many decades. We are in the battle now. As a consequence, the main battles are being fought by military forces in continued readiness, by warning and intelligence services, by the research and develop- ment community, by national and industrial planners, and by budget makers, as well as by moral and intellectual attitudes. Militarily speaking, the decisive phase could be won or lost by the staff and operational officers who 5 to 10 years before the shooting select or reject certain weapons systems, succeed or fail in shortening lead times, organize offensive and de- fensive forces, determine the balance between force elements, and plan deployment and reaction times. It also may be won or lost by the executive and congressional branches which de- cide, with a timelag of 2 to 3 years, the force levels to be main- tained in any technological phase; by the weapons require- ment, procurement, and logistics planners within the military; and by industry, all of whom, together, have the task of devel- oping and producing superior weapons faster and in larger quantity than the enemy; finally, by intelligence officers who must try to forecast the relative strengths and weaknesses of the strategic equation 5 to 10 years ahead. The latter will suc- ceed - or fail - depending on whether or not they convince the powers-that-be that their best estimates are valid. In protracted conflict, the climactic phase may be war in its most extreme form. If the climax is a matter merely of threat and surrender, it will be the most "peaceful" of all wars. To intelligence its most significant aspect should be that pro- tracted conflict is a war during peace. It is easy to enumerate the need to win the technological race, the requirements for adequate numbers of weapons and forces, the advantage of hardened and dispersed base locations, the ti necessity for fast reaction times, and so forth. But the basic reason these requirements are difficult to satisfy is that no'., nation has the economic capability to live up to the exigencies., of protracted conflict in the early period of the nuclear age. I am not talking about budgets which can be increased anct, I do not mean various degrees of economic mobiliza tion and readiness. Rather, I refer to more fundamental, limitations. SECRET To win the technological race a nation needs numerical and qualitative superiority in technicians and inventive geniuses. Unless the most revolutionary educational changes are made, it is unlikely that sufficient scientists and technicians will be produced to satisfy the growing needs of increasingly complex military programs. Even a program which marshaled all edu- cational resources into scientific and technical curricula prob- ably would be inadequate for acquiring that degree of technical superiority and material effort which makes the launching of a nuclear attack or the psychological threat of such an attack a relatively riskless affair. The cost of weapons systems is rising geometrically, while the increase in productive capabilities proceeds much slower. There is the problem of protecting and rebuilding our cities and facilities to survive in a nuclear environment. This is a prob- lem - so far largely untouched -- which clearly accentuates the severe limitations on our economic capabilities to meet the challenge of the nuclear age. In this time of economic plenty, scarcity still is the supreme fact of civilian and, above all, mili- tary economics. Material resources are not the only limiting factor. Time, which is a major resource, also is in short supply. For ex- ample, the time needed to transform a blueprint into a modern weapons system has become such that a military force never possesses an active arsenal without at least some obsolescence. I mean obsolescent in the sense that certain tasks simply can- not be accomplished against opposition or must be undertaken at excessive risks and costs. There is one inescapable conclusion from this discrepancy between requirement and capability. It is this: the future strategist has the potential choice of an entire technological spectrum of weapons. At least several weapons systems will be able to do the same task. Because of the technological potential available to both sides, he will have to decide whether to select a faster or slower weapon, an explosive with greater or lower yield, a weapon of endurance or of stealth. Should he guard against high or low level attack? Should he dispense with manned bombers in favor of missiles? Should he select an earth satellite "anchored" approximately 21,000 miles above its target to de- Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 SECRET SECRET liver nuclear firepower - or should he use a submarine from which to la h unc a missile? In practical terms the strategist can select only a limited number of systems from this entire technical spectrum, which will grow as we progress further into the scientific era. Strat- egists on the other side have to make similar eliminations. The chances are that the choices may not be identical because of different strategic objectives, production capabilities, opera- tional doctrines, concepts of defensive warfare, and so forth. In turn, because the choices probably will be different on both sides, the possibility of surprise and other major military in- itiatives will increase. Therefore, intelligence must forecast, in ample time and cor- rectly, the enemy selection so that proper defenses can be de- signed. Of course, the choice of the enemy may impose the need for counterweapons, which may have a feedback against our original weapons choice. It is necessary to insure that the relationship between what we actually have and what we require to counter the enemy's principal threats is such th t a we are notti accepng undue risks. If we made a poor or overly narrow selection from the spec- trum, if intelligence fails to guide the research and develop- ment community concerning the enemy's probable selections, we might invite attack, provide inadequate defense, and jeop- ardize life and liberty. But if our intelligence is keen and our armament effort generous we might ensure peace for the period of the technological c l yc e . We are in a conflict which has and undoubtedly will endure for decades but which at present is chan in g g complexion G .en- eral J. F. C. Fuller coined the term "machine warfare" to de- scribe World War I s and II Thi .s expression no longer fully applies to future "technological arf ? w are I am afraid that the Communists have shown a rather sophis=- ticated understanding of the strategic robl . - :____ _. .. A p m tech l ` o ogical strul Th gge.ey seem to understand nd t h w ec nical and eco nomic competition. More than that, they are organizing them, selves to achieve an overwh l i e m ng strategict ih posuren the tec nological realm The ar i . y e g rding to wi th t neechnologicd race against the US Wh t a ever the didta .savanages of a dict tonal s ste t y m,heir regime responds to rapid decisionmakin SECRET In this area, we do not seem to have matched their strategic comprehension. We are said to have made the decision never to strike the first blow. At the same time we have neglected to introduce sufficiently into our thinking the fact that if the opponent is allowed opportunity to achieve a broad tactical suc- cess through an initial blow, the retaliatory strategy must be more costly and complicated in order to compensate for the risk and loss which could occur at the outset and weaken the retaliatory force before it goes into battle. Under the postulate that the enemy strikes first, defense must be more expensive than under the postulate that we shall not surrender the initiative. It follows that we must not be re- luctant to pay the price of our security against an opponent to whom we present the gift of the deliberate surprise attack. The technological race has engulfed us exactly as a fast flow- ing river occasionally catches the unsuspecting oarsman. Such a situation cannot be met and overcome by preaching to the river, by throwing away the oars, or by using only one of two hands. In such a situation, all skills and all strengths are needed to ride out the rapids and not get smashed against the rocks. The fundamental conclusion I want to leave is that the tech- nological race, because of various economic limitations and po- litical climates, may not be won by any super power engaging in the competition, even with all its strengths. But this race very well may be lost by a country which fails to put its con- tinued best efforts into the challenge. It is to a large extent the duty of the national intelligence community to explain to our nation's leadership the true na- ture of this strategic problem. I pray that we will not fail in this task which is indispensable not only to our survival but to the survival of civilization. Intelligence has been getting the facts about the Soviet Bloc, or at least enough of them to enable many right decisions to be made. But we have not been able, often enough, to get our Information and evaluations accepted and acted upon. The somber fact is that as professional intelligence people we have not entirely grasped the meaning of protracted conflict in the nuclear missile age. I believe it not unfair to state also that as professional intel- ligence people we have been disappointingly slow in under- SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 standing the nature of the pressing problems which are con- fronting us. Only too often our categories of analysis and esti- mates still reflect the strategic realities of a passing age. We know all about the deposits of even the least important raw materials, but we may miss major scientific discoveries. Our battle orders of the infantry are considerably better than those of earth satellites. We are adept in measuring floorspace, but we are rarely engaged in comparing lead times. We are able to refine our calculations of weapons yields to the first decimal, but the analysts worrying about Soviet neuropsychology have yet to break through to the national estimates. We produce mountains of "data," but our progress in data handling para- phrases Lenin's title, "one step forward, two steps backward." We are considerably better in post mortems than in warning. Our understanding of man's greatest resource, time, has re- mained fuzzy in most areas. All in all, although we often express our conviction as to how important intelligence is to national security, we ourselves have not quite realized the crucial position we are occupying in the present power struggle. It is really the effectiveness of intel- ligence which, together with the effectiveness of our scientists, is the basis of technology. Beyond the development phase, in- telligence is either. a multiplier or a divisor of military strength- in-being. It is the one "weapons system" which by necessity is in constant touch with the enemy, regardless of whether there is war or peace. And in war, of course, intelligence re- mains a key condition of success. But we must elevate our sights beyond the old saw of intel- ligence being the "first line of defense." Intelligence is the fac for which should make defense economically practical, tech nologically superior, and strategically victorious. In the mils sile age, intelligence literally will merge with the decisive weap= ens system, lest the missiles be entirely ineffective. But intelligence will not be able to do this job unless it com of age as a technological system in its own right. We mus get the equipment our ubiquitous, instantaneous, and ency clopedic mission requires. We must have the forces to opera' these tools. We must develop utilization techniques which at par with or better than those equipments. And we m be able rapidly to feed our information to all users. One feature will remain unchanged: the ability to think. Electric computers and space telescopes are no substitutes for common sense and judgment. Reasoning by false analogy; preoccupation with minor problems to the detriment of major issues, emphasis on decimals and disregard for the large magni- tude, wrong philosophies about the rules of evidence, delusion- ary procedures such as the piling of estimates upon estimates - not to mention normal human failings such as prejudices, wishful thinking, parochial interest arguments, and subver- sion - all those will remain possible in the era of technologi- cal warfare. The machines, even the electrons, are no better than the brains they are designed to serve. It is gratifying to think that when the machine proves to be inadequate - for example, because it may take three months to "program" it - common sense and "conventional thinking" still will be called upon to take its place. The plain fact is that the machine, however good, will not replace the analyst. The machine will make the human brain a more powerful tool - this is the main reason we need it in intelligence. Intelligence technology is indispensable for the rapid handling of thousands of data and for the reduction of innumerable variables to manageable factors. This technology is the key to speed, coverage, and accuracy; to computation; and to experimentation with, and testing of, our conclusions and estimates (for example, through "gaining" techniques). But intuition and insight are necessary to make the ma- chines work. In turn, intelligence technology will make its greatest contribution if it allows deeper insights and ever more creative intuitions. Man has remained the key factor in tech- nological warfare, as he was the key to victory when rocks and clubs were the most powerful weapons. Military, or in a broader sense, conflict intelligence will be at its best when it is based on brain intelligence: IQ's plus wisdom. Pending the dawn of the technological age in intelligence, we should face up more courageously to the facts of life, how- ever bitter. As a nation and as the core of the Free World alliance, we have been underrating the danger for more than twelve years. Why was intelligence not more reliable? Why did we fail to are the obvious? Our own thought patterns and our intel- Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 30 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL 31 lectual isolationism have proved to be far more dangerous enemies to our security than the Iron Curtain and the ominous developments behind it. CONCEPTS FOR A PHILOSOPHY OF AIR INTELLIGENCE Lewis R. Long I should like to set forth certain concepts for air intelligence that I feel would vitalize an air intelligence philosophy and could lead to an air intelligence policy and doctrine consistent with the dominant role that air power must play in the years to come. I make no claim of originality in all these concepts; nor do I consider that they alone would form a sound air intel- ligence doctrine. However, together with the valid concepts contained in the doctrinal manuals, they would, I am con- vinced, provide better guidance to the field than has hereto- fore been available. I should like to emphasize that all the concepts presented are meant to be applied within the framework of one overrid- ing concept for a philosophy of air intelligence - that air intel- ligence is geared to air power in a nuclear age. and that it has the same predominant characteristics as has the air force - range, speed, mobility, flexibility, and penetrative ability. Because air forces have the capability of flying to any point on the globe and returning to any desired location, air intelli- gence must provide basic information to guide such flights in peace or in war. Because air forces exert a dynamic impact on all forms of international relations, air intelligence must be pre- pared to expose for the scrutiny of air commanders the entire structure of other nations and to advise and assist in the deter- mination of air strategy and policies. In the established principles for the successful employment of air forces it is considered that the air forces are an entity. gven so, air intelligence must be considered indivisible and re- sponsive at all levels of operation to employment as a single aggregate instrument. Air intelligence must be employed for the attainment of a common objective, which - in essence - Is to contribute to the security of the nation. Air intelligence provides the key to proper employment of the air forces in ex- esdaing the initiative in many different conditions of interna- tional relations, in taking advantage of different opportunities MORIIHRP PAGES 31-50 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 as they occur, and also in creating opportunities in which bene- fits to the US may accrue by the utilization of air forces in peace or in war. Air intelligence must also guide the air force in ex- ploiting the principle of surprise, in order to attain both mili- tary and psychological advantages through speed, deception, audacity, originality, and concentration. For the present, air intelligence must concentrate on indications of imminence of hostilities, without neglecting information on capabilities and vulnerabilities of potential enemy countries. This concentra- tion of effort not only will contribute to the security of our forces. but also will provide guidance for combat operations if war is forced upon us. Finally, air intelligence must be care- fully coordinated through proper control. CONCEPT NUMBER ONE. Intelligence agencies are never more at war than in periods of nominal peace. The logical out- growth of this concept is, of course, the fact that the success of the initial phases of war (and in this thermonuclear age these probably will also constitute the decisive phases) will de- pend on the quality of intelligence produced in peace. Most people can understand and pay lip service, at least, to the lat- ter idea, but they balk completely at a rational consideration of the first one when it comes to providing tangible support needed by the intelligence structure. I have never, in peace- time, seen an intelligence staff at any echelon that was not undermanned, overworked, and restricted in its operations by a lack of real appreciation on the part of the command for the goals the intelligence section had set for itself to accomplish in the light of the command mission. At all echelons intelligence staffs must have adequate num= bers of the best qualified personnel, maximum equipment, facil ities, and funds; maximum freedom of action; and coequal status with other major staff elements. It can be categorically, stated that if the air force intelligence structure had all the support it could profitably employ - and fully Justify-in peacetime, its resources would be ample for any type of war W, might become involved in. Let us now analyse each of the requirements (personnel, m terial support, freedom of action, and coequal status) in to of what other writers have had to say, bearing in mind th three basic intelligence missions: to provide timely warnin the imminence of hostilities (whether on a total or limited w CONFIDENTIAL 33 basis); to provide detailed knowledge of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of potential enemy nations and of friendly and neutral nations; and to provide the best possible intelligence as to the intentions of foreign nations, particularly those that are our potential enemies. PERSONNEL. During wartime, all the services drew heavily on civilian professions for manning intelligence posts. Law- yers, insurance adjustors, investigators, police enforcement of- ficers, scientific and technical personnel, and teachers were put into uniform; and, by and large, these people carried the intel- ligence workload of the services. By and large, too, their con- tributions compared favorably with those of professional mili- tary people. There have been numerous attempts made to identify the qualifications for intelligence personnel. Farago' lists ten major groups of traits which "the good spy is supposed to possess" in -order to qualify for that particular aspect of intelligence work. For the most part, these same traits could be used as a starting basis for selection of personnel for other intelligence tasks. First of all, his morale must be high and he must be genuinely interested in the job ahead. Second, he must be energetic, zealous, and enterpris- ing. Third, he must be resourceful, a quick and practical thinker. He must have good judgment and know how to deal with things, people, and ideas. He must be pro- ficient in some occupational skill. Fourth, he must be emotionally stable, capable of great endurance under stress. He must be calm and quiet, tolerant and healthy. Fifth, he must have the ability to get along with other people, to work as a member of a team, to understand the foibles of others while being reasonably free of the same foibles himself. Sixth, he must know how to inspire collaboration, to organize, administer and lead others. He must be will- Ing to accept responsibility. 1xrago. Ladislas, War of Wits (NY, Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1954), p 187. Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 34 CONFIDENTIAL Seventh, he must be discreet, have a passion for ano- nymity and know how to keep his mouth shut and pre- serve a secret. Eighth, he must be able to bluff and mislead, but only when bluffing and misleading become necessary. Ninth, he must be agile, rugged, and daring. Tenth, he must have the ability to observe everything, to memorize details accurately. He must be able to report on his observations lucidly, to evaluate his ob- servations and relate them to the greater complex of things. MATERIAL SUPPORT. I should like to stress the importance of allocating the maximum in equipment, facilities, and funds to intelligence work in time of peace with a quotation from Sun Tzu,2 the Chinese military oracle, whose writings on the art of war in 500 B. C. have influenced military thinking down to this day. Hostile armies may face each other for years, striv- ing for victory which is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condi- tion simply because one grudges the outlay of a hun- dred ounces of silver in honors and emoluments is the height of inhumanity. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his sovereign, no master of victory. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things be- yond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. In speaking of the cost of the British secret service as whole (both positive and counterintelligence), Seth noted:3 In 1913 the Secret Services cost 46,000 pounds; in 1939, 500,000 pounds; during the recent war 52,000,- 000 pounds annually; and in 1953, 5,000,000 pounds. It is worth many times this amount, for though the American, French and Russian (secret) services tion and notes by B/G Thomas R. Phillips, Harrisburg, Pa., Military Service Publishing Co., 1944). "Ronald Seth, Spies at Work, London: Peter Own Limited MC p. 202. CONFIDENTIAL 35 are now more extensive than at any time in. this cenr tury, British secret service still maintains its lead in performance and results. Farago gives a somewhat different order of magnitude for British expenditures for intelligence. He said that the 1954 budget was three million pounds and that this amount was the highest in the entire history of the British Secret Service. He pointed out, however, that this figure is deceptive because it represents only allotments from public funds and he adds: "The bulk of Britain's intelligence revenue comes from private funds, such as dividends of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, some of whose shares are held by the Admiralty." 4 Farago then gave an indication of what US military services are spending for intelligence. In fiscal year 1955, the Army asked for $54,454,000 for intelligence, and for fiscal years 1952- 54, inclusive, the Army spent a total of $176,400,000 on intelli- gence. Yet this represented less than one-half of one percent of the total Army budget .5 Then, stressing his thesis that the cold war is a "War of Wits," Farago pointed out relative ex- penditures for intelligence in the Continental Army and in the services today: 6 Between 1776 and 1781, George Washington spent approximately eleven percent of his entire military budget on intelligence operations. The fact that today we spend less than one percent of our peacetime mili- tary budget on these same activities shows how little effort is being made to solve the "friction" by intel- lectual means rather than brute force. From the contacts I have had with various British intelli- gence officers, visits to JIB (Joint Intelligence Bureau) and some of the intelligence officers of the Air ministry, and from comparing the results of British intelligence with those of USAF Intelligence, I am certainly inclined to agree, at least partially, with Seth's last statement for the quality of British intelligence production is invariably very high, and the quantity compares favorably with that produced by the much larger USAF intelli- pence staffs. The British traditionally have been willing to hrago, op. cit., p. 50. ' /bid.. p. 51. /bid p. 345. Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 36 - CONFIDENTIAL spend a great amount of money, time, and effort in the collec- tion of intelligence information, more, perhaps, than most modern nations. They have not, in other words, weighed re- slts obtained by intell igence efforts on a completely pragmatic basis, as we "practical Americans" are inclined to do; they know that one cannot package intelligence results on a "pound-for- pound" basis. So for the past two hundred years they have been preeminent in the field. This is not to say that they have not made serious mistakes; but, by and large, their intelligence estimates have been remarkably sound. Moreover, they have used periods of nominal peace to extend and consolidate their intelligence activities, not only for the purpose of preparing for the next war but also (what is even more important) pre- paring for the peace to follow. FREEDOM OF ACTION. As background for a discussion of the need for granting maximum freedom of action to air force intelligence, I should like to quote the following passage from, the Report of the Task Force on Intelligence Activities: Effect of Diplomacy on the Over-All Collection of In- telligence. The task force has recognized the incompatibility in method between the practice of diplomacy and the more direct and active operations incident to the col- lection of intelligence and the conduct of cold war. While all contribute to the end in view, conflicts be- tween them must be resolved, usually on a high level, and always in the national interest. It must be real- ized that diplomacy is not an end in itself; that while political ends must be served and unjustifiable risks avoided, the collection of intelligence is a vital element in the fight to preserve our national welfare and ex- istence. Instances have come to the attention of the task force where too conservative an attitude has pre- vailed, often to the detriment of vigorous and timely action in the field. Although the foregoing comment was made in connecti with a discussion of the intelligence activities of the Dep ? Intelligence Activities, A Report to the Congress, by the Commissl 1955, pp. 42-43. (Hereafter referred to as "Task Force Report."), CONFIDENTIAL 37 ment of State, it is every bit as applicable to air intelligence as to the Department of State because the air attache system, which is a major contributor of intelligence information, func- tions as an integral part of the State Department's Forefgn Service. It is altogether appropriate that, generally speaking, diplo- matic considerations take precedence over the collection re- quirements of the attaches. Nevertheless, within the frame- work of that principle (which is a part of the principle of civil- ian control over the military establishment), it should be ob- vious from the implications of the Task Force findings that a less conservative attitude toward opportunities for collection of intelligence information should permeate not only the diplo- matic service but also the military establishment. I shall not devote much attention to detailed suggestions for carrying out intelligence operations. My concern is with the promotion of principles that would provide the type of climate in which competent people, using their innate intelligence and ingenuity, can devise an infinite number of ways in which to collect and produce air intelligence - ways which must, of course, be within the framework of US national objectives at all times. Nevertheless, I feel very strongly that we should take a page out of the British Secret Service book and put our intelligence collection efforts on a basis where they can pay their own way, at least in part. This would be a long-term proposition and it would be impossible of achievement under the existing regimentation that governs all business enter- prises in which the government is officially engaged. COEQUAL STATUS WITH OTHER MAJOR STAFF ELE- MENTS. There is, as far as I can discern, no rhyme nor reason in subordinating intelligence as a staff section to operations. My biggest objection to the subordination of intelligence to op- erations lies in the fact that the operations officer is automati- cully placed in the position where he frequently makes purely command decisions. The intelligence officer is supposed to itdvise the commanding officer as to what the enemy can and probably will attempt to do that would interfere with the ac- complishment of the command mission. The operations officer iS Supposed to advise the commanding officer as to what hta own forces can and should do. The commanding officer t then in a position to weigh both his own and the enemy's Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 38 CONFIDENTIAL capabilities and to make a sound command decision as to command action. It is totally wrong for the operations officer to make such a decision, for the commanding officer is thereby deprived of the full value (and probably full information) of enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions. Zacharias, commenting on the fallacy of subordinating, told the Con- gressional Committee investigating the Pearl Harbor disaster that one of the organizational deficiencies which was a con- tributing factor was: S That the planning officers were allowed to take over the Intelligence function of evaluation. This resulted in individuals without a full knowledge of the Japanese or their psychology determining what the Japanese might do. This practice applied not only in Washing- ton, but also at Pearl Harbor, where the erroneous con- clusion was reached by the planning officer that there was no chance of an air attack on Pearl Harbor. CONCEPT NUMBER TWO. Success achieved by intelligence in peace will determine the outcome of the war. General Kuter stated: 9 In jet-atomic warfare there will be no room for gross errors of judgment. There will be no time, should hos- tilities start, to correct mistakes in the types of forces that we have provided, the manner in which they have been organized and trained, or the way we fight. And the terrible penalty for failure could be quick and com- plete defeat. Many factors are involved in any satisfactory an- swer. But one thing is sure. The question cannot be answered satisfactorily unless we have the proper doc- trine, and unless the doctrine is accepted. For years the US has believed that its greatest military p tential lay in its industrial might. The validity of this bell' n was demonstrated in World Wars I and II and again in Kor lanned to destroy not only our retaliatory force b ill be p w also our industrial potential. Thus we can see that "no long; 8 Zacharias, p. 253. Kuter, Lawrence S., Lt. Gen., "No Room For Error," Air Force M tine (AWC Curriculum Handout #36-4-a, 24 November 1955). CONFIDENTIAL 39 will the US or any other country be able to build up its mili- tary forces and rely on its industrial potential after the war has begun." 1? Intelligence must be developed before war breaks out if it is to influence our preparations, provide a foundation for our planning, and guide early phases of operations. It is true that Mr. Allen Dulles, present Director of the CIA,11 achieved un- precedented success in the history of espionage with the intelli- gence network he established in Germany, operating from Switzerland, during the war. ... Through this network Mr. Dulles managed to start a conspiracy within the high command of the German armies in the south and to bring about the surrender of the very army on which Hitler was de- pendent for the prolonging of the war from behind the legendary "Alpine redoubt." However, the situation in Japan was a far different matter. Through shortsightedness and perhaps ineptitude and inex- perience, the US had failed to establish the groundwork for an effective espionage system in Japan, notwithstanding the fact that Zacharias and other authorities on Japan had been aware of the need and had advocated such prior planning. In view of the steadily deteriorating relations that existed between Japan and the US right up to the surprise attack against Pearl Harbor, this failure to develop, in advance of war, a workable system for systematic collection (in Japan) of intelligence in- formation during the war that most intelligence personnel were sure was virtually inevitable is an extremely black mark against the US intelligence agencies of that time. Moreover, this country made no serious effort to establish an intelligence net within Japan during the war because it was felt that the effort was far too great in relation to its possible value. Farago pointed out that it is a virtual impossibility ". . . to set up a local network in an enemy country under wartime condi- lions...." 12 [Allen Dulles' success notwithstanding] 'Thomas K. Finletter, Power and Policy, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., p. 256. - Tango, op. cit., p. 183. 0Ibid.. p. 182. Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 How can we account for the fact that, against all reasonable odds, the US did establish a satisfactory espionage net in Ger- many after war started but failed to do so in Japan, its other major enemy? I suggest that the reason lies, among other factors, in the accessibility of Germany before the outbreak of war. In other words, more Americans and individuals from Allied nations had contacts before the war in Germany than in Japan. Interestingly enough, the Soviets failed to re-establish within Germany an adequate espionage net: ... when their original network, known as the Rote Kapelle or Red Orchestra, was smashed. They managed to create such networks only in countries of their wartime allies, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and in neutral Switzerland, tra- ditional battleground of international espionage.13 The Soviets did achieve remarkable success in Japan (remem- ber the Sorge espionage case?) 14 It seems to me that there is a direct correlation between the accessibility of a potential enemy, country just before the outbreak of hostilities and the proba- bility of being able to establish (or re-establish) and maintain; an espionage net in that country after war breaks out. What does this mean, as far as the US is concerned at the present time? If it is difficult to penetrate the iron Curtain today, it will be even harder when war breaks out. Therefore, w must go all-out to penetrate it, and to establish many strong ' diversified, and versatile nets as soon as possible. We canno do this under the existing limitations of personnel, equipment, and funds. Yet maximum reliance must be placed on the ability of intelligence to decide by whom, when, where, and what strength the US may be attacked. The responsibility o the Directorate of Intelligence (ACS/I, since 1 July 1957).; USAF, is to develop this information regarding our suscepti bility to air attack - this in an air-nuclear age. CONCEPT NUMBER THREE. Air intelligence must, on a con tinging basis, encompass all aspects of power in foreign na tions (political, economic, and psychosocial, as well as mini - tary), both in the present and in the historical perspectit Moreover, it must speak out on matters of national strategy. 's Ibid., p. 182. " Ibid., pp. 163, 166, 179, 181, 212, 219-220. Heretofore, air intelligence (as well as army and navy in- telligence) has confined itself primarily to an evaluation of the military power of foreign nations. The National Security Council has directed the air force to interest itself primarily in intelligence of foreign air forces and has assigned responsi- bility for covering other aspects of national power to the other US intelligence agencies. It has long been an American tradition that the military establishment should remain free from the "taint of politics." As a result, the military has shied away from any contact with political problems. This even reached the point before World War II where few of the regular military establishment exer- cised their constitutional right to vote in elections. This fear of military domination in our national life stems, of course, from our inherited distrust of all forms of tyranny and autocracy. Before the time that military power became inextricably tied to the other forms of national power, perhaps even as late as the First World War, this attitude may have had some validity in our national consciousness. However, Clause- witz would not have subscribed to the complete separation of military thinking from the remainder of national life and activ- ities. He pointed out that war is merely an extension of na- tional, political policy by other means.15 Hitler demonstrated his conviction that war is merely a "mopping-up process" by capitalizing on the gains made by his fifth column. Certainly the Marxists have from the beginning showed the world by word and deed that the line of demarcation between politics and military action is extremely nebulous. It can and probably will be argued that air intelligence should "stick to its knitting" and concentrate on ascertaining the strengths and weaknesses of foreign air forces in the tradi- tional fashion (in which the army is supposed to develop intel- ligence on foreign ground forces; the navy, on foreign naval forces: the air force, on foreign air forces; and the State Depart- ment and CIA, on foreign political and economic strengths and weaknesses). However, as it is air power that will have to carry the brunt of any initial contacts with the enemy, as well a~ continuously to seek out and destroy all aspects of the enemy " Karl von Clausewitz, General, On War (Translation by 0. J. Mattijs Julien). Washington, D. C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1950, p. 16. Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 42 CONFIDENTIAL warmaking potential and will to fight, air intelligence must have the capability of advising the Chief of Staff, USAF, where and when to hit the enemy in order to hurt him most. It seems incontrovertible to me that we have reached a place in history where the military establishment, particularly the air force, must concern itself with political problems (as well as the economic and psychosocial problems) - the traditional American feeling in the matter notwithstanding. General d Director of Intelligence, Headquarters USAF, agreed Samfor , on this point, in response to a question asked by the writer, ruuuwulg 111 rowing community of thought that the mili e is a "Th g er effect, tary establishment should get into the fields_ofr " polittical and, 1 Air in- telligence, obviously, must be in the vanguard this new, CONCEPT NUMBER FOUR. Intelligence must take ^a dh In speak- o na mic approach. Soviet Bloc are inadequate, the Task Force Report on Intelli-I ities considered that security measures adopted by, ti A v c gence the Communists have been exceptionally effective, particularly n th A i -------- in compar so it relatively simple for foreign nations to collect vital secrets, The task force admonishes, however: . The information we need, particularly for our Armed Forces, is potentially available. Through con- centration on the prime target we must exert every conceivable and practicable effort to get it. Success in this field depends on greater boldness at the policy level, a willingness to accept certain calculated politi- cal and diplomatic risks, and full use of technological capabilities." Opportunities to increase air intelligence coverage of So; d intenons n capabilities au. ----- a. The increasing of our clandestine operations, and,effo to infiltrate the uULL countries, taking maximum advantage not only of bor Samford, John A., Mai or General, "Objectives for the Use of FO lecture to Army War College, 2 January 1956. 17 Task Force Report, op. cit., p. 69. CONFIDENTIAL 43 crossing techniques on land and by air drop but also neutral shipping and US submarines, particularly in the Arctic Ocean and the Black Sea coastal areas. b. The establishment of contacts with and provision of sup- port to (in return for services rendered) agents from. among known governments in exile, such as those from the Baltic and East European Satellite nations; the known 10,000,000 Chinese living outside China, as minority groups throughout Asia; all known religious organizations, business firms, and govern- mental agencies throughout the Free World having dealings with the Soviet Bloc; all known visitors to Soviet-dominated territory, such as trade union officials, scientists, airline and shipping crewmen, and others; and all defectors from iron cur- tain countries. c. The attempt to bribe, intimidate, subvert, or otherwise cause Soviet and Satellite diplomats, government officials, tech- nicians, or visitors abroad to "double" for us upon their re- turn - or to defect and remain in the West. d. The making of surreptitious photographic penetration flights with high capability aircraft at irregular intervals, to cover peripheral areas. e. The purchase of controlling interest in the most active Western firms having dealings with the Soviet or Satellite na- tions in order to use these firms to collect intelligence informa- tion, spread favorable propaganda, subvert Soviet and Satellite nationals, and otherwise create situations behind the iron and bamboo curtains that would be favorable to the West. f. The employment of such outstanding historians as Alfred J. Toynbee; political scientists, as Professor William M. Mc- Govern and Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupe; geographers, as G. Don- aid Hudson; ethnologists, as Margaret Meade; and authorities on Russia and Communism as Dr. Marc Szeftel and Mr. James Burnham. The individuals named represent only a few of the potential list of qualified consultants; the profound and dttutlcd knowledge of foreign peoples and areas in their re- apcctlve professions that is possessed by people of this stature -mold furnish a wellspring of ideas of inestimable value to air Intelilgence. In addition to enriching the staff with people of " caliber we should hire outstanding representatives in the ?4rrrtising and public relations fields (preferably those having tprcnee in foreign areas), who can assist the factual experts Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 in packaging the ideas we want to use in our "War of Wits" with the Soviets, this struggle for the minds of men. CONCEPT NUMBER FIVE. Intelligence should be used as an offensive weapon, one capable of influencing the outcome o either the cold war or any hot war, peripheral as well as total. Although there are no apparent indications that the Soviet Union, during the next few years, intends to take action of the sort that would surely precipitate another world conflict, we must be always on the alert to the possibility that such a con- flict might arise through miscalculation on their part. The dangers are greatest in the peripheral areas, where Satellite peoples might get out of hand and take action "from which we cannot retreat without disaster; then the chances of keeping war limited are very remote." 18 The difficulty is not in the lack of desire to exercise such restraint, but in the fact that the things we stand to lose are of such great value that there is no chance of limiting phases, of conflict. To have mutual understanding and agreement be- tween enemies is essential if conflict is to be localized. What does this mean to air intelligence? Simply this: we must pro-. duce intelligence on every facet of enemy life. To do this, air,, intelligence should control or at least coordinate all air force agencies that to any degree operate in enemy territory or attack behind enemy lines or perform other than strictly military, operations in areas that may become the scene of battle or areas where, in the cold war, the air forces encounter Com munist influences. CONCEPT NUMBER SIX. Intelligence must be used syst atically. Commanders, policymakers, planners, and opera. tions personnel at all echelons must rely upon, then plan, th act not only upon intelligence but also upon intelligence reconi, mendations - within practical limits of our own capability an feasibility of such recommendations. We have long express as a principle of intelligence the concept that it must supplied to the interested command in time to be of Unfortunately, in intelligence circles there has not been, seems to me, equal emphasis placed upon submission of inte gence to the commander and his staff in such a form and, convincingly expressed that it will receive the prompt attentii CONFIDENTIAL 45 and responsive command action that it warrants. Stressing the need for reducing the margin of error inherent in any human undertaking, General White pointed out the need for educating our planners and our leaders. He said that poor command decisions and inferior or unimaginative staff work would nullify the tremendous effort that has gone into develop- ing an extremely expensive air force. He added: ... Superior employment of air weapons must be based on complete understanding of the nature of air warfare, the political and military context within which the air forces are operating, and a sound but imaginative understanding of targets and weapons.19 There also has been entirely too little emphasis on the con- cept that command plans and action should be based on in- telligence. This has not always been the fault of intelligence. Nevertheless, too often in the air force, particularly, operational plans have been prepared with absolutely no regard for the intelligence estimate of enemy capabilities and intentions that these selfsame plans were designed to counter. In my experi- ence as a staff officer at various echelons of command, there have been few instances in which command war plans, emer- gency plans, or operations plans have actually been geared to the intelligence that gave rise to the necessity for such plans. More often than not, the intelligence annex is merely prepared at the same time as the basic plan and the other annexes and all are stapled together at one time. The proper procedure, and the one that we in intelligence at USAFE (US Air Forces In Europe) were finally able to sell to the planners, should be this. The intelligence estimate of the situation is prepared first, and given to the commander and to all his staff agencies in advance of the planning cycle. The basic plan and all the annexes (including the intelligence annex) are then prepared simultaneously, with a view to countering the threat indicated In the intelligence estimate. I believe this failure to take the intelligence estimate into conhlderation at every stage in the planning cycle in the mili- tary establishment stems by and large from an American pre- White. Thomas D., "The Current Concept of American Military Mtmngt.h," AU Quarterly Review, Vol. VII, Spring 1954 (AWC Cur- rkulum Handout #56-2-B, 22 November 1955). Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 46 CONFIDENTIAL dilection for ignoring in the policymaking cycle available in- telligence regarding the capabilities and intentions of actual or potential enemies. It seems to me that the intelligence family must find some way not only to improve the quality of its product but also to stimulate an acceptance of that product and a willingness to act upon it. The process of making positive recommendations by intelligence for command action would, I believe, materially improve this situation and would lead to a command acceptance of a principle advanced by General Ridgway, when he was Chief of Staff of the US Army. He stressed the fact that the present world situation makes it more important than ever to have com- plete information upon which to base economical deployment and effective employment of army forces, as well as to avoid sur- prise (obviously the same principle applies to all military forces). General Ridgway stated: "Adequate intelligence con- stitutes the fundamental basis for the calculation of risks, the formulation of plans, the development of materiel, the alloca- tions of resources, and the conduct of operation." 