STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE [Vol. 3 Nos. 1 - 4, 1959]

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Approved For, ease 2005/02/10: CIA-RD t Tiii;;;;i001-1 .CONFIDENTIAL STUDIES in INTELLIGENCE 001 rya cD (37.) 2: Ls...I CD Li fL = Cl) Cs) c) C.) ?1 I-- CD VOL. 3 NO. 1 WINTER 1959 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF TRAINING CONFIDENTIAL 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 All opinions expressed in the Studies gre those of the authors. They do not necessarily re FeOnf:the; Official views of the Central Intel!!9e.,11.5! Agency, the Office of Training or any other organizational component of the intelligence community. This material containR information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the trans- mission or revelation of which to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. stake , JL 25X1 STUDIES IN INTEILIGENC EDITORIAL POLICY Articles for the Studies in Intelligence may be written on any theoretical, doc- trinal, operational, or historical aspect of intelligence. The final responsibility for accepting or rejecting an article rests with the Edito- rial Board. The criterion for publication is whether or not, in the opinion of the Board, the article makes a contribution to the litera- ture of intelligence. EDITORS 25X1 25X1 EDITORIAL BOARD SuzzasAN IC?rnT, Chairman LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 25X1 Additional members of the Board represent other CIA components. SET 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 spetti CONFIDENTIA CONTRIBUTIONS AND DISTRIBUTION Contributions to the Studies or communications to the editors may come from any member of the intelligence community or, upon invitation, from persons outside. Manuscripts should be submitted directly to the Editor, Studies in Intelligence, Room 25X1 2013 R & S Building and need not be coordinated or submitted through channels. They should be typed in du- plicate, double-spaced, the original on bond paper. Footnotes should be inserted in the body of the text following the line in which the reference occurs. Articles may be classified through Secret. SECRET/ CONTENTS Policing a Nuclear Test Ban. . . Herbert Scoville, Jr. Official results and personal views on the conference of experts in nuclear blast detection. OFFICIAL USE ONLY Papers from the Melbourne Conference: The Assessment of Communist Economic Penetra- tion Edward L. Allen Intelligence mobilization for the economic cold war. SECRET On Processing Intelligence Information ? Paul A. Borel Taming and channeling the raw flood for an army 25X1 For inclusion on the regular Studies distribution list call your of thirsty consumers. CONFIDENTIAL 25X1 The Guiding of Intelligence Collection office dissemination center or the responsible OCR desk,) 25X1 For back issues and on other questions call the Office of William P. Bundy 25X1 the Editor Multiple bridges between the seekers and far-flung 25X1 NIFIDENTIAL SIVT Approved For Release 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 finders of information. SECRET The Monitoring of War Indicators. Thomas J. Patton Progress and prospects in organizing for eternal vigilance. SECRET Techniques of Domestic Intelligence Collection Anthony F. Czajkowski The intelligence ,officer as salesman extraordinary at home. CONFIDENTIAL History's. Role in Intelligence Estimating Cyrus H. Pc.nicg. Fallacies in synthetic substitutes for the distillate of human experience. CONFIDENTIAL Soviet Intelligence Training. . . Sherman W. Flemer Details on the institutions Which award the doc- torate in intelligence. SECRET SECRET/ Pa 25X1 MORI/HRP THIS PAGE 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 25X1 SECRET! The Early Development of Communications Intelligence Wilhelm F. Flicke 99 Failures, successes, and fumbling techniques before and during World War I. Ork1CIAL USE ONLY Communications to the Editors 115 In defense of Mr. Tidwell 1 ' SzcErr Classified Listing of Articles in Vols. I 8g Il 119 CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED ARTICLES Page Agent Radio Operation During World War II Scudder Georgia 125 Recollections of the hazard-happy Joe and his big brother's devoted solicitude. Critiques of Some Recent Books on Intelligence. . . . 133 The Zimmermann Telegram, by Barbara W. Tuch- man Seymour Lutzky Allied Intelligence Bureau, by Allison Ind Benjamin Cain Man Hunt in Kenya, by Ian Henderson Peter F. Jethmal 25X1 SECRET, MORI/HRP THIS PAGE Approved For Release 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 SECRET 25X1 CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE 25X1 Herbert Scoville, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Atomic E Intelliffence Committee.1 Edward L. Allen is Chiefof CIA Economic Research. Paul A. Sorel is Chairman of the USIB Committee on mentation. William P. Bundy is a member of the Board of National, mates. Thomas J. Patton is one of the pioneers of Indications I gence. Anthony F. Czajkowski is an officer of CIA's Contact MI Cyrus H. Peake is an intelligence analyst of the Departm State. Sherman W. Flemer is an intelligence officer specializi Soviet affairs. The late Wilhelm F. Flicke, a career officer in the Gt intercept service from 1919 to 1944, is the author unpublished history of modern communications i gence, portions of which have been adapted as an in this issue. Scudder Georgia is a veteran CIA communications office SECRET 25X1 MORI/HRP THIS PAGE Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 Approved For Release 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 OFFICIAL USE ONL1 The story behind the East-West experts' exploration of nuclear test detection methods and their agreed comlusion$,,preg7 _ nant with latent purport for in- telligence. POLICING A NUCLEAR TEST BAN Herbert Scoville, Jr. The East-West conference on methods of detecting violE tions of any international agreement to suspend nuclear test held in Geneva from 1 July to 21 August 1958, was in effect, E might be expected, a USSR-West conference. The Wester delegation, a single team with members from the Unite States, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada, faced fot separate delegations from the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Polani and Rumania; but the Satellite delegates only present? papers apparently prepared by the Soviets and made no sill stantive contribution to the discussions. The Soviets a tempted to broaden the scope of the conference to incluc agreement to stop testing nuclear explosions, but the Westei delegations succeeded in maintaining the position that ti agenda was technical, not political, and that the decision halting tests was not a matter for consideration. Neverth less the technical discussions were colored throughout wi political overtones, and several of the technical agreemen reflect Soviet political concessions. The conference agreed first on technical methods whil might be useful in a detection system and on the capabilities each of these methods for identifying explosions under d ferent types of conditions. Both sides agreed on the use acoustic waves, radioactive debris, seismic waves, and elect] magnetic (radio) signals to detect and identify surface, atm( pheric, underground, and underwater explosions. For exp sions at very high altitudes (30 to 50 -kilometers and aboN several additional methods of detection were discussed a considered promising, but none were specifically recommend for inclusion in the system, since experience with explosic at such heights is lacking. OFFICIAL USE ONLY MORI/HRP PAGES 1-12 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Policing A Nuclear Test Ban After reaching agreement on these basic methods the con- ferees agreed on the technical equipment which would be re- quired to put them to effective use, and then consolidated them into a recommended worldwide control system for policing a nuclear test suspension, specifying in some detail its technical requirements and disposition. This recommended system in- cludes a provision for inspection of locations in which the con- trol network has detected possibly natural phenomena that it has not been able to distinguish from nuclear explosion effects. The Agreements Acoustic Waves. It was agreed that with a sufficient distri- bution of listening posts the acoustic wave method would be effective in measuring and locating one-kiloton explosions in the air up to an altitude of 30 or perhaps 50 kilometers. The acoustic method is not applicable to underground explosions, but under the oceans even small explosions can be detected by hydroacoustic methods to distances of 10,000 kilometers. The instruments which record these air or water pressure waves can be expected to improve in precision and sensitivity, but they will not always be able to distinguish between acoustic signals from nuclear explosions and those from some infre- quent natural events such as meteor falls, volcanic eruptions, and submarine disturbances. Acoustic detection must there- fore be supplemented by other methods, even to identify ex- plosions which do not occur underground. Radioactive Debris. It was agreed that analysis of radioac- tive debris is effective in identifying and locating either fission or fusion explosions, and three methods of collecting samples were recommended. Control posts 2000 to 3000 kilometers apart on the ground would detect one-kiloton explosions in the air up to 10 kilometers high by sampling fallout 5 to 20 days afterwards, but would be subject to considerable error in deter- mining the place of explosion and to some error in determining the time. If the approximate location of a suspected explosion is known, however, an aircraft can collect samples two to five days afterwards for a close determination of time and place. Shallow underground and underwater explosions are also sus- ceptible of detection, with less reliability, by these means. Finally, inspection teams might collect samples from suspected OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 Policing A Nuclear Test Ban OFFICIAL USE sites of underground or underwater explosions, as 12 stir?face tests, and examine them for radioactive debris. It was recommended that ground posts and existing a flights over international waters be used for routine sax and that when other detection data indicated a need: samples over the territory of any nation, that nation's a should carry observers from other nations in the cant ganization in sampling flights over predetermined route debris method would become increasingly effective wit longation of a period free of nuclear explosions and wi perfection of sampling and analysis techniques. Seismic Waves. Seismic waves provide the Only I) for initial detection of nuclear explosions undergrou under waters not linked hydroacoustically with the o and seismic wave detection is less discriminating than methods. It was agreed that, giyen a sufficient distri of control posts and ordinary seismic stations, 90 perc more of five-kiloton seismic disturbances would be ide and located within a radius of about five miles, but the id cation of one-kiloton explosions would require unusually able conditions and unusually quiet seismic stations wi range of 1000 kilometers. It was noted that the rang discrimination of this method would probably be inc with improvements in apparatus and technique, but s disturbances not positively identified as natural ea.rthc would probably still give rise to the greatest number mands for regional inspections?perhaps as many as year, even if limited to magnitudes of five kilotons or gi Radio Signals. The radio signal caused by gamma rad from an explosion on or above the earth's surface prov detection means of great range and accuracy, but th difficulty at ranges greater than 1000 kilometers in I guishing it from the electromagnetic emissions of lig' flashes. The conference made reference also to a poss that the radio signal might be deliberately altered or nated through shielding the explosion against gamma sions. It recommended further research to improve dis nation and develop automatic equipment for this pu High-Altitude Explosions. The detection of explosic an altitude of 30 to 50 kilometers and above was discuss OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Policing A Nuclear Test Ban a theoretical basis, but no recommendations were made. Three methods were considered. The registration by,enrtb_ sateL_lite, instruments of gamma radiation and neutrons would detect nuclear explosions hundreds of thousands of kilometers from the earth, but there are difficulties in the possibility of shield- ing the explosion and in uncertainties about background cos- mic radiation. Light from the explosion itself and the lumi- nescence of affected upper layers of the atmosphere would be revealing, but would not be observable from the ground in cloudy weather. Such an explosion would also create a mea- surable increase in the ionization of the upper atmosphere, but an unknown number of natural phenomena might produce similar effects. The detection of explosions millions of kilo- meters from the earth was not discussed. The Control Network. The conference set up recommended specifications for acoustic, hydroacoustic, seismic, and electro- magnetic detection equipment, and for apparatus to collect samples of radioactive debris both on the ground and in air- craft. It recommended that all ground posts of the control net be equipped for all methods of detection, except that hydroacoustic equipment would be needed only on islands and ocean shores and in ships. Ships could also collect debris samples and might use the radio and aeroacoustic methods with reduced effectiveness, but could not use the seismic method. The number of control posts required was determined largely on the basis of the needs of the seismic method, since the dis- crimination of underground explosions presents the greatest problems. 160 to 170 land-based posts were recommended, 60 of them on islands, along with about 10 ships. The posts should be as close together as 1000 kilometers in seismic areas, but could be diffused to distances of about 1700 kilometers in aseismic continental areas and of 2000 to 3500 kilometers in aseismic ocean areas. It was suggested that each post might require a personnel complement of about 30 specialists plus supporting staff. It was agreed that this system would effectively discourage violations of a nuclear test suspension: it would provide good probability of detecting and identifying all explosions down to one kiloton except those set off underground. It would detect underground one-kiloton explosions but would be able to dis- 4 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 Policing A Nuclear Test Ban OFFICIAL USE C tinguish only a small percentage of them from earthqw WitEcut cn -site inspection, in fact,- it would be-impossib: positively identify deep underground nuclear explosions of high yields, since they could always be claimed to have " earthquakes. If, however, the ten percent or less of kiloton disturbances not identified as earthquakes and a r ber of lesser events taken at random were subject to site spection, a violator could not feel secure against exposur mattter what precautions he took. The identification by inspection of deep underground clear explosions would still be very difficult. All the rt. active debris would remain confined in a small volume underground, and surface evidence might be very difficii obtain. An inspection team would have to survey the pect area indicated by the seismic signals for signs betra the conduct of a test?recently used mine shafts or tun: excavations, logistic support for tests, or instruments: This task would of course be easier in completely dese areas than in inhabited ones where signs of human act would not be so suspicious. Finally, when suspicion of a cealed explosion was very high and the location closely termined, it might be necessary to drill many hundred fee- a sample of the radioactive material in order to prove a lation. The Soviet Attitude These agreements were not achieved in smooth harmon: spite of an increasingly evident Soviet desire to avoid : conclusions. Just before the opening of the conference t was question whether the Soviets would even attend; but st the seriousness of the Western delegation was evidence( the arrival of its members at Geneva, the Soviets also c and the conference began as scheduled. Then the first days were spent in political maneuvers, with the Soviets tempting to force the Western side to agree in advance - if the conference were a success nuclear testing should CI The USSR's strong propaganda position resulting from unilateral announcement of test suspension while the Un States was engaged in an extensive series of tests mad difficult to keep the Western insistence on a purely techr conference from appearing too negative: Soviet OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Policing A Nuclear Test Ban Gould have exploited a breakdown of the conference in the initial *ages and its published proceedings tazonsidegableoavl?, vantage. Finally, in the face of Western firmness, the Soviets requested a day's delay, obviously to obtain instructions, and then acceded to the Western position. Thereafter the discus- sions were almost entirely technical in nature, though shaped in some respects to take account of political factors. In general, the Soviets attempted to make detection appear easy, while the Western delegates pointed out the practical difficulties in detecting and identifying nuclear explosions. Discrimination of natural events from possible explosions was usually simplified by the Eastern group. The U.S. representa- tives generally relied on the statistical use of experimental data, while the Soviets drew upon simplified theories. On one occasion, Semenov, a Soviet Nobel prize winner, amused the Western scientists by saying that the experimental evidence must have been faulty since it conflicted with his theories. Specific evidence of Soviet desire for agreement developed toward the end of the discussion of the first of the methods for detecting nuclear explosions, that using acoustic waves. The Soviets had pre.sented theoretical data optimizing the ranges at which explosions could be detected by this method and had proposed draft conclusions citing these ranges. Overnight three Western scientists prepared a statistical analysis, using data from more than 200 experimental observations of nuclear tests, which demonstrated that under practical conditions the ranges would be very much shorter than those given by the Soviets. The West proposed conclusions citing these short ranges. After considerable discussion of the validity of the analyses and their conclusions, the Soviets accepted the West- ern draft with only minor modifications. This accommoda- tion was the first real indication that they were prepared to accept scientific facts at variance with their position in order to reach agreed conclusions. A Major Concession A more important demonstration of Soviet desire for agree- ment occurred in the discussions which followed on the use of radioactive debris for detecting and identifying nuclear explo- sions. Outstanding success in collecting good early debris samples by aircraft and difficulties experienced in obtaining OFFICIAL USE ONLY Policing A Nuclear Test Ban OFFICIAL USE 01 ? reliable samples by grp-und collection techniques bad led '44'irelt to propose the use of aircraft in addition to groi sampling. The Eastern delegations, on the other ha strongly held that ground sampling was adequate and relia and that the use of aircraft was unnecessary, unduly corn cated, and expensive. This position was obviously based Soviet political sensitivity to the use of aircraft for intellige purposes. Discussion on the relative merits of the two ME ads was protracted. Although the Western delegation pres for data to support the reliability of the ground detection tern, the Soviets never succeeded in substantiating their sound technical position. Private attempts were made to assure them that our emphasis on aircraft was not based desire for unrestricted overflight but rather on sound tea cal grounds, but they remained extremely chary of the in( sion of any mention of aircraft as an important element the system. The Soviets delayed agreement to any conclusions on t subject for several weeks, apparently awaiting instruct, from home, and the conference proceeded to other subje Finally, however, they again acceded, agreeing to the inclus of aircraft sampling as a basic element of the system and e' to the provision that overflight of national territory mil occasionally be required. Such overflights, to be sure, wo be made by the aircraft of the nation involved, but they wo have observers from other nations on board. This first ma political concession was strong proof that if the Western di gation presented a sound technical position and held to it, - desire for agreement would lead the Soviets to give way. In the discussions on the Use of seismic waves for detect explosions, the Soviets again tended to theorize and to simp: the problem, particularly with respect to discriminating tween the seismic signals from explosions and those fr earthquakes In this case, the Soviet attitude may have bi due largely to lack of scientific experience in such discrimi tion. The presentation of the U.S. data on the Ranier und ground test in September 1957 was convincing to them E won their gradual recognition of the difficulties involv After the differences in scientific views had been ironed c agreement was reached on the seismic method without 1 raising of any major political problems. The Eastern dele Approved For Release 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY 7 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Policing A Nuclear Test Ban tions accepted the Western conclusions which stipulated that, in order to identify-9G percent of the-earthontrancir ermai=? nate them as possible nuclear explosions, at least five stations should be so disposed with respect to any seismic disturbance as to obtain a strong signal capable of determining the direc- tion of the first motion. This agreement later became a major factor in the discussions on the over-all detection system and the number of control posts required. Next came discussions on the electromagnetic method, where the problem of discrimination between radio signals from explosions and those from lightning flashes was a domi- nant factor. The Soviets presented strong theoretical argu- ments for reliable discrimination with the use of machine methods, but no specific data to support their theory. In this discussion, however, they appeared to be in a stronger technical position relative to the West than in any of the others. Technical Disagreements A major difference of opinion developed at this time, and continued almost to the end of the conference, on the possi- bility of shielding out gamma radiation and thereby elimi- nating the electromagnetic signal from nuclear explosions. In the course of the discussion one of the U.S. scientists re- ferred to success in shielding out the electromagnetic signals in a shallow underground explosion. When quizzed by the Soviets on how much earth was above the explosion the scien- tist had to admit the explosion occurred 75 feet underground. This amused the Soviets to no end; and although later experi- mental data were presented to demonstrate that even explo- sions on a tower could be shielded, they never fully accepted the feasibility of shielding, and tended to ridicule the Western position. Unfortunately the final record of the conference does not completely clarify the technical facts on this subject. This was a good example of how care must be used in selecting evidence to present at a meeting of this sort. Since neither side gave any indication of experience in de- tecting tests at altitudes greater than 30 kilometers?this was before the U.S. ORANGE and TEAK shots at Johnson Island? high-altitude detection was discussed largely on a theoretical basis. Both sides presented material on the possibility of using gamma and neutron radiation, ionization phenomena, 8 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 Policing A Nuclear Test Ban OFFICIAL USE 01, and optical methods. The Soviets pressed very strongly the use of sputniks equipped with gamma and neutron-det ? tors, while the Western delegation urged equal considerat of the use of ionization phenomena. The most violent session of the entire conference occur during an informal meeting arranged to iron out the ft wording of the conclusions on these methods. This meeti which had been intended to last for only a few minutes, star at ten o'clock on a Saturday morning, broke up for lunch four PM, and finally continued until after eight in the event with both sides refusing to make any concessions. The Sovi exhibited great sensitivity to the Western proposal to use ra techniques, either passive radiotelescopes or active syste] probably out of fear of their intelligence potential. No agi ment was reached that day, and over the weekend the West( delegation decided not to press further for its views. Insti it agreed that the conclusions would give some preference satellite detection over ionospheric phenomena, but wo- specifically recommend neither for the detection system cause of the lack of experimental data. When the chairrr of the Western delegation made this concession at the open of the following session, Fedorov, chairman of the Soviet d( gation, was taken aback. He said plaintively that the Sovi had spent all day Sunday preparing technical papers to ref the Western position. He was almost unhappy that the W had conceded since it prevented his delegation from present. these studies. Furthermore, in consequence of their was effort, the Soviets were unprepared to proceed to the next it on the agenda. Discussions on the equipment to be used by the detect system were almost entirely tethnical in nature and invol no serious disagreements. The Soviets now for the first ti raised the possibility of using ships as platforms for detect stations in ocean areas where suitable land masses were available. The usefulness of ships for acoustic and elect magnetic detection was seriously questioned by the West, E in an informal session it was agreed that use of these meth, on shipboard would not be included in the conference conc sions. When these conclusions were taken up for ratificati Fedorov apparently had not been briefed that this item I been eliminated from the text, and the conclusions were n OFFICIAL USE ONLY 9 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Policing A Nuclear Test Ban fled without further discussion. Later, just after Fedorov ehastised -the Western delegation for-not adher- ing to previously agreed conclusions on some other matter, the subject of shipboard detection again arose and Fedorov re- ferred to these methods as an essential ingredient of the sys- tem. When it was called to his attention that he had just previously agreed to their elimination, he was considerably embarrassed. The final text of the conclusions restored a qualified men- tion of the aeroacoustic and electromagnetic methods on ship- board. On land, it was agreed, all four basic systems?acous- tic, seismic, electromagnetic and radioactive debris collection? would be used at every station. This collocation, found diffi- cult by the West, was strongly endorsed by the Soviets and is very likely their practice. More Political Concessions The major problem of the conference was the integration of these various methods into a worldwide system capable of detecting tests under all possible conditions. At Soviet in- sistence, the discussion on all the basic methods had been keyed to small-yield test explosions, down to one kiloton, de- spite Western desires to include consideration of systems re- liable only for higher yields. In designing the over-all system, therefore, the conference initially used the one-kiloton yield as a basic parameter. The detection and identification of underground explosions was the dominant factor in determining the number and dis- position of the control posts. The initial Western attempt at designing a system came up with about 650 stations for one- kiloton worldwide control, as against 100 proposed by the So- viets. The Soviet proposal was obviously inadequate for dis- criminating between one-kiloton underground explosions and earthquakes of equivalent energy, since five of the 100 stations would never obtain clear signals of first motions from such an event. The Eastern delegation then proposed the use of exist- ing seismic stations as a supplement to the detection system, but the ease with which seismic records could be falsified and the signals from an explosion made to resemble those of an earthquake rendered this solution impractical. 10 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Policing A Nuclear Test Ban OFFICIAL USE ON At this point, the Western delegation suggested that a s: terri-5-6- desigilet-Wifft-tien-il' good discrimination I- - yields of five kilotons and greater, and the Eastern de1eE tions accepted this approach. By Western criteria such system required 160 to 170 stations, while in the Soviet desil it would have 130. Not unexpectedly, the Soviets agreed the Western figures just prior to the conclusion of the cc ference. This acceptance of a system which would involve I tween 15 and 20 control posts in the USSR, each manned by or more persons, constituted a second major Soviet politic concession at the conference. Since at present it is not always technically possible identify a nuclear explosion by seismic means alone, inspecti. of the site of an unidentified event suspected of being a nude explosion is necessary in order to prove or disprove the occt rence of a concealed nuclear test. The 160-170 control pc system would leave unidentified some 20 to 100 events per ye of energies equivalent to five-kiloton yields or greater, and is clear that inspection would be required in such caso Furthermore, if the system is to have any capability for yiel of less than five kilotons, inspection of suspected sites of lowc yield tests on a random basis would be required as a deterre to violations at this level. The Soviets early in the conferen referred to the need for inspecting sites of suspected nude explosions but consistently deferred the inclusion of stal ments to this effect in any of the agreed conclusions. Final] however, in the conclusions on the control system, tip agreed to such inspection. This acceptance of the principle inspection was the third and perhaps most important politic concession made by the Soviets in order to achieve an a.grei report. Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 Soviet Intentions Before the conference, many members of the U.S. delegatit believed that the Soviets were attempting to establish a sit ation in which they could continue weapons development I means of concealed tests and at the same time inhibit nude testing in the West. The conference yielded no evidence support this thesis; in fact it had led all Western represent tives with whom the subject was discussed to change thE views. The Soviets fought strenuously on many points at OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1 ,e Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Policing A Nuclear Test Ban attempted to minimize the difficulties inherent in establishing an adequate test detection system, but- these-efforts? appeared aimed entirely at avoiding politically sensitive arrangements such as large numbers of observers, overflight, and free access to locations within the Soviet Union. On all of these points, they ended up by making major concessions. Furthermore, the Soviets strongly pressed for a high-sensi- tivity system, one capable of reliably detecting explosions as low as one kiloton. Had their objective been to design a sys- tem susceptible of evasion, they would have given much readier acceptance to the Western proposal to consider higher-Yield systems. In view of all these considerations, I believe that the USSR has no present intention of carrying out a concealed nuclear test in the event of a moratorium, and that it would openly abrogate such an agreement before risking being caught in a violation. Moreover, if the principle of inspection is adequately safeguarded in political discussions and in the terms of a suspension treaty, the system as designed is ade- quate to deter any nation from conducting a concealed nuclear test, at least with a yield greater than one kiloton. Without on-site inspections such a system would not be capable of pre- venting deep underground nuclear tests of even moderate yields. 