20 CONCEPT NUMBER SEVEN. Intelligence must eontinuousl, estimate enemy intentions as well as capabilities and vulnera",, bilities. One of the biggest reasons that commanders at times have made their own estimates, rather than accept those o their intelligence officers, is simply that the intelligence office have been unwilling to "go out on a limb" and estimate enem intentions. Before the early 1930's the "method of intentions' was used by the US Army. It was a method used by the eld von Moltke. Shortly before 1936 the American Army adop the "method of capabilities," which had been the method us by Napoleon.21 Admittedly the "method of intentions" is a difficult one an for the inexperienced intelligence officer, nonhabit forming: cause the probability of error is extremely high. Success f' this method depends not only on an intimate knowledge of th 14 mentality of the opposing commanders as well as the tactii doctrine of the enemy but also upon such intangible things; the physical and mental condition of the opponent, his no reactions, and reasoning processes. On the other hand Farago, op. cit., p. 8. "Command and General Staff School, "Military Intelligence, CONFIDENTIAL 47 "method of capabilities" takes into consideration all lines of action open to the enemy. It does not discard any possible line until the enemy's dispositions are such that, even though he desired to adopt that line, he is physically incapable of doing so. Thus it strives by elimination to reduce the possibility down to one - the only one line of action which the enemy can take. This is the ideal, as far as intelligence is concerned, but it is seldom reached. CONCEPT NUMBER EIGHT. Intelligence is no longer a func- tion of command, except at the higher echelons. All of the services (particularly the air force) have traditionally paid, only lip service to the principle that intelligence is a function of command. This has been amply demonstrated by a lack of provision for suitable intelligence staffing between World War I and World War II and by a demeaning of intelligence func- tions. My reasons for believing that intelligence should no longer be considered a function of command at all echelons are different from either of these. In the first place if an all-out global war should occur, the US intelligence operations should be centrally controlled. Sec- ond, the entire intelligence process cannot reasonably be car- ried out at all echelons; therefore, even in a prolonged period of cold war, air intelligence operations must be, if not actually centrally controlled from Washington, at least concentrated in a small number of locations where the complete intelligence process is directed by one individual. Unquestionably, in the past, commanders of squadrons, groups, wings, even air divi- s4ons and air forces occasionally may have felt a twinge of conscience because they have been unable to see their way clear to carry out all the intelligence functions that manuals said they should, from collection through dissemination. These Individuals may now draw a sigh of relief, as I view it; for in the air force, their primary intelligence function is to dissemi- nate down to the troops air intelligence that has been received from higher echelons. It may be argued that I am hereby cutting the rug out from under the principle I previously expressed - that the intelli- p ncr officer should not be subordinated to other staff officers but should report directly to the commanding officer. On the c mtrary. in these lower units, and even when his recognized CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 CONFIDENTIAL 49 duties are in accord with his actual duties, I still feel that the intelligence officer at every echelon of command should remain responsible only to the commanding officer or the chief of staff, and not to any other staff officer! He must maintain this inde- pendence of other staff considerations in order best to present to his commander the most complete intelligence picture and the most reasonable intelligence recommendations, even though he himself may not have developed either the intelligence esti- mate of the situation or the recommendations based on it. At the major air force command levels there is no question in regard to major staff level standing for the intelligence officer as intelligence should continue to be for his commander a complete function of command, in the traditional sense. At the lower echelons, intelligence would still be a command re- sponsibility, but rather more in the "special staff" tradition than the "general staff" concept. CONCEPT NUMBER NINE. Major headquarters staffs should get out of the operational aspects of intelligence to the maxi- mum extent possible and should confine their attention largely to policymaking and flash or spot estimating functions. This concept is closely related to some of the thinking indicated in the discussion of the preceding concept. Compared with the, present tables of distribution, the intelligence staff of Head relatively small. These staffs, however, would be comprised of highly qualified personnel, representing the maximum Intel primarily policymaking, inspection, liaison, and estimating of the imminence of hostilities and spot estimates, as requir by the commander and his staff. They would exercise st supervision not only over the intelligence activities of all su ordinate units of the command, but also over the collection an production activities of the intelligence centers belonging the command; these centers would perform the operation aspects of the intelligence process for the entire command. CONCEPT NUMBER TEN. Air Intelligence (to include cou ' terintelligence) must keep under continuous review and, the maximum extent possible, must downgrade and publish flies concerning enemy capabilities, activities, and intentions;' What I am proposing is nothing less than declassifying cer- tain carefully selected items of intelligence and counterintelli- gence regarding Soviet activities and providing such informa- tion to the American public on a planned basis. Let the Amer- ican people get this information, but from authoritative sources and not from newspaper columnists. Probably the most violent opposition to this proposal will come from some of my fellow intelligence officers, because tradi- tionally, intelligence has had a moral responsibility to protect its sources, and rightly so. Nevertheless, intelligence files are bulging with information that represents such a conglomera- tion from so many sources that no one source could possibly be harmed by its disclosure. Let us substitute this type of infor- mation for at least some of the detailed data on our own mili- tary establishment that we now hand out so freely. I am confi- dent that the public reaction to this policy would, in general, be very favorable, and that in the long run, the story of air power and the capabilities of the air force to safeguard the security interests of the US can be made synonymous in the minds of the American people. So let's stop giving aid and comfort to our potential enemies and start a program designed to discomfort them on a global talc - by informing and arousing the American public and the rest of the free world with factual knowledge of Soviet ac- tivities and intentions. For example, an article in the Sep- t,-tuber 1955 Reader's Digest discussed the disturbing story of the manner in which the Communists, who had infiltrated the military services and governmental structure of Iran, were pre- rnted from taking over the entire country by the merest ac- cident. As a result of the investigation, it was disclosed that five hundred Iranian officers were implicated in the plot, in- cluding numerous high-ranking individuals in both the Army and the police departments.22 This story, terrifying in its implication for other countries, would. I submit, have had a much stronger impact on public awareness of the Communist threat to the world today had it bat-tt omcially released by a government intelligence agency, rather than by a commercial writer. This is the type of run- J?*+cph A. Mazandi and Edwin Muller, "The Hunch That Saved hon." Reader's Digest, September 1955, pp. 59-60. Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 50 CONFIDENTIAL of-the-mill basic intelligence available to the, services which should be released to the public as soon and as fully as is prac- ticable and, in any event, before some sharp news reporter can capitalize it. All air intelligence concepts must be con- CONCEPT ELEVEN . sidered dynamic, kept under constant review, and revised to meet changing world situations. It follows that air intelligence philosophy must be considered in its broadest sense as a con'. ---__ d -1-4oa roelilt an nt sear h for princi t . . a s ing from this process must be changed as new concepts are. General Kuter provides another valid con= In this context , cept for developing an air intelligence policy, although he was, of ai r, it in he in l r g app y -- - -force thinking. "A true air doctrine accepted and exploited ar mili sour o k h _ i - . a er e > 23 a common strategy. We don't, as yet it i n must exploit we h air intelligence policy or doctrine in writing, lI ave an t that last admonition of General Kuter's as ill ado USAF p w the basic air force intelligence policy, it will be only a matter ntil ti .... ....... ...- me u of which the commands may then soundly base their own intel ligence policies. Kuter, op. cit., p. 29. SECRET 51 DEVELOPMENTS IN AIR TARGETING 1. THE MILITARY RESOURCES MODEL The basic objective for air targeting is to present measure- ments of the ability of the enemy to take actions which threaten our national security. These measurements must be presented in such a way as to guide our action against the enemy's strengths. This objective is usually broken down into subobjectives which illustrate clearly its breadth and com- plexity. Expressed in terms of courses of enemy action which are unacceptable to the US, these subobjectives are, in descend- ing order of importance: 1. To deliver atomic weapons against the US, our forces abroad, and our allies. 2. To resist the penetration of his airspace by our air forces. 3. To develop and produce potentially decisive weapons or weapons systems. 4. To conduct large-scale land and naval operations against our forces and our allies. 5. To develop and maintain the economic, political, and psy- chological strengths necessary to support prolonged military operations. With the development of new weapons and weapons systems, however, and the resultant capability of a single aircraft or missile to deliver the equivalent of millions of tons of TNT on one mission, the analysis and presentation of the strengths supporting the first three subobjectives have assumed ever- Increasing importance and urgency. This compression of fire- power in time brings the realization that the decision in future wars may be reached in a matter of hours or days at most. Old problems have been accentuated and many new ones cre- ated by these developments. For example, selection of target rytems to achieve the subobjectives time-phased in the order drown above is no longer sufficient. Analysis must produce rat only a priority of targets within each subobjective and target system, but also an indication of how many of them MORIIHRP PAGES 51-64 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 must be attacked to achieve the objective. Thus analysis by increments in time and space is becoming an essential element in the targeting process. The complexity of these problems and the speed with which they must be solved have led to the introduction of new statis- tical methods and of new machine computing techniques into the targeting analysis process. For example, immediate assessment of the damage and contamination effect of a given attack will be necessary in order to determine the destruction required of succeeding attacks. This involves a continuing evaluation of target priorities and of net offensive strengths throughout an air offensive until a decision is reached. Two- sided war-gaming offers the best possibility for providing the answers needed for this and similar problems. Because of the time element and the great volume of data required by the new, statistical techniques, high-speed electronic computing is By this process hypothetical but highly probable essential . military situations in both peace and war can be examined and by the analyst to guide and evaluate target selections. Only in this way can the total targeting effort truly be said to pr sent measurements of the enemy's strengths in such a way to facilitate action against them. During the last several years it has become increasing apparent that mathematical "Monte Carlo" and "input-ou put" type models offer a new and promising technique for "war'.. ga m-a __ resources for targeting purposes. The rapid advances in th speed and data handling capacity of modern electronic con% i on puters have now made these models feasible for applicat many air targets problems. The purpose of the mathematical models is the selection targets for optimum forestalling of enemy courses of actin s This requires the models to answer the following question order. 1. Present situation a. What is the size and composition of the enemy tart' establishment (military resources)? b. What is the size, composition, and productive abili: of the enemy economy (economic resources) ? c. What levels of military action will these resources sup- port? 2. Mobilization capability a. What would be the size and composition of enemy military resources and economic resources after an all-out mobilization period of x months? b. What levels of military action would these resources support? 3. Evaluation of damage a. For any specified bombing attack what would be the yield and location of all exploding weapons? b. Given these explosions what would be the size and com- position of the post attack military and economic resources (including population)? c. Given the post attack resources what level of enemy military action could be maintained? 4. Recuperation What would be the size and composition of enemy mili- tary and economic resources y months (or days) after the specified attack, taking into account repair, rebuilding, con- version of other facilities, and new construction? For "war-gaming," that is, estimating net offensive capabili- tIes, the above questions must be asked about our own country as well as about the enemy country. The system of mathematical models which would answer these questions is shown schematically in Figure 1. The air battle, the damage, and the contamination models would answer questions 3a and b above. Discussions of these models are planned in subsequent issues. The remaining questions concerning the present, post mobi- lization, post attack, and post recuperation capabilities of the military and the economy are the province of the military re- aources model, which includes economic resources. Procedurally, the military resources models determine the number and size of missions, both offensive and defensive of "Anus types, which each country can carry out in a given span Cd time. This information is fed to the air battle model which to ether with the damage and contamination models deter- Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 DAMAGE MODEL AIR CONTAMINATION MODEL BATTLE MODEL DAMAGE MODEL CONTAMINATION MODEL N mines the military, economic, and population resources re- maining in each country after a period of air battle. The dam- age information is in turn fed back to the military resources model which determines the number, type, and size of missions which each country can carry out after the first phase of air battle. The process is then repeated for later phases of the air battle. If the models can, as is believed possible, answer the ques- tions posed we have an exceedingly powerful tool not only for target selection, but also for estimating the capability of a country to carry out military action now and in the future under various conditions and assumptions. The testing of alternative target systems in the first and succeeding phases can lead to the choice of the optimum target system for any of several different strategic situations. When then, is the military resources model and how is it de- signed to answer the questions put to it? The military resources model is an input-output model. This is a kind of mathematical model about which it has been said, it is much easier to understand what it is expected to do than how it does it. What the military resources model is expected to do is to estimate the capabilities of a military establishment and its supporting economy to carry out military action. The r sential problem of making this estimate is that everything must be considered simultaneously. It Is not enough to know that the capacity of the aeroengine Industry is so many engines per month. One must also know whether there is enough steel (or electric power, copper, petro- 1runt, ball bearings, and so on) to produce these engines while at the same time the tank, gun, shipbuilding, ammunition, and many other key industries (including reconstruction in a post attack period) are also requiring steel. Furthermore, not only ihr direct demand for steel must be considered. The aero- Inc industry consumes not only steel but also aluminum, ciactrlc power, transportation, and many other inputs, the pro- duction of which also requires some steel. In short, to know ttw capabilities of one industry we must account for require- tflcnta of all industries for a vast range of raw materials, labor, akppttal equipment, components, goods in process, transporta- Ucm and communications. Input-output models are a tech- for doing just this. An input-output model shows for Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 MILITARY RESOURCES MODEL MILITARY RESOURCES MODEL Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 SECRET 57 each industry (or military activity) the requirements for sup- plies from each other industry.' The military resources model consists of three sub-models or grids; the military grid, the economic grid, and the transpor- tation grid. The economic grid is in turn broken down into geographical regions which are related to each other by the transportation grid. The military resources model can be illustrated schematically. THE MILITARY RESOURCES MODEL ids consists of an inventory of resources an Each of these gr a table of coefficients in the form of inputs required perrus i ono is h n--- - e ec of Output. rur t oe ffi, roducing industries. The table of ll o f p the capacities of a f cients shows material, labor, and capital inputs per unit ne cult.ri m le x f p a or e dustrial output, , bomber a ton of aluminum and tons of aluminum per heavy bomber ii and le , ?~--~ required per unit of military activity; for examp -r+ roe nrinm tnns of arnmur e of airs per nymg hour,11u11~ division month, and so on. Its invent) Lion (by type) per of resources is the number of military units of each kind an' rid haste tio t n g a The transpor their associated equipment. its output units of transportation capacity on a and nomic arid This grid acts as a restraint on both the eco bottleneck or restrf military grid as transportation can be a structure its r ilit y a both in the economy and within the m 1 Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 1, No. 4, "The Role of Inte9rind p. t Loring Allen " , Rober Studies in Economic Intelligence, Without knowing the full complexity of the statistical and computational procedures (which is awe-inspiring) the reader can now visualize the operation of these grids in answering our initial questions. The military grid shows for a given set of military forces the level of combat actions that could be main- tained if the economy provides all the supplies the military re- quires. The coefficients of the military grid determine the re- quirements of the given level of combat actions from the econ- omy. The economic and transportation grids determine how much of these supplies can be forthcoming from the existing inventory of economic resources. At the present time the economic grid of the Soviet Bloc has been largely completed. It has been constructed in two parts - one covering the USSR and European Satellites and the other the Peoples Republic of China. For the European 1i1oc the grid distinguishes 240 producing industries or sectors and their materials, components, capital equipment, and labor inputs. Five test runs have been made and evaluated.2 On the basis of the evaluation of these test runs, application of this grid to certain types of live air targets problems is now be- in:; undertaken. However, a substantial data improvement rrsearch program is going concurrently. `i'hc military grid has been under development for about nine months. It is expected that test runs of this grid will be made in the summer of 1958. The transportation grid has been under development for about six months, and it is expected that test runs of this grid rill be made in the summer of 1958. The construction of this grid is being undertaken on two fronts. The first involves the Er);raphic disaggregation of the economic grids in terms of kcal regions. The second consists of the development of a transportation grid based on these regions. To date, 159 re- gk3n.+ covering the USSR have been designated, outlined, and cod-vd. The transportation net has been divided according to ttwwr regions and the terminals and links within each region cndrd and catalogued. The 159 regions correspond to Soviet C& Uts wherever possible in order to take advantage of the data UsWbuUon of these runs has been made throughout the intelli- L*ncr community. A few copies are still available for interested Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 SECRET on production and transportation published by the Russians. The effort to gather Soviet source information for the grid is linked to a concerted effort to gather applicable data, both The enormous complexity of the computations ein wont d in a ca ? - model analysis manes ~ rid for the European Soviet Bloc, for ic g able. In the econom example, there are per unit of output of each of the 240 sectors uirements from each of the other 239 t re q the commodity inpu sectors. This will be further broken down into 159 geograph-3 . - +n ho siMi ltane, th e ,,,......... - ical regions. gnus ously processed theoretically could be of the order nhl m millions 0, x lbu, or about 1111111, +_? tic steps may be involved. Modem eler individual arithme re tronic computers, however, can perform this ----A ivifli which thel - the ompu h es tionary aspect of can file, sort, recall, and manipulate large masses of data These partially routine steps in arriving at intelligence estii n + Tnn,. have a.lwavs beer ch s u w. -- - mates on large areas, time-consuming and cumbersome. For the more difficult an e r with t alytical problems, electronic computers aogr slderii h for mancai inn-r, prgreat many more of the e and holding in juxtaposition a -- --ihla This tee was s menu or the analysi eliminate the human judgm ns , nique does not, by any mea factor.. Rather it is believed that it will prove to be a po e"ri lanners to m~ p nee lli t g e tin assis ing ll tool better judgments, and to be able to make them more rapidly Some of the more specific applications of the military, ted below . sources model to air targets problems are presen i il it es 1. Enemy Capab del can be used to assess The military resources mo capability of the economy of the Soviet Bloc ato mount an a f 111111 tam elements o J tions: under varying Bloc objectives, policies, and assump urces} ilable res o government is constrained to work its ava If it wants a j i ps. within technological relationsh ' The number is actually smaller since many of the coefficielx emember which o ld r zero. Only a machine, however, cou zero. bomber regiment it must provide planes, bombs, crews, air- bases from which to operate, and so on, in specific quantities. If a ton of steel is needed the government must see that steel mill capacity, pig iron, scrap, coal, labor, and so on, are avail- able in the correct amounts. If more steel capacity is needed it must provide the steel, concrete, machinery, and so on, in the right quantities and types to construct a new steel mill. These resource restraints and technological relationships are set out comprehensively and in detail by the military resources model. The ability of the economy to support the mobiliza- tion of desired combinations or "mixes" of air, land, and sea forces can be measured. A typical problem would be a deter- mination of the maximum "balanced" air, land, and sea forces which could be activated in a specified mobilization period with specified stockpiling and capital expansion policies. In addi- tion to measuring the maximum activation of combat units, the economic grid can be used to determine under a variety of illoc policies and objectives the maximum capability to pro- duce specific weapons such as guided missiles and H-bombs at specified times. However, the economic-industrial grid does not take into account any restraints or bottlenecks that might develop within the military structure itself. Therefore, the outputs of the economic grid are fed into the military grid as inputs. The military grid is then used to assess the capability of the Soviet illoc military structure to mount and sustain, during a pre- attack period, elements of military strength fully prepared to rnkage in combat activities required by given strategies. The ability of the military structure to support desired combina- tians or "mixes" of air, land, and sea combat activities can be measured under varying Bloc mobilization objectives, policies, and assumptions. In addition to measuring the maximum r*mbat capabilities that can be sustained, the military model can be used to determine the capability of the military struc- 14at to put into operation specific weapons, such as guided 4*411es. within the available military resources, that is, trained patratnel, missile sites, logistics, and repair facilities. Tic transportation grid would then be used to establish any lttnaportation restraints or bottlenecks which might develop the economy or military structure itself. Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 SECRET 61 2. Effects Analysis Following their use in pte-attack situations, the three grids of the military resources model can be used to determine the capability of the Bloc economy, military structure, ce,a trans- portation system to re-mount various types eriod after air attacks of different scope k t p ac in the post at and intensity. The analysis can be applied to various time' of time only, d i s o periods after the air attack. In very short per the military and transportation grids ibl y the military, or poss as the answers needed would be the avail, l t ay, o p might come in immediate military structure of the Soviet th e abilities within ir attacks and to sustain ground and naval l e a Bloc to re-cyc action. These answers would be in terms of availabilities of yinP duce fl aircraft, runways, fuel, men, and ammunition to pro ound divisio hours, and the needed inputs to produce gr 4.1- time narin of na it s months and un involved the more industrial and economic resources must be d ht ?,?,,,?b ---- analyzed an In the analyses of recuperation periods of over a fe rces . sou months the economic-industrial grid is heavily drawn upon However, diate post-attack military assessment, as well as long rang t . economic and industrial recuperation assessmen Selection of Air Targets 3 . utstanding advances of the model-comput th e o One of technique is the possibility of rapidly testing a great variety ant tions um , p simulated air targets problems, using various ass O e i . p considering air attacks of varying magnitude and scop of c iet y mum air target systems can be developed for a var pe - cumstanCes as a result ? e capabilities problems and post-attack air target ae ffe t pr -1^11 d3V e) iems (a. and u. auo v sile sites, storage, supply, repair facilities, and industrial f5k 091 itin transportation installations which prove to be lim g -%a and inA o or bottlenecks in pre-attack mobilization enn k t k r p ac at o re-mounting of combat activities in the p -tac come the all 4als-. to actual hot lated problems would, of course, be applied problems. 4. Feasibility Testing The necessity for balancing the internal flows within the matrix of an input-output model make this type of model par- ticularly suitable for testing the internal consistency of either announced Soviet Bloc plans or of US intelligence estimates of Soviet Bloc military or economic growth patterns. For exam- ple, the internal consistency of either Soviet Bloc plans to mount military strength or US intelligence estimates of Soviet Bloc military growth plans can be tested. Estimates inde- pendently projected for various types of air combat strength can be tested one against the other in order to determine whether or not the total projected strength estimate is internal- ly consistent and whether or not such total strength can be sup- ported by the Soviet Bloc military structure. The economic grid can be used to check production estimates independently arrived at for various military end products to determine whether or not the production pattern so established is eco- nomically feasible. The transportation grid should be of great help in checking estimates of Soviet Bloc transportation pat- terns and capability. 5. Mobilization Indicators The military resources model can be used to establish indi- cators of mobilization build-up. By testing the model under various assumed mobilization conditions certain economic changes as well as changes within the military structure can be Identified as indicators of partial or complete mobilization. Specific changes in the use of resources can be identified as in- dicating specific types of mobilization. 6. Intelligence Collection Indicators In using the military resources model to solve a series of simulated air targets problems, certain areas of economic and military activity will be shown to be of critical significance to Ut capability of the Soviet Bloc to mount and maintain mili- tary strength. These critical sectors are those on which it is mwt Important to obtain accurate, current data for targeting purposes. Thus the priority list of air targets intelligence re- gWroments can be sharpened, and emphasis can be placed on U collection of certain key military and economic data. 7. Inputs for Operational Models The military resources model is to be used to translate any over-all military strategy into requirements upon the Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 economic-industrial, transportation, and military structure for the creation of military formations and military resource ele- ments together with the necessary military supporting activi- ties in both pre- and post-attack situations. Operational models such as the air battle model, currently being tested, serve to indicate these requirements in a realistic manner. The military resources model is designed to provide appropriate inputs for these operational models in the form of units of comp`, bat capability and to reflect the output of operational models in changing requirements upon the military structure. Thus the military resources model can define the maximum levels of combat activity possible within the limitations of the Bloc mill), tary and economic structure at any specified time. 8. Data Requirements The validity of problem solutions provided by the mili resources model is dependent upon the accuracy of the data inputs as well as the logic of the mathematical design of th model. Each of the component parts of the model - the ee nomic grid, the military grid, and the transportation grid has its own data requirements which must be initially asseinn bled and subsequently kept up to date. The economic grid contains a classification of economic ac tivity in the Soviet Bloc in the form of three submatrices o grids; the commodity input grid, the capital input grid, an the capital expansion grid. The data requirements of the co modity input grid or matrix consist of the commodity inpu per unit of production for each of the 240 sectors of the mat These sectors cover most of the commodities produced in Bloc. The data requirements of the capital input matrix c sist of the inputs of capital equipment and labor per unit production of each of these same commodities. The data l u quired by the capital expansion matrix consist of the co, modity and capital inputs necessary to increase available ca ital by one unit: The data described above are in the form technological coefficients which reflect the technological r, tionships currently operating as the economic restraints in desired mobilization or recuperation. by the Soviet Bloc. order to reflect fully the flexibility of the Soviet Bloc econ in meeting mobilization or wartime requirements the data puts must reflect not only production processes currentl; use but also the alternative processes which could be us SECRET 63 break bottlenecks, or stoppages resulting from air attack. Thus the economic grid requires the introduction of all practical alternate input coefficients in order to establish realistic tech- nological restraints. Because production technology changes with the passage of time, these coefficients must be continually scrutinized to insure that they reflect current technology. In addition, changes are necessitated in the classification of com- modities and capital equipment in the light of experience gained in using the model for various types of problems. Those economic sectors which prove to be the most sensitive to mobi- lization or recuperation demands may require a more detailed or disaggregated classification in the model, whereas less vital sectors may be further aggregated. . The running of a simulation on the economic model requires, in addition to the technological coefficients, data on the eco- nomic resources available to the Soviet Bloc for the time period being considered. Thus for each of the 240 commodity groups in the grid, current data on Bloc capacity, inventory, and for- eign trade must be assembled. The data requirements of the military grid of the model parallel those of the economic grid, but pertain to military activities rather than economic activities. As previously men- tioned, the output of the military grid, equivalent to commodity outputs in the economic grid, is in units of frontline activity, for example, flying hours of a specific type of bomber. For each such military activity data on inputs of other military activities as well as inputs of industrial commodities must be determined. In addition, for each unit of military activity the requirements of military capital aggregated in the form of "resource elements" such as airstrips, naval bases, and repair facilities must be determined together with the inputs neces- sary to expand a military "resource element" by one unit. As in the case of the economic grid, input data for alternative Processes of producing a unit of military activity must be Wembled and all coefficients in the grid must be kept in accord 11th the most modern logistical processes used by the Soviet We. In the running of simulations on the military grid, data pf total Soviet Bloc capacity, inventories, and possible incre- t to from foreign trade for each of the military activities in t11t+ grid Should be available for the time period under consid- tton. Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 The introduction of transportation factors into. the military- resources model requires an analysis of the Soviet Bloc eco- nomic and military commodity flow structure in terms of geo- graphic regions, thus greatly increasing the data needs. For each region the types and amounts of transportation facilities available must be determined in order to establish the freight- handling capabilities of each region. For example, the analysig of the USSR railroad system, currently underway, requires for, each terminal, link, and region estimates of the terminal motive. power and freight-car handling capacities, rail-link capacities, and regional car-day requirements. In addition to these trans portation data requirements, the Soviet Bloc production and consumption pattern must be established by geographic region.' This task requires the identification of the types and amounts; of economic and military capital facilities, or "resource el ments," available in each region. In addition, the Soviet Bloc "bill of goods," or final demand for military and civilian goods; must be determined by geographic region. The regional con, sumption of goods for military, government, and civilian use as well as the regional consumption of construction materials an producer durables must be estimated. Only when all th data are introduced into the military resources model can th transportation restraints, or "bottlenecks" under specifi mobilization and recuperation conditions be identified. The data problem is formidable, but considerable progr has been made, and new sources of data are being found an exploited. The data requirements for the model-machine tec nique do not represent a marked change from the req ments of traditional methods of analysis. However, the rigo ous analysis made possible by this technique or method simpp; makes existing data deficiencies more apparent. Moreov this technique has the additional advantage of enabling analyst to identify those specific data requirements which,`.'. the most crucial in target analysis by subjecting the data, various types of sensitivity testing, e.g., the variation of co cients, and data aggregations. The model also offers a me, of testing the reliability of coefficients in the light of kno output patterns of past years. It is believed that these va i( testing techniques will contribute to a sharpening of the, ority list of intelligence collection requirements. The headshrinkers' literature is full of remarks about the efforts of mankind to avoid thinking. As a matter of fact, I rather imagine that a very small proportion of the brainpower of the most creative thinker alive is ever devoted to creative thought. In our society a fairly large proportion of this small amount of creative thought is devoted to finding ways to help mankind avoid thinking. Games, alcohol, tranquilizers, TV, and business routine can all be used to help an individual fill 24 hours a day without ever having a creative thought. We like cliches because they help us sound confident without thinking. This does not mean that the average man is idle. On the con- trary, he is probably a very active and useful citizen. As a matter of fact, idleness is generally abhorred because it leaves a vacuum that is an invitation to thought. You and I may be exceptions to this general pattern in some small degree, but I want the reader to recognize that if this taper contains one small original thought, it will be here only as a result of tremendous psychic effort spent in overcoming my own urge not to think, and that if this thought, in its turn, sUmulates any creative thinking in the mind of the reader, it 'will be only over the opposition of your shrewd and dogged sub- conscious which tries so hard to protect you from the rash act of thinking. having drafted this challenge to the reader's subconscious, I now propose that we think about some of the problems of in- telligence. (I almost said "look at some of the problems of in- klligence." This just goes to show you how my subconscious &bhors the sound of the word "think.") To pose the problems thrt I would like us to think about, I want first to go back into a little Intellectual history. Some of the readers will be much more familiar with the events that I am about to describe than 1 am, but here at least is my version. In the early days of the postwar intelligence effort, the at- ktiUon of the intelligence community was focused primarily 'twt the interpretation of surface phenomena. Some of the MORIIHRP PAGES 65-70 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 t issue were almost unbelievably naive. For ex- questions a ample, there was not complete agreement on the general nature of the Soviet Communist system, and there was a great deal of, i the discuss on __ ---and other p eo ple feeling that these were indigenous parties, _ iet annara.tlus. Dur +w S f ov t the th - y ..~-- r - a pie ieeiuir, standards ing this period there was no agreement concerning At one extreme it y. of analysis in the intelligence commun ents without re some people used biased and emotional argum eople eiaimP.1 p guru to system. . that local communist parties were not part of the ,Sovieet+ap her as paratus because C to settle the matter in a court of law. As time went by, how; to acce p ever, the intelligence community more and more came w r -e%nnmirc- gnni d ,?.. the standar ology, and so forth, and attempted to conform to academi ement on standards of thought tended to l V V agre Genera the major problems in intelligence into the realm of facts. iven situation should be interpreted d that a g as agree it w the use of the techniques of economics then the size of tl the situata i n gross national product of a country involved t having great bearin _____+ f ant ac Uilum intuuy on the final analysis of the situation. The intell~i~gen~c Ca munity, therefore, . ?? o estions of the fact were important issues. SO which major qu blood and sweat shed over the numbers f th e emember of us r Soviet planes produced, the size of the gross national prodti f the Chinese rah d the adequacy o of Communist China, an The list could continue ad infinitum. roads . The focusing of the intelligence community on major qi elop th e fie, tions of fact feu to for the establishment or verification of facts. Some of. th ouidb ' am, c I I; techniques, like the factory markings progi hou e erally understood and accepted' throug fiPir1.q involvii hove . -- - Even un this field, phisticated statistical techniques, acceptance of the new m q her techni lete Ot _ od was neither immediate nor comp -a YnPT4~ d analysis in political an aoc.w --~ their wake. At,, gasp g nit y the intelligence commu point, the intelligence community entered a stage which always be with us to some extent. It is the stage in which arguments about fact are caused by the technological gap be- tween the informed and the uninformed analyst. This is a gap that training and experience have narrowed considerably and which probably can be narrowed even further in the future, but it probably will exist to some degree as long as some parts of the intelligence community develop new methods and new ways of thinking and other parts of the intelligence community lag in knowledge and understanding. It is not necessarily a bad phenomenon. It at least means that somebody is out in front and doing some thinking. It keeps the other fellows on their toes. As a result of over 10 years of development, the intelligence community has now reached a high level of sophistication in the application of standard techniques of analysis to intelli- gence problems.' Subsidiary methods such as style of writing and the manner of presentation are excellent. The community seems to have learned how to produce very good answers to intelligence problems without generating an undue amount of Internal friction. All this is cause for considerable pride and satisfaction. As good as we may be, however, we are obviously not good enough. We have just seen a classic example of one of our major outstanding difficulties in the question of US policy to- ward the launching of the Soviet earth satellite. There was no failure of intelligence to report the facts relating to the Soviet satellite program well in advance of the event, and intelligence also pointed out that this event would be of distinct advantage to the Soviet Union in the field of political prestige. Intelli- gence had done the job our customers normally expect of us, and yet in a real sense, the US was caught napping. The US prepared a plan of what to do after the Soviets had launched a Jatellite, but we did not take any action or even decide to take any action before the event. In other words, our planners did fwt fully recognize the magnitude of the blow the Soviet taunching would give to our prestige. It would be very easy for us to sit back smugly and blame the unfortunate consequences On the policymakers, who were adequately informed in advance bnt Who did not take adequate action in advance. Could it be *At we have not yet established adequate confidence in our product in the minds of our consumers? Could it be that the Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 fault still lay with the intelligence community? Could it be that we have not yet devised the proper method of presentation which would permit us to say "damn it, we mean it!" If we are willing to recognize that it is possible for intelli- gence to "fail" even when it is shrewdly accurate and timely we might find further food for thought in looking at the pro lems that we are being shrewdly accurate and timely about: They tend to be problems that have a fairly immediate practical application. No one could object to our tackling such problems When one looks for analysis in depth or in terms of long-te trends, however, we find that it is generally lacking in our for mal publications. The bold analysis, the sharp intuition, th long step ahead, and the provocative ideas are generally foun in informal bull sessions; in "think" pieces that have no tru status; in the internal staff memoranda of ONE, OCI, and so on and in some of the briefs and background material used by th DDI on an ad hoc basis. They are almost never found in thi formal papers put forward by the community for the so guidance of our planners and policymakers. There are strong conservative influences in our present tem of producing intelligence which would tend to resist than in anything involving method and type of analysis, form presentation, and so on. Might we not be at a point of develo ment, however, where we need to make a quantum jump in conduct of intelligence? Is there any way in which intellige can learn to say better "we mean it," "these are the probl that may arise in consequence," "these are the decisions must be decided?" How can we extend our analysis in and depth beyond present dimensions and yet carry with us conservative elements in the intelligence community? There might be changes in organization or in the meth of presentation which might improve our impact on the fo lation and execution of national policy. These things sho be explored, but no such changes could create, by themsel, the change in the intellectual and visceral impact of in gence that we must aim for. The only sure way to con national affairs with greater wisdom is for the responsible organizational substitute for brains. Intelligence is an portant and integral part of the process by which we condo' our national affairs, and intelligence officers, therefore, ha SECRET 69 tremendous responsibility to apply themselves to new ways of thinking which will give us a more brilliant insight into the dynamic world and our constantly changing place in it. The real area in which we must seek improvement, there- fore, is in that related to analysis. Perhaps we must learn to pose a different kind of question to ourselves. Perhaps we need to learn to think on a different time scale. Perhaps we need to develop even more new methods of analysis. Perhaps we need to do some combination of all of these things, and many others as well. There are probably many different ideas that should be ex- amined. Here is a sample of the kind of thing that we might think about. Might it not useful for us to engage systemati- cally in backward analysis from hypothetical cases? For ex- ample, intelligence predicted the launching of the Soviet earth satellite and said that it would have unfortunate consequences. But let us suppose that several years ago we had posed the fol- lowing question: "What would be the impact on the policy situation of the US and on its prestige if the Soviet Union were to accomplish some technological breakthrough which would support a Soviet claim for Soviet supremacy in the field of sci- ence and technology?" If we had had this sort of analysis, it might have been possible for us to point out in a much more meaningful manner the way in which the Soviet missile pro- gram and the development of a Soviet earth satellite might place the Soviet Union in the favorable situation envisaged in our hypothetical analysis. We could pose other similar ques- ttons such as: "What will be the effect on the world political altuatlon when Soviet industrial production equals US indus- trial production?" "What would be the consequences if all of the 'third force' groups backed by the US came to power and 'right wing' parties disappeared?" "What would the world kink like after 20 years of disarmament and `peaceful coex- Utance?"' Analysis of these questions might put a vastly dif- terent light on intermediate developments leading toward the hypothetical situation we have posed for ourselves. There is undoubtedly room for improvement in our work, but Unfortunately as we get better and better, we have more and more justification for continuing to think and do exactly as re h*ae been thinking and doing. This is more and more justi- GtUtiort for not thinking creatively about improvement. We Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 70 SECRET know, however, that there will always remain an important challenge to us in intelligence as long as the US does no act to accommodate itself adequately to world developments What do you think that we should do about it? SECRET 71 ELINT A SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM. Charles A. Kroger, Jr. During the initial phases of the Battle of Britain a German bomber, relatively safe under cover of darkness, flew over the blacked-out landscape heading for London. At a specific mo- ment the bomber dropped its bombs, which accurately hit their target, and another successful German Luftwaffe attack was history. Electronic advancements by the Germans made this possible. British interception and analysis of this new elec- tronic bombing device countered the Germans' success and continued to render less effective every subsequent electronic advantage the Germans. developed. In a parallel manner the Germans developed a highly effective electronic intelligence rdiort directed against the Allied raids originating from Britain. This phase of electronic intelligence, utilizing electronic means to determine enemy electronic capabilities, began in England just before World War II and has been an ever increasing effort which today is called ELINT. ELINT is a coined word for the process of electronic intercept and analysis or electronic intelligence - a process about which rrry little has been written. The intelligence officer, unless he Is In the electronics field himself, has had little contact with FLINT. By directive ELINT is defined as: "the collection (observation and recording), and the technical processing for later intelligence purposes, of information on foreign, non- communications, electromagnetic radiations emanating from Other than atomic detonation sources." In simple terms, LLINT is the detection and analysis of radiations from foreign *kctronic devices for the purpose of extracting information of talus to intelligence. Jtut as a flashlight radiates a beam of light observable to the human eye, electronic devices emit or radiate nonvisible, non- wdible radiations which are detectable and recordable, using Ikttronlc devices just as the human ear hears sound. This ptfon or collection of enemy radiations is the first stage '6 RUNT. lbe formal definition restricts ELINT to "noncommunica- Oft radiations other than atomic detonation MORIIHRP PAGES 71-83 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 sources" This means that ELINT is responsible for all radia- tions except those used in voice or other communications cCch a d those resulting from legraph an s radio or te hat other kind of radiations are there? To name a few with What missiles and mis f rom adiations which ELINT deals, there are r adiations from d r sile guidance devices,on el tronic devices tories and field testing stations working ' irc ra t g fir d cr a radar, navigational aids, antiaircraft an for later intelligence purposes" means in g ical process "Techn subjecting the collected ELINT raw data, u r1pi sual a 11 d y in the fso by of beeps on a mdr.ilr- u - equipment p ic euipment. This eq p p t x elec ron use of comple to see on an oscilloscope, to ith his ears , t to hear w the analys measure very accurately, to photograph, to compare with __---4--A ~imnai in as mano ti at g -- standards and to inves ways as are necessary to identify the characteristics of th nrnopSSlnP'" is complete foreign device. vv uric u- ass to the intelligence analyst d t can l p ys al ana the technic tailed information on the location and capabilities of the Pori The int o-- ---- eign device. this information with other knowledge to estimate the over- For a technical look at what ELINT really is let +usttuurn in a ht i ,v ew , t, -w - g magnetic energy, like l in length and form a spectrum. We are all familiar with 6 iinving ing n g l rainbow with ILS coors ra viola' millimicrons in length (400 million megacycles/sec); e meM (800 millio th leng with waves of 385 millimicrons in -4- nr +In dl his cycles sec). p -~ netic spectrum. The radio portion of this electromagne ,?no+innc and multi d ctrum is use spe , ...