12 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 -intelligence -Am organized to support the eco- nomic cold war and about some of the methodological problems it has encountered. SECRET 25X1 THE ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNIST ECONOMIC PENETRATION Edward L. Allen What the Soviets call "peaceful competition" with the West, particularly Sino-Soviet Bloc trade and development aid to underdeveloped countries, has presented a new challenge to the West and, from our own professional viewpoint, imposed new tasks upon economic intelligence. The increases in Bloc trade have been spectacular. Since 1954, Soviet trade with underdeveloped countries is up 500 per cent; total Soviet trade with the West is up 100 per cent. Further, the Bloc last year got 36 per cent of Egypt's trade, 33 per cent of Iceland's, 40 per cent of Afghanistan's, and nearly 25 per cent of Yugo- slavia's. It succeeded in getting a substantial share of the trade of Syria, Burma, Iran, Turkey and Ceylon. U.S. Organization for Cold War Economic Intelligence It became clear to us three years ago that the USSR and other members of the Bloc had embarked upon a long-run program of economic penetration: At that time, we revamped our internal organizationto provide the essential intelligence support to government policy-makers. As the Bloc program grew and the magnitude of the threat became clearer, we ex- tended our list of consumers far beyond the executive branch of the government. It was important to keep not only Con- gress informed, but also influential business groups and the public in general. The Soviet economic challenge, in the words of our Director, Mr. Allen Dulles, had become the most serious challenge our country has faced in peacetime. The pattern of coordinated reporting is now well established. Since February 1956, a working group under the Economic In- telligence Committee has turned out a detailed report every Approved For Release 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 MORI/HRP PAGES 15-23 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 SECRET Communist Economic Penetration two weeks. This working grplials?c2nulogglegfixessasenta,tim - -of the DepartineritZraate, CIA, the International Coopera- tion Administration, the military services, and the Depart- ments of the Treasury, Commerce and Agriculture. Addition- ally, there is an analytical summary every six months, and a special quarterly report to the President's Council on Foreign Economic Policy. The full organizational structure support- in.g this intelligence effort is illustrated in the chart on page 22. This organizational arrangement provides a mechanism for combining the political, military and economic facets of Soviet penetration activities. Although there is no rigid division of labor between agencies, there are obvious areas of primacy of Interest. The Department of State, for example, bears the primary responsibility for political analysis, while the Depart- ment of Defense prepares all estimates on illicit trading in Bloc arms. On a broader basis, an annual National Intelligence Esti- mate is produced which covers not only the magnitude, impact and intensity of Bloc penetration activities, but also relates these activities to the capabilities, motivations and internal policies of the Soviets. Characteristics of Bloc Aid Programs We have found a number of common characteristics in the Bloc aid programs for underdeveloped nations. First of all, a composite prescription is applied on an integrated basis? a line of credit, technical assistance and training, and in most cases a commitment to long-term trade. The provision for payment by means of its own commodities has great appeal to an underdeveloped nation, particularly one which is having difficulty in marketing exportable products at adequate prices. Secondly, the Soviet program is almost entirely a credit pro- gram. Interest rates are low-2 or 25,i per cent. Repayment usually begins after the project is completed. Amortization Is usually prorated over a 12-year period. Our Western inter- est rates are higher, but our repayment terms are often much longer, running from 30 to 40 years. Third, the Soviet program usually covers only the foreign exchange costs of a project, leaving the balance to be financed from internal resources. Western development loans have 16 sFrPFT Communist Economic Penetration SECF assisted through various devices with some of the- intornal? nancial requirements. Fourth, Bloc economic credits are usually related to ind- trial development. They are granted for sugar mills, cem.i. plants, and textile mills rather than for sanitation, sewage, honfusinthg, tdevelopment. al programs are aimed at increasing public or socialized sector of the economy, rather than t private or free enterprise sector. Thus the Russian-br Indian steel mill at Bhilai is a government-owned pla whereas the American-built plant at Jamshedpur is a privab owned expansion of Tata. Finally, the aid-and-trade deals are independent of railitz pacts. Non-Communist underdeveloped countries receive B: military and economic assistance without entanglement in Bloc military alliance. This practice disarms many; it ler at least surface credence to the Soviet line that "there is body here but us peace-loving Russians" as the military a economic technicians pour in. Sources of Information on Bloc Economic Aid We have encountered rather formidable difficulties in es mating closely the magnitude of Bloc economic assistance underdeveloped countries. It is true that considerable inf( mation is usually available from open sources regarding t amounts of non-military assistance which Bloc countr promise to deliver. Soviet agreements, in particular, E widely publicized, especially when large lines of credit are tended: it has been trumpeted to the world that Afghanist received a $100 millions credit and Egypt a $175 millions ere( from the USSR. More important for our purposes, the actr tetsxof many of the major agreements have been officia released. Even when no value figures are announced, informati? available through attache reports usually permits us to es mate the approximate total cost and the foreign exchan component of an economic assistance agreement. Reports c tamed through overt or covert channels from Western inch trial firms who have commercial contacts in underdevelop countries can also provide such data. The cost of the pet leum refinery Czechoslovakia is building in Syria, for examp Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 SECRET Communist Economic Penetration was estimated in part on ;(he basjg information, obtained fronr-a--WgrerridOrpoMion whose bid on the project was rejected. We are thus confident that our estimates on promised eco- nomic assistance are fairly accurate. We believe we are with- in 5 per cent of the correct total figure and no more than 10 per cent in error for individual countries. The confidence we have in. our estimates of Bloc performance on assistance agreements is considerably less, and so far we have published estimates of only the minimum amount of assistance actually provided. Such estimates are of some value, but they are an inadequate basis for answering several pressing questions. In particular, they do not enable us to determine the amount of indebtedness or the rate of loan amortization of a country receiving credits from the Bloc. The major difficulty in assessing the implementation of Bloc Fi.s.gista.nce agreements is finding sources of raw information. It is exceptional for officials in underdeveloped countries to be candid in discussing Soviet projects with U.S. attaches. Debt statements and ministerial reports of recipient countries are occasionally helpful. But in general we must rely on de- livery or shipping notices and clandestine reports on construc- tion progress. Clandestine reports are also our most valuable source on the numbers, competence, and activities of Bloc technicians assigned to aid projects. We feel the need for much more information on what success the Soviets are having in getting accepted as the representatives of peace and pro- gress and the real champion of underdeveloped countries. Special Problems with Bloc Arms Deals Estimating the value of military assistance encounters con- siderably greater difficulties than estimating non-military assistance. The publicity attending the signature of an eco- nomic assistance agreement is notably absent in the case of military agreements. The military estimates must be based mostly on descriptions of individual shipments or other obser- vations contained in many discrete military attach?nd clan- destine reports. The resulting estimates of units of equip- ment are converted to value terms by applying Bloc prices to the items in question, if they are known. In some instances we have had to use the U.S. prices for comparable items in 18 crrpm. Communist Economic Penetration SECR order to arrive at a vaine-isthnate. We con.66quatili that bithough our estimates in terms of equipment units a reasonably accurate, those in terms of value may be in err by 25 per cent or more. The most troublesome consequence of our uncertain about value estimates is inability to determine with precish the financial indebtedness to the Bloc of those countries r ceiving Bloc military assistance. A reliable determination the amount of cotton Egypt, for example, is shipping eac year in repayment for the arms it has received from the Bl would be significant intelligence. But especially in the case Egypt, the inaccuracy of our evaluations is compounded by tl fact that some of the arms delivered have been obsolete ax therefore sold at a discount, and some of them apparently hal been given without charge. Moreover, some small portion I the arms shipped to Egypt and Syria have been sent on to I used in other areas, and we are not certain who ultimate will pay for these. Sources of Information on Trade Collection of data on Bloc external trade is considerab: simplified by the fact that most non-Communist countri( issue periodic reports on the value and pattern of their foreig commerce and we therefore do not have to depend on Comm nist sources. Statements issued by Bloc countries, as we as information obtained through clandestine collection, pri vide means of cross-checking sources. When there are di crepancies between estimates made on the basis of official nor Communist compilations and the statements of Bloc corn tries, we do not automatically assume that the Communisi are lying. An early estimate of Soviet shipments of machinery an transport equipment to underdeveloped countries in 1956, fc example, showed only about 20 per cent of the amount claime by the USSR. This discrepancy, we ultimately conclude( probably resulted from inaccurate item classification in th recipient countries. Underdeveloped countries often have ur tidy or inexact customs procedures. Even when a standar classification system is used, customs officials are frequentl lax in establishing proper criteria to be used by their opei Cre?rtr-r Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 SECRET Communist Economic Penetration ating personnel. Indian practices are particularly annoying in this respect. In their official reports of commodity imports, items accounting for as much as two-thirds of the value of im- ports from the USSR have been listed in the unspecified "all other" category. Since among the underdeveloped countries India is a major Bloc customer, the errors in India's com- modity reporting may have a considerable effect on our esti- mates of total Bloc trade. Other underdeveloped countries have similar bad habits. Most of them publish trade data in a very leisurely fashion. None is up to date in releasing statistics on commodities. No country includes shipments of military items in its reports. There is also the usual problem of re-exports involving third nations, compounded in the Soviet case by the employment of brokers and trading fronts for sensitive transactions. Finally, countries which have multiple exchange rates, such as Egypt and Argentina, present particular difficulties when we attempt to evaluate their trade in terms of dollars. New Tasks for Intelligence There is a need for detailed performance information, be- yond the question of volume and money value, on Bloc develop- ment aid programs. Part of the Western effort in underde- veloped nations is devoted to highlighting for these newly emerging countries the dangers of dealing with the Bloc, to pointing out the advantages of dealing with the West wherever possible. So we not only need to report that country x re- ceived a cement plant from the Bloc at a certain price, but also to report the plant's reliability, relative efficiency, and the quality of its product. And it is not enough for intelligence to measure current trends and performance in Bloc trade and aid. We have, in addition, the important task of anticipating future Soviet moves, of pointing out where economic, military or political problem areas are developing which could present the Bloc with opportunities for exploiting weaknesses. This must be done early in the game if Western policy-makers are to have an opportunity to move in first or to capitalize on some action of the Bloc. 20 SECRET Communist Economic Penetration SECRET Both in the anticipation of future Bloc moves and in the detailed analysis of Bloc development aid performance to date, I believe that we in the intelligence field need to do a lot more work. Strategic Trade Controls The other side of the economic cold war coin is the strategic trade control program. We in CIA play a major role in pro- viding the interagency committee structure of the U.S. Gov- ernment with intelligence support for the development and enforcement of international and U.S. security export con- trols against the Sino-Soviet Bloc. This intelligence support consists primarily in estimating the significance of certain Western commodities, technology, and services to the war po- tential of the Bloc. U.S. unilateral controls, as you are aware, are broader than the international ones, and require separate administration. There are therefore two major interagency committees in- volved in the control of strategic exports, one dealing with problems of multilateral export controls and their enforce- ment and the other with those of unilateral export controls. The CIA participates in an advisory capacity at each level of these committees up through the National Security Council, as indicated by the dashed lines in the appended chart. Reports on Bloc exports and imports are often useful in pointing to economic strengths or weaknesses in the Bloc, but one can easily exaggerate an apparent economic strength or weakness by relying solely on commodity trade data. The USSR, in particular, has sometimes exported machinery and equipment known to be in domestic short supply (rolling mills and agricultural machinery, for instance) when such exports have been judged to be of net Soviet advantage. Similarly, in reviewing Soviet purchases from underdeveloped nations, it is prudent not to seize on every import of foodstuffs or industrial raw materials as proof of economic weakness in respect to that commodity. Commodity studies of Bloc foreign trade will rarely reveal anything more than specific short-term soft spots in the pro- duction pattern. This type of information is useful for trade control purposes, but it is inadequate as an indicator of the SECRET 21 Approved For Release 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 SECRET Communist Economic Penetration ? 