-._ weapons use radio wa y the militar tl y Curren weapons. varying from a few thousand cycles (waves per second) up, n waves per sewn' billi o ndred 100 kilomegacycles (one hu _ :4: of the radio di ng The following r all electromagnetic in the ove color spectrums e bands an expansion of the radio spectrum showing t di e. a different soviet electronic devices ra Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 For a specific example of how ELINT works, let us take a simplified look at Soviet radar. Soviet radar devices radiate electronic impulses at certain frequencies and in definite beams searching the sky for long distances and great altitudes for any object that may be present. When these impulses strike an object they bounce off and return to a ground or airborne re- ceiver which calculates the length of time between emission and reception and the strength of the signal received. From this, the Soviet radar operator can generally tell the size, speed, direction, altitude, and other pertinent information about the unseen object. Our Strategic Air Command, with its retalia- tory mission, urgently requires every possible bit of information on Soviet radars - particularly on their location and capa- bility. This is where ELINT goes to work. By, intercepting, amplifying, recording and analyzing an enemy radar signal or pulse, we can learn all about it. By studying the type of radi- ation, its modulation (AM, FM, pulse) its pulse repetition rate, pulse duration, pulse shape, its radio frequency (position on the electronic spectrum), its antenna pattern characteristics, and so on, we can identify the radar, compare it with known information, ascertain its range, location, use, and other essen- tial information required to evaluate its capability as a radar and its susceptibility to countermeasures. This same process of ELINT pertains to any and all enemy electronic devices including airborne intercept devices used by guided missiles, guided missile launchers, fighter aircraft, long- range and short-range navigational aids, ground controlled in- tercept height finders, anti-aircraft and aircraft fire control radar, blind bombing devices, electronic radiations emanating from scientific laboratories or production plants, and so on. What do these radiated signals sound like? Frankly they sound like noise or radio static during a thunder storm-in fact, before the more euphonious term of ELINT was coined, the British called it "Noise Listening" and, during World War II, had a "Noise Listening Bureau." Although ELINT is a very complex field - constantly looking beyond present knowledge of electronics to fulfill its role of pro- viding timely information on new foreign electronic develop- ments, it need not be pushed aside as too complicated to be understood. Because of its complexity, some members of the intelligence community are inclined to throw up their hands Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 and ignore this potential tool. However, FLINT is not too difficult to comprehend or use, nor is it an end in itself, but it can contribute essential, accurate information to the intelli- gence process. Scientific intelligence and, in particular, ELINT, or electronic intelligence, had its start in England immediately before World War II. Early in 1939 the British Committee for the Scientific Study of Air Defense first drew attention to Britain's ignorance of new German weapons. One scientist, Dr. R. V. Jones, was appointed to look into the matter. Before he even started his task the war broke out and in June 1940, Dr. Jones, after con- siderable study, concluded that the Germans had developed a radio beam by which their bombers could operate over England regardless of weather, darkness, or cloud cover and still be most accurate in their blind bombing. This beam, just a little more than one-half mile wide, passed directly over London. Based on Dr. Jones' conclusion, steps were immediately taken to find any possible countermeasures. A Royal Air Force search air- craft was outfitted and it accomplished its mission of looking for and detecting this German beam. Technical analysis of this information provided the radio frequency and other char- acteristics of the beam, thus permitting the British to jam it and render. it ineffective. Henceforth, many bombs intended for London fell harmlessly on the open countryside. This in- terception and analysis of an enemy electronic radiation (later known as Knicklbein) was the birth of present day ELINT. The Germans altered their beam system and soon began using a better system utilizing intersecting beams referred to as the "X" apparatus, which provided greater accuracy. These beams were at a different frequency than Kriicklbein, requiring new search and analysis before the British solved this new threat and took countermeasures. With the "X" apparatus, the bomber flew along an electronic beam while its position along the beam was observed from a German radar station on the continent. When the bomber was over the target, it was told to drop its bombs. By now Britain's ELINT capability of inter- cepting and analyzing this electronic information was quite effective and continued to grow in scope and importance throughout the war. During World War II the US made extensive use of electronic intercept devices in both the Pacific and European Theatres of SECRET 75 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 SECRET Operation. Special USAF and Navy planes equipped with ELINT receivers ferreted out the secrets of German and Jap- anese antiaircraft radar and aircraft warning devices. From the use of such planes the word "ferret" was coined, a term Presently applied to aircraft equipped to investigate enemy electronic radiations. Among the most deadly weapons di- rected against the Eighth Air Force were the German antiair- craft guns which were equipped with extremely accurate radar directors known as "Wurzbergs." The close formations of American aircraft made a juicy target for the more than 16,000 German antiaircraft guns. By use of radar intercept equip- ment (ELINT equipment) information was obtained which per- mitted the use of jamming devices, and thus the one-billion dollar investment of the Germans in their Wurzberg radars was literally ruined by the countermeasures made possible through ELINT. Knowing we had this capability, the Germans began a frantic search for non-jammable radar equipment, but the war was over before they succeeded. Following World War II there was a period in which interest in ELINT, as in many wartime activities, tapered off. Some effort continued but the real push to provide intelligence on electronic advancements in other countries was not initiated until the USSR clamped down its Iron Curtain. Since that time, the collection and analysis of electronic signals radiating behind the Curtain has been the constant goal of ELINT. Since the birth of ELINT in 1940 the effort has grown in size, cost. importance, complexity, coverage, and capability, and, like most scientific efforts, is making yesterday's limits, today's capabilities. Electronic intercept, to use one connotation of ELINT, pro- vides factual information. Unlike the collection of much in- telligence information where we are forced to rely on word of mouth, memory, or integrity of source, electronic radiations are intercepted and recorded by machine. If a signal is being radi- ated it can be recorded and later reported accurately even by someone who doesn't understand all that he is doing. Because of this factual nature, ELINT has provided substantiation of many intelligence estimates based on other intelligence processes. During World War II, Air Force B-24 aircraft and radar- equipped Navy Catalina aircraft were assigned the job of locat- ing enemy radar in the Pacific. They spotted and pinpointed Japanese air warning sets scattered all the way from the Solo- mons to the China coast. A few days before the Leyte landing in October 1944 one of the ferrets discovered a new Japanese radar on Suluan Island at the mouth of the Leyte gulf. As this radar commanded the approaches to the Leyte coast line it was necessary to eliminate it and this was done on a com- mando raid by the US Rangers. Currently, ELINT is providing the Strategic Air Command with the intelligence it requires on the location and range of Soviet radar. Through ELINT, information is acquired on the method, capability, and limitations of Soviet long-range navi- gation systems upon which their atomic bombers rely. Soviet missile tests are monitored by ELINT and the point may soon be reached where, by interception and analysis of the telemeter- ing signal from Soviet missiles, we will acquire missile per- formance data vital to our National Intelligence Estimates. (Telemetering is the electronic system used in missile testing which records, codes, and transmits to ground test stations such things as missile speed, flight path, guidance, skin tempera- tures, and other behavior characteristics of the missile in flight.) Since early in World War II the Army, Navy, and Air Force each have expended varying degrees of effort on ELINT, and in 1952 the Central Intelligence Agency entered the ELINT field. Although much of this individual endeavor was valuable, in 1954 better organization was given to ELINT -organization on a national level. The lack of proper dissemination of val- uable intelligence produced by one organization but not always readily available to the others in the community was noted as a serious problem. When this situation came to the attention of the National Security Council a study was made, and National Security Council intelligence Directive No. 17, entitled Elec- tronic Intelligence (ELINT) was issued (in May 1955). NSCID-17 established the first national policy for ELINT and it is still the basic authority for the national ELINT program. It directed that: a. The US Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) shall be the national policy body for ELINT. Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 SECRET b. The Department of Defense and the Central In- telligence Agency shall be responsible for their respec- tive ELINT collection activities. c. The technical processing of all ELINT shall be accomplished in a jointly-staffed center administered by the Department of Defense. d. All data collected by the collection agencies shall be made available to the National Technical Process- ing Center (NTPC). e. The NTPC shall effect the fullest and most expe- ditious processing possible and furnish the results to the interested agencies. The present national organization for ELINT is rather com- plex, with many interlocking organizations and many formal and informal coordinating committees. The important con- sideration is that each of the services and CIA is free to run its own collection operations designed to furnish information it alone requires, but is expected to submit all collected data to the NTPC subject only to the minimum delays necessitated by prior exploitation for urgent tactical or operational purposes. One can immediately see the strong vertical organization for ELINT within each major component. It should also be appre- ciated that much horizontal collaboration is being accom- plished by joint participation in such organizations as the NTPC and AFOIN-Z in an effort to coordinate individual activi- ties into a national ELINT program. In October 1953 a study was made of ELINT in CIA. This resulted in the appointment of an Agency ELINT staff officer and in the preparation of an Agency ELINT program which the Director of Central Intelligence approved on 29 May 1954. Within the Agency ELINT is organized generally as follows. The Office of Scientific Intelligence develops targets and requirements for ELINT collection, furnishes scientific and technical guidance to Agency collectors, and performs the tech- nical analysis and collation of ELINT with all source material in the production of scientific intelligence. The Clandestine Services conducts a continuing review of the potential and capabilities for covert ELINT collection, implements specific clandestine activity in response to approved ELINT require- ments, and coordinates US ELINT clandestine activities with foreign governments. The Office of Communications arranges for research, development, and procurement of ELINT equip- ment as required to support clandestine ELINT collection. The CIA ELINT Staff Officer advises the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and appropriate operating components on the formulation, implementation, and coordination of ELINT plans, policies, and programs. On the national level, much work has gone into summarizing what each organization requires in the way of information on enemy electronic developments. This sizeable task has re- sulted in a formal statement of the currently definable Specific ELINT Collection Requirements (SPECOR). This collection guide is based on the priority of the National Intelligence Ob- jectives. It has been disseminated throughout the services and CIA field units for guidance as to what information the intelli- gence community requires and in what priority. To realize the need for an adequate requirements system, consider that the ideal ELINT system is one capable of collect- ing all s bgnals of interest and extracting all of the useful infor- mation from each signal. This is neither possible nor prac- ticable, however. The questions of just what signals are of interest and just what information about them is needed must be answered in the light of the gaps in our intelligence. Thus, as in other branches of technical intelligence, ELINT is faced with the problem of relating scientific techniques to intelli- gence problems. In general, ELINT targets fall into two major categories. The Army, Navy, and Air Force, charged with the military de- fense of our country, are primarily concerned with the location and capability of all enemy radar on a current basis. This is referred to as the Radar Order of Battle (ROB). The Air Force, for instance, must know where the heavy concentrations of enemy radar are so that its planes can either skirt the area or take proper countermeasures. The largest portion of inter- cepted enemy electronic information falls into this category of maintaining an adequate radar order of battle. CIA, on the other hand, is primarily interested in scientific break-through, or in not being surprised by new enemy electronic develop- Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 ments. This means that most ELINT effort is directed toward the interception and analysis of new and unusual electronic signals. Naturally in the course of searching for new and un- usual signals, much order of battle information is received. This serves, in addition to supplementing the services opera- tions, as a basis of comparison to determine what is new and unusual. The ELINT objectives of first priority to CIA relate to those signals which have yet to be intercepted or for which the radiating source has yet to be seen. Specifically, the targets are as follows: a. Those non-communication signals which are, or are suspected to be, associated with the Soviet or Satellite ability to deliver atomic or other weapons of destruction - that is, guidance or telemetry signals associated with missiles, airborne navigation, and bombing systems. b. Those non-communication signals which are or are suspected to be associated with the Soviet or Satel- lite ability to defend their countries against the deliv- ery of atomic or other weapons of destruction -that is, early warning, ground-control intercept, gap-filling radars, surface-to-air weapons systems, airborne weap- ons systems, ground surveillance systems, jammers, and so forth. c. Those signals occupying an unusual portion of the radio frequency spectrum not normally associated with Soviet or Satellite equipment. The equipment involved in ELINT is elaborate and com- plex. To make matters worse, the higher up the frequency spectrum you go the shorter your intercept range becomes, and the present trend toward higher frequencies means that ELINT equipment must get closer to the target or be designed with greater ranges, both of which approach the impossible. ELINT equipment falls into two main catagories: collection equipment (airborne, maritime, fixed station, or agent-carried) and analysis equipment (used on the ground to reproduce, readout, and analyze the collected information). Basically, the major components of an ELINT collection system are the antenna, receiver, recorder, direction finder, and analyzer. The antenna corresponds to the human ear. It is that com- ponent which first detects a signal. It is, of course, desirable that the antenna be very sensitive or, as we say in ELINT, have high antenna gain. This permits the maximum intercept range. The ideal antenna system would have the following characteristics: a. a continuous and fixed broad area coverage, b. very broad electronic spectrum coverage, c. very high gain, d. inherent capability for giving directional in- formation. These requirements are not all compatible. In practice it is necessary to compromise in order to gain a workable system. The decision as to which of the desirable characteristics can be safely compromised, and to what extent, is based on the fre- quency range of interest and also on the specific ELINT target under consideration. For instance, broad area coverage may be obtained by either of two means - a broad beam antenna fixed in space or a narrow beam, scanning antenna. The first method demands a sacrifice in gain. The second limits the time coverage of any part of the total area. Following receipt of the signal by the antenna it is passed to a receiver. The function of the receiver is to convert trans- mitted information available at the antenna into a form that can be measured and recorded. Basically two general types of receivers are in use today - the superheterodyne and the crystal video. The operating characteristics of each receiver may be outlined as follows: Superheterodyne - slow scan. a. inherently high sensitivity, b. good frequency resolution, Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 SECRET c. prohibitively long search time in many cases. Crystal video -wide open. a. low sensitivity reducing maximum probable range, b. frequency resolution problems, c. search time considerably less than the super- heterodyne. From the receiver the signal goes next to the recorder where the.0"al is c,+_-3 ___ _ .. . on main reasons for recording signals.^rA permanent record of the' signal is required for future analysis and for records, and on signals of h s ort duration or higher complexity the operator may not have enough time or capability to evaluate the signal parameters before the transmission is ended. Direction-finding equipment is sometimes utilized during the interception of the signal. It displays incoming signals on an oscilloscope or other azimuth-reading device giving the direc- tion of the arrival of the signal. Analyzers in the ELINT collection system are sometimes used during interception to provide a preliminary observation of the type of modulation and to measure the repetition rate, dura- tion, and general shape of signal pulses. Signals are usually presented by a cathode ray tube (similar to a television screen), which provides a moving picture of the shape, size, and nature of the incoming signal pulse or wave form. The pictures are usually photographed as a permanent record. It should be pointed out that ELINT collection devices need not be huge in size, as are those used in ground, sea, and some airborne operations. Quite to the contrary, considerable use is made of miniature equipment no larger than a book. ELINT collection equipment is usually designed for the specific situation in- volved, whether it be a 60-foot parabolic antenna on the ground or a tiny, unassuming, hand-carried package. The major components of an ELINT analysis system vary greatly with the purpose of the analysis. Order-of-battle analysis is often done automatically by IBM-type equipment. The analysis that CIA performs is not for order of battle but is to identify new and unusual signals. For this, man-operated equipment is required and an analysis position contains at least . rAPE IRON RECONOEP ATION ON SEW.- PECTRON ND SPACENEET- SIGNS EIGN REAN.IOTN D ROTATION AND/OR NOD E the following fundamental equipment: a tape transport used for duplicating or monitoring; a counter that measures and illustrates the modulation frequency; an ink-on-paper recorder to draw a continuous trace of the signal amplitude; an oscil- loscope, which permits observation of the wave form; a vibra- lizer to display modulation frequency components versus time; filters to separate signals; a rapid-advance movie camera; and a host of other equipment to permit the analyst to scan great volumes of tape and film to separate that minute portion which, upon detailed analysis, may prove to be a new electronic devel- opment. It is hoped that this basic discussion of ELINT will provide a general concept of this complex scientific intelligence process. It should be realized that in the interest of readability many points have been simplified and technical details omitted so as not to confuse the non-technical reader. If one considers that one-third of the cost of a modern fighter aircraft goes for electronic equipment and that most of the electronic devices which make up this equipment radiate sig- nals, then one begins to understand how much there is to learn of Soviet capabilities by examining their use of electronics. This also applies to ground and sea weapons, including missiles. Recent news reports of Soviet developments in the scientific field demonstrate how heavily the Russians are relying on elec- tronics and how advanced their development is. The Soviet earth satellites with their radiated signals are a responsibility of ELINT. ELINT must continue to intercept and to analyze Soviet electromagnetic emissions preferably in the research and development stages in order to keep abreast of Soviet electronic advancements and to attempt to predict future capabilities. Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approv 'or Release 2005/03/15: CIA-M30fi Th 000100020001-2 85 REPORT ON HUNGARIAN REFUGEES Guy E. Coriden The Hungarian Revolution of October 1956 provided an un- precedented opportunity for the collection of intelligence on a Soviet Bloc country. Each of the many facets of intelligence activity played its role. Every known Free World and Bloc intelligence organization was involved. Every Hungarian refugee who could toddle was a potential target for an intelli- gence-minded group. It is obviously impossible, therefore, to claim with good conscience to tell the "intelligence story" of the Hungarian Revolution. It is also impossible to get the many participants to agree on which of the many efforts was the most fruitful. This, then, will be the account of one activity - the collection of the intelligence information and material from the Hungarians who were admitted to the US. Other operations will be mentioned only as they are considered ix-rtinent. Because the opportunity was unique, certain adap- tations in intelligence collection methods were required to take lull advantage of it. The object was to extract the maximum anwunt of intelligence at a minimum cost while still. abiding by decent rules of human conduct. As the methods used were lit-cessarily determined by the processing and resettlement pro- erdcurs as well as by the official US Government attitude to- ward intelligence exploitation, it might be well to begin with a brief historical background. 'I'hc story of the revolution has been told many times, prob- ably best by the UN in its massive report. The outbreak took place on 23 October 1956, and in the months following, it is ratlrnated that 188,000 Hungarians found refuge in Austria and 18.000 in Yugoslavia. As of 1 September 1957, approximately 35.000 of these refugees had accepted asylum in the US. In early November 1956, when it became apparent that a num"ive influx of Hungarians was going to have to be resettled, It wu4 decided that Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, would be the prOcessing center for all of the refugees. Because the iinstalla- lton was an Army camp, the Army was charged with the initial Iftlxonsibility for coordinating the resettlement effort and pro- tiding all of the housekeeping services. On 12 December 1956, MORI/HRP PAGES CONFIDENTIAL 85-93 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL 87 however, the President appointed a civilian Committee for. Tracey F. Voorhees. This Committee has coordinated all activ-' utilized the services of more than 20 volunteer and govern- mon4.,1 ., .. November 1956 until early May 1957, when Camp Kilmer was' Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS)~ocean voyages, and 133 fli ghts chartered by the Intergovernmental Committee for, and Naturalization and the Public Health Service performed the functions necessary for admitting aliens to the US, and various charitable-religious agencies arranged for most of the resettlements. Part of the job of fitting the individual's skills' to available employment opportunities was performed by the, The processing and resettlement was handled with an amazing, degree of efficiency, and the sympathetic attitude of the Amen-. can peo le was s t i p o sus a ned that by early May it was possible to close Camp Kilmer. About 32,000 of the refugees had been dispersed to various parts of the country, and those remaining Lest the cursory nature of this account convey they idea that this was a simple and smooth process, remember that the operation involved the complete transplanting to the US of a large number of participants in a violent revolution who h d a lost most of their possessions and who had little or no knowl- edge of the English language. Only 6,500 of these could come' under any available immigration quota. The rest were ad- mitted under the Attorney General's discretionary authority, and the rules were established and changed several times. Indeed, methods and procedures were developed, abandoned, and reinstituted many times in the early days of the operation. Also the prevailing attitudes, both official and public, changed appreciably over the months. In the early days the primary concern was to provide a humanitarian welcome for the vic- timized Hungarian people. Every effort was made to avoid 1;A incidents which might cause unfavorable comment. This atti- tude was motivated by a genuine sympathy and admiration for the Hungarians and a determination to take full advantage of CONFIDENTIAL the propaganda opportunity against the Soviet Bloc. As the spotlight of international interest turned elsewhere, concern for internal security and the collection of material bearing on motivations came to the fore. A few statistics may help to give some idea of the scope of both the intelligence collection problem and the opportunities. Hungary is a nation with a population roughly equal to that of Pennsylvania and a land area just slightly smaller than that of Indiana. About 65 percent of the population was consid- ered to be rural, and 16 percent was concentrated in Budapest and its environs. The 188,000 people who fled the country during the great exodus represented about 2 percent of the population. No age distribution is readily available for pre- revolutionary Hungary, but 83 percent of the refugees received into the US were under 40 years of age, and approximately 64 percent of them were males. This is certainly not a typical slice from an old country in a near postwar period. Also despite the fact that Hungary is predominately rural, less than 1 percent of the group coming to the US admitted to being engaged in agricultural enterprises. This is probably easily explained on two counts: first, the land owners, even collective farmers, are less likely to leave than the landless; and second, those of rural background, faced with new opportunities and feeling that they have little prospect of owning land in the new country, are likely to follow the prevailing trend toward city occupations, even to the extent of falsifying their background statements. Another survey of the refugees who were over 16 years of age (excluding housewives) revealed that the average education of the group coming to the US was almost 10 years. The fact that the refugees were young, well educated, male, and engaged primarily in nonagricultural enterprises is a happy one when we think of the group both as a national asset and as a positive foreign intelligence target. The addi- tional fact that this predominately urban group formed about 1 percent of the total population of a small agricultural country should mean that not only every trade and industry but every major enterprise should be represented by a delegate in the US group. It is well recognized that a certain number of the Hun- garians probably succumbed to the human tendency to exag- gerate and alter their backgrounds, but it is believed that the distortion is not significant for our purposes. Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 CONFIDENTIAL In November 1956 the intelligence community faced the pro lem of exploiting the Hungarians without the benefit of even: the crude statistics presented in this article. The known fac were that tens of thousands of Hungarians were crossing th border to seek refuge in the Free World. Some were sincere patriots who had jeopardized their lives for their country in., the revolution; some were opportunists seeking economic betterment; and some were intelligence agents with missions, to collect intelligence, to establish nets or to report on they activities of Hungarians in the first two categories. Austria found its border area inundated with the Hungarians an could not screen them thoroughly with the resources at its dis-,,, posal. At the same time the Austrian government did note .7' wish to provoke the Soviet Union by allowing other Western nations to set up obvious intelligence procedures as a first step in the resettlement process. A number of the refugees were willing and even anxious to impart information of value to the Western powers, both for patriotic reasons and in order to secure more favorable treatment. The more enterprising of these found their way to one or another of the overt US or UK, missions operating in Austria. Reports coming back from these missions were the first indications of the high caliber, intelligence-wise, of the refugee horde. It was impossible to begin the problem of cataloguing the intelligence assets in Austria, so the next best thing seemed to be an attack on the same problem in the US. The NSCID #7 Committee has the. responsibility for domestic exploitation. It was now faced with . the problem of exploiting a large, but indefinite number of sources without any prospect of additional manpower to meet the vastly increased workload. In casting about for a solution to such an undertaking, the training cadre of the Armed Services Prisoner Intelligence Com- mittee (ASPIC) seemed best fitted for the mission in terms of qualifications and availability. This was an Army-Navy-Air Force-CIA unit which, in time of war, could be expanded to deal with certain aspects of the prisoner interrogation problem. At the time of the Hungarian eruption it consisted of a group of intelligence language experts furnished by the Army and Air Force as a basic cadre. Under the auspices of the NSCID #7 committee, advanced units of ASPIC were sent to Camp Kilmer in December to establish a process for assessing the intelligence CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 CONFIDENTIAL value of the refugees, in preparation for a full exploitation. At this time the prevailing sentiment among those responsible for ,'Operation Mercy" was a desire to extend undiluted Western hospitality to the Hungarians. At this early stage there was an attitude of mild horror toward any intelligence activity. The advanced unit found it necessary, therefore, to act under a cover - the Historical and Statistical Survey Team (HSS). The activity of the unit was restricted to obtaining background information on the individual Hungarians and collecting such documents and possessions as could be pried loose without cre- .ating a furor. Through its own efforts and with the coopera- tion of the authorities who were processing the Hungarians, HSS was given ready access to the information which was avail- able to all processing authorities. This information generally consisted of name, place of birth, former occupation, military service, and, in some cases, education and language capabil- ities. Because of language difficulties and a normal human desire to describe one's background in the best light, the educa- tion and occupation data were of limited value. With the per- mission of the authorities a certain number of the refugees were selected for extended interviews. Here again the prevail- ing sentiment toward humanitarianism, the complications of processing the many homeless, confused people in a humane and overt way presented an amazing number of difficulties for the surveying teams. Refugees were difficult to locate, suspi- cious, or overly garrulous. The intelligence operation was at the low end of the priority scale at the camp. There was incle- ment weather, a complicated system of drawing meal tickets, and the usual spate of unsettling rumors. Methods were de- veloped by HSS on one day, altered the next, and discarded on the third day - all in response to the changing conditions and reactions. On the basis of the original inadequate informa- tion, about 6,000 refugees were selected for their intelligence potential and were asked to submit to an initial interview. Of these, about 3,600 complied with the request, and slightly more than 2,000 proved to have sufficient potential to justify record- ing a Preliminary Interrogation Report (PIR). These ranged from scientists or ministerial officials with detailed knowledge of intra-Bloc operations to private soldiers with knowledge of troop and supply locations in one limited area. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL , 91 After it became apparent that the refugee flow was no longe the primary news topic in the count it r Y, was decided that ar effort would be made to c arry collection effort at Cam on a more intensive intelligenc Kil p mer. This decision was based OA the fact that an refugees before operation carried on there would catch the they became involved in the i ' roblems of ad' ng to living conditions in their n o Just ew envir entail much smaller cost to the US i ce ser i es W ntelligen v c ye fact that an individual's memory of a situation does not ' prove with the passage of time wa l s a so ar decision, Primary factor in this There was, of course, much th securing full ought given to the method cooperation of for th e refugees within the framework of the humanitarian effort. The refugees were usually { and eager to impart all possible inform ti a on. The ommon common sense things were generally mo t s efficacious in cooperation. An interviewer competent in the refugee's fjeldJ generally established satisfactor y rapport rapidly. Cordialicreature comforts, and a symbol f U "i o S Government oificialdom'il . For instance, invitations car were looking helpful stamp secured far bett large t er results han those merely stating that the US desired that the refugee report to a par- ticular building. The air of uncertainty fwas also The refugees who were contacted soo n to work with than a those who w ere around long enough to learn that they were safe and could extract favors in return for serv- ices or information. When the refugee reached his destination and was integrated in a com munity, protective relatives and friends frequently became a barrier or encouraged a suspicious attitude. Simply stated, the refugee, like a bewildered child in an unfamiliar situation, responds best to a friendly, solid person who understands him. As he becomes wise to the way of the new world these psychological factors favoring coopera tion disappear. Then each case takes on more individuality and the treatment which has placed the refugee in this specific situation is the important thing to look into for any needed !ever to cooperation. It was decided that to take advantage of the situation the intensive intelligence exploitations should be carried out by a second interagency group with the cover name of US Sociolog- ical and Technical Research Unit (USSTRU). This unit was CONFIDENTIAL activated on 10 January 1957. While maintaining some sem- blance of separate operations, HSS and USSTRU cooperated fully; and when conditions permitted, sources were shuttled from one to the other. About ninety different individuals from CIA, comparable numbers from the Army and the Air Force, and a few from Navy and State participated in the USSTRU operation. No large portion of the group was there at any one time - the ceiling at the peak of the operations was about 60 persons from all participating agencies. Because in the case of USSTRU the most effective collection could be done by analysts and intelligence officers having knowledge of the particular areas covered and gaps to be filled, specialists from all parts of the intelligence community were rotated to Camp Kilmer for time periods varying from a few days to sever- al weeks. Members of both intelligence units operated with a degree of dedication comparable to that shown by the people engaged in the processing and settling of Hungarians. For most of the period the work week consisted of seven 12- to 14- hour days. Although the constant flow of experts through the intelli- gence operating units provided the best qualified interviewers, they also created continuing problems. The light cover re- quired a certain degree of caution which was difficult to main- tain under the circumstances. This mass participation meth- od, however, had the added advantage of acquainting the whole intelligence community with the potential of the Hungarian refugees and the problems involved in exploiting this potential. Many of the large number of analysts involved were given their first experience in interviewing a source through the use of an interpreter and in reporting on information in which they were not expert. We have introduced the problem of interpreters, and this might be the place to say that early in the game two language factors came to light: (a) the intelligence community probably has fewer language specialists in Hungarian than in any other but the most exotic Eastern and Near Eastern lan- guages, and (b) the Hungarians have a lower coefficient of sec- ond-language competence than any other civilized population except Americans. The shortage of competent Hungarian translators was a limiting factor in the size of the operation throughout its existence. Those who did come forward were used for long periods of time and were released only with great Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL reluctance. Des it p e this s serious handicap, inception to its demise 1 May, USSTRU, produced about 1,5QOrint reports Hence menu with covering all fields of interest . a ccom of docu possible f and nd other articles ? uture operational Usefuln b~ __ ee i p n for the Hungari by CIA, under its responsibility for ans was undertaken the exploitation sources in the US. Because man he of all Priva available fo y of the sources r any sort of an sources were not their interviews shortened interview at the camp, many had' because qualified experts resettlement opportunities ati, nd" et was were not available in all fields at sot necessary to compile full 2af hat th records on the sour ey might be located at a later date confusion i h . n erently attending the whole pro Because of the compiling the records involved scoop- Of gram the job of opaper not only from the ing up all available piles from all of the a intelligence components but also agencies gram participatin i T t g . n he resettlement pro- hen followed many hours of c mg, discarding and recordi ?~ng J ng, sort. requestin the gaps. The resulting compilation pof of great data use o ?Y to all components of the ' proved not ;A on a n intelligen ce umber of occasions, to other but, also utilizing these records and its complete Govern me ldt foagencies. rce, supple mented by Aii Force and Army units, 3,000 reports Icy 1 September and has CIA more t come. This part of the collection operation faced many y Of the e. This encountered at Camp Kilmer, with som w edc~~ e ne Ones dd Principal among these was the fact that the finding themselves free to move about Harians, locations with amazing frequency as they pleased, changed ing in many cases to tom and rapidity without bother- comply with th re i qu re that aliens register e US regulations which changes of address with the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization_ the disillusioning experience of tracin Many field collectors had believed to have potential for ving a Hungarian refugee only to find after knocking Considerably overstated his experience and qualifications. The total result of the effort seemed whelming majority of the gaps in intelli n that the over- prerevolutionary Hungary were filled. When the Con analysts are able to collate and digest the mountain of ~ignfore O C NFIDENTIAL oration resulting from the program, the records and facilities available should enable the collectors to fill all but a minuscule number of gaps. In addition the many intelligence officers who participated in the interviewing gained not only experience in the techniques involved but also a certain area familiarity. It would be impossible for an interested, informed person to talk to about forty or fifty Hungarians from all walks of life for a total of about 200 hours without acquiring a useful knowl- edge of the country and the people. When you add the thou- sands of reports and items to the training and area familiariza- tion and divide it by the cost (Army food and quarters were provided, and no additional personnel were hired) you find that the intelligence community has made a bargain purchase. The Hungarian exploitation effort, American domestic style, will be a source of example and anecdote for some time to come. Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For R 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 SECRET 95 PAPER MILLS AND FABRICATION Stephen M. Arness The paper mill and fabrication problem has appeared in many forms including outright fabrication, the sale of pseudo- intelligence, false confirmation, and multiple distribution of both valid and false information, as well as organized decep- tion. by foreign governments. US intelligence agencies as well as all Free World intelligence agencies have been flooded with such information. It was esti- mated in 1952 that more than half of all the material received on several countries of greatest intelligence interest fell into these categories. US estimates were thus endangered and American intelligence efforts have been needlessly dissipated. Multiple dissemination by paper mills operated by exiles from the Soviet Bloc cuts particularly deeply into the professional manpower resources of all agencies. Working independently of each other, American intelligence agencies were slow in de- veloping a mechanism for benefiting methodically from their common experience in order to remedy this situation. Paper mills are defined as intelligence sources whose chief aim is the maximum dissemination of their product. Their purpose is usually to promote special emigre-political causes while incidentally financing emigre-political organizations. The information thus conveyed consists of a mixture of valid information, overt material, propaganda, and fabrication. Its bulk, form, and obscure origin frequently preclude successful analysis and evaluation. Fabricators are individuals or groups who, without genuine agent resources, invent their information or inflate it on the basis of overt news for personal gain or a political purpose. The line between the two categories, in many cases, is diffi- cult to draw. Competent fabrication has defied recognition on the part of analysts and evaluators. Well-planned deception or provoca- tion is apt to prove undetectable by analytical processes. It cannot be assumed, therefore, that more than a fraction of the number of actually existing cases in these categories have been identified. The established professional competence of the SECRET MORI/HRP PAGES 95-102 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Soviet intelligence services coupled with their known r pation with deception aprovocation - "disinformatione ti forcibly deception and n ;! or, as p c it, Mills and fabricators represent) to he USaintellig they intelligence c term eom-r munity. This essay is primarily intended to call attention to the nature of this danger and to suggest the necessity of remedial action which may in time make the deception weapon less? effective in the hands of the adversary and reduce his oppor- tunity for employing it. US intelligence-gathering agencies have spared neither Power power nor funds to close the gap man- requirements and their knowledge of the SoetiBloc orGmraotips of exiles from all target coun ____ 4-1.:- . . tries reco ni t g ze ha personal advantage. Their i t l t v al n e ligence represen at s well aware of the multiplicit ve were f y o accepting American agencies uncritically all information offered a d , n even outbidding another for intelligence sources Moreover, their own exp ence often proved to them that A. e ri- m i er can agencies did not fully coordinate their efforts, nor effectively c fraud. ooperate to expose Satellite politicians in exile knew that they could not return to power in their homelands Western except in the wake of war and victory. The liberal by Western monetary remuneration offered agenci es for information from behind the Iron Curtain offered ffered them a ready-made opportunity to remain alive and to preserve a Political organization b Ong alleged intelligence. Careful operational analysis d m- onstrated that few, if any, emigre organizations had valid and unique intelligence assets; they lacked primarily the technical communications and documentation facilities for continuous contact with the homeland. Despite this, the unfortunate fiction persisted that such organizations had undefined special means of obtaining intelligence. In many cases exile leaders neither understood nor respected the basic preiiiise of TT o Policy theacked. "S Policy not to engage in war unless att Their "intelligence" production, true, embroidered, or false, was inevitably used to influence US policy in the direc- tion of hostility to the Soviet Bloc and to satisfy the ambitions of political pressure groups. SECRET To state the obvious: each exile group, as each sovereign country, used the weapons at its command in its self-interest, enlightened or otherwise. Emigre groups considered intelli- gence production a weapon to be so used. Yet the record of US dealings with them shows that in case after case it ignored the fact that the satisfaction of US intelligence needs was clearly secondary to their own political interests. One effect of the cry-wolf policy on the part of the emigres and the recognition of their efforts to mislead is that one of their reports may be ignored. Immediately after the war, several exile groups had man- power assets behind the Iron Curtain. Hasty, uncoordinated, and totally insecure operational use of these assets by both emigre groups and Free World intelligence agencies permitted the Communist security services to identify and destroy or to use them. Initial failure in the West to recognize the ruth- lessness and efficacy of the Soviet-type police state contributed to this process which, generally speaking, was completed by 1950. In view of this, it became apparent that nothing could be achieved by further uncontrolled subsidies to exile groups. Assertion of operational control by US intelligence officers through financial or other means, it could be expected, would normally be resented and sabotaged by such groups as it would strike at the roots of their political purposes. Generally, it was found advisable not to deal exclusively with the political leadership, but to take advantage of dissidence within the groups and to make it plain that intelligence production on our terms was valued more highly than the leaders' political coop- eration. The leaders, finding personal control of their groups effectively endangered, then were apt to come to terms. This strategy was followed increasingly in those operations involving Satellite exile groups with which CIA had contact. However, unless all intelligence agencies also recognize these principles and effectively suppress extraneous, uncoordinated aid to these groups, the uncontrolled information-peddling pattern will certainly persist or recur. The fact that substantial funds for intelligence procurement have been available to numerous agencies may actually be a handicap. Exile groups and individual intelligence peddlers Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 SECRET 99 The Communist concept of intelligence operations, patterned on the Soviet model, embraces a much broader field than does the Anglo-American. Far from being limited to seeking infor- mation through clandestine operations, it includes within the scope of "state security" a great variety of tasks designed to maintain the Communist Party in power and suppress all op- position. This means that all activity which can be construed as even critical of the state becomes a priority intelligence tar- get. The Communist security services accordingly make every ef- fort to penetrate and control emigre movements abroad which may endanger their regime. This is not a difficult task. Emigre groups have operated openly in the West with