22 Working Groups 0 US 0 a) 00. C? e1-1i Z.) g c.) 1111 '1 I ill 4 I 1 231 CD os giE c?octil to 21EA1V10 0.70P, SECRET Communist Economic Penetration SECRET overall capability of the Bloc to achieve its objectives in the cold war. The real capability of the Bloc is revealed only in a close survey of its economic structure and its production and growth characteristics. The basic facts are the $180 billions of current gross national product for the USSR and the an- nual growth rate of about 10 per cent in Soviet industry, a GNP of nearly $70 billions for the European Satellites and of over $60 billions for China. Institutional characteristics, in particular the bilateral na- ture of Soviet trade, the isolation of the Soviet price structure, and the inconvertibility of the ruble, may cause the USSR serious problems in its future trade outside the Bloc. They have not seemed, however, to be a serious constraint so far. To determine Bloc economic weaknesses and strengths, and to estimate the impact of the strategic trade control program as a whole, we look primarily to Soviet domestic production capabilities. The large and rapidly expanding production ca- pacity of the USSR, complemented by the European Satellites and to an increasing extent by Communist China, is an im- pressive indicator. SECRET 23 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 The bases for the aggressive U.S. a u?roach to documenta- tion 25X1 CONFIDENTIAL ON PROCESSING INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION Paul A. Sorel The cycle of organizational activity for intelligence pur- poses extends from the collection of selected information to its direct use in reports prepared for policy makers. Between these beginning and end activities there lie a number of func- tions which can be grouped under the term information proc- essing. These functions include the identification, record- ing, organization, storage, recall, conversion into more useful forms, synthesis and dissemination of the intellectual content of the information collected. The ever-mounting volume of information produced and promptly wanted and the high cost of performing these manifold operations are forcing a critical review of current practices in the processing field. Storing and Retrieving Information Efficient and economical storage and retrieval of informa- tion is by all odds the toughest of the processing problems. Millions are being spent on it by the research libraries of uni- versities, of industry, and of government. Even as we meet here today, an international conference is under way. in Wash- ington at which new means of storing and searching for scientific information are being discussed. For intelligence, storing and retrieving information is a par- ticularly vexing problem. Our Document Division alone proc- esses daily an average of some 1,500 different intelligence docu- ments, received in an average of 15 copies per document This is exclusive of special source materials, cables, newspapers, press summaries, periodicals, books, and maps. Since these reports come from scores of different major sources, the daily volume fluctuates and shows lack of uniformity in format, in reproduction media, in length and q ality of presentation, and in security classification. As they come in they must be read CONFIDENTIAL 25 Approved For Release 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 MORI/HRP PAGES 25-35 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 CONFIDENTIAL On Processing Intelligence Information with an eye to identifying material of interest to some 150 different customer offices or individuals. We have a general library of books and periodicals, whose operations approximate those of the conventional library. We have several registers (in effect special libraries) through which we handle special source materials, biographic data on scien- tists and technicians, films and ground photographs, and data on industrial installations. Most of these materials are sub- ject to control through indexes of IBM punched cards. We have a collection of two million intelligence reports mini- aturized by microphotography. Short strips of film are mounted in apertures on IBM punched cards filed in numerical sequence. Access to these cards, from which photo reproduc- tions can be made, is obtained through an organized index of IBM cards now numbering eight million. Thus access to the document itself is indirect, through codes punched into the index cards to indicate subject, area, source, classification, date and number of each document. The data on index cards retrieved in response to a particular request is reproduced on facsimile tape and constitutes the bibliography given the cus- tomer. This system?which seeks to fit a given request with the relevant "intelligence facts" on hand?we call the Intello- fax system. These then are our assets. I'll say no more at this time about problems in connection with the general library, or those of operating our registers, since they are in many re- spects variations on the theme of our concern with the effec- tive operation of the Intellofax system. Demands made on our document collection stem from three types of requests: Requests for a specific document to which the analyst has a reference or citation; Requests for a specific bit of information in answer to a specific question; Requests for all information relevant to a subject which may or may not be well defined. Our major difficulties are almost all connected with the last of these three, the one which requires a literature search. In searching unclassified literature we rely on commercially pro- duced reference aids, but in searching classified materials we 26 CONFIDENTIAL On Processing Intelligence Information CONFIDENTIAL use the Intellofax punched card index. This index we would use to retrieve, for example, information responsive to a re- quest for "anything you have on the movement of iron ore from Hainan to Japan between 1955 and 1958, classified through Secret, and exclusive of CIA source material." Intellofax is a high-cost operation. Only 10 to 15 per cent of the questions put to the information section of our Library are answered by literature search; yet some 30 people are used in the necessary coding, and another 50 to 60 in IBM and aux- iliary operations exclusively in support of Intellofax. On the other hand, some portion of this cost would be incurred in operating any alternative system even at minimum level; and Intellofax makes possible the organization of bibliographic ma- terial in various forms and at speeds which would not be prac- tical under a manual system. Search results, ? however, are not uniformly accurate. We recently tested the accuracy of the Intellofax system by hav- ing a task team of three analysts from a research office con- duct a controlled experiment. Five subjects, corresponding to common types of reports produced by that office, were se- lected. The test indicated quite conclusively that the system does an efficient job of retrieving documents referring to spe- cific objects or categories (tracks, factories, serial numbers), but that it is less satisfactory in handling a more general sub- ject, such as industrial investments in China. A comparison with the analysts' own files showed very satisfactory Intello- fax performance in retrieving documents placed in the system, but some documents in the analysts' files were not retrieved. Reruns with the same code patterns yielded consistent results. The inaccuracies of the Intellofax system reflected in the above and other tests can be reduced by revising procedures and improving supervision, but they cannot be eliminated alto- gether. In literature search a set of symbols assigned to in- coming documents is used to provide the searcher with a clue to the pertinence of any document to the request he is servicing. This set of symbols is in the nature of an index, but different people viewing these symbols may give them dif- ferent interpretations. This makes the problem complex, for the determination that there exists a meaningful relation be- tween even two pieces of information depends on many differ- CONFIDENTIAL 27 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 CONFIDENTIAL On Processing Intelligence Information ent, often subtle criteria which elude unequivocal symbolic representation. The solution of the accuracy problem would appear to turn on the ability to develop a master set of symbols, a Code, large enough to cover an extremely wide variety of subjects and areas and small enough to be contained on an index card, one applicable to diverse documents containing fragmentary, fugi- tive and often seemingly unrelated information, and at the same time conducive to uniform application initially by those coding incoming documents and later by those seeking to re- trieve them. To prepare such a Code is a tough assignment today. The job is not likely to be easier for some time. It is relevant at this point to invite your attention to the views on this subject of the Working Party organized last year I _ I to exam- ine the possibility of establishing a common reference service: Ibooks of reference and finalized intelligence reports. It would be impracticable to try and include the welter of documents from which such finished reports are built up; even if it were practicable, it would be an immense task beyond our resources? I disagree. Not as to the difficulty of the task or its rela- tively high cost, but as to its impracticability. I believe the solution lies in a) selectivity in identifying those documents to be held by the Center, and b) the organization of those documents into discrete collections, each controlled by an index suitable to its particular requirements. This is the ap- roach we have taken, more by accident than by design. Such an approach makes it possible to cope with small problems, even though the big problem may still be unmanageable. Reference Service and the Research Function Where central reference services have been organized inde- pendent of research offices, it soon becomes evident that the functional line of demarcation between them and the research units is not clear. This becomes important when it results in IModern Methods of Handling Information, 15 Oct. '57 (Confidential), para. 6. 28 CONFIDENTIAL On Processing Intelligence Information CONFIDENTIAL duplication of effort or, worse, in non-use of reference mate- rials by the researcher laboring under the misimpression that he has all relevant documents in his possession. Today's re- searcher, like his predecessor, feels insecure without files which he can call his own. In such a situation we must have a proper regard for tradition, but sometimes it is difficult to distinguish tradition from inertia. Recently our Biographic Register, receiving a report published by a research office, found that failure on the part of the author to check the Register files had resulted in some one hundred errors or omissions. It must be decided whether a reference service is to be active or passive, dynamic or static. To take a simple case, a passive approach to reference service would mean that refer- ence personnel would merely keep the stacks of the library in order, leaving it to research analysts to exploit the collection. Under the active approach, on the other hand, reference ana- lysts would discuss the researcher's problem with him and then proceed, as appropriate, to prepare a bibliography, gather apparently pertinent documents, screen them, check with colleagues in other departments for supplementary materials, make abstracts, have retention copies made of popular items in short supply, initiate a requirement for supplementary field service, or prepare reference aids. In CIA we aim at active rather than passive reference service. How active we are in a particular case is a function of the customer's knowledge of our services, his confidence in us, and how pressed he is to get the job done. Once a separate facility has been set up to provide reference services it is not long before it publishes. This comes about for several reasons, the least controversial of which is that a customer has made a specific request. Thus our science ana- lysts may call for a compilation of biographic data on the indi- viduals most likely .to represent the Soviet Union at a forth- coming international conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. We call this type of publication a research or refer- ence aid. Some are citiite specific; others are more general, being prepared in response to a need generally expressed. A number of different customers may, for example, make known that it would be very helpful to have a periodic compilation of all finished intelligence reports and estimates for ready refer- CONFIDENTIAL 29 Approved For Release 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 CONFIDENTIAL On Processing Intelligence Information ence. Or the need may be implied rather than expressed: the reference analyst may note that over a period of time the de- mand on him for biographic data about Soviet scientists is heavy, many requests calling for much the same information furnished earlier to others. The result: the production of a major reference aid along the lines of our "Soviet Men of Science." And naturally it isn't long until a revised edition is called for. Criteria for determining when and when not to summarize information holdings in a general reference aid are elusive. It is similarly difficult to define the proper scope of the general reference aid. How far can it go before the researcher con- ' siders it an infringement on the research activity for which he is responsible? This question has implications beyond those readily apparent. Quite basic is the feeling among research personnel that they and their mission are a cut above the ref- erence officer and his role. A manifestation of this attitude is the steady flow of competent people out of reference into re- search, with only a trickle coming the other way. I doubt whether the inconsistency of this position is appreciated in view of the joint effort required by research and reference ac- tivities to provide the soundest base possible for the research effort. In my view the legitimate limits of the reference aid can best be arrived at in terms of the highest level of service ex- pected of the reference officer. Stated simply it is this: to. make make known the availability of services and information the existence of which may be unknown to the researcher; and, given a task, to make the preliminary selection of materials to meet the particular need of a particular user. This may Involve bulk-reduction operations (such as abstracting) to leave a smaller quantity of material containing everything; pertinent to the user's problem, or conversion operations (such as translation) to get information in usable form. I ?' would even say that the reference function includes evalua- tion, evaluation of the reliability of information. To the re- searcher must be left the determination of its significance for, the present; to the estimator its significance for the future; and to the policy-maker the indicated course of action. 30 CONFIDENTIAL On Processing Intelligence Information CONFIDENTIAL Machine Application to Documentation Problems In processing intelligence information, increases in effi- ciency may depend upon the adoption of techniques involving automata. This is especially the case when savings of time are sought. But as soon as you consider automation, that is, the inclusion in your processing system of a machine as an integral part of it, you are faced with the need to make de- cisions different in nature from those made with respect to the desirability of expanding staff or restricting functions. It is a difficult problem to achieve an optimum balance be- tween man and machine. Among the many considerations involved there are two important ones which ought to be, but seldom are, fully explored before you commit yourself to a particular machine?you should accurately determine the net gain or loss in terms of time, space, manpower, and money; and you should be fully aware of the limitations of the ma- chine and of its use by man. It is often more important to know what cannot be done with the machine than to look wholly to what can. 25X Nevertheless, I would again incline to disagree I In view of the great initial investment needed to launch [a mechanized reference system], the very large and per- sistent requirement for coding, maintenance and other super- visory skill and the inevitable limitations of machinery when applied to intelligence processes, we do not think the introduc- tion of such a system merits further examination. No one would argue that large investments should be made in schemes unless they hold promise of relieving major prob- lems. And the demands of a mechanized reference system for special skills are admittedly both high and persistent. However, these factors should be weighed in terms of the relative costs, not only the cost of alternative ways to solve the particular documentation problem, but also the cost of not solving it at all. We take exception to the conclusion that the limitations of machinery when applied to intelligence proc- esses are "inevitable." We also believe it unwise to categori? cally dismiss the introduction of machinery as not meriting CONFIDENTIAL 31 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 CONFIDENTIAL On Processing Intelligence Information further examination. Limitations there are today and will continue to be. But those which are inevitable are fewer than Is generally supposed. Only by daring and risking will we come to know how few are the real limitations of a mechanized approach to documentation. This philosophy is yielding prom- ising developments in the fields of microphotographic storage, automatic dissemination, abstracting, and translation, all fields of particular concern today. Microphotography. Both Air Intelligence and CIA are test- ing a system developed by Eastman Kodak known as Minicard. This system in essence substitutes a 16 x 32 mm film strip for the present CIA system of IBM punched index