little regard for security, and normally have admitted as members anyone who voices his anti-Communism strongly enough to be heard and who cannot be positively identified as a Communist agent. These two facts - that penetration and control of the opposi- tion abroad are among the most important Soviet and Satel- lite intelligence tasks, and that they are so easily accom- plished - lead to the assumption that emigre groups can keep only few secrets from the Soviet and Satellite governments, and that Soviet and Satellite agents may be high in the coun- cils of such organizations. There can be no reasonable doubt, furthermore, that Soviet and Satellite intelligence services have had the same easy access to the bulk of the emigre "intelligence" product as we do. It follows that Soviet intelligence analysts are apt to have a grasp of the extent of US information on the Soviet Bloc procured from such sources. They are thus able to base their deception planning on a thorough knowledge both of US intelligence pro- curement methods through exile groups and of much of the information in US hands against which deception is likely to be checked. The lengths to which the Soviet Government will go in keep- ing track of emigre activities can best be illustrated by an historic case. During the nineteen twenties and thirties, in France, Soviet Intelligence obtained control of the Ligne In- terieure, an "elite secret group" within the strongest Russian emigre organization of the day, the General Russian Military Union (ROVS). The Ligne Interieure had been designed by the ROVS for the centralization and political control of Rus- assume that cost is no object to US intelligence personnel. Innumerable instances are on record in which payment for; both good and bad information was wholly out of proportion to its true value. US financial liberality and competitive bidding among agencies has led to inflation in the intelligence; market. Quality intelligence is seldom to be found in pieces of paper upon which a peddler has placed a price tag. Virtually all outright fabrication cases can be attributed pri- marily to disregard for factors such as the following: a. Control of agents should include their direct financial dependence upon the intelligence officers handling them. b. Salaries of agents and sub-agents should be based upon sound estimates of actual living costs in indigenous terms, and exceed these only moderately. Excessive personal com- pensation, particularly when it is used to encourage volume , of production, is a common cause of padding and fabrication.: c. A portion of the agents' earnings should be withheld in. special blocked accounts until their services are satisfactorily completed. d. Unless the use of funds available to agents for opera- tional expenditures is closely controlled, security breaches or the purchase of embroidered and fabricated material will result. e. Subsidies to foreign intelligence services and groups must be carefully watched to prevent financing by them of recognized paper mill operators and fabricators. US intelligence agencies abroad have reacted in various ways to the problem of uncoordinated spending on intelligence pro- curement, provided they were aware of it. Local coordination on a varying scale has taken place spontaneously in some areas. In the past some CIA field stations, concentrating their avail- able manpower on procuring good information, paid no atten- tion to US competitors in the field; others treated the problem as one of counterespionage. For the most part, however, efforts have been made to establish the origin of all information from the area, regardless of the agency purchasing it. In some in-' stances the attendant waste of professional manpower overseas has been prodigious. It is estimated, for example, that one- third of CIA's intelligence officers in Austria were committed during June 1951 to the detection and neutralization of fabri- cators and paper mills. Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 100 SECRET sian emigre groups, especially those of military usefulness., This aim naturally appealed to most White Russian emigres; however, since the Ligne Interieure was under Soviet control, it simultaneously served the purpose of making virtually the whole White Russian emigration subject to Soviet inspection;` and manipulation. In 1935 this Soviet control was exposed:;" when the head of the Ligne Interieure, the Soviet agent Gen- eral Skoblin, was discovered to have organized the kidnapping of General Yevgeni Miller, then head of the ROVS. His inten- tion had been to replace Miller with a Soviet-controlled substi- tute. In subsequent investigations the background of the So- viet conspiracy outlined above was uncovered in detail. These considerations should not lead to an automatic as- sumption that information received from emigre groups is planned Soviet deception or provocation. In most cases there is no substantial evidence that the originators of fabrication were, or are, agents of the Soviets, that the material has been supplied to them by Soviet intelligence, or that it constitutes Soviet deception. On the other hand, it is known that the Soviets are masters of deception and provocation and are will- ing to accept extraordinary sacrifices in terms of true informa- tion passed, in order to make deception stick at the proper mo- ment. This leads to the conclusion that the Soviets may be using the present to digest their information and to develop potential deception channels and materials, reserving decep- ' tion operations for moments and circumstances of their own :- choosing. The theory that analysts in Washington are in a position to detect deception or fabrication rests on the assumption that they have verified material at hand against which they can measure their reports. Under the pressure of the volume of invalid material they must process, with little verified "control" material to go by, evaluators must rely on their personal skill and instinct. Their judgment is thus increasingly subject to human error. On the whole, analysis alone, whether on a high or low level in US intelligence, has been unable to break fabrica- or deception cases except when the material lacked quality. tion Evaluators are handicapped not only by their ignorance of the operational circumstances under which the information is pro- cured, but by the amount of processing and re-processing to which it is subjected before it reaches them. Translations, SECRET 101 revisions, and summaries of spurious information frequently eliminate the flaws which might allow an analyst to detect a fraud in the original. It is the lesson of experience that fab- rication and multiple false confirmation can be detected only by the method of operational investigation of the source and transmission channels, combined with reports analysis. There can be no doubt that the Soviets are fully capable of planting information in our intelligence channels which has all the earmarks of being genuine. Only by careful scrutiny and cross-checking of the channels through which such deception material has been forwarded can the danger be reduced. Unfortunately the following doctrines, which are fallacious and detrimental to the US intelligence effort, are still wide- spread among intelligence personnel: a. That intelligence agents of all nationalities are entitled to keep secret from their US intelligence officers the iden- tities, antecedents, methods of operation, and means of access to information produced, of their subsources. b. That it is the mission of intelligence officers in the field to procure information without a determined attempt to ascertain its origin, leaving it to the experts in Washington to judge its validity. c. That overseas sources are in danger of compromise if identities are revealed to other agencies of the US Govern- ment which were established, trained, and equipped to pro- tect such information properly. The last mentioned concept fostered resistance among intel- ligence officers of various government agencies which prevented a long overdue exchange of information on fabricators and paper mills. As a result, an excessive amount of professional manpower had to be devoted to costly overseas investigation, where simple headquarters coordination of suspect sources would have revealed duplication or fraud. The steady concentration of US intelligence agencies on mili- tary targets in the Soviet Bloc, and the relatively small influx after 1946 of knowledgeable new sources, have tended to solidify the intelligence market. Since 1946, in many areas, agencies of the Government have been dealing with identical intelligence sources. This makes a systematic program of centralized reg- istration of sources both necessary and profitable. Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Editor's Note The views developed in this paper were first expressed early 1952 when the menace to the intelligence community pre" sented by paper peddlers of various types was at its height. Since then steps taken under the authority of the IAC give; promise of achieving a coordinated solution to this problem by the US intelligence community. UNCLASSIFIED LOST ORDER, LOST CAUSE Millican, Robert M. Gelman, and Thomas A. Stanhope C Bogie The month of September North. began T South, having repeat- edly Civil War for edly proved its superiority on the field of battle, was demon- strating a spirit of resistance which boded at least an ultimate stalemate and the separation of the former United States into two rival nations. Before thebemonth September ended, the eventual defeat of the in August, Robert E. Lee had smashed and routed the Fed- eral under John Pope at the Second Batte of of hrnmentll leaving Henry a a legacy gacy hysteria to the appointed Federal general-in-chief in corn- W gallck, the recently app the suddenness mand of all army operations, was stunned by and magnitude of the defeat. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, was busy with nervous preparations for the fall of Wash- ington. To prevent arms and ammunition from falling into the hands of the enemy, he gave orders toship teape arsenalweto New York. In the War Department, important placed in bundles which could be carried by men on foot or on horseback. Gunboats were ordered to stand by on the Potomac River, and a steamer was held in readiness to evacuate Presi- dent Abraham Lincoln and his Cabinet. Other areas of the United States, although not under the guns of Lee's army, were no less apprehensive than the canr an In eastern Pennsylvania, Governor Andrew Gregg begged President Lincoln for a minimum of 80,000 troops to defend Philadelphia against the 120,000 to 190,000 rebels which he believed were being massed in Maryland for an invasion of Pennsylvania. In western Pennsylvania, there were fears that Braxton Bragg somehow was going to take his western Con- across impassable mountains to join with Lee. federate army In Maryland, where inemories of the April 1861 riots in Balti- more against Federal soldiers were still Clear d bitter, there was widespread apprehension of a rebel uprising the loss of the state and the isolation of Washington. 1important places in the eastern united States mentioned in the text are shown on the accompanping map. UNCLASSIFIED Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 104 UNCLASSIFIED In New York and Indiana, potential Copperhead plots and sabotage terrorized b th i o offic al and public opinion. Confed= erate armies in Kentucky unde B r ragg had taken Lexington and were threatening Louisvill e and Cincinnati, where martial' law was proclaimed I . n each of these places the citizens dug trenches and slept in terror h w en they did not actually flee to the countryside. A third majo C r onfederate army under Earl enm omh __ in con d k re rr , up additional nightmares for the frightened, who visualized this army sweep.. ing through or around Ulysses S. Grant and eventually over= running the western ~,- - -. f Among the European powers, sentiment was building toward mediation in the war and recognition of the Confederacy, if not toward actual intervention on its behalf. The British were provoked to these attitudes by the shortage of cotton for their textile mills, resulting in unemployment and deprivation for hundreds of thousands of workers; by a preference of the Brit- ish nobility for the aristocratic, Anglo-Saxon South over the heterogeneous, "mongrelized" North; by the desire of the British Government to see two rival pygmies instead of a single united giant on the Ca di na an frontier; and by general national anger toward supposedly hostile Northern actions such as the blockade and the removal by a Yankee warship of two Con- federate agents from a British mail steamer, the Trent. Subtle propaganda by Confederate agents in Great Britain provided a catalyst for these sentiments, and the rout of the Federal troops at Second Bull Run fired the retort. Recognition of the Con- federacy by Her Majesty's Government and a negotiated peace .on the. basis of Southern independence loomed as a startling reality to the North in the shambles of its defeated army. Britain would have been followed by Napoleon III of France, who had the assurance of Confederate support and eventual recognition of any French conquests in Mexico in return for his recognition of the Confederacy-which had, in effect, al- ready repudiated the Monroe Doctrine. The South responded to news of the great victory at Second Bull Run with a demand that the war now be carried into Yankee territory. Newspapers in every Southern city spoke for their readers when they clamored for an immediate invasion of the North. Sentiments similar to those stirring the average Southern citizen also motivated the leaders of the Confederacy. UNCLASSIFIED 11 L ' e DaDH. 1OERICKffi'jRG CbMelbrsnik I RRICHMOND na YORK 00 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 1 Approved Foase 2005/03/15: CIA-RDP78T039-4A0M0020001-2 Lee agreed that Southern military success had put the Con- federacy in a position to state its political objectives leading to an honorable peace, but he still felt that one more victory over the Federal troops -- and this one a victory north of the Potomac - would so clearly prove the strength of the Con- federate position that the North must accede to any demand for peace. Such a victory might well affect the coming Con- gressional elections in the North as well as influence the waver- ing British and French Governments to recognize Southern in- dependence. An offer of peace after a great victory would be considered a magnanimous gesture by a victorious power rather than a sign of weakness by a frightened bureaucracy. To achieve these political ends, Lee had to gain another bat- tlefield victory over the Federals, and a major objective of an invasion of the North was therefore the Federal. Army of the Potomac itself. By taking the initiative, Lee could draw his opponents, far less skillful than he, whoever they might be, into a war of maneuver in which he could win on a field and at a time of his choosing. As another major objective of his in- vasion, Lee also intended to seize or to destroy the Pennsylvania Railroad bridge over the Susquehanna River at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The seizure or the destruction of this bridge would sever the connecting artery between Washington and the \Vest. The only other through connection to the West was at the periphery by way of the Hudson River and the Great Lakes. Lee had the capability of attaining his objectives. With a victorious, battle-tested army under successful veteran com- inanders, Lee would be able to defeat the Federals if he were permitted to select the terms of reference for the battle as he already had done at Second Bull Run and was to do again later at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. Lee also would be able to destroy the railroad bridge at Harrisburg if he reached it without having drawn the Federals into battle or to seize the bridge if he reached it after a victorious battle. Although his army was relatively small, Lee divided it into several parts, with the Federal garrisons at Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg in the Shenandoah Valley as targets for three units. Two other units were to proceed toward Boonsboro and Hagerstown. In his Special Orders 191 of 9 September 1862, Lee drew up his order of march and made his troop dispositions. Each of the key commanders mentioned in the order was sent Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 UNCLASSIFIED a copy of the order. James ("Pete") Longstreet carefully re his copy and chewed it -- "as some persons use a little cut tobarrn 11 ini- r yr- ,,--- pine d - .~ copy to the Inside of hid jacket. Thomas J. ("Stonewall") Jackson meticulously burned his copy. There was a certain confusion in Jackson's mind as td whether Daniel T-T.- ., rn:,, __ s s w Vol under his command 0 directly under Lee. To be certain that Hill received a copy o1 Special Orders 191 (the Arm f N y o orthern Viii h rgnaad not yet, een n divided into } corps), Jackson, in his own hand, sent Hill a considering Hill no longer under Jackson but idirectly yonder; himself also sent Hill , a copy Hillli . camed that he never re- ceived this co py On Saturday, 13 September, the hastily reorganized Federal: Army of the Pn+rt- --3-- - -L Clellan moved into Frederick and set u ca p mp on the outskt irs of the town. Colonel Silas Colgrove, the commander of the 27th Indiana V l t o un eers Third Bid ,rgae, First Division, Twelfth Army Corps, ordered his men to stack arms in the same area which had revi l p ous mand of y beenHilloccupied by the men under the com- DanielHarvey . While resting in this area, Private Barton W. Mitchell and Sergeant John M. Bloss, both of the 27th Indiana, found a copy of Lee's Special Orders 191 i n a paperd wrappe around three cigars. The order was authenticated by Colonel Samuel E. Pitman, First Division Adjutant-General, who recognized the signature of Lee's Assistant Adjutant-General as that of Colonel Robert H. Chilton, with whom Pitman had served in Detroit. The order then was brought to McClellan, who set off to destroy Lee in detail. McClellan, dilatory by nature and convinced by his faulty intelligence that Lee had an army about 50 percent larger than the Army of the P t o omac was nt likl t ,oeyo have attacked Lee. Even with Lee's orders before him - orders dividing Lee's army - McClellan inched cautiously forward. Lee, informed of the loss of the copy of Special Orders 191 that he had sent to Daniel Harvey Hill, did his best to reassem- ble quickly his scattered units to present a united front to the Federals, and on Wednesday, 17 September 1862, the Battle of Antietam took place. Lee, forced to fight on the defensive for UNCLASSIFIED the first time during the war and incapable of maneuver, was able to stop the Federal attack only with great difficulty. On 19 September, Lee withdrew into Virginia, and the North was free of the invader. The railroad bridge at Harrisburg was not cut, and the North was able to maintain its fundamental east-west link. Mary- land, eager to follow a winner, not only did not secede but even went so far as to increase its effort on behalf of the Union. With Maryland remaining loyal, Washington was neither sur- rounded nor isolated, and its Fifth Column remained nervously underground. The fear of invasion among Northern states proved to be groundless, and the governors of these states rather than demanding troops from Washington to defend themselves, provided troops, albeit reluctantly, to the Union army. With substantial reinforcements from the eastern states available, the Union was able to send Western recruits to Don Carlos Buell and Grant to exploit their victories at Perryville, Kentucky, and at Corinth, Mississippi. The Copperhead movement, which needed the impetus that a Southern victory north of the Potomac could give, never re- ceived this impetus and gradually lost strength as the war progressed. Even at the polls this movement proved to be weak as Lincoln's Republicans swept the Congressional elections of 1862 to remain in power. Lincoln, who had resolved upon the Emancipation Proclama- tion as a military, political, and psychological measure neces- sary to insure the ultimate conquest of the Confederacy by the Union, leaped upon Antietam as the victory which he needed to give meaning to the Proclamation. Even though the Procla- mation was a political gesture, in-victory it seemed more ideal- istic -and realistic - than if it had followed a defeat on Northern territory. After a Union defeat the Proclamation would have seemed to be nothing more than the empty oratory of a beaten demagogue rather than the noble gesture of a con- fident leader. The recognition which the South had expected from abroad was contingent upon a Confederate victory, and the Southern retreat from Maryland could hardly be construed as a victory even by the Confederacy's most sanguine European supporters. The retreat, in turn, led to second thoughts; second thoughts, to inaction; inaction, to continued nonrecognition -right Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 108 UNCLASSIFIED through to the end of the war. Lincoln's Emancipation Pr y lamation, moreover, swayed foreign public opinion to the Nort hi h w c now seemed to stand for the oppressed rather than the oppressor of a popular revolt. Finally, Southern hopes which had been raised to the hei h g t, with the victory at Second Bull Run and with the transfer o: frustration in less than three weeks. Although the spirit a th e South was as reoltft Ati sue aernetam as before, a gnawin d b ou t now marchedid bidith t sey se whis spirit. Lee unequivocably blamed the failure of the invasion o Maryland on the lost order. He defended the division of his army, pointing out the need to eliminate the threats to his ticularly, Harpers Ferry. In addition, Jackson's investment of clothing, and weapons which were some of the objectives of the invasion. At the very least, if McClellan had not obtained a copy of Lee's orders, Lee could have reunited his army lone have re-equipped it with some of the hoard from Harpers Ferry and given his 10,000 or more stragglers time to rejoin his army. Thus refurbished, Lee could have gone on to Harrisburg, de-, t s royed the bridge, and sought out McClellan.2 The Confederates held Harpers Ferry and had destroyed much of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, an important east'; west link. Destruction of the railroad bridge at Harrisburg!' _ _-_ -_ _ . I t Would have nn+ th west e eas B t al imore and rnualhi E ,aepa.ven if Lee had subsequently b d f een e eated by McClellt an -a mos unlikely event on the basis of previous encounters between these generals - many months would have elapsed before the rail connection over the Susquehanna River could have been re-established. Recon- struction of the bridge from the heights over the river would have been, at the very least, a major engineering achievement. The cumulative effects of a victory by Lee over McClellan in Maryland would have been devastating to the North. Lee could have moved on to Harrisburg and with his headquarters s Courses of action open to Lee if McClellan had not gained posses- sion of Special Orders 191 are shown on the map. Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 UNCLASSIFIED 109 Approved lease 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 in the capital of Pennsylvania, astride the rail lines to Phila- delphia, Baltimore, and Washington, would have menaced all three of these terrified metropolises. During Lee's second in- vasion of the North in 1863, Richard S. Ewell approached within three miles of Harrisburg before he was called back because of the chance encounter at Gettysburg. The panic of the Penn- sylvania countryside at that time is a slight indication of what Confederate headquarters at Harrisburg might have caused - especially if Confederate cavalry under James E. B. ("Jeb") Stuart had been permitted to raid in the direction of Phila- delphia and even New York. If Lee had chosen to commit himself early rather than to wage psychological warfare against the three cities simultane- ously, he might have marched directly from a victorious battle- field against Baltimore or Washington. The very Maryland farmers who watched impassively as Lee's half-starved tatter- demalions poured across the Potomac might conservatively have estimated that a victory by Lee on Maryland soil looked dangerously like the beginning of the end of the war on Southern terms. The number of recruits whom Lee might have picked up in Maryland, under the band.