cards corres- ponding to hard copy or film in the document storage file. Sell-indexing Minicard document images are read electroni- cally, not mechanically as IBM cards are. The characteristics of Minicard make possible a reduction of space requirements by a factor of 4, and an increase in speed of handling by a factor of 2. The new system is capable of a level of informa- tion manipulation and a degree of coding sophistication which gives promise of radically augmenting the contribution of the information fragment to the solution of reference problems requiring a search of the literature. And, contrary to present practice, the integrity of the file is maintained at all times. Automatic Dissemination. Air Intelligence is testing a Doc- ument Data Processing Set designed by Magnavox. This is a general-purpose computer especially designed for problems requiring close correlation. Requests for information form the reference file against which incoming documents must be compared. Up to 20,000 words specifying the subjects and areas of interest, other qualifying data (such as evaluation or type of copy desired) , and user identifications are stored to de- fine the requirements of 160 users. When a document is to be disseminated, its subject and area coverage, previously coded and punched into paper tape, is fed into the machine. The machine searches its file of requirements and prints outS a list of those who have requested such a document, the total - number of copies needed, and the form in which it is wanted. Speed and uniformity of performance rather than financial economy is what the Air Force is after in this case. 19 On Processing Intelligence Information CONFIDENTIAL Automatic Abstracting. Army intelligence and IBM are working on means for producing, entirely by automatic means, excerpts of Army field reports that will serve the purposes of conventional abstracts. At a recent demonstration the com- plete text of a report, in machine-readable form, was scanned by an IBM 704 data-processing machine and analyzed in ac- cordance with a standard program. Statistical information derived from word frequency and distribution was used by the machine to compute a relative measure of significance, first for individual words and then for sentences. Sentences scor- ing highest in significance were extracted and printed out to become the "auto-abstract." Adoption of this method of pro- ducing abstracts of overseas reporting would require the use of a flexowriter in the field. When the original report is typed on stencil, a flexowriter tape would be produced simul- taneously as a byproduct and would accompany the report to headquarters. There tapes in sequence would be fed into a computer and auto-abstracts printed out. Mechanical Translation. The only successful Free World demonstration of machine translation to date took place on 20 August 1958, when a continuous passage of 300 sentences taken from Russian chemical literature was translated by the Georgetown University research group, under CIA and Na- tional Science Foundation sponsorship. An IB_M 704 computer was programmed with the appropriate grammatical, syntag- matic and syntactic rules, and a Russian-English vocabulary was introduced into its memory system. The machine alpha- betized the text, determined the lexical equivalents of the words, reconstructed the text, performed the necessary logical operations, and printed out the English translation. Only minor stylistic editing was required to make the product com- pare favorably with a translation made by a linguist. The rate of translation was about 24,000 words per hour. With improved input equipment (reading machines), rates up to 100,000 per hour are foreseen as possible. Research has al- ready started on mechanical translation from Polish, Czech, Serbo-Croatian, French, Arabic, and Chinese. Soviet research in this field is considerably ahead of ours. Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 CONFIDENTIAL On Processing Intelligence Information Outlook In closing this general review of aspects of the intelligence documentation problem, we should look briefly at certain trends which affect us all. First, channels for procuring pub-, lications and techniques for storing and retrieving the physi-4 cal document are extensive and well developed. The immed- iate outlook is for no basic change in ways and means in this: field, but rather an expansion and intensification of present methods. Second, the type of reference or information service coming ; to be required will demand action primarily in preparing refer- ence personnel to give assistance of higher quality than is given today. Reference tools will need to be improved also, but this is likely to follow if there is a more sophisticated reference officer to create a demonstrable need for them. The increase in amount and kinds of material available will call for more intense exploitation of it by the research analyst; he in turn will by necessity rely increasingly on the reference officer for first-cut selection and evaluation. Reference offi- cers will therefore need greater subject competence, more language ability, and a wider training and experience in all . aspects of intelligence documentation. Already a number of American corporations are using information specialists as members of research teams. This approach deserves testing in intelligence. Third, in the field of literature searching, specialized - schemes will be developed to fit the needs of specialized users. While general theory will continue to be developed, pragmatic approaches to problems based on an analysis of the way users ; employ services and exploit materials will play an increasingly '- important role. Proved systems employed by reference cen- ters will be simplified and adapted for use by the individual , analyst to enable him to control the literature he requires in ; his immediate possession. The analyst in turn will provide the central system with the means of subject retrieval in his spe- cialized field as a by-product of the way he controls his files., In this field, machines will long continue to play a secondary role. Fourth, the present and future demands for reference serv- ice will lead to increased use of machines where these can be. - 34 CONFIDENTIA1.1`: On Processing Intelligence Information CONFIDENTIAL introduced without jeopardizing the performance of essential intellectual operations. This fact and the increasing volume of information which must be processed will bring about more centralization. The problem then becomes one of insuring that central reference is at least as responsive to research needs as the reference facility which is an integral part of the research area. The solution is to be found in an approach which integrates the information-processing activities, wher- ever performed, into a single system within which collection, processing, and user components operate along well-defined lines. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 35 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 contemplates the tortured progress of a complex organism in getting its food from hand to mouth. SECRET 25X1 THE GUIDING OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION William P. Bundy In tackling the subject labelled "Procurement" in the pro- gram for this conference, it seems most appropriate to discuss, for an audience predominantly of researchers or intelligence producers, not the whole range of collection activities, but simply the link between the people who use raw intelligence on the one hand and collectors of raw intelligence (or should I say "procurers?") on the other. To make even this restricted subject manageable, I have confined my illustration almost entirely to the procurement of positive intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, excluding other geographic areas and exclud- ing also the effort in support of intelligence collection opera- tions themselves. The essential problem is of course simply one of communi- cation between human beings. No one who has ever done research on his own will have the slightest doubt that the ideal unit is one?a single person doing his own collecting and producing with no intermediaries whatever. Or one might grudgingly accept as a model Mark Hopkins' picture of the true university?the collector on one end of a log and the producer on the other. If these be only dreams, I do still recall one actual large or- ganization that seemed to me to approach the ideal. During the last war I was at a place called Bletchley in England. There, in three low brick wings of the same building, side by side,?called, poetically enough, "huts"?were housed respec- tively a final producer apparatus, an intermediate processing apparatus, and a collection control apparatus. They were within easy walking distance, and the people in them knew each other by their first names and had been in their jobs long enough to have quite a knowledge of each other's prob- lems. The result was a tremendously efficient collection ?per- ? MORI/FIRP PAGES 37-53 Approved For Release 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 SECRET The Guiding 01 Intelligence Collection ation, which balanced intelligence priorities and needs fully against the need to maintain assets for stand-by purposes, and all with what was?even by British standards?a mini- mum of red tape: As I recall, the weekly so-called control meeting used to take about an hour to dispose of all its busi- ness, including discussion and action on new ideas. I had never seen anything like it. And I don't really expect to again. For that guidance sys- tem had two great advantages unlikely ever again to exist in combination in a large-scale effort. First, a relatively limited focus, almost wholly military, within which the basic substan- tive priorities were largely self-explanatory and seldom con- troversial. And second, a single collection system, and that of such a nature that its capabilities, though flexible in degree, were limited and readily tested for possible expansion. You knew pretty well what could be done, and if you didn't know you could find out fairly quickly. In other words, both the intermediate processor and the collector knew what the pro- ducer wanted, and both the producer and the intermediate processor knew what the collector could do. Where these conditions exist, and where you have continuity of first-class people, it would take a most imaginative management con- sultant to contrive a system that could gum the works. There are in intelligence today a very few areas thus hap- pily self-contained. Map procurement, I think, is one. But by and large we are now in a situation where the demands are manifold, the priorities difficult to keep clear, and the collec- tion capabilities variable, hard to appraise and extremely limited relative to the demands. In these circumstances guid- ance becomes one of our major problems, one testing the com- petence, experience and knowledge of our people, and testing also our capacity to devise administrative methods than can assist the infirm and the temporary while not blocking the op- erations of the sophisticated and imaginative professional. The Hydra-Headed U.S. Consumer and Collector The complexity of the problem of guidance is indicated by the variety of consumers and of collection mechanisms in the U.S. intelligence community. - (I am using the term "con- sumer" in the broadest sense, in order to avoid shades of dis- tinction among the various stages of processing or intelli- 38 SECRET The Guiding Of Intelligence Collection SECRET ence production and the various policy-making levels of con- sumption. From the collector's standpoint the rest of us are, in truth, all "consumers.") On the consumer side the prin- cipal units are: 1. State 2. Army 3. Navy 4. Air Force 5. Joint Staff 6. AEC 7. CIA ORR?for Bloc economic and worldwide geographic matters 8. CIA OSI?for basic scientific matters 9. CIA OCI?f or current intelligence at the national level, including indications, and for research in support of current intelligence 10. CIA ONE?for national intelligence estimates (usually via one of the other consumers) On the collection side, the list is even more extensive. The collection activities can usefully be broken down into two categories: first, what I shall call "self-contained" systems, such as the Foreign Service (including foreign aid and infor- mation people) and the system of military attaches, which work primarily for their own parent organizations, and second, a larger number of "common concern" systems, service or- ganizations which work primarily for others. Of these lat- ter, some use technical methods of a classified nature, for ex- ample the Atomic Energy Detection System and ELINT. Others, who make use of unclassified technical methods or simply "people and paper," include the following: 00/Contact (for domestic collection) 00/rBID (for foreign broadcasts) 00/FDD (for material that comes by subscription) Publication Procurement Map Procurement OCR Liaison & Collection (representing government of- ficials not directly connected with intelligence) Clandestine Services SECRET 39 Approved For Release 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 SECRET The Guiding Of Intelligence Collection In addition some "coramon concern" services are not com- plete organizations, but make use of the facilities of one or more of the others: SovMat Defectors and returned German scientists East-West Exchanges Trade Fairs International Conferences Graphics It would be pleasant to report the hitherto undisclosed existence of an IBM 704, or Hollerith Hurricane, that handled all requirements and steered them effortlessly to the right collectors. Alas, this is not the case! There is no central mechanism that attempts to do a thorough policing and sort- ing job on the requirements any one producer may choose to levy on collection. Basic to our entire system, in fact, is the principle that the individual producing agency?responsible for its aspect of total intelligence production?may levy upon any one, or upon all, of the collection facilities to meet its needs. Whether this right is, in a given case, any more effective than Owen Glendower's ability to "call spirits from the vasty deep" is, of course, another matter. But at least the require- ment can be levied, and unless patently outrageous it will reach the designated collectors. For almost all requirements levied by one agency on the collection facilities of another, this will be via the good offices of our, CIA Office of Central Refer- ence, which while not policing does fulfill an important func- tion in registering, numbering, and transmitting requirements for most of the non-technical forms of collection. In this, as in many other respects, it is useful?and histori- cally important?to keep in mind the distinction between those collection systems that are organic parts of operating and intelligence producing departments?the "self-contained" systems?and those that exist for the benefit entirely of others. Foreign Service reporting and the attach?perations of the military services historically antedate the existence of any overall intelligence framework. An ambassador today hardly thinks of his reporting work as being the fulfillment of An The Guiding Of Intelligence Collection SECRET a "requirement," and indeed in the formal sense it seldom is, for our senior department is understandably reluctant to tell its top people abroad what they should look for, at least in the political sphere, by the historic overt methods of diplo- macy. As for the attach?ystem, the intimate ties between the attach?nd his base are such that, armed as he may be with an apparatus of guides and requirements, most of his reporting is done, in practice, in accordance with a "felt neces- sity" derived from daily cable exchanges. Not so with the other collection systems?overt, clandes- tine, and increasingly the various technical systems?oper- ated as a matter of "common concern."' These have no direct base to report to (even those sharing CIA parenthood with pro- clueing offices must and do serve other masters with at least equal zest), and they must hence be governed by an unruly flow of requirements from their many consumers, and must make shift with this as best they can. Agreed Objectives To help reduce this state of potential anarchy to relative order, the U.S. community has evolved a commonly agreed framework for the overall intelligence effort at all stages a set of Priority National Intelligence Objectives. These PNIO's have developed from a slow start. Originated in September 1950, largely on the initiative of the military services, they consisted at first of a short statement of about eight cate- gories of key importance. Along about 1953, this statement seemed inadequate to cover the breadth of factors involved in the cold war, and it was decided that the Board of National Estimates, from its Olympian vantage point, should coordi- nate an effort to set up a longer list with more clearly defined categories. Substantively, the aim was to include political and economic objectives in perspective with military-related ones, and to separate the really crucial military-related objec- tives from those of more routine nature. Since that time, the Estimates Board has continued with the assignment, revising the list annually in a far-from-per- This term has a precise statutory meaning in our National Security Act of 1947, from which many functional charters derive. It is used here more broadly, to cover all collection work not done predomi- nantly for the account of the collecting agency itself. Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 ill ILLEGIB Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 SECRET The Guiding Of Intelligence Collection functory exercise culminating in review at the top intelli- gence level and circulation for information to top policy- makers as well. The document now consists of three cate- gories of priorities, with a total listing of about 50 items. The PNIO's set priorities for all intelligence activity, produc- tion as well as collection. Their greatest weight, however, is almost certainly in the collection field, where they serve as a basis for adjusting major priority questions, especially in the guidance and direction of the "common concern" collection systems. But there are also many things the PNIO's do not do, things that no document of the sort can well do. One is to forecast what may turn out to be crisis areas at any given time. If a Communist revolt breaks out in Ruritania, common sense dic- tates a top-priority effort which in practice would be under- taken irrespective of Ruritania's normal status as a third pri- ority. The PNIO's cannot select the Ruritanias of the year to come?or at least they haven't reached that point yet, in spite of their being drafted in the Estimates shop. More generally, the PNIO's are only statements of objec- tives. In themselves, they are only a most general guide and framework within which individual levies or major collection projects can be judged. Many stages of translation are re- quired before they can become anything like true guidance, in any specific sense, for collection effort. One of those stages, for certain areas of intelligence, is provided within the PNIO framework itself, by a series of Annexes dealing with the priority economic, scientific-technical, atomic energy, guided missile, and international communism objectives, and in addi- tion, in a crucial field which Mr. Patton will describe, one com- prising the General Indicators List. These subordinate annexes, drawn up by the several sub- committees of ITSM charged with the respective subjects, vary greatly in bite and effect. Those on atomic energy and guided missiles get pretty well down to cases, and I have no doubt have a marked effect on the allocation of effort. The scientific and technical one reads largely in generalities, but does use- fully highlight some of the important technical breakthrough issues. There is similar generality in the economic one, though it too has useful specifics on the Soviet penetration problem. Clearly any document of this sort runs a major risk The Guiding Of Intelligence Collection SECRET of boring the collector with what seems to him largely boiler- plate, and thus getting no effective impact. So much for attempts to state objectives. When the effort started, I find from the historical files, many powerful voices were raised prophesying nothing but a waste of time. I think it has not turned out so: certainly the blood on our Estimates conference tables every year looks real, so somebody must be getting hurt; and that is a good sign. Nonetheless, there are clear limits to what can be done along these lines. Generic Practical Problems There are certain problems of a day-to-day nature in the consumer-collection relationship common to most forms of collection which it will be worth while to look at one by one. They seem to be? associated mainly with five steps in the process of levying requirements: 1. Defining the requirement, or locating intelligence gaps. 2. Stating the requirement for the collector. 3. Selecting the appropriate collection system. 4. Servicing the return, including supplemental require- ments. 5. Making specific evaluations and appraising the col- lector's reporting. I should say, by the way, that I shall be talking solely about consumer-originated requirements, leaving out the handling of requirements originated by collectors themselves for the purpose of testing or developing a source, or to take advantage of spot opportunities. This latter type of self-levy is common and often very important today?particularly, for example, when our overt collectors learn of projected travel behind the Curtain by knowledgeable legal travellers?but it raises no real machinery problem. Defining the requirement. In the field of modern history writing, and I am sure other areas of scholarship as well, it is a commonplace that the great bulk of writers choose a sub- ject because the available materials are ample, rather than ask what the key questions are and then seek out and work on materials however slender. This is a natural human tend- ency, and in scholarship the immediate cost may be no worse than massive cases of publisher's indigestion. In intelligence, Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 ILLEGIB Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 SECRET The Guiding Of Intelligence Colledion however, the tendency can be fatal, with the massive indig tion falling to the policy-making reader, while the poor collec tor goes about his business with no help from the producer in the middle. Making the producer stress his gaps rather than his sat* factions is of course largely a problem in education of the individual, and toward this education the various priority lists certainly make some contribution. Yet something more intensive and specific is needed. In essence, the intelligence analyst must be taught not to begrudge time spent in pointing out gaps in information (and how they might be met) as an, essential part of his job?and one to be done as early as possi- ble. It seems to me that the difficulty in educating the analyst varies directly as the amount of material available to him. Our scientific analysts, having lived for years on a very thin diet indeed, seem to become collection-minded very easily. So too with our economic analysts in earlier years. But our political analysts, and lately, with the flood of published ma- terials, our economic ones as well, need fairly constant tending and reminding of this aspect of their jobs. We have a number of devices on this score that may be worth mentioning. Our current intelligence, office has long had its men do a periodic four-month review of priority re- quirements (called Periodic Requirements List, or PRL) which for economic matters draws heavily on the Bloc economic analysts in ORR and which is also now reviewed in draft by State. In our estimative process, we have had for some years a system of post-mortems, in which the estimate writers state in broadbrush terms where they thought the available infor- mation was inadequate to support good answers to key ques- tions?or, more realistically, as good answers as they thought might be obtainable by more or different effort. These are then taken by each agency and, we hope, made the basis of in- tensified collection. , Recently our Bloc economic analysts have instituted a prom-' ising procedure under which each division is responsible for a periodic statement of its gaps in intelligence. These must be stated not merely in general terms, but in terms of possible avenues of approach to solution?target lists and so on. And most broadly of all, our whole National Intelligence Survey, operation?with a formal research framework, bibliographies, AA The Guiding Of Intelligence Collection SECRET etc .?serves to highlight excellently gap areas in our world- wide knowledge. Significant as these devices are, however, we are surely a long way from erring on the side of overempha- sizing the problem of gap-detention. Informing the collector. Once you have your gaps spotted, you must make perfectly sure that they cannot be filled by some available materials. The analyst who reaches for the requirement sheet before he has picked all the brains within reach and made a truly conscientious search of the open liter- ature and available reporting (using Mr. Borel's massive tools as they should be used)?such 511 analyst is indeed a deplorable species. But unfortunately, I am told, not non-existent or even perhaps on the decline. Granted that the need has been found real, however, it must then be stated precisely and in- telligibly to. the collector, and must ask him for something within his potential capacity to provide. Thus this step may in practice often follow the next one, the selection of a col- lection method. In the drafting of requirements we have increasingly stressed the inclusion of as much background as possible to make what is wanted absolutely clear to the field collector. But the ultimate questions must, at all costs, be firm and specific. A requirement that asks the production capacity of a Soviet plant, without more, is of no use whatever to the collector. Rather the requirement should seek feasible par- ticular answers that bear on this desired conclusion. More- over, great things can sometimes be accomplished if the re- quirement can be pitched so as to elicit useful responses by an untrained as well as a trained observer. You may not have a returnee scientist, but only a layman, so it behooves the ana- lyst to think in terms of a layman's capacity to remember floor spaces, height of stacks, size of loading facilities, and so on. And even if you have (and can personally brief) an expert collector, you must still stress your precise gaps and go over ways to meet them. Choosing the collector. If our analyst is fortunate enough to have one of the self-contained collection systems at his dis- posal, we need shed no tears for him. If he is in State, he may not be able to induce his department or the Kabul Embassy to share his interest in a full count of the goats in Afghanistan, but his only problem will be persuasion. A far more serious /IS Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 SECRET The Guiding Of Intelligence Collection case is that of the Bloc economic analyst who, in pursuit of his top-priority study of rocket-fuel inputs, finds that he any real dope about the most prominent known Soviet produc- ing facility. To what collection agency shall he turn? This, frankly, is a major problem with us. I am told tha something over 50% of the requirements that come through our inter-agency machinery now arrive "cold"?that is, with- out prior warning to the collectors or discussion of what they can or cannot be expected to accomplish. Such a requirement may often name multiple possible collectors, and each of these may conscientiously accept the requirement, try to. find out more about it, and then make an effort to fill it. It would al- most be better if they did not?and in practice we do find blan- ket requirements increasingly queried. A consumer should care enough about his need to do a lot of follow-up on it, and only if such follow-up produces no indication of the best collec- tion method is he entitled to call broadcast upon many collec- tors. This problem, like so many others, gets back in the end to the individual analyst's consciousness of collection problems and capacities, assisted and advised by requirements staffs?' to whose importance I shall return. That analysts are not sufficiently collection-conscious is due to physical separation, security precautions often largely legitimate, and not least to personnel turnover. Perhaps a shade too to the academic tra- dition of self-help and solo effort. In any case, the fact remains that this particular link of collector selection is probably the weakest one in our process at present. It is of course a far from unique organizational problem. Perhaps its parallel could be found in the relationship between Production and: sales in any manufacturing business. But it certainly is one on which we can profit at this conference by a few shared ex- periences. Servicing the return. Moving to the next stage, let us sup- pose that the requirement, in usable form, reaches a collector iii the field (whether in an Embassy, in a clandestine station or within the semi-overt collection complex in the United States) and that the collector is then able to do something about it and assemble some information. At this point, there arises the problem of servicing the return so that' it can be The Guiding Of Intelligence Collection SECRET most useful. This problem is not serious if there is no great time pressure and if the source will be readily available for re- interrogation, further visits to the target, or more search of his files. In questioning returned German scientists we have been able to work through several stages of refinement, so as to be fairly sure of having tapped the collection capability to the maximum. In other cases, however, we have often had disastrous ex- periences of misunderstanding and incomplete collection dis- covered when the source was no longer available. In seeking to avoid such failures we have found it useful, at major sta- tions, to have a reports officer right on hand ready to put the take into at least semi-finished form, set the product against the requirement, and direct immediate follow-up to catch the gaps. I suggest that this device may have more uses than we have yet turned it to, perhaps including an area of concern to all of us, the handling of legal travellers from the Bloc, in- cluding Communist China. Evaluating and appraising. From what might be called specific "intermediate" or "field" evaluation it is only a short step to the final major problem in the normal process, that of final evaluation and appraisal, a subject to which I shall return at the conclusion of this paper. The need for specific evaluation may sometimes be voiced in an urgent plea from the collector who has developed a new source and wants to know whether it is worth further culti- vation. That type of evaluation raises not too much difficulty with us. Provided he is not tackled too often, the consumer does respond adequately. But in the more routine case of in- formation collected in response to general requirements, our collectors complain bitterly about the lack of steady evalua- tion. and I suspect it Is one of the parts of our process that needs a lot of attention and perhaps a device or two. In a community as far-flung as ours it is perhaps too much to strive for any uniform system or form of evaluation, and this we have never attempted. Moreover, there will always be the problem of reluctance to criticize, or appear to criticize, collection service under separate command. Yet this is just the crying need, and felt by none more strongly than the col- lector himself. -I V\ I Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 ILLEGIB Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 25X1 SECRET The Guiding Of Intelligence Collection Within what I have called the self-contained systems the evaluation job appears, on my brief survey, to be extremely well done. State and the military services appraise the report- ing performance of their overseas posts quite rigorously. State, for example, does it by despatches on a spot basis, by periodic evaluation of its people from this standpoint, and by an annual critique of each overseas post's intelligence per- formance. And on all of these they may and do consult with other major consumers of the take. The CIA collection serv- ices, on the other hand, both overt and clandestine, find their consumers, CIA producing offices as well as others, limited in their evaluation efforts; and as a result the collectors are never too sure of just where they stand with respect to ade- quacy in their job. In all of these five day-to-day problems, much depends on the personal competence and savvy of our requirements and liaison people. In our system, we maintain requirements staffs at both ends of the line, at least in the CIA production and collection services. In State and the military services they stand, I believe, more in the middle, attached organiza- tionally neither to the producing offices nor to the offices charged with giving instructions to the collectors. What is clear, in either set-up, is that they must have the broadest possible knowledge of the capabilities of various collection units or of their own particular one, and must be able to interpret the collector to the consumer and vice-versa. At the same time, I venture that the really good require- ments officer should have a king-sized lazy streak in him, lead- ing him to avoid interposing himself where he is not needed and to permit, indeed urge or compel, the analyst to get to- gether directly with the collection agency, as far down the line as possible, so that he can make clear what his need really is and tailor it to the capacities of the collector. So far as organization goes, I have sought in vain, in talk- ing to all I could get my hands on, for any generalized formula. I do know I has a practice that our clandes- tine services have always resisted, namely having consumer representatives detailed directly to the collection shop and actually in on the planning of operations. This practice pre- vails to some extent in our military services' covert activities in support of field commands and similar missions within the The Guiding Of Intelligence Collection SECRET sphere of what we call "agreed activities," but it is not used in the main CIA clandestine collection service. The advantages and disadvantages of the two systems may deserve some dis- cussion at this conference. Problems of Clandestine Collection All the problems I have just discussed are common in some degree to all forms of collection. But there is a very great difference between the guidance problems of the overt and semi-overt systems and those of clandestine collection. Here, I should say, is the ne plus ultra of guidance and requirement problems, where all the types of problems, from basic alloca- tion of effort to the attempt to meet specific requirements in relation to available resources, are at their maximum. This arises from the simple fact that clandestine assets cannot be laid on the table for inspection. In the U.S. community our most important coorclinnting device is an Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Com- mittee (IPC), on which all the major consumer agencies are represented. This committee, founded in 1950, has as its prin- cipal function the preparation of continuing guide lists of key specific targets in the USSR, Communist China, and the Satel- lites. (IPC's responsibilities are worldwide and may on occa- sion lead to work on other areas, such as the UAR, especially where a Soviet element is present.) These lists are based on, and under present practice stated in terms of, the basic First, Second, and Third Priority Objectives set forth in the PNIO's. The IPC lists have evolved a great deal over the years. They were originally massive shopping lists, in which pistols were doled out more or less indiscriminately to the mole, the rat, and the badger on a sort of prima facie showing of rele- vance to Soviet striking power or some other key aspect of Soviet power and intentions. Particularly within the past two years, however, they have become a far more meaningful selec- tion which we believe really does take in virtually all of the key physical targets of which we are aware. Moreover, the frighteningly encyclopedic character of the lists has recently been reduced by the production of special lists of installations of absolute top priority, and admission to these lists is very carefully screened indeed. The result is that today for the \)\ Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 SECRET The Guiding Of Intelligence Collection first time our clandestine collectors have a fairly reliable frame of reference against which to judge the incoming spot requirement of consumers. Moreover, the lists have become of increasingly greater usefulness in a function they have al- ways filled to some extent, that of providing a framework for long-range planning in the development of clandestine assets. Yet there obviously remain major defects and problems. Although the IPC lists are pitched in terms of clandestine col- lection, each important case has to be shaken out to be sure there are not other forms of collection that can better take on all or a part of the job. We have made great progress in some fields in deciding what should be gone after by the clandestine route, but there have still been ghastly fiascos where great clandestine effort was applied to obtain results that were avail- able all the time through careful analysis of the open litera- ture, and conversely I am sure there are many cases where clandestine effort is not being pushed to the maximum in the belief that other sources are of some use, when in fact they are not. In this, as in so many matters in this field, the secu- rity fears of the collector (not by any means only the clan- destine collector) play a large part. Naturally, the consumer's dream is a situation where he could go to the collectors, get a full layout of their assets, and go back and frame his requirements accordingly. This can be done to some extent in areas such as East Germany, where the clandestine assets are considerable and of a general char- acter that can be presented without much security problem. But in the key areas of the USSR itself and Communist China, assets are so relatively few that they cannot be usefully de- scribed without tending to pinpoint them in a way that does clearly present major hazards. The result is that in this area, above all, there is a premium on use of the competent middleman, or Requirements Officer, who can master the possibilities of an asset and then, by some obscure process of osmosis and double-talk, get the consumer to use his imagination and frame requirements that will elicit useful responses. The premium on well-framed questions is tremendous, sources are not easily accessible for a second round, and often a great deal of collateral research is needed to think of things that the particular type of source is really in a position to observe and report. Thus the need for con- ca ccrocT The Guiding Of Intelligence Collection SECRET sumer and collector to be close together is nowhere more acute, and yet nowhere is it made more difficult by the prob- lems of security, physical distance, and the number of go- beAtwpeearntsfrinvolomved. their intrinsic difficulty, these problems suggest a larger question in the theory of clandestine collection? whether in fact it makes the best sense to have a system of consumer-originated spot requirements for clandestine collec- tion. As a practical matter, virtually no spot requirement can be met without a great deal of follow-up contact as direct as possible between the analyst and at least the headquarters of clandestine collection. The tail does wag the dog, more than in any other form of collection, and it is a question whether requirements work should not be done almost wholly by laying out the general nature of the asset and then can- vassing consumers to see what needs that asset can be brought to serve. This of course should not mean that clandestine planning and major direction would not continue to be done within as strong an overall framework of priorities as possible, but only that spot requirements would not be levied except after more general statements supplemented by all the per- sonal contact and consultation possible. This relates to the organizational question I mentioned earlier, whether the con- sumer might not have his people right in the requirements shop of the clandestine collector. Overall Evaluation Last, and perhaps most important, I come to the problem of overall appraisal of the collection system and top-level work to set in motion major new developments and changes. Of all human activities, I suppose intelligence may be about the least susceptible to accounting methods or to attempts, at any given moment, to figure out just how well or badly you may be doing relative to the possible. Any businessman would despair if he tried to get the equivalent of a department by depart- ment profit-and-loss statement such as General Motors gets from Cadillac, Buick, and so on; and he would succumb to total frustration if he set out to take a measure of how the whole vast holding company was really doing. Yet though we may be rightly skeptical of quantitative or even qualitative appraisals on an overall scale (I have earlier CPC D=T g 1 Approved For Release 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 SECRET The Guiding Of Intelligence Collection remarked the importance of appraisal in a more specific con- / text), we have become increasingly conscious over the past five years of the need to draw back from the operating picture and take stock to see if we are not leaving undone really big things that we ought to be doing. For this purpose the ordinary machinery of government has severe limitations. For two years I had the dubious experience of chairing a working group to inform our National Security Council, on a most discreet basis, how intelligence was doing. The report has become better over the years, but the amount of uncandour, ellipsis, and just plain backside protection is still formidable. You simply can't get people to confess their sins in front of others. Within the structure of government the one device we have found useful is the creation of a gadfly post at a high level. Given a self-starting, inquiring, and energetic individual with power to open all doors, this can be quite profitable. For the large tasks of appraisal, however, we have found it most useful, in many cases probably indispensable, to bring in groups of more or less expert outsiders to advise us. They are a nui- sance while in the inquiry stage, but they bring together people from all corners of the community, put their work into greater focus than it had, and on many occasions come up with ex- tremely important recommendations. Lastly, we have embarked during the past year on a signifi- cant experiment in seeking to deal with our most serious col- lection gaps. This is the creation, last March, of a Critical Collection Priorities Committee, chaired by CIA's Deputy Di- rector for Intelligence and with high-level representation from all the main agencies. This committee, chartered to look into any aspect of collection on key priority objectives and to rec- ommend action, has taken as its first task the field of guided missiles. Aided by the fact that the overall requirements in this field had been built up with exceptional care and thorough- ness by our guided missile conamittee, the CCPC has achieved as a first step what may be the first single-document inventory of all assets being employed on the guided missile problem. Its work has great promise?which I can say the more easily as I have no connection with it?and it may well be the fore- runner to future exercises in really comprehensive collection planning, though I doubt if the approach fits any but the most cleanly focused substantive problems. 59 SECRET The Guiding Of Intelligence Collection SECRET A Look Ahead Let me conclude with a word on the future of collection against the Sino-Soviet Bloc. I suspect that in terms of method the future will see an increasing emphasis on the technical collection methods, and that as to targets we should be focusing more and more on Soviet scientific plans and pro- gress. From my viewpoint as an estimator it appears that our information on the Soviet Bloc economic picture, while of course still far below what we would like it to be, has sorted itself out tremendously in the last few years. On the political side we must go on trying, but are not likely to succeed beyond modest limits in getting advance knowledge of inner political developments or changes in foreign policy and plans. And as to military hardware, we are not in too bad shape on the con- ventional weapons and forces. It is in advanced weapons and scientific progress that we find at once our most critical area and the one where our present status is least good. Though our hopes lie in the ex- pansion of technical collection systems, it is also true that in this area we have a much greater number of opportunities for getting at the fringes, and sometimes more, through contacts with Soviet scientists, the expanded Soviet scientific litera- ture, and a host of other sources that can be tapped through the more orthodox overt and clandestine methods. Yet the use of these methods, in turn, will require a degree of educa- tion and training well beyond past needs. .It is one thing to train an agent to count the flatcars going through Brest- Litovsk; quite another to train and give the right questions to an agent in a low-level position in a scientific establishment. From a guidance standpoint, this seems to me to present the greatest challenge to our ingenuity, industry, and machinery. The need is greatest, perhaps the response will be also. SECRET 53 Approved For Release 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 SECRET the U.S. strateg warning watchtower still under con- structicrn. THE MONITORING OF WAR INDICATORS Thomas J. Patton 25X1 To provide warning of any surprise attack against the United States and its allies is our first national intelligence objective, but one, it has been our experience, that cannot be adequately served by the normal processes of estimative or current intelligence. We have therefore found it necessary to develop a somewhat specialized intelligence effort for ad- vanced strategic early warning. This effort, which we have termed "indications intelligence," seeks to discern in advance any Soviet or other Communist intent to initiate hostilities, whether against the United States or its forces, its allies or their forces, or areas peripheral to the Soviet Orbit. It also seeks to detect and warn of other developments directly sus- ceptible of enemy exploiting action which would jeopardize the security of the United States; and this effort has been ex- tended in practice to any critical situation which might give rise to hostilities, whether or not there is an immediate threat of direct US or Soviet involvement. We maintain a sharp distinction between this intelligence early warning?a strategic warning in advance of military operations, based on deductive conclusions about Soviet prepa- rations?and operational early warning, tactical conclusions from information on Soviet operations now obtained largely by mechanical means. I like to think of the indications ac- tivity as having four aspects: First, it is the cultivation of a mental attitude which leads to first assessment of all Soviet or Communist action in terms of preparation for early hostilities. Second, it is the development of a body of doctrine which can serve as guidance for the collection of warning informa- tion, for its physical handling, and for its evaluation. Basi- cally this is the isolation of those actions which would be most likely to constitute preparations for hostilities, whether SECRET 55 MORI/H RP PAGES 55-68 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 SECRET The Monitoring Of War Indicators deliberate or in response to the immediate international situ- ation. It is the creation, through experience, of a body of "common law" applicable to the selection, evaluation and anal- ysis of information pertinent to warning. Third, it is the development of new techniques and methods for the collection, processing, evaluation, and analysis of in- formation significant principally or solely for purposes of stra- tegic early warning. These techniques and methods range from finding new sources to analysis by electronic devices. With the development of missiles and the consequent sharp reduction in the time lag between an enemy decision to attack and the attack, we must give this aspect of the activity in- creased attention. The alternative would be a degree of abdi- cation by intelligence to "operations," with a consequent loss to national flexibility. Fourth, it is the organization of the intelligence community at all levels so that it can process most rapidly and effectively information from every source which could provide insight into Soviet preparation for hostilities. This processing in- volves every step from initial screening, or even collection, to the reporting of conclusions to responsible officials of the ex- ecutive arm of the government. This continuous process is an integral part of, and yet different from, the current intelli- gence