-wagon steam- roller, would have increased sharply, thus augmenting even more an army in which straggling had suddenly disappeared. The strong secessionist tendencies indicated by Baltimore in April 1861 might have opened that city to Lee in 1862, per- mitting his entry against bare token resistance.. Washington, thus isolated by a secessionist Maryland and itself swarming with a devious, opportunistic Fifth Column, could hardly have remained the capital. Previously prepared evacuation plans might have moved the Government to Phila- delphia or New York while Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederacy, graciously doling out merciful terms to a stunned city, rode triumphantly down Pennsylvania Avenue. Recog- nition, but no longer intervention, would have been inevitable. A triumphant South would have scorned intervention. While Lee campaigned in the North, 20,000 recruits were assembled in Richmond for his army. A victorious Lee, gath- ering volunteers in Maryland, would hardly have needed these recruits. Bragg, however, pressing on Buell in Kentucky, could have used the recruits, and such reinforcements might well Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED have balanced the numbers in Bragg's favorgivinhim t , g ht opportunity of making good his intention to install a Confect: erate governor at Frankfort, the capital of Kentucky. The Federals in the West would have had to withdraw troops from wherever th ey were available to relieve Buell, thus taking _ pressure off Van Dorn i n for his part, then would have been free toy attain Vwhatever ;P~Emperor Maximilian of Mexico. In the struggle to get the French army out of North America and Maximilian off his throne, this government had the use of an intelligence enterprise which, though conducted on a small scale, turned out to be very effective. Up to the last weeks this intelligence operation consisted of competent reporting on the part of espionage agents and diplomatic representatives; but when a crisis developed at that point, these sources were silent, and it was a cablegram from Napoleon to his commanders in Mexico that yielded the information needed by the nation's leaders. As an intelligence coup the interception and reading of this message were hardly spectacular, for it passed over fifteen hundred miles of telegraph wire accessible to United States forces and, contrary to later assertions that it had to be de- ciphered, it appears to have been sent in the clear. Neverthe- less, the event was an outstanding one in the history of United States intelligence operations, not simply because it represented a beginning in a new field but also because the message in question was of crucial importance. State of the Union, 1861-65 The crisis in which America's intelligence capability as- serted itself did not come until after the nation had spent five anxious years watching the European threat develop. Napoleon had sent an army to Mexico late in 1861, assertedly to compel the payment of huge debts owed by the government of Mexico. His object, however, was not simply a financial one: a new commander whom he sent to Mexico in 1863 re- ceived instructions (which leaked into the press) to the effect that the Emperor's purpose was to establish a Mexican govern- ment strong enough to limit "the growth and prestige of the United States." 3 At a time when the American Union ap- peared to be breaking up under pressure from its southern half, such a statement meant to American readers that Napoleon had no intention of stopping at the Rio Grande. J. Fred Rippy, The United States and Mexico (New York, 1926), p. 261, citing Genaro y Carlos Pereya Garcia, Documentos ineditos o muy raros para la historia de Mejico (20 vols., Mexico City, 1903), XIV, pp. 8-20. 82 CONFIDENTIAL A Cable From Napoleon CONFIDENTIAL In June 1863 French arms swept the Liberal government of President Benito Juarez from Mexico..City= and, inAhe-su of 1864 Napoleon installed the Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian, thirty-two-year-old brother of Emperor Franz Joseph of Aus- tria, on the new throne of Mexico. During this period the Northern people, their belligerence aroused by the Southern rebellion, were clamoring for action against France - action that might well bring disaster upon them. Aggressive be- havior by the United States might give Napoleon the popular support he needed to join hands with the Confederacy in a declaration of war, a development that could provide Seces- sion with enough extra strength to prevail. While the Civil War lasted, Congress and the public were held in check largely through the prestige and political skill of the Federal Secretary of State, William H. Seward. But when the War was over - by which time the government had reason to believe that Napoleon had become disenchanted with his puppets in Mexico - Seward was ready to turn his people's aggressive demeanor to advantage, and he warned Napoleon that their will would sooner or later prevail. Before this state- ment reached Paris, however, the United States Minister there, John Bigelow, who had been mirroring Seward's new firmness for some months, had in September 1865 obtained a tentative statement from the French that they intended to withdraw from Mexico.4 While Bigelow was shaking an admonitory finger at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an American military fist was being displayed before the French along the Rio Grande. Promptly upon the silencing of Confederate guns, General Grant sent Philip Sheridan, second only to William T. Sherman in the esteem of the General-in-Chief, to the command of the Department of the Gulf, with headquarters at New Orleans. A considerable force was posted along the Mexican frontier and designated an "army of observation." 4 Rippy, op. cit., pp. 264-65 and 269-72; Seward to Bigelow, September 21, 1865. All diplomatic correspondence sent or received by United States officials that is cited herein will be found in the Papers Re- lating to Foreign Affairs Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the First Session, Thirty-Ninth Congress (covering the year 1865), Second Session, Thirty-Ninth Congress (1866), and Second Session, Fortieth Congress (1867-68). Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78TO3194AO00100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 CONFIDENTIAL A Cable From Napoleon Sheridan and Intelligence 1 _ '-T_ he possessor of a-reputa- tion as a gamecock, adhered strongly to an opinion prevalent in the Army that a little forceful military action now would save a full-scale war later. The audacious statesman who was directing foreign policy at Washington was, to Sheridan, "slow and poky," and the general found ways of giving considerable covert aid to the Juarez government, then leading a nomadic existence in the north of Mexico.5 Sheridan and Seward, though the policy of each was anathema to the other, made an effective combination. One of the ways in which Sheridan could exercise his relent- less energy against the Imperialists without flouting Seward's policy was in collecting intelligence on what was going on below the border. There was an interregnum at the United States Legation in Mexico City, and all the official news reaching Washington from below the Rio Grande was that supplied by the Juarist Minister to the United States, Matias Romero, a scarcely unbiased source if a prolific one.6 Sheridan quickly undertook to fill the gap. This task must have been decidedly to the general's taste, for he had been one of the most intelligence-conscious commanders in the Civil War .7 He had achieved something of an innovation in organizing intelligence activities when, during his 1864 campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, he established a group of intelligence operatives under military control. His previous sources of information, local citizens and Confederate deserters, had both proved unreliable. "Sheridan's Scouts" were a mili- tary organization in a day when it was customary to have civilians perform most of the intelligence-gathering tasks other ' John M. Schofield, Forty-Six Years in the Army (New York, 1897), p. 381; Philip H. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs (2 vols., New York, 1888), II, pp. 215-19; Percy F. Martin, Maximilian in Mexico (London, 1914), p. 432. ? Dozens of examples of this intelligence will be found in the Romero- to-Seward correspondence in the Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs described in footnote 4. T When a division commander in 1862-63, Sheridan had exercised an initiative in intelligence collection that was more likely to be found in an army commander. His Memoirs reveal a constantly high in- terest in intelligence activities. 84 CONFIDENTIAL A Cable From Napoleon CONFIDENTIAL than battle-zone reconnaissance. After the war, Major Henry Harrison Young, the- Scouts- comet- tinder; --of west men went to the Gulf Department with Sheridan. Sheridan also, in common with numerous other commanders North and South, had an acquaintance with communications intelligence as it was produced in the field command of that day. By the time the Civil War was well advanced, Signal Corpsmen in every theater had learned how to solve the enemy's visual-signaling alphabets, and they derived much information for the commanders by keeping their field glasses trained on enemy signal stations s There was not likely to be any op- portunity for such methods along the Rio Grande, however, and no more likely was the possibility of tapping telegraph lines carrying useful information. Young and his four men were dispatched to important points in northern Mexico to report on movements of the Imperial forces and the various projects of ex-Confederates who were joining Maximilian's forces and attempting to establish colonies under his flags Judged by the accuracy of the reports reach- ing Sheridan and the strong tendency of the Southerners' projects to abort after coming under his notice, the work of these five men was most effective.'0 1866, Year of Telegrams and Tension The critical question -whether the French would tire of their venture and withdraw - was, however, one to which no intelligence service could divine an answer, for the French for a long time did not know the answer themselves. In 1865 Marshal Frangois Achille Bazaine, now Napoleon's commander in Mexico, was informed by the Minister of War that he must bring the army home, and at about the same time he received I War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confed- erate Armies (Washington, 1884-1901) contains hundreds of deci- pherments resulting from such interceptions, chiefly in the oper- ations of 1863-65 in Tennessee and Georgia, the operations along the South Carolina coast beginning in 1863, and the Richmond- Petersburg siege of 1864-65. ? Sheridan, op. cit., II, p. 214. 10 See, for example, intelligence reports sent by Sheridan to Grant, March 27, May 7, June 24, July 3 and 13,1866. All Army correspond- ence cited hereafter in this article will be found in the United States National Archives, except where otherwise indicated. CONFIDENTIAL 85 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 CONFIDENTIAL A Cable From Napoleon word to the opposite effect from the Emperor himself." Na- e, by vhich-thhle latter .accepted - the throne of Mexico contained a secret clause providing that French military forces to the number of 20,000 were to remain in Mexico until November 1867.12 As events were to prove, however, this compact was less likely to determine Napoleon's course of action than were the pressures on him represented by the United States' vigorous diplomacy and the rising mili- tary power of Prussia. In April 1866 Minister Bigelow succeeded in pinning Na- poleon down to a definite understanding, to the effect that the 28,000 French soldiers in Mexico would be brought home in three detachments, leaving in November 1866 and March and November 1867. Seward's reply to this promise was char- acteristic of his tone at this time: dwelling only briefly on the diplomatic niceties, he suggested that the remaining period of occupation be shortened if possible. The Secretary was in high feather; in the same month a protest by him induced the Aus- trian government to abandon an effort to send substantial reinforcements to the small Austrian force in Maximilian's army .l3 In June Maximilian received a studiously insolent letter from Napoleon containing the stunning announcement that the French would withdraw. Attention now focused on whether he would attempt to hold his throne without French arms. The unhappy sovereign reacted first by dispatching his Em- press, twenty-six-year-old Carlota, to Paris in a vain attempt to change Napoleon's mind. He soon decided to abdicate, then determined to remain on his throne, then wavered for many weeks between abdicating and remaining 14 Napoleon meanwhile had to contend not only with his pro- teg6's indecision but with some apparent recalcitrance on the u Philip Guedalla, The Two Marshals (London, 1943) p. 130. "Ibid., p. 112. "Seward to de Montholon, April 25, 1866; Seward to J. Lothrop Motley (United States Minister to Austria), April 6, 16, 30, May 3, 30, 1866; Motley to Seward, April 6, May 1, 6, 15, 21, 1866; James M. Callahan, American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations (New York, 1932), p. 235. "Martin, op. cit., pp. 266-267 and 272-273. 86 CONFIDENTIAL A Cable From Napoleon CONFIDENTIAL part of Bazaine, who was variously suspected of having a secret agreement with Maan '~`uprt, of being secretly in league with the Mexican Liberals, of profit- ing financially from his official position, and of having hopes of succeeding Maximilian. (There is evidence to support all these suspicions.) 16 Soon Napoleon realized he had made a bad bargain with the United States; to attempt to bring the army home in three parts would risk the annihilation of the last third. Early in the autumn of 1866 the Emperor sent his military aide, General Castelnau, to Mexico with instructions to have the army ready to leave in one shipment in March, and to supersede Bazaine if necessary. Thus the evacuation was to begin four months later than Napoleon had promised, but to end eight months earlier.16 No word of this important about-face was, however, promptly passed to the United States government. At the beginning of November - supposedly the month for the first shipment - the best information this country's leaders possessed was a strong indication that Napoleon intended to rid himself of Maximilian. This was contained in a letter written to Maximilian by a con- fidential agent whom he had sent to Europe; it showed the failure of Carlota's visit to Napoleon. Somewhere between its point of origin, Brussels, and its destination, the office of Maxi- milian's consul in New York, it had fallen into the hands of a Juarist agent 17 Soon after Minister Romero placed it in Seward's hands, Napoleon's new Foreign Minister, the Marquis de Moustier, wrote his Minister in Washington, de Montholon, that the evacuation timetable was raising serious difficulties but that in no case would the November 1867 deadline for its Castelnau to Napoleon, December 8, 1866,' quoted in Georges A..M. Girard, La Vie et les souvenirs du General Castelnau (Paris, 1930), pp. 112-124; Marcus Otterbourg (United States charge d'affaires in Mexico) to Seward, December 29, 1866; Martin, op. cit., pp. 298-99; Lewis D. Campbell (United States Minister to Mexico) to Seward, November 21, 1866. "De Moustier (Foreign Minister) to de Montholon (Minister 2the United States), October 16, 1866, in Foreign Affairs; Bigelow Seward, November 8, 1866; Martin, op. cit., pp. 56-57; Guedalla, op. cit., p. 133; Girard, op. cit., p. 122. "Romero to Seward, October 10, 1866; New York Tribune, January 4, 1867. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 A Cable From Napoleon A Cable From Napoleon CONFIDENTIAL Cruz, to find the French leaving and Juarez resuming the reins of government: ills loo ea o ex=aenaor Lewis D. Campbell, newly appointed Minister to Mexico, and General William T. Sherman, sent with Campbell to give the mission prestige, to advise Juarez in regard to the many military prob- lems that would be plaguing him, 21 and possibly to arrange for the use of small numbers of United States troops to assist the Liberal regime by temporarily occupying certain island forts.22 Evidence was accumulating that Maximilian and his Eu- ropean troops would soon be gone from Mexico, 23 but it stood no chance of general acceptance in Washington. Such was the degree of trust now accorded Louis Napoleon that his promise to evacuate Mexico would be believed on the day when the last French soldier took ship at Vera Cruz. At this juncture Sheridan's headquarters came into posses- sion of a copy of a coded telegram to Napoleon from Bazaine and Castelnau. The message had left Mexico City by courier on December 3 and had been delivered to the French Consulate at New Orleans, from where it was telegraphed to Paris on the 9th. As will be explained below, there is every reason to believe that this message went unread by United States cryptogra- phers. The possession of its contents would have been of great value, for the message (as translated from the version given by Castelnau's biographer) said: completion be exceeded."' This note should have reached Sew- ard in early November (1866), but if it did, itss, strong:.hint not here would be no partial evacuation in that month was apparently lost on him. When the French felt able to promise complete withdrawal in March, de Moustier revealed to Bigelow the abandonment of the three-stage plan. So alarmed was Bigelow by the pros- pect of a -major outbreak of anti-French feeling in America that he refrained from sending the news to Seward until he had heard it from the Emperor himself, whom he saw on November 7. The November shipment had been cancelled for reasons purely military, the Emperor said, showing surprise that the United States had not known of the change. The order had been telegraphed to Bazaine and had been sent in the clear in order that "no secret might be made of its tenor in the United States." 19 Undoubtedly the Emperor was perfectly sincere in implying that he expected the United States govern- ment to make itself a tacit "information addressee" on tele- grams of foreign governments reaching its territory. Receiving Bigelow's report of this interview, Seward struck off a peremptory cablegram to Paris: the United States "can not acquiesce," he declared. The 774 words of this message un- folded before Bigelow on November 26 and 27, their transmis- sion having cost the State Department some $13,000. On De- cember 3 Bigelow telegraphed the Foreign Minister's assurance that military considerations alone were responsible for the change of plans and his promise, somewhat more definite than the previous one, that the French "corps of occupation is to embark in the month of March next." 20 So strongly had this government relied on Napoleon's original promise that President Johnson had dispatched an important diplomatic mission to Mexico (republican Mexico, that is) - a mission that was already at sea, expecting, on arrival at Vera De Moustier to de Montholon, October 16, loc. cit. Bigelow to Seward, November 8, 1866. "Seward to Bigelow, November 23, 1866; Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1867 (Baltimore, 1933), p. 534; Bigelow to Seward, December 3, 1866. 88 CONFIDENTIAL Seward's instructions to Campbell, dated October 25, 1866, are per- haps the most impressive of the numerous masterful documents produced by the Secretary in the Mexican, affair. Grant was the President's first selection as the military member of the mission and was excused only after a number of urgent requests. Cor- respondence relating to the inception of the Sherman-Campbell mission includes: Andrew Johnson to E. M. Stanton, October 26 and 30; Grant to Sherman (at St. Louis), October 20 and 22; Grant to Johnson, October 20 and 21, and Grant to Stanton, October 27. " Sherman to Grant, November 3, 1866 (Sherman MSS, Library of Congress) ; Grant to Sheridan, November 4, 1866. Sheridan was directed to "comply with any request as to location of troops in your department that Lt. Gen. Sherman ... may make." Campbell to Seward, November 21, 1866; unaddressed, unsigned military intelligence report dated at Washington, November 18. CONFIDENTIAL 89 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 CONFIDENTIAL A Cable From Napoleon A Cable From Napoleon CONFIDENTIAL New Orleans, 9 Dec 1866 To Eiis Majesty the Emperor Napoleon-at Paris. Mexico, 3rd December. Emperor Maximilian appears to wish to remain in Mexico, but we must not count on it. Since the evac- uation is to be completed in March, it is urgent that the transports arrive. We think that the foreign regi- ment must also be embarked. As for the French of- ficers and soldiers attached to the Mexican Corps, can they be allowed the option of returning? The country is restless. The Campbell and Sherman mission, which arrived off Vera Cruz on November 29 and left December 3, seems disposed to a peaceful solu- tion. Nevertheless it gives moral support to the Juar- ists through the statement of the Federal government. Marshal Bazaine and General Castelnau 24 As December wore on, rumblings from Capitol Hill indicated that Congress - the same Congress that was even then mov- ing to impeach President Johnson - might attempt to take the management of the entire affair out of the Administration's hands. Word arrived from Bigelow that transports to bring the army home were ready to sail from French ports, but that information would by no means be convincing enough to reas- sure Washington. And that word was the last to be heard from Bigelow, as competent a reporter as he was a diplomatist. He was relieved as Minister by John Adams Dix, ex-senator, ex- general, who did not manage to turn his hand to report-writing until mid-February, after the crisis was past.25 Similarly, nothing that would clarify the situation was com- ing out of Mexico. General Grant received a report from Sher- man, at Vera Cruz, containing two items of intelligence, highly significant and completely contradictory: two ships, waiting at Vera Cruz to take Maximilian home, had been loaded with tremendous quantities of royal baggage; and the Emperor had just issued a proclamation to the Mexican people announcing "Girard, op. cit., pp. 117-18. sc New York Herald, December 7, 1866, p. 4, col. 3; Bigelow to Seward, November 30, 1866; Morgan Dix, Memoirs of John Adams Dix (2 vols., New York, 1883), II, 150; Dix to Seward, December 24, 1866. 90 CONFIDENTIAL Tiff WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY. Ae~ 1 k,Y u19 THE WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY. First and last pages of the five-page message to Napoleon III from his commanders in Mexico, reporting on the situation there and asking instructions concerning the evacuation of the European forces. The French clear-text version, as repeated by General Castelnau in a letter to Napoleon on December 8, 1866 (and quoted by Castelnau's biographer), reads: L'empereur Maximilian parait vbuloir rester au Mexique, mais on ne peut y compter. L'evacuation devant titre terminee en mars, it est urgent que les transports arrivent. Nous pensons que le regiment etranger doit titre aussi embarque. Quant aux offi- ciers et soldats frangais detaches au. corps mexlcains, peut-on leur laisser la faculte de revenir? Le pays est inquiet. La mission Campbell et Sherman arrivee devant Vera Cruz le 29 novembre et partie le 3 de- cembre semble disposee a une solution pacifique. Elle n'en donne pas moins un appui moral aux Juaristes par la declaration du gouvernement federal. CONFIDENTIAL 91 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2 CONFIDENTIAL A Cable From Napoleon his intention to remain. Sherman and Campbell were facng a dilemma, in that they could not reach Juarez without cross- ' ; t rrifc held by the Imperialists, with whom they were supposed to have nothing to do. Sherman invited Grant to instruct him to go to Mexico City to see Bazaine, who, he was sure, would tell him the truth about French intentions, but nothing came of this suggestion. Wrote the general of the colorful pen and the fervid dislike of politics: "I am as anxious to find Juarez as Japhet was to find his father, that I may dis- pose of this mission." 26 Tension mounted in Washington early in January as the Senate prepared for a debate on the Mexican question, and a wide variety of reports circulated, the most ominous being that half of the French forces were to remain in Mexico through the summer, and that Assistant Secretary of State Frederick W. Seward, who had sailed mysteriously from Annapolis on Christ- mas day, was on his way to see Napoleon. (He was en route to the West Indies on one of his father's projects for the pur- chase of territory.) 27 But on January 12, before the Senate got around to the Mexican question, the War Department re- ceived a message from Sheridan at New Orleans transmitting the following telegram: French Consul New Orleans Paris Jany 10th for General Cast[elnau] at Mexico. Received your dispatch of the ninth December. Do not compel the Emperor to abdicate, but do not delay the departure of the troops; bring back all those who will not remain there. Most of the fleet has left. NAPOLEON. "Sherman to Grant, December 1 and 7, 1866. Sherman, despite his reputation for hard-headedness, was not one of those who favored military action by the United States in Mexico. He wrote Grant, "I feel as bitter as you do about this meddling of Napoleon, but we can bide our time and not punish ourselves by picking up a burden [the French] can't afford to carry." 21 New York Herald, January 3, 1867; New York Evening Post, January 8, 1867; Frederick W. Seward, Reminiscences of a War-time States- man and Diplomat (New York and London, 1916), pp. 348-55. Seward's project, a very closely kept secret, was the acquisition of a harbor in San Domingo. A treaty was later concluded but buried by the Senate. 92 CONFIDENTIAL A Cable From Napoleon ' - Gttti c w a~ `7"~ Yiiw 5mc: glilii,q fdgn,Y. u/Fruaa,/~m.~1~.~ . ,mot ~,? ,, d4 %,ts &~. 4- ahx-