and estimative processes. When a threat appears great, as in moments of considerable crisis, the indications process tends to coalesce with both the current intelligence process and the estimative process, at least at the national level. Before treating these aspects in detail I shall outline the organization and procedures for advance strategic warning which have evolved in the United States. Far from perfected and still evolving as they are, they will at least illustrate one national effort to provide intelligence indications of threaten- ing war. The Watchers and Their Work-Week The Director of Central Intelligence and the US Intelligence Board, who have the ultimate national responsibility for this warning, have in effect delegated the function to the USIB Watch Committee. The Watch Committee is composed of sen- ior intelligence officers at the general officer of senior colonel 6)\9 The Monitoring Of War indicators SECRET level representing the major intelligence agencies, and is chaired by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. Al- though it meets only weekly during normal times, or perhaps daily during crises, its function is continuous, exercised through frequent liaison and contact and through a constant routine exchange of information and evaluations, formal or informal Serving the Committee is a permanent staff in the National Indications Center, the physical locus of Committee functions. The NIC staff of 25 is composed of intelligence officers at the colonel or naval captain level representing each of the major intelligence agencies, assisted by administrative, communica- tions, and graphics personnel. The Center itself is linked by electrical communications to the major agencies. It receives from the USES agencies a flow of possible indications informa- tion, both on a routine across-the-board basis and as evaluated and selected for possible pertinence. It has a 24-hour intelli- gence duty officer who is in frequent contact with duty officers in other agencies and with members of the staff. Through these contacts and communication links there is a constant interchange of information and views, but formally the Watch Committee functions on a weekly cycle which can be telescoped during crises to a matter of minutes. The cycle is rather elaborate, and while imperfect it at least ainiS at thoroughness. It runs roughly as follows: Friday to Monday noon: Screening and processing informa- tion, in the NIC and in each member agency. Monday afternoon: The NIC staff reviews available informa- tion, compiles a preliminary agenda for the Wednesday Watch Committee meeting, and teletypes it to member agencies. Tuesday: "Pre-watch" meetings in each member agency, attended also by NIC staff members, at which available information is reviewed and selected for the Watch Com- mittee meeting. Final agenda and graphics are prepared in the NIC. Wednesday morning: Watch Committee meeting. All in- telligence and operational information considered perti- nent and its interpretation is reviewed, orally and graphi- cally, in a two- to three-hour session. The Committee drafts its conclusions at the table. Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 SECRET The Monitoring Of War Indicafors Afternoon: Watch Committee members check its conclu- sions individually with USIB members. The conclusions, when coordinated through the medium of the NIC, are then published as USIB views and transmitted to re- sponsible government officials and other recipients around the world. MC prepares the draft body of the 'Watch Report, a summarization of the evidence considered by the Committee, and sends it by courier or teletype to USIB member agencies. Thursday morning: The draft Watch Report is reviewed, updated, and commented on by USIB members and by responsible analysts at the desk level in all major agencies. Afternoon: The MC staff, on the basis of agency comments, prepares a final draft report and submits it to USIB mem- bers for approval. Friday morning: The printed report is disseminated to all recipients; all concerned breathe deeply and plunge into the cycle again. This fairly exhaustive procedure is complex, sometimes pon- derous and time-consuming. But in addition to the produc- tion of the formal Committee reports, it has served another very important purpose: it has accustomed all those involved to the joint hammering-out of all the issues, including minor or particular ones. This means that when time is pressing and the issues really urgent we can arrive at joint evaluations and conclusions very quickly. Upon occasion a Committee conclusion has been passed to the White House less than an hour after the Committee was summoned to meet. Within most of our agencies, the normal internal intelli- gence processes and organizations are relied on to flush out and evaluate the information which is passed to the MC or utilized by Watch Committee members at their meetings. Several agencies, however, maintain small internal groups whose sole function is to screen out warning information and seek or stimulate evaluations of it. They are parallel pieces, by way of insurance, to the normal internal intelligence or- ganization and process. In Air Force, for example, a 24-hour indications center is maintained to serve USAF Headquarters and to act as central for a net of small indications centers in the major geographical air commands. SECRET The Monitoring Of War Indicators SECRET Each of our major joint military commands outside the con- tinental United States has a replica of the national Watch Committee. These are responsible to the theater joint com- mander, but forward their reports to Washington, where they are regularly considered by the Watch Committee. Thus in our national intelligence warning process the Watch Com- mittee cycle has its concurrent parallels abroad dealing simi- larly with local warning problems. In some instances the timing of the process abroad has been adjusted to that of the Watch Committee. With these mechanics as a background, I return to the four aspects of indications intelligence which I mentioned ear- lier: mental attitude, doctrine, the development of techniques, and organization. My remarks constitute an amalgam of the experience and ideas of a small number of us who have worked in indications intelligence for some years. Some of these ideas have yet to be adopted throughout our community, but our experience leads us to believe that in time they may be more widely accepted. Attitude of the Watcher Ideally, for the purposes of indications intelligence, some or all of the following assumptions must be made as basic work- ing hypotheses, though each can be legitimately challenged in any given situation: The Soviets, together with the other Communist states, are seeking an opportune time to initiate hostilities to achieve their ends; The attack will attempt maximum surprise, possibly during periods of international calm. The decision to initiate hostilities may be made without the military capability which we would consider requisite. Any estimates which argue from other assumptions may be quite wrong. If intelligence officers dealing at any stage with potential warning information can be conditioned to these assumptions, we feel that we have a greater chance of detecting that pattern of developments which may attend preparations for an at- tack. Intelligence officers need not be ruled by these assump- tions, but they should be conscious of them when any possibly relevant information iS considered: for instance, military exer- SECRET 59 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 SECRET The Monitoring Of War Indicators cises should always be considered as deployments and as changes in degree of military readiness or as rehearsals for an impending attack. We must instill and maintain this attitude in all personnel dealing with potential warning information, particularly dur- ing non-critical periods or during the fading days of a crisis. This is a difficult task, especially in a large intelligence organi- zation with a high degree of specialization and compartmen- talization. There are two obvious alternative ways of going about it. One is to wage a relentless educational campaign among the body of our intelligence personnel. This method faces some of the obstacles of a highway safety campaign or a campaign against sin; and it is possible that in laying exten- sive general stress on the warning problem we might overdo it and give rise to unbalanced or unduly alarmist intelligence re- porting and estimates. The other approach, which I favor, is to develop a small group of indications intelligence officers, either working to- gether as a body or spread among various organizations but maintaining close contact. Such officers would consider in- formation from the warning point of view only, would provide continuity in the development of doctrine, would serve as mis- sionaries among both collectors and analysts, and would keep pressing for adequate attention to fragmentary information of potential but not necessarily apparent significance to warn- ing. Such officers need not achieve great depth in any re- gional or functional intelligence field, since they could rely on experts for the necessary support. It has been our experience that intelligence officers given this responsiblity become en- thusiasts, if not zealots, of the indications hunt, and ex- tremely sensitive to those visceral signals which in the last analysis may well be the vital factor in our judgment as to the imminence of a Soviet attack. In the United States several intelligence agencies have made use of this approach to a greater or less degree. Others de- pend largely upon having their representatives in our National Indications Center and upon the fact that our major joint current intelligence committee, the Watch Committee, focuses on indications of hostilities and does not spread its considera- kg? " ?-? r?r. The Monitoring Of War Indicators SECRET tion to all matters of general intelligence significance. Al- though it might appear that this specialization could develop a predisposition to a too-frequent crying of "wolf," we feel that the joint nature of the considerations which precede the for- warding of our warnings tends to preclude the danger. In practice, we have found that the nature of our system hs served to reduce the number of alarmist "flaps" which arise, particularly outside intelligence circles, from undeliberated interpretation of developments. Doctrine of the Watch In the development of a doctrine to guide and assist us to provide warning of an attack, we have sought first to identify in advance those actions which would constitute preparations for hostilities. Such pre-identifications, useful to both ana- lysts and collectors; we have compiled into Indicator Lists. An indicator we define as a major action which the Soviets must take before they are ready for hostilities, whereas an indication is evidence that such an action is being or has been taken. The distinction is an essential one which all of us tend to lose sight of in common usage. In isolating those actions which we designate as indicators or potential indicators, we are seeking answers to several key questions: What are the essential steps the Soviets and their allies must take in their preparation for early major hostilities? Which of these steps represent a degree of national com- mitment which would only, or most likely, follow their decision to initiate hostilities? In the light of the nature of information currently available , to us, or which can be expected, what sort of information will we accept as evidence that these preparatory or im- plementing steps are being. taken? How do we distinguish, during periods of crisis, between those actions which are precautionary and those which are preparations for deliberate hostilities? What actions constitute evidence that the Soviet decision- making process is in action, possibly considering the ques- tion of hostilities? SFC PFT Approved For Release 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 67 ILLEGIB Approved For Release 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100030001-1 SECRET The Monitoring Of War Indicators We have attempted to distinguish a series of preparation phases representing progressive steps toward a decision to attack or progressive commitment of the enemy state to war. We group the indicators in four such stages as follows: Long Range: Actions involved in the intensified achieve- ment of specific military capabilities, offensive or defensive, essential to the prosecution of general hostilities which are either generally anticipated or deliberately planned. Medium Range: Actions or developments which might ac- company or follow a decision to ready the nation or the military forces generally for any eventuality, or which might follow a deliberate decision for war but precede for- mulation, issuance or implementation of specific opera- tional plans and orders. Short Range: Actions which might follow or accompany the alerting and/or positioning of forces for specific attack operations or to meet an estimated possible US attack. Immediate or Very Short Range: Actions which might ac- company or immediately precede a Soviet attack (fre- quently combined in practice with the preceding stage). These stages can, and have been, defined at greater length or quite differently, but the purpose is the same?to arrive at a listing which groups at one end those actions which may represent long-range preparations for hostilities, but not nec- essarily a commitment to them, and at the other end those actions which, by their urgency and costliness, appear to con- note a commitment of the enemy state to war. It also gives us a sensing of the imminence associated with such indications as we may detect, and of the phasing in time among them. In our listings we attempt to give not only the major ac- tions which constitute indicators, but also some of the con- tributory indicators which, if noted in concert, would comprise evidence of a major indication otherwise undetected. Our phased approach also serves to isolate actions by which we hope to gauge the extent and danger of Communist reaction to a particular, perhaps seemingly localized, crisis. Our proposed schedule of lists will include: First, a general indicator list stating in broad terms the major actions we would expect. The Monitoring Of War Indicators SECRET Second, a series of functional lists in much greater detail. There will be separate lists for Long Range Air Force preparations, ground force preparations, political and dip- lomatic activities, clandestine activities, civil defense, mili- tary medicine, weather service, etc. Third, a series of lists which address themselves to special- ized sources, including the technical sources. These lists, in effect, are an application of the preceding lists to in- formation provided by individual sources, particularly to changes in a routine take whose warning significance might not be immediately apparent. One such list ad- dresses itself to monitored changes in the conduct of Soviet broadcasting. Another might concern radar moni- toring. Another would cover observations our embassy personnel in Moscow might make in the normal course of their daily routine: closure of some subway stations, for example, and an absence of fire engines from normal sta- tions might provide confirmation for suspicions that late- stage civil defense preparations were under way. A simi- lar list for legal rail travelers would include actions ob- servable from a train window which might fit into indicator patterns. Fourth, a series of target lists naming those installations or outfits by whom or at which certain activity would be of major significance, and those by whom or at which arty activity would have major significance. Examples of the latter might be an elite Long Range Air Force unit or an air transport unit suspected of a role limited to the ferrying of nuclear "pills" to operational commands. This is an ambitious program, reflecting primarily the pau- city of available information, particularly information on the major instruments of Soviet attack. When completed, it will be a massive document. We also plan, however, a highly con- densed one-sheet version of each list, perhaps in tabular form. Such lists must be looked on only as guides, and quite often they rapidly become obsolete. In some instances we have failed so far to come up with anything really satisfactory? most notably in the missile field. But when we have had suffi- cient experience with our own missiles and with